HANDBUCH DER ORIENTALISTIK

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HANDBUCH DER ORIENTALISTIK

ERSTE ABTEILUNG

DER NAHE UND DER MITTLERE OSTEN

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON B. SPULER†

ERGÄNZUNGSBAND IX

A HISTORY OF THE DRUZES



A HISTORY OF THE DRUZES

BY

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To Basma, Ghasan, Tarik, Sausan and Safī

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PREFACE

The last ten years have seen a spate of books and articles on the Druzes which in scope and number far exceed anything published on the subject during the previous half century. Their interest often kindled by the involvement of the Druzes in Lebanon's civil war, authors on the whole have been preoccupied with two main aspects: the early history of the community and its religious faith, and the Druzes' contemporary socio-political situation, especially since the Second World War. But perhaps the outstanding phenomenon has been the number of books written by authors who are themselves Druzes. Although many of them find it hard to entirely escape an apologetic tone, their works often provide us with valuable new historical material, especially concerning the traditional leading families of the Druze community.

While no one book employs an integrative method based on an interdisciplinary approach in an attempt to deal with the entire history of the Druze minority, four books in particular, when taken together, may be said to contribute to such an approach. The first, written by the Lebanese Druze scholar, Najla Abu Izzeddin, is *The Druzes, a New Study of Their History, Faith and Society*; the second is Robert Betts's *The Druze*; the third, written in Arabic by the Lebanese Druze historian, ʿAbbās Abū Ṣaliḥ, is entitled *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn ad-Durūz as-Siyāsī fil-Mashriq al-ʿArabī*; and the fourth (in Hebrew), by the Israeli Druze historian, Shakib Saleh, is called *Toldot ha-Druzīm* (The History of the Druze).

Abu Izzeddin concentrates on the early history of the Druzes, while an important part of her study is devoted to the religious and historical background from which the Druze faith emanated. Relying mainly on secondary sources, Betts in the bulk of his book focuses on the contemporary development of the community in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Abū-Ṣaliḥ, though somewhat apologetic in his narration, covers important political aspects of the Druze history in Syria and Lebanon from the 11th century until the end of the Mandate period. His book may be considered a prototype of the method by which most modern Druze historians approach their own history. This approach itself could well serve as a basis for an analytical study of the role Druze historiography plays in the building of the

community's self-image in modern times. Finally, Saleh, though avoiding the apologetic approach notably when he deals with historical events, mainly surveys the Druzes' political and historical development, with only one of his chapters devoted to the Druze society. A fifth study which deserves mention is David McDowell, *The Druze Revolt 1925-27 and Its Background in the Late Ottoman Period* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1972). Documents on which parts of his research are based proved helpful in the writing of my own study.

Since Abu Izzeddin's book offers a well-written treatment of early Druze history, it was deemed superfluous to go over the same ground in equal detail in the present volume. However, in order to clearly set out for the reader the continuity of the entire history of the Druze people, the Introduction (Part One) relates to this early history, with emphasis given to the religious, political, and social features that fostered the Druze community as a religious minority with its own particular characteristics. The Introduction also briefly explains and analyzes controversial theories concerning religious, racial, and historical issues in order to facilitate an understanding of the current behavioral patterns of the Druzes.

The main product of the historical research that makes up the present volume is divided into three parts (Parts Two, Three and Four). While for the narration use has been made of as many secondary sources as possible—in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew—primary sources throughout have provided the skeleton, so to speak, for the reconstruction and explanation of the historical events.

At the end of the 17th century a shift occurred in both Druze settlement and political power. Part Two examines the period of this shift, i.e., of the decline of the Druzes in Lebanon and the emergence of a new center of settlement in Ḥawrān (in Syria), as well as the socio-political significance of this decline against the background of the history of the community as a whole. Part Three studies the situation of the Druze community during the years 1860-1914, a period in which the new community in Ḥawrān took over the role previously played by the community in Lebanon. It discusses the rise of the Aṭrash family, the particular type of feudality that existed in Ḥawrān, the interrelationship of the Druze community with its environment, and the socio-political development within the community itself. Part Four is concerned with repercussions of the

Mandate system (both British and French) on the socio-political situation of the Druzes in Syria and Palestine. It examines the stand of the Druze community vis-à-vis the new power constellation, at the center of which stood the dispute between Britain and France and the emergence of national movements.

Sufficient sources containing historical material are available in order to cover the years surveyed in these three parts and to bring the narration up to the establishment of the independence in 1946/1948 of Syria, Lebanon and Israel, which are the sites of Druze settlement.

Whereas the historical narration presented in this volume offers an attempt to deal with the history of the Druze community in an integrative manner using an interdisciplinary approach in order to describe, analyze and in particular explain historical events and processes, the lack of accessible archival material and written documents in the independent states makes it difficult to write about the contemporary period in the same historical fashion. Inevitably, the writing on the post-1946/1948 years approaches that rather of political science. This period, in order to maintain historical continuity, is therefore dealt with in a separate concluding part which surveys the Druze communities in Syria, Lebanon and Israel, and provides a historical perspective in evaluating the present situation of the Druzes in each of these Middle Eastern countries.

I am indebted to many friends and colleagues who have helped me throughout the preparation and writing of this book. My foremost debt is to many of the Druze Elders in several Druze localities who enabled me to reach inside the collective psychology of the Druze community. Acknowledgment furthermore is due to the directors and staffs of various institutes, libraries and archives in England, France, and Israel. I am especially grateful to the director, the librarian, and the staff of the Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College, Oxford, where I spent a year of research for this book. I am appreciative also of the assistance I received from the Gustav Heinemann Institute of Middle Eastern Studies and the Faculty of Humanities at my own university, the University of Haifa.

Finally, I was especially fortunate during the final stages of my manuscript to have had the skillful help of my good friend, Dick Bruggeman, not only as editor but also as a generous proofreader, and of Genoveba Breitstein who with delightful speed took care of the word processing of the various versions of my text.

While this study forms a comprehensive attempt to reconstruct, in its continuity, the entire history of the Druzes, it is in the nature of such attempts to confront one with the fact that not all aspects can be given the attention they require and that some even have to be left out. I hope that the present volume will be of use to others dealing with the social and political life of the Druze community.

ʿIsfiya, July 1991 Kais Firro

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY

The Origins of the Druze Faith

The Druze community constitutes a tiny minority in four Middle East countries: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. In addition, small pockets exist on other continents—the Americas, Australia, and West Africa, to which Druzes have immigrated mainly from Syria and Lebanon. The total population of the community numbers fewer than one million in the Middle East, and fewer than one hundred thousand elsewhere. Apart from Israel, population figures regarding the Druzes are inexact. In Lebanon, the last official census was conducted as far back as 1932; in Syria, the last estimate of population distribution by religious community was made in 1956; and in Jordan, official censuses do not refer to the Druze as a separate community. Consequently, the exact size of the Druze community remains in the realm of speculation, estimates being based on analyses of past censuses and on personal information collected by people who visited the Druze areas. These estimates give the Druzes of Lebanon a population of 200,000 to 390,000; those of Syria, 400,000 to 500,000; and those of Jordan, 5,000 to 20,000.[1] Combining the maximum figure in these three countries with the official count of Druzes in Israel and in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights (75,000)[2] yields a total population of just under one million Druzes in the Middle East.

Although Syrian and Lebanese Druzes represent a very small percentage of the total population of these two countries (3 to 4 percent in Syria, 6 to 10 percent Lebanon), their concentration in the mountainous districts have enabled them to constitute compact communities, even an exclusive majority in some areas. Until the 1960s only a few thousand Druzes resided in Beirut and Damascus; since then, however, Druze villagers in Syria and Lebanon have been attracted to the urban life of these two capitals. In Israel the Druzes on the

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[1] On the Druze population, see e.g., Robert Betts Brenton, *The Druze* (New Haven and London, 1988), pp. 55-65.

[2] *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1990*, No. 41, Central Bureau of Statistics.

whole remain attached to their native villages in the Galilee and on the Carmel Mountain range. The Druzes traditionally have settled in mountainous areas since at one time these were the most defensible zones of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine—by seeking refuge in the mountains and maintaining their faith in secrecy soon after the Druze religious doctrine was set apart from the Sunnīs, Shīᶜīs and Ismāᶜīlīs in the 11th century, the Druzes have survived as a religious minority.

Like the religious doctrine of many other Muslim sects which developed in the course of the first four centuries of Islam, the tenets of the Druze faith nursed from the same religious sources. For the development of each sect there was a specific background of social, economic, cultural, and political factors that catalyzed the particular set of beliefs. Generally speaking, Islam, at the beginning of the eleventh century, was divided into three main religious streams: Sunnī, Shīᶜī, and Ismāᶜīlī. Although the issue of the legitimate successor (*khalīfa*) of the Prophet Muḥammad remained the focus of the division, the dispute between them also led to the introduction of different religious tenets for each stream of Islam. As the dominant religious establishment, the reigning Sunnī political power claimed succession (caliphate) to the Umayyī (661-750) and ᶜAbbāsī (750-1258) dynasties which ruled the Muslim Empire.

Shīᶜism took root at the beginning of the Umayyī period as a purely political faction grouped around the claims of ᶜAlī, Muḥammad's son-in-law, and his descendants to the succession of the Prophet. Shīᶜism, as it developed, introduced new ideas derived from the religious legacy of the Middle East region, the most prominent of these being the messianic concept in the form of *al-mahdī* (the rightly or divinely guided one). Imāmī Shīᶜa recognizes a succession of twelve *imāms*, the last of which, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-ᶜAskar, was considered not really to have died, but to have gone into cosmic *ghayba*, or concealment, from which he would, in his own good time, return to destroy tyranny and establish true justice in the world.

The Ismāᶜīlīs agree with the Shīᶜīs on the first five of the *imāms*: ᶜAlī, Ḥusayn, ᶜAlī Zayn al-ᶜĀbidīn, Muḥammad al-Bāqir, and Jaᶜfar aṣ-Ṣādiq. It was the controversy over the legitimate *imām* after Jaᶜfar aṣ-Ṣādiq which set the Ismāᶜīlīs apart from the mainstream Shīᶜa, also called the "Twelver Shīᶜa." Whereas the latter recognizes Mūsā ibn Jaᶜfar aṣ-Ṣadiq as the successor, the Ismāᶜīlīs maintain that instead his elder brother, Ismāᶜīl, was the rightful *imām*.

His son, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, the seventh *imām*, is considered by the Ismāʿīlīs to be the founder of the sect.

The Shīʿī doctrine developed out of the emotional responses of its followers to Umayyī oppression; through successive Shīʿī revolts Ismāʿīlī precepts were fostered within the Shīʿa in the second half of the 9th century. Ismāʿīlism first appeared in southern Iraq, where social unrest led to revolts by the peasants. The earliest form of Ismāʿīlism was associated with the Qaramatian movement, which succeeded in setting up a state in the province of Baḥrain on the gulf coast of Arabia. At the beginning of the 10th century the Ismāʿīlīs established themselves in Yemen and North Africa. In this latter region Ismāʿīlīsm became the religious doctrine of the Fāṭimī state, which in 969 conquered Egypt, where the Fāṭimīs built their capital, Cairo, and the Great Mosque of Al-Azhar as a center of the Ismāʿīlī faith. From Egypt they extended their political and religious sway into Syria and Palestine.

The "Twelver" Shīʿa never moved far away from the established Islam of the Sunnīs. Ismāʿīlism, on the other hand, introduced and developed various religious elements that set it apart from its Shīʿī and Sunnī sources. Thus, Neoplatonic and Indian ideas were added to the religious legacy that Islam had inherited from other beliefs. Although the Qurʾān continued to serve as Scripture, the Qurʾānic verses began to bear these various religious elements. Consequently, the Qurʾān took on two meanings, one exoteric (*ẓāhir*) and the other esoteric (*bāṭin*), the latter known only to those who could perceive the inner meaning of the Qurʾānic verses.[3]

Combining messianic ideas, Neoplatonic elements, and esoteric meanings, Ismāʿīlī doctrine advanced religious principles regarding the creation of the world and the history of mankind that could only be revealed through an acceptance of the inner meaning of the Qurʾānic verses. Following Neoplatonism, the Ismāʿīlīs see the world as emanation: God created Universal Intelligence (*al-ʿaql al-kullī*), which is the Prime Creator (*al-mubdiʿ al-ʾawal*), the Cause of Existence (*ʿillat al mawjūdāt*), and Precedent (*as-sābiq*). From *al-mubdiʿ al-ʾawal* emanated the Soul (*an-nafs*) or the Follower (*at-tālī*).

[3] On the development of the Ismāʿīlī doctrine and its influence on the Druze doctrine, see Nejla Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes, A New Study of Their History, Faith and Society* (Leiden, 1984), pp. 15-100; David Brayer, "The Origin of the Druze Religion," *Der Islam*, part 1:52(1975), part 2:53(1976).

Precedent and Follower are the sources (*al-aṣlān*) from which were derived the Heavenly and the Earthly Emanations. The Heavenly Emanations consist of the Spiritual Intelligences (*al-ʿuqūl ar-rūḥāniyya*) or the Heavenly Ministers (*al-ḥudūd al-ʿulwiyya*). An equal number of *ḥudūd* also are found on the earthly plane of existence: these are the members of the Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa*, i.e., the *dāʿīs* and *imāms* (Arabic *daʿā* – to propagate, proselytize; *daʿwa* – mission).[4] Correspondence between spiritual and physical *ḥudūd* grants Ismāʿīlī *imāms* and *dāʿīs* (faith propagators) the special characteristic of sinlessness (*ʿiṣma*).[5]

The history of all religions, according to Ismāʿīlī doctrine, consists of stages and cycles (*adwār* and *akwār*), each beginning with a prophet (*nāṭiq*), who comes with a religious code of law (*sharīʿa*) carried out by an establisher (*asās*), who imparts the *sharīʿa* with its inner meaning. Consequently, every religious law has the two meanings of *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*. *Ẓāhir* is formal revelation (*tanzīl*), in which religion is understood through ritual acts and a literal adherence to its scriptures; *bāṭin* is esoteric interpretation (*taʾwīl*), which only can reveal the true meaning of religion. *Tāʾwīl* is rooted in the theory of symbol and symbolized (*al-mathal wal-mamthūl*), viz., in the correspondence between *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*. Apparent, literal, external, and physical elements representing the *ẓāhir* have their hidden, inner, eternal, and spiritual counterparts that represent the *bāṭin*.[6]

Explaining and propagating these major principles were the Ismāʿīlī theologians and religious missionaries (*dāʿīs*), who formulated the doctrine in highly sophisticated terminologies, some of which they borrowed from different religious and philosophical sources. Iranian and Indian religious elements as well as ancient Greek and Neoplatonic philosophies were coupled with the concept of monotheism in its last and ultimate manifestation, i.e., Islam.[7] Through a vast army of *dāʿīs*, Ismāʿīlism soon reached many parts of the Muslim world. Many writers and intellectuals were attracted to Ismāʿīlī ideas. The greatest poets of Arabic literature, al-Mutanabbī (d. 965) and Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (d. 1057), and such

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[4] *Ibid.*, part 1, pp. 58-64. The Ismāʿīlīs later altered this system with ten Intelligences; see Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat al-ʿAql*, ed. M. Ghalib (Beirut, 1983), pp. 158-170; M. Ghalib, *Ad-Daʿwa al-Ismāʿīliyya* (Beirut, 1965), pp. 58-61.

[5] See "Introduction" by Ghalib to *Rāḥat al-ʿAql*, p. 35.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[7] See Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 87-100.

intellectuals as the group of *ikhwān aṣ-ṣafā* (the Sincere Brethren), who in the 10th century published a series of fifty-two epistles covering all branches of knowledge, all exhibited a strong Ismāʿīlī bias. Ismāʿīlī ideas also reached the common people, the peasants, and town populations.[8]

In Tunisia the Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa* achieved perhaps its most brilliant success when in 909 as a result of the enthronement of Abū ʿAbdalla al-Mahdī as *imām* and *khalīfa*, it became the religion of the Fāṭimīs. The fourth *imām* and *khalīfa*, Muʿizz, conquered Egypt in 969 and built his new capital there—Cairo. Under the Fāṭimī caliphs in Egypt, who had to justify their continuation of the *imām* title after the concealment (*ghayba*) of the seventh *imām*, Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, by proving their genealogical relationship with the Prophet, Ismāʿīlī doctrinal propaganda was organized by the state through a hierarchy of missionaries (*duʿāt*) at the head of which stood the chief missionary (*dāʿī ad-duʿāt*). Responsible for propagating the *daʿwa*, the chief *dāʿī* employed Ismāʿīlī doctrine and terminology to grant the Fāṭimī caliphs full legitimacy as rulers and *imāms*. He did so in two series of lectures that he gave to an audience of *ʿulamāʾ* and scholars, in the first of which he dealt with the authority of the *imām*, in the second with the genealogy of the family of the Prophet (*ʿulūm al-bayt*).[9]

Although the Fāṭimī caliphs attempted to consolidate Ismāʿīlism under one established doctrine and state, several variants remained in existence both within and beyond the borders of the Fāṭimī state until its final decline in 1171. Some Ismāʿīlīs, called *waqfiyya* (limitation), rejecting the continuation of *imāms* after Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, maintained that the number of *imāms* was limited to only seven. Others revived the earliest Ismāʿīlī beliefs, which included worshiping some of the first *imāms* as God after some members of the Fāṭimī *daʿwa* considered the *imām-khalīfa* al-Muʿizz to be of a divine nature. Some Fāṭimī state theologians, although viewing the *imām-khalīfa* as an ordinary human being, endowed him with heavenly powers, and introduced the notion that the *imām-khalīfa* of their time, as *mahdī* or *qāʾim*, was a messianic candidate.[10]

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[8] B. Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (revised ed., New York, 1967), pp. 109-113.

[9] See Brayer, part 1, p. 62.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65; Abu Izzedin, *The Druzes*, pp. 68-69; the first Fāṭimī *khalīfa* was called *al-mahdī*, the second *al-qāʾim*.

The Druze Daʿwa

Ever since the establishment of the Fāṭimī state, the Ismāʿīlī *dāʿīs* kept the followers of the doctrine in expectation of the coming of the *mahdī*, who, personified by the *imām-khalīfa*, would destroy tyranny and establish true justice. Ninety years passed, five *imām-khalīfas* came and went, but the messianic realm remained unfulfilled. By the time of the ascent of al-Ḥākim bi Amr Alla (996-1021), it seemed to many Ismāʿīlī followers that they had been waiting long enough for *al-mahdī* (*al-qāʾim*). With their patience running out, mounting desperation began to threaten the Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa*. It was against this background and under these circumstances that among the Ismāʿīlīs a movement first began to appear which would become the Druze religious movement.[11]

During the second decade of the 11th century, in the belief of certain personages in charge of the Fāṭimī Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa* Ḥākim bi Amr Alla became the expected and longed for *mahdī*, and ten years later these "extremists" proclaimed Ḥākim as the manifestation of the Divinity.[12] The exact length of the interval between their announcement of Ḥākim as *mahdī* and the proclamation of his divinity is unknown. It seems, however, that a theological polemic had broken out among the Fāṭimī *dāʿīs* some time before 1017, the year which saw the public declaration of the unitarian doctrine of the Druzes. For example, in 1016 the great Fāṭimī *dāʿī*, Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 1021), had come to Egypt from Iraq and attempted to refute the "extreme" views of some of the *dāʿīs*, notable among them Ḥasan al-Farghānī al-Akhram, who claimed that Ḥākim was divine.[13] While in Druze sources there is no reference to this religious polemic, they do affirm that before 1017 the training of missionaries (*nudhr*, s. *nadhīr*) had well prepared the ground for the establishment of a unitarian religion (*din at-tawḥīd*),[14] and that prior to the disclosure (*fatḥ*) of the unitarian *daʿwa* (*daʿwat at-tawḥīd*) the Fāṭimī teaching had already gained widespread popular support for Ḥākim in many parts of the state.[15]

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
[11] Sadik Assaad, *The Reign of al-Hakim Bi Amr Allah, 996-1021, A Political Study* (Beirut, 1974), pp. 38-39.

[12] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 101; Assaad, p. 39; Brayer, p. 66.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] See Samī Makarem, *Maslak at-Tawḥīd* (Beirut, 1980), pp. 49-50.

[15] Assaad, p. 91.



Map 1. The Middle East at the time of the *daʿwa*.

The unitarian doctrine, which later became known as *ad-durziyya* (Druzism), was made public in the beginning of 1017. Its conceivers were theologians who had studied in the Fāṭimī-Ismāʿīlī schools of *dār al-ḥikma* and *dār al-ʿilm* (the House of Wisdom and the House of Science), which during Ḥākim's reign had become special institutions where religion, medicine, logic, mathematics, philosophy, history, and languages were taught and discussed. The variety of subjects and religious doctrines they encountered imparted to the scholars and theologians of *dār al-ḥikma* a broad outlook. Discussion of unconformist religious views was also permitted.[16]

However, although the Druze philosophy, mythology, and terminology can thus be traced back to their Ismāʿīlī origins, the new teaching was to place the Druze order outside the orthodox Ismāʿīlī creed.[17] The most radical change introduced by the Druze faith was the abolition of the hereditary system of *imāma*, which formed the core of Ismāʿīlī messianic beliefs. The declaration of Ḥākim as a manifestation of the Divinity had reshaped the Ismāʿīlī messianic idea, as a result of which the entire religious terminology took on new meaning. The Ismāʿīlī messianic *mahdī*, who would return in the person of the *imām-khalīfa*, was now replaced by the final triumph of unitarianism, in which a last cycle of divine manifestations would occur before a Last Judgment.[18]

At the center of the Druze faith stands the tenet of the strict, uncompromising unity of God: He is unique, eternal, without a beginning, and abiding without end; He is beyond the comprehension of human understanding; thus, He cannot be defined by words or attributes distinct from His essence; He has no body and spirit.[19] Because of these concepts, the Druzes consider themselves the true unitarians: *muwaḥḥidūn*.

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[16] On *dār al-ḥikma* and *dār al-ʿulum*, see Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 83-85; Assaad, p. 88.

[17] On the development of the Druze doctrine, see Silvestre de Sacy, *Exposé de la Religion des Druzes* (Paris, 1838; republ. Amsterdam, 1964); G.S. Hodgson, "Al-Darazi and Ḥamza in the Origin of the Druze Religion," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82 (1st quarter, 1962), pp. 5-20; G.S. Hodgson, "Durūz," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 631-37; Brayer, part 1, pp. 47-84, 239-262; part 2, pp. 5-26; Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 59-86; Assaad, pp. 156-181.

[18] See Brayer, part 1, p. 262.

[19] Epistle 13; See also Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 111-112; Makarem, *Maslak*, pp. 90-95.

Since human beings are subordinated to their material nature and since their intellect cannot be freed from space and time, they cannot conceive of the essence of the Deity (*lāhūt*). God can be understood within the limits of their own comprehension, like an image in a mirror, as when the Deity appears in human form (*nāsūt*)—the *nāsūt* is not an incarnation of God but an image by which the Divinity brings Himself nearer to human understanding.[20] The form of *nāsūt* of the Deity assumes a number of manifestations each of which contains a unitarian message. Ḥākim represented the locus (*maqām*) of the Deity's manifestation which completed the cycles of the unitarian message.[21] All through the Epistles (*rasāʾl al-ḥikma*) which comprise the Druze Canon, there is a strong emphasis on the unitarian concept and the caution that the *nāsūt* image should not be conceived of as the Deity itself.

The Druze concept of creation followed Neoplatonic philosophy in its Ismāʿīlī interpretation and terminology. God, the Eternal and Self-Subsisting (*al-munfarid bi-dhātihī*), created (*abdaʿa*) from His Light (*nūrihi ash-shaʿshaʿānī*) Universal Intelligence (*al-ʿaql al-kullī*). The *ʿaql*, glorying in its supreme position, became proud, which led to the appearance of the *ḍidd* (the Adversary or Opposing Principle). From the Light of the *ʿaql* God created the Universal Soul (*an-nafs al-kulliyya*) as its partner in the fight against the darkness and evil of the *ḍidd*. From the light of the Soul emanated the Word (*al-kalima*); from the Word, the Precedent (*as-sābiq*); and from it, the Follower (*at-tālī*). God then issued the spheres, the earth, and the elements. These five cosmic principles—Intelligence, Soul, Word, Precedent, Follower—form the *ḥudūd* (Spiritual Dignitaries) with their counterparts on earth. Between their appearance and the creation of man, there was a span of three hundred and forty-three million years, consisting of cycles lasting thousands of years until the beginning of the first manifestation of the Deity in the human era. All human souls were created at once, their number fixed for all time. A soul cannot be detached from the human body, which serves as the vestment (*qamīṣ*) of the soul. Upon the death of the body, the soul immediately settles in a new human body. This transmigration enables the soul to pass through every possible human experience and condition: health and illness, wealth and poverty, etc. Transmigration, there-

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[20] Epistles 44, 36, 58, 67; see also Makarem, *Maslak*, pp. 125-138.
[21] Epistle 12.

fore, grants human beings equal opportunities, through which Gods justice (*ʿadl*) is vindicated. A human being's only choice is between right and wrong.[22] The process of transmigration goes on until the Last Judgment, whereupon every soul will be evaluated for its deeds and for its adherence to the unitarian concept (*at-tawḥīd*). Believing in true unitarianism, the soul frees itself from deficiencies and at last attains completion (*al-kamāl al-akhīr*).[23]

The history of mankind reflects this journey of the souls through transmigration and their process toward unitarian knowledge, which has existed since the creation of man. In the course of this progress several religious revelations have taken place. Each such revelation is informed by three categories of beliefs: *tanzīl, taʾwīl*, and *tawḥīd*. The followers of *tanzīl* accept the outward (*ẓāhir*) meaning of religion; *taʾwīl* adherents follow the *bāṭin* in order to arrive at the inner meaning. Both, however, fail to achieve the ultimate goal of religious revelation. It is by applying both their hearts and their minds that the unitarians attain the true meaning of religion (*tawḥīd*). Followers of *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin* cannot reach true *tawḥīd*, and therefore use ritual and symbolism in their worship. The unitarians have no need for such intermediary means of worship. They are exempted from the performance of ritual obligations (*daʿāʾim taklifiyya*). Thus, the *tawḥīd* replaces the *tanzīl* and *taʾwīl*. In this, it differs from the *sharīʿas* of the Sunnīs, the Shīʿīs, and the Ismāʿīlīs.[24]

The division among the three doctrines was grounded in the Qurʾān, which the unitarian *dāʿīs* who wrote the Druze Epistles interpreted allegorically—the Qurʾānic verses were invariably quoted to explain the principle of the unitarian doctrine, which the Epistles refer to as the third or middle doctrine (*maslak*). The three doctrines are perceived as three stages of the religious faith: "Islam (*ẓāhir*) is the door to *imān* (*bāṭin*), and *imān* is the door to the ultimate goal (*tawḥīd*), the highest stage of the religion."[25]

With its allegorical interpretation of the Qurʾānic verses, the Druze faith considered the seven pillars of Islam as rituals meant only for those who accept literally the outward meanings of the

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[22] Brayer, part 1, p. 241; Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 113-117; Makarem, *Maslak*, 109-115.

[23] Epistle 58.

[24] This division, of *tawḥīd* on the one hand and *tanzīl* and *taʾwīl* on the other, is found in several Epistles of the Druze scriptures.

[25] Epistle 9.

Qur'ānic verses, and as such they abandoned them: each pillar instead was interpreted allegorically as a spiritual experience of the unitarian believer and no longer as an outward practice of rites.[26] Instead of the seven ritual pillars (*daʿā'im taklifiyya*), the Druze faith imposed seven unitarian principles: (1) truthfulness, (2) mutual aid, (3) and (4) renunciation of belief inconsistent with *tawḥīd*, (5) belief that the doctrine of unity was preached in every age, (6) resignation with satisfaction to whatever God does, (7) submission to His will.[27]

After the disclosure of the *daʿwa* in 1017, the basic tenets of the Druze faith were propagated between 1017 and 1043. Although the one hundred and eleven Epistles (*rasā'il*), which form the Druze Canon, contain some information on the story of the Druze *daʿwa*, many historical events remain obscure.

Early non-Druze sources that refer to the *daʿwa* were predominantly hostile. The first such source was Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī, one of the great Ismāʿīlī theologians, who as we have seen criticized Ḥasan al-Farghānī al-Akhram for claiming that the Deity had manifested itself in Ḥākim.[28] Another source is Yaḥyā Ibn Saʿīd al-Antākī (d. 1065), a Christian chronicler, who kept a year-by-year record of events that occurred in the Fāṭimī and Byzantine Empires from 937 to 1030.[29] Although he lived in Antioch, near where some of the Druze *daʿwa* events had transpired, al-Antākī's narration very likely was influenced by his hostile attitude toward Ḥākim.[30] According to al-Antākī, one of the most important founders of the Druze *daʿwa* was a Persian, Muḥammad Ibn Ismāʿīl ad-Darazī, whose name was related to the term *durūz*, which is the plural of *durzī* and an Arabic corruption of the Persian name, *Darzī* (or *Darazī*).[31] Both al-Farghānī and ad-Darazī were considered by the chroniclers writing in the two and a half centuries after the Druze *daʿwa* to have been two of the principle founders of the Druze sect. These later

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[26] Epistle 6. There are five pillars of faith for the Sunnīs; to these, the Shīʿa and Khawārij sects add two more.

[27] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 117.

[28] Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī, *ar-Risāla al-Wāʿiza*, ed. Muḥammad Kāmil Ḥusayn, *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, University of Cairo, May 1952, pp. 1-29.

[29] Yaḥyā Ibn Saʿīd al-Antākī, *Tā'rīkh Yaḥyā Ibn Saʿīd al-Antākī*, ed. L. Cheikho, B. Carra de Vaux, and H. Zayyat (Beirut-Paris, 1909).

[30] See Assaad, pp. 15-16.

[31] See Hodgson, "Al-Darazī and Ḥamza," p. 6.

chroniclers focus their narrations primarily on the historical events in Cairo during the Ḥākim period. The activities of the *dāʿīs* outside Cairo are only indirectly mentioned in these accounts, which also often mixed up the names and origins of the *dāʿīs*. E.g., Ḥamza Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Aḥmad az-Zawzanī, who in Druze Epistles is given the title of Guide of the Faithful (*hādī al-mustajībīn*), was confused by some with al-Akhram, and ad-Darazī was given two names and origins: Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl, the Persian, and Anūshtigīn (or Nashtakīn), the Turk. Some of the chroniclers stated that ad-Darazī was killed in Cairo by Ḥamza's followers in the early stage of the *daʿwa*; others tell that he was sent to Syria to propagate the new doctrine in Wādī at-Taym, west of Damascus.[32]

Although referring to the propagation of the *daʿwa* outside Cairo, notably in Syria and Palestine, Druze historical accounts were written primarily to explain theological and religious issues rather than to record history. Druze accounts that have survived were written at a much later date, i.e., in the 16th and 17th centuries;[33] thus, their importance lies not in the historical information they provide, but in their portrayal of the propagators of the *daʿwa*, and in particular of Ḥākim, as perceived in Druze doctrine. In this sense, too, historical persons described by the non-Druze chroniclers were depicted by Druze writers as mystical figures whose true characteristics had remained hidden from the eyes of ordinary historians.

Both kinds of sources have had much influence on subsequent modern writings on the Druze faith. Some of the non-Druze historians refer to the Druze faith primarily through the personality of the *khalīfa* Ḥākim as described by the early non-Druze chroniclers.[34] Others have used the chroniclers' accounts in order to pursue the sectarian dispute in the Middle East against the Druze community.[35] As for Druze historians, their attachment to the Druze faith

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32 On those chroniclers and their narrations, their confusing names, and their repetitions, see Brayer, part 1, pp. 68-69.

33 ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ashrafānī (17th century), *ʿUmdat al ʿĀrifīn*, 3 parts (unpublished ms.); Taqiy ad-Dīn Zayn ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ghaffār (16th century), *Majrā az-Zamān* (unpublished ms.).

34 See, for example, ʿA. Badawī, *Madhāhib al-Islamiyīn*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 557-619; M.A. ʿInān, *Al-Hākim bi Amr Alla*, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1959), pp. 294-323.

35 The most prominent example of such a dispute are given in M.A. Al-Khatīb, *ʿAqīdat ad-Durūz, ʿArḍ wa Naqḍ* (Amman, 1980); and Anwar Yāsīn (pseudonym), *Bayn al-ʿAql wa an-Nabī* (Paris, 1981).

and tradition has often resulted in an opposite bias, i.e., a selective use of the non-Druze sources, choosing accounts that fit the Druze doctrine.[36] Some of them even avoided reference to the historical background of the Fāṭimī caliphs altogether.[37]

In fact, however, neither the historical personalities of Ḥākim and the unitarian *dāʿīs* nor the history of the Fāṭimī caliphate as such have any importance for the Druzes. Since the time of the Druze *daʿwa* in the 11th century, the Druzes have reconstructed the history of mankind in accordance with their beliefs: Ḥākim as well as the unitarian *dāʿīs* are no longer historical figures—they are what the Druze Epistles teach. Thus, history has become ahistoric, and the ahistoric history.

Modern historians view the Druze *daʿwa* as a religious revolution within the Ismāʿīlī teaching which involved the question of the *imām-khalīfa* as candidate for *mahdī*. Basing themselves on the chroniclers, some of them claim that Ḥākim himself contrived the *daʿwa*.[38] Others, comparing the several versions given in the different chronicles, conclude that Ḥākim had no wish to be considered divine and did not support or encourage the unitarian *dāʿīs*. Before Ḥākim's mysterious disappearance in 1021, Ḥamza secretly organized the *daʿwa*, especially in Syria, where he appointed *dāʿīs* who propagate the Druze doctrine.[39] In their conjectures concerning Ḥākim's disappearance, both chroniclers and historians center on two possibilities: personal vengeance or assassination for political aims. The eclipse of the sun coinciding with his disappearance was interpreted as *ghayba* (concealing) and as proof of Ḥākim's great effectiveness in stirring up the emotions of the masses.[40]

Based on the Epistles, modern Druze historians on the whole accept that the new *daʿwa* was made public in 1017, after Ḥākim had issued a proclamation (*sijill*) inviting the people to choose freely their belief.[41] As with the story of Ḥākim's reign, Druze historians tend

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[36] See, for example, A. Najjar, *Madhhab ad-Durūz wat-Tawḥīd* (Cairo, 1965), pp. 103-110; Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 74-86.

[37] ʿA. Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidin ad-Durūz as-Siyāsī fil-Mashriq al-ʿArabī* (Beirut, n.d.), p. 59.

[38] See a summary of the chroniclers' writings and their conclusion that Ḥākim was behind the *daʿwa* in Brayer, part 1, pp. 75-83.

[39] See Assaad, pp. 168-181.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

[41] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 101, Abū Ṣaliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, p. 60; Makarem, *Maslak*, p. 52.

to select those versions of his disappearance that fit in with the Druze faith, as found in the first Epistle of the Druze Canon.[42] The Epistle states that Ḥākim will never be found, and warns people against looking for him, promising them that he will willingly reappear as soon as they abandon their evils.[43]

After Ḥākim had vanished, followers of the doctrine who had never seen him, especially in Syria, experienced a new wave of religious fervor that significantly deepened their attachment to the unitarian *daʿwa*. Most immediately, they had to endure the fierce hostility of the successor *khalīfa*, Abū Ḥasan ʿAlī aẓ-Ẓāhir (1021-1036), who issued a decree calling for the extermination of all unitarian followers from Antioch to Alexandria. The *daʿwa* was suspended until 1027.[44] Before disbanding the proselytizing mission in 1021, Ḥamza wrote *Risālat al-ghayba* in order to fortify the unitarians against persecution (*miḥna*, pl. *miḥan*) at the hands of aẓ-Ẓāhir.[45] The propagation mission was resumed in 1027, but a new wave of persecution followed in 1032 in the regions of Aleppo and Antioch. Nevertheless, proselytizing continued until 1042 under the leadership of Bahāʾ ad-Dīn as-Sāmmūqī, one of the five principle *dāʿīs*. This time, the mission faced a further difficulty—a split among the first followers of the doctrine. The situation was exacerbated by the attacks of outside forces against the newly founded community.[46]

The history of the proselytizing process was written down in the 16th and 17th centuries by the Druze authors Taqiy ad-Dīn and al-Ashrafānī, on whom modern historians rely. These Druze sources reflect the impact which the vicious persecutions of the years 1021-1042 had on the community in the course of its history. In consequence of the severe tribulations, the followers of the Druze doctrine who had settled in Aleppo, Antioch, Damascus, and Ramla either abandoned their belief or sought protection in the mountains: the mountains of Greater Syria granted the new sect one of the more important instruments by which it was to survive and avoid further persecution (*miḥna*).

It was around the *miḥna* that Druze popular tradition rebuilt its

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[42] See Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 85-86.
[43] Epistle 1.
[44] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 106.
[45] Epistle 35.
[46] Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, pp. 83-94; Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 106-107; Makarem, *Maslak*, pp. 64-80.

mythological history. *Miḥna* signifies for the Druze not only brutal persecutions but also an inner experience: the Druzes believe that by the *miḥna* their faith is being put to the test. It will be experienced, too, shortly before the Last Judgment, when the transmigration of souls comes to its conclusion. Then, reinforced by proof of their courage and belief, the Druzes will put an end to the *miḥna*. Anticipation of the Last Judgment and the final *miḥna* puts the Druzes in a state of perpetual tension: every sign of real danger could be the beginning of the final *miḥna*. This tenseness was observed by some of the European travelers who lived among the Druzes.[47] Since 1042, the concepts of the Last Judgment and the *miḥna* have captivated the Druzes. The *miḥna* constitutes the most important instrument for the Druze community to achieve full solidarity. It overcomes any internal division within the Druze society. It is through *miḥna* that the seven principles or commandments of the Doctrine come to fulfillment, in particular *ḥifẓ al-ikhwān* commanding all Druzes to guard the safety of their fellow believers.[48]

Racial Origins

The proselytizing of the Druze doctrine, accompanied as it was by persecutions (*miḥan*), proved the catalyst for the establishment of the Druze community as a religious minority in the Middle East. At the same time, neither the non-Druze chroniclers nor the Druze narrators of the *daʿwa* story refer to the racial origin of the people who embraced the doctrine. Several theories regarding these origins, some curious and amusing, other naive and strange, have been proposed over the years by travelers and modern scholars. These theories have encompassed the Arameans, Arabians, Samaritans, Cuthites, Hivites, Armenians, Persians, and Turks, more strangely the French and British, and even the Tibetans.[49]

Two main approaches have been adopted to try and trace the

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[47] See Laurence Oliphant, *Haifa, or Life in Modern Palestine* (London, 1887); a new edition was published under the title *Haifa or Life in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 110-111.

[48] On the *miḥna* and its influence on Druze behavior, see K. Firro, "Political Behavior of the Druze as a Minority in the Middle East, a Historical Perspective," *Orient* 27 (1986), pp. 463-479.

[49] For summaries of these theories, see Robert Betts, *The Druze*, pp. 24-26; Philip Hitti, *The Origin of the Druze People and Religion* (New York, 1928), pp. 13-17.

Druzes back to their racial origins. The first approach attempts to derive conclusions from the religious tenets and the ethnic origins of the the Druze *dāʿīs* and leaders; the second follows ancient peoples and tribes through their migrations and settlements in the Druze areas before the 11th century. A third approach, which uses anthropometric studies, may be mentioned in passing.

The main proponent of the first approach has been Philip Hitti, whose theory[50] has been used as the principal source concerning the racial origins of the Druzes. Hitti's theory and similar ones were later criticized by Martin Sprengling.[51] According to Hitti, the Druzes were a mixture of Persians, Iraqis, and Persianized Arabs receptive to the new dogmas and tenets of belief.[52] This predominant Persian origin is explained by three arguments: (a) the founders of the Druze faith were Persian; (b) part of the religious vocabulary was Persian in origin; and (c) the natives of Wādī at-Taym, where the Druze faith was propagated, were homogeneous communities subjected to ʿIraqizing or Persianizing influence before 1017.

Sprengling, after analyzing each argument of this theory, presented important factors that had been omitted by Hitti but that clearly repudiated the "Persian Connection." According to Sprengling, neither the Fāṭimī dynasty nor the four *dāʿīs*, Ismāʿīl at-Tamīmī (from the Arab tribe, Tamīm), Abū ʿBadalla al-Qarashī (from the tribe of Quraish), Salāma as-Samūrī, and Bahāʾ ad-Dīn as-Sāmmūqī aṭ-Ṭāʾī (from the tribe of Ṭay) were Persians. Even Ḥamza, whom Hitti considered the brain of the community and "of undoubted Persian origin," had a good Arabic name, as did his father and grandfather. Sprengling proved that words and religious terms that Hitti postulated as Persian were in fact introduced to the Arabic language long before the year 1000; the Druze terminology derived not only from the Persian language but also from Old Syriac and Aramaic. As for the people who accepted the Druze faith, Sprengling criticized Hitti's speculative assumption that turns the Taymalla (a tribe that settled in Wādī at-Taym) into a Persian tribe and omits the Tanūkh (Arab tribes), from whom the great Druze families near Beirut claim descent. Sprengling concludes that the

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50 *Ibid.*

51 Martin Sprengling, "The Berlin Druze Lexicon," *American Journal of Semitic Languages* 56(1939), pp. 388-414.

52 Hitti, p. 23.

Druzes were a mixture of stocks in which the Arab (more particularly, the South Arab) component largely predominated, onto which was grafted an original mountain population of Aramaic blood.[53]

The second approach, which follows tribes in their migration and settlement process, is adopted in particular by Druze historians and scholars who wish to emphasize the pure Arab race of those who accepted the doctrine in the 11th century. Their argument points to the "purest Arab dialect" of the Druzes and that they are of "purest Arab blood," unmixed through intermarriage with Turkish or other strains. According to this school of thought, most Druzes are descendants of twelve Arab tribes that immigrated to Syria before the Islamic period. In addition to recorded history, which follows these tribes in their settlement in Syria, use is made of genealogical trees reconstructed by Druze families, who employed for this purpose the Druze chronicles referring to this subject.[54]

Even physical anthropologists have applied their tools to unravel the enigma of the Druzes' racial origins. In the early 20th century, when racial origin became an important factor in the pursuits of certain European nations, Felix von Lushan, e.g., having measured the skulls of fifty-nine adult male Druzes, found that not one of them fell within the range of the true Arab according to his cephalic index. Another anthropologist, C.K. Arriëns Kappers, came to the opposite conclusion that the Druzes and their neighbors, the Muslims, are descended from the same race. Using the anthropological method combined with the historical approach, Abu Izzedin concluded that Druzes and their neighbors shared the same racial origin.[55]

Methods based on racial origin, however, can only present national identity in a static case, not in dynamic historical and cultural movement. The relevant importance of such methods inheres, not in their reliability or their unreliability, but rather in the fact that

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[53] Sprengling, "The Berlin Druze Lexicon," pp. 391-398.

[54] See Sulaymān Abū ʿIzzeddīn, "Aṣl-ad-Durūz," *al-Muqtaṭaf* (June 1930), pp. 79-80; Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 11-14; Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al Muwaḥḥidīn*, pp. 15-26; Amīn Taliʿ, *Aṣl al-Muwaḥḥidīn ad-Durūz* (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 22-23; Shakīb Arslān, "An-Naqd at-Tāʾrīkhī wa ʿUrubat ad-Durūz," *Al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī bi-Dimashq* (Damascus, 1931), p. 455; Arslān, *Rawḍ ash-Shaqīq* (Damascus, 1925), pp. 146-269.

[55] On the anthropological approach, see Hitti, p. 14; Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 1-14.

they reflect the self-image that Druze scholars and historians have constructed for their community: the search for racial origin offered the Druzes a means to define their national identity. The most important evidence in this regard is that all Druze historians, scholars, and leaders in Syria and Lebanon consider the Druzes to be Arabs, and that their arguments were accepted not only among themselves, but also among the entire Druze community in these countries.

Although many Druzes in Israel still accept the guidance of their brethren in Syria and Lebanon on the matter of self-image, Israeli Druze politicians and some Druze intellectuals have begun to reject racial origin as a component in their national identity. This rejection fits in well with Israeli government policy, which aims at separating the Druzes from the rest of the Arab communities in Israel. As basis for their separatism vis-à-vis the other Arabs the Israeli Druzes stress the belief that unitarians have existed since the creation of man, their souls transmigrating from place to place and settling in bodies of different races. Unitarians who are known as Druzes do not represent the entire unitarian community in their different locations and times (*adwār*). In this approach, the Druze national identity is not defined by any concrete history, culture, or race, which become elements that do no more than envelop the essential: the soul. Referring to the "claim" in Syria and Lebanon for the Arab descent of the Druzes, Druzes in Israel have eagerly accepted Hitti's argument, according to which the "claim" results from the "application of the principle of dissimulation" (*taqiyya*), since in Syria and Lebanon the Druzes comprise a small minority amidst an Arab majority that has always been in the ascendancy.[56]

Taqiyya

The term *taqiyya* is usually translated into English as dissimulation. In Arabic, it actually means prudence and carefulness. The practice of *taqiyya* is Shīʿī in origin. It permits the adoption of outward forms of Islamic ritual in order to protect the inward faith. The Druzes practice *taqiyya* in nearly the same sense of the Ismāʿīlī and ʿAlawī

[56] These separatist arguments may be seen in pamphlets issued by Druze Zionist groups. For an example, see Jaber Abū Rukun, *Aj-Jwāb ash-Shāfī Lissuʾāl al-Kāfī* (Daliat al-Karmel, 1990), pp. 3-10. On Hitti's theory on *taqiyya* and the claim of Arab descent, see Hitti, p. 14.

principle. It is likely that this practice existed before the disclosure of the Druze *daʿwa*. It is certain that the principle of *taqiyya* was related to the secrecy of the faith. In 1043 the "gates" of the *daʿwa* were closed and the faith thereafter kept secret. Secrecy and *taqiyya* reinforced each other in preventing hostility from outsiders. Through *taqiyya* and settling in the mountains the Druzes protected themselves, whether from governmental authorities or from other religious groups. Thus, secrecy and *taqiyya* were acts of prudence in a hostile environment.[57]

Some modern Druze scholars reject this reasoning for the origin of secrecy and *taqiyya*. According to Kamāl Junblāṭ, the Druzes' secrecy is an inherent characteristic of the gnostic tradition, because it is given only to the few initiates to read and understand gnostic doctrines, to which the Druze faith belongs. Revealing the mysteries of gnostic truth inevitably exposes the faith to perversion.[58] According to Sāmī Makarem, prudence had been, at all times, the attitude of gnostic doctrines and, thus, *taqiyya* and secrecy were not seen as a consequence of persecution or hostility.[59] Nejla Abu Izzeddin combined these two reasons for the practice of *taqiyya*:

> The Druze do not reveal their faith to outsiders. The secrecy is partly *taqiyya*, the concealment of one's religious affiliation when the person or community is in danger.... A more important reason for the secrecy is the concern with keeping the faith from the reach of those who, being unprepared to accept its message, could misinterpret and corrupt its truth.[60]

The term *taqiyya* does not appear anywhere in the Druze Epistles. Non-Druze scholars trace the *taqiyya* practice back to the commandment issued by Ḥamza that followers should conceal *ḥikma* from those not worthy of it. This command they interpret as *taqiyya*,[61] an interpretation that attempts to derive from the religious teaching of Ḥamza a tenable conclusion regarding the practice of *taqiyya*, which thus, according to these scholars, means dissimulation. Such an interpretation, however, fails to take note of the fact that during the

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[57] See Najjār, *Madhhab*, pp. 18-21.

[58] K. Junblāṭ, "Introduction," in S. Makarem, *Aḍwāʾ ʿAlā Maslak at-Tawḥīd* (Beirut, 1966), pp. 7-16.

[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

[60] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 119.

[61] See A. Layish, "Taqiyya among the Druzes," *Asian and African Studies* 19/3(1985), p. 246.

daʿwa period the *dāʿīs* Ḥamza and Bahāʾ ad-Dīn had no need for *taqiyya* in this sense when they urged and encouraged public avowal of the faith. It would seem that Ḥamza's command to conceal *ḥikma* from the unworthy was motivated by other reasons. One motivation may have had to do with the method of proselytizing, which was based on initiation only among those who could fully understand the *daʿwa*'s message. This command, however, later became the basis for the division of the Druzes into two categories: the initiated, *ʿuqqāl* (the wise ones), and the uninitiated, *juhhāl* (the ignorant), who are unprepared to have full access to *ḥikma*.

Pointing to the *taqiyya* principle, many non-Druze scholars attempt to develop theories about the behavioral patterns of the Druzes, an approach accentuated by those Israeli scholars who consider that Druze politics is based on *taqiyya* . According to them, *taqiyya* is the practice of pretending to follow the dominant religion; going along with the dominant majority; sitting on the fence or adopting a neutral position and joining the side that seems likely to win.[62] In their view Druze history and politics cannot really be understood without recourse to *taqiyya*: "It is hard to distinguish between the practice of taqiyya and everyday political opportunism."[63] In order to explain the political aspects of *taqiyya* most of these writers quote from the *Taʿlīm ad-diyāna ad-durziyya* (The Teaching of the Druze Faith), written by a Christian, Jubrāʾīl al-Ḥalabī, probably in the 18th century. Recently, some have been following *Bayna al-ʿaql wan-nabī* (Between Intelligence and the Prophet) by the pseudonymous Anwar Yāsīn.[64] The main quotations chosen from these books tend to present *taqiyya* as a tenet that encourages the Druzes to follow the dominant religion of their environment. Ḥalabī, for example, wrote the following, often quoted, sentence: "Our Lord has commanded us to hide in the dominant religion, be it what it may; with Christians, Christian; with Muslims, Muslim, and so on."[65]

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[62] *Ibid.*

[63] J. Teitelbaum, "Ideology and Conflict in the Middle East Minority: The Case of the Druze Initiative Committee in Israel," *Orient* 26(1985), pp. 342-343.

[64] On this meaning of *taqiyya* as a political instrument and the sources used, see H. Blanc, "Druze Particularism: Modern Aspects of an Old Problem," *Middle Eastern Affairs* 3 (1952), pp. 315-321; G. Ben-Dor, *The Druze in Israel: A Political Study* (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 37-51; Layish, "Taqiyya," pp. 245-281.

[65] See H. Blanc, *Hadruzīm* (Jerusalem, 1928), p. 137; Ben-Dor, *The Druze*, p. 41; Layish, "Taqiyya," p. 251.

Druze sources, written over the previous four centuries, testify to the fact that *taqiyya* does not mean hiding in every dominant religion; rather, it implies the outward acceptance of Islam as the *ẓāhir* of *tawḥīd*.[66] Although the *taqiyya* practice has had influence on Druze history and politics, it is not in itself sufficient explanation for the political behavior of the community. Rather, a variety of complex factors has determined this behavior throughout the community's history. Some factors are peculiar to the Druzes, such as the principle of *ḥifẓ al-ikhwān*, the belief that the Druzes are linked to each other through the transmigration of souls, or the particular sociopolitical structure characterizing Druze society. Other factors derive from social, political, and cultural developments that occurred in the entire Middle East and their impact on the ethnopolitics of the area.

Ethics

As in the case of their political behavior, Druze ethics have been formed by a number of different factors, which apart from the tenets of religious faith include the social structure of the Druze society. In Druze religious teaching all human souls are given an equal opportunity in their transmigration from one body to another; thus, the unitarians, though at the outset no different from other believers, are free as human beings the moment they choose the unitarian doctrine. Equality and freedom are reflected in the absence among the Druzes of slavery and polygamy, which were widely practiced in the 11th century. Although slavery never existed in Druze society, religious teaching did not succeed in dissolving the differential ranks and classes within society. In Lebanon and Ḥawrān (in Syria), a particular form of feudalism has characterized traditional Druze society. Druze religious teachings grant women complete legal equality: marriage is monogamous. In marriage and divorce the woman is to expect the same treatment and possesses the same rights as the man. Property is shared equally between the two partners. In the case of divorce, if either partner leaves the other without due cause, then he or she has to surrender half their joint property to the other partner. Daughters and sons have the same rights to their parents' inheritance.[67] Although legally and religiously a Druze woman

[66] Sayyid ʿAbdalla Tanūkh, *Sharḥ al-Amīr as Sayyid* (unpublished).

[67] On the abolition of slavery and polygamy and the status of women, see Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 122, 220-231; Brayer, part 1, p. 261.

enjoys theoretical equality with a Druze man, in everyday social life she does not have equal rights where education, employment, free choice of her husband, and other realms are concerned because of restrictions that the dominant male society imposes.[68]

Although religion was the main factor that brought the Druze community into being in the 11th century, it was its admixture with several other factors which fostered the Druze communal entity. This entity consists of ascriptive-kinship groups. In other words, the community itself is a group of several sub-groups held together by a supreme communal source of power. The sub-units in Druze society are the extended families, which go by two main names: *bayt* and *dār* (both literally mean house). These terms are derived from Arab tribal terminology. Usually *bayt* and *dār* are used to express sub-units or branches of *ʿashīra* (tribe) or *ḥamūla* (the great or extended family). These units and sub-units consist of members who are tied together by real or imaginary blood relationships. It is certain that such units and sub-units existed in Druze areas before the propagation of the *daʿwa*. The Epistles, e.g., were addressed to various groups, among them ʾĀl-Tanūkh and ʾĀl-ʿAbdalla in the Gharb district near Beirut, ʾĀl-Sulaymān in Wādī at-Taym, and ʾĀl-Turāb in the Galilee.[69] The use of the term *ʾāl* usually connotes membership in a tribe or an extended family. It seems that the *daʿwa* was first accepted by these tribes and extended families through their chiefs, the *amīrs* and the *sheikhs*.

The units that constituted a community bore a social legacy whose main characteristics the new doctrine, though influencing it, did not vitiate. Endogamy, the inferiority of the woman's status, feudalism, the factionalism among the Druze families, and other social phenomena that seem contradictory to Druze religious tenets were all incorporated from the beginning of the *daʿwa*. The religious beliefs aggregated but did not abolish all the different groups, whether tribes or extended families. These groups then came together to build a community: individuals in these groups saw themselves as the embodiment of the community just as they were the embodiment of their extended families and tribes. Leadership of the com-

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[68] On Druze women in Israel and Lebanon, see A. Layish, *Marriage, Divorce and Succession in the Druze Family* (Leiden, 1982); N. Alamuddīn and P. Starr, *Crucial Bonds—Marriage among the Lebanese Druze* (New York, 1980); Betts, pp. 42-50.

[69] Epistles 50, 90, 92, 97, 99, 101, 103, 108.

munity generally went to the most powerful and prestigious families and tribes. During the years the *daʿwa* was being propagated, the most powerful family was a clan of the Tanūkh federation of tribes.

Early History

The federation of tribes generally named Tanūkh had settled in Greater Syria a long time before the Druze *daʿwa*. One of its tribes settled in the hills behind Beirut, in the Gharb district. There is no information on the kinship relation of this clan to other clans, such as ʾĀl-ʿAbdalla (in the same area), ʾĀl-Sulaymān (in Wādī at-Taym), ʾĀl-Turāb (in the Galilee), and other clans that accepted the *daʿwa* in north Syria and near Damascus. It is known, however, that Tanūkhs who came to north Syria had been influenced by the Ismāʿīlī *daʿwa*; this is testified to by the strong Ismāʿīlī bias of the Tanūkhī poet, Abūʾl ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī. Counter to Philip Hitti's hypothesis of a "Persian connection" in regard to Druze origins, the "Tanūkhī connection" is a more likely hypothesis: the Tanūkhs were a federation of tribes scattered over various districts of Syria.[70]

Apart from Epistle 50 in Druze Scripture, which was explicitly addressed to the Tanūkh *amīrs*, nothing is known about the family. Similarly, the history of the Druzes during the first century after the close (*iqfāl*) of the *daʿwa* remains shrouded in darkness. The recorded history of the Tanūkhs began in 1147, during the Crusader period, when the ruler of Damascus sent the *amīr* of the Gharb district a proclamation recognizing him as prince and awarding him an *iqtāʿ* (land grant) in the territory of the district. In return, the rule of Damascus urged the *amīr* to defend the area against the Franks. This early history is recorded by two Druze chroniclers, Ṣāliḥ Ibn Yaḥyā (d. 1435) and Ḥamza Ibn Sibāṭ (d. 1520).[71] From their writings, it seems that in 1147 the Tanūkh *amīr* was called Buḥtur. Thus the

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[70] On the Tanūkhs and their settlement in Syria before the 11th century, see Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 142-146.

[71] Ṣāliḥ Ibn Yaḥyā, *Tāʾrīkh Bayrūt*, first edited by Louis Cheikho (Beirut, 1927); second ed. by Francis Hours and Kamal Salibi under the same title (Beirut, 1969); Ḥamza Ibn Sibāṭ, *Tāʾrīkh ibn Sibāṭ*, the surviving parts of the book were edited by Naila Takieddine Kaidbey, under the title *Tāʾrīkh ad-Durūz fī ʾĀkhir ʿAhd al-Mamālīk* (Beirut, 1989).

imāra (principality) of the Gharb became known as the Buḥturī principality.[72]

Since the history of the Buḥturs was first written down only in the 15th century, it is difficult to ascertain whether they emanated from the same clan of Tanūkh *amīrs* mentioned in the Druze scriptures. Salibi considers the Buḥturs to have been the most prominent family of Druze notables in the Gharb, though they never reigned as princes. He sees their rule as exogenous to Mt. Lebanon; the Buḥturs were appointed princes by outsiders: the Sunnī rulers of Syria.[73] The Tanūkh *amīrs* mentioned in the Druze scriptures disappeared during the 12th century. Did, then, the Buḥturs have any connection at all with the Tanūkhs? In other words, is the kinship relationship between Buḥturs and Tanūkhs a fiction of the Druze chroniclers? Salibi offers no hint one way or another. Undoubtedly Ibn Yaḥyā's and Ibn Sibāṭ's histories admix some of the mythology which characterizes most of the historical records of the early periods. Because the Tanūkh *amīrs* were living in the Gharb district in the 11th century, it is logical to assume that the Tanūkh *imāra* in this area was an indigenous phenomenon; thus, the Sunnī rulers of Syria were simply confirming the title of *amīr*, thereby strengthening its legitimacy.

Whether or not their recorded history contains elements of mythology, it is certain that the Tanūkhs played an important role in maintaining the minority Druze community within its religious boundaries. This role is explicitly reflected in the activities of al-Amīr as-Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn ʿAbdalla at-Tanūkhī (1417-1479), whom the Druzes look upon as "the most deeply revered individual in Druze history after the *ḥudūd* who founded and propagated the faith."[74] As-Sayyid's commentaries on some of the Druze Epistles, his theological writings, ethical treatises, and his own biography (*sīra*) became living examples of the unitarian faith.[75] It is logical to assume that he preserved the Tanūkhs' legacy both in religious matters and in the political leadership of his family.

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[72] See K. Salibi, "The Buhturids of the Garb, Medieval Lords of Beirut and Southern Lebanon," *Arabica* 8(1961).

[73] K. Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions, The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London, 1988), pp. 121-123.

[74] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 172.

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 172-178. ʿAjāj Nūwayhid, *Sīrat al-Amīr as Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn ʿAbdalla at-Tanūkhī* (Beirut, 1975); Najib Assrauy, *Al-Madhhab at Tawḥīdī ad-Durzī*, 2nd ed. (Brazil, n.d.), pp. 114-129.

Although the origin and development of the religious institution of *mashayakhat al-ʿaql* (the Spiritual Leadership) are still unknown, it probably arose shortly after as-Sayyid's death. The term *sheikh al-ʿaql* or *sheikh al-ʿuqqāl* (leader of the initiated) came into use with as-Sayyid's reforming of the basis on which Druzes could be considered "initiated" (*ʿāqil*). It was through the religious *sheikhs* who succeeded al-Amīr as-Sayyid in providing religious guidance, such as Abū Yūsuf ʿAlam ad-Dīn Sulaymān and Sayf ad-Dīn at-Tanūkhī, that the institution of *mashaykhat al-ʿaql* took root, though the term itself first appears in the sources only at the beginning of the 19th century.[76]

The cause of the decline of the Tanūkhs, or Buḥturs, as the leading family and the rise of the Maʿnīs on the eve of the Mamlūk period is still obscure. The story of the Maʿnī succession on Mt. Lebanon has been told by the Lebanese chroniclers of the 19th century, who trace the Maʿnīs back to the Crusader period, when they were ordered by the ruler of Damascus to leave Jazīra on the upper Euphrates and to establish themselves in the Shūf in order to defend the area against the Franks.[77]

Salibi's more recent research led him to conclude that the Maʿnīs were regional chiefs in the Dayr al-Qamar and Bārūk districts when the Ottomans conquered Syria in 1516. He finds the Lebanese chroniclers' story of the Maʿnī succession that year as princes of the Druze country to be pure invention. For the greater part of the 16th century the Maʿnīs remained local chiefs, who led the Druze clans in their resistance against the Ottoman occupation of Mt. Lebanon. The Druze country was finally subdued by the Ottomans in 1586. A more positive connection between the Maʿnīs and the Ottomans came about in 1590, when the latter attempted to employ Druze military forces against the Shīʿīs of Jabal ʿĀmil (southern modern Lebanon), who had allied themselves with the Shīʿī Safavid Kingdom of Persia, the main enemy of the Ottomans at that time. To counter this alliance, the Ottomans concluded a pact of reconciliation with the Druzes and appointed their paramount chief, Fakhr ad-Dīn al-Maʿnī, as *amīr-i-liwā* of the Sidon *sanjaq* (governor of the Sidon district). Eight years later, and for the same reason, Fakhr

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[76] See Amīn Ṭaliʿ, *Mashayakhat al-ʿAql* (Beirut, 1979), pp. 81-105.
[77] See Ṭanūs Shidyāq, *Akhbār al-Aʿyān fī Jabal Lubnān*, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1954), vol. 1, pp. 290-293.


ad-Dīn was also appointed *amīr-i-liwā* of the *sanjaq* of Ṣafad in the Galilee.[78] In his revisionist history Salibi undermines the myth of Fakhr ad-Dīn as the founder of the Lebanese entity and state, a myth that Lebanese historians attempted to construct in order to legitimize the Lebanese state that was created in 1920. Indirectly, however, the myth strengthens the Druze version of events, which sees Fakhr ad-Dīn as a Druze ruler under whom the community's power attained its zenith. He rose up as the paramount Druze chief and succeeded in controlling territories beyond Mt. Lebanon. While the Druze area of the Shūf remained his power base, he controlled various districts in Syria, Palestine and Transjordan from 1610. The period of his ascendancy, 1590-1633, chroniclers and historians describe as prosperous. During these years the ports of Beirut, Sidon, and Acre renewed their commercial ties with the West. Agriculture and trade were modernized, and the silk industry was strongly promoted. Security prevailed in the areas held by his forces. Furthermore, under Fakhr's patronage, the Druzes and Maronites of Mt. Lebanon lived in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, which played a key role in his success.

Fakhr's success was accompanied by autonomous tendencies in economics and politics, which the Ottomans viewed with great suspicion. His unfettered actions flew in the face of Ottoman policy, which tended to suppress such autonomous manifestations, and eventually invited their hostility. In 1633, the Ottomans decided to put an end to Fakhr's nuclear rule of the Shūf district, and he was taken away captive to Constantinople. Fakhr's rise and subsequent fall in the Druze area of Mt. Lebanon testify to the pivotal role of the Druze community in his career. Just as his rise was a manifestation of the increasing power of the Druzes, so did his fall usher in a new era in their history.

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[78] Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, pp. 123-126.

PART TWO
FROM ZENITH TO DECLINE



Map 2. The Druze settlement in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.

CHAPTER ONE
TO ḤAWRĀN

The Beginning of the Migration to Ḥawrān

In the course of the 19th century two interacting developments played a dominant role in the history of the Druzes: the final decline of the community in Lebanon and the emergence of a new center of settlement in Ḥawrān. The dwindling settlements of Mt. Lebanon, northern Palestine, Jabal al-Aᶜlā and Wādī at-Taym and the rising star of Ḥawrān, when viewed together, effectively explain the history of the Druzes as it evolved during the 18th and 19th centuries. Thus, writing the modern history of the Druze community means relating the history of its migration into Ḥawrān, viz., the economic, social, political, and demographic factors that combined to set the migratory process in motion, with Ḥawrān as the centripetal force. This process cannot be explained simply by the static givens of "pull" and "push." It had its own inner dynamics. At the same time, it formed the continuation of the historical development of the Druze community from its ancient settlements. While specific catalysts drive a particular people to migrate and specific elements characterize every stage of the migratory process, general features clearly also define the process, i.e., the specific reasons constitute events which fall within and contribute to the larger stream of the migratory process.

Since the crystallization of Druze doctrine in the 11th century, migration from one place to another within the traditional regions of Druze settlement had been the outstanding feature of the minority community, forever seeking shelter. Inevitable socio-economic and political changes occurred because of this constant migration, as some centers of settlement weakened while others gained strength. In the era of the Tanūkhs (1147-1516), the southern parts of Mt. Lebanon had become the main center of Druze settlement. Under the Tanūkh *amīr*, who ruled in the Gharb district near Beirut, the Druzes began expanding beyond this region, notably toward the Shūf mountains (see map 3), and it was during this period that the Druze community took shape as a distinctive ethnic group, with its own particular social and spiritual characteristics. During the Maᶜnī

period (1517-1697) which followed, and especially during the reign of Fakhr ad-Dīn al-Maʿnī II (1590-1633), the Druze role in the history of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine reached its zenith. The southern parts of Mt. Lebanon even came to be called Jabal ad-Durūz (the Druze mountain). During those years the Druzes in Palestine and Wādī at-Taym enjoyed a large measure of protection against external forces. After Fakhr ad-Dīn's death the factionalism of the Qaysīs and the Yamanīs[1] soon eroded the unity of the Druze community, Fakhr's successors being unable to impose their authority over the important group of the Lebanese notables, the *muqāṭaʿjīs*.[2] The Shihābī *amīrs*, too, who succeeded the Maʿnīs after 1697, managed to apply but limited authority over the *muqāṭaʿjīs*. Under these conditions the *amīr* of Jabal ad-Durūz became merely a *primus inter pares*. He was elected by an assembly of local chiefs, each of whom retained power in his own local district. Continuous friction among these chiefs, coupled with the weakness of their chosen *amīrs* and the intervention of external forces, such as the Ottoman governors of Sidon (Ṣayda) and Damascus, vitiated the Druzes' reduced power, not only in Lebanon but also in Wādī at-Taym and Palestine. These circumstances led to an era of decline of the Druze community in its traditional places of settlement. Frequent battles with Ottoman governors and internal conflicts in Lebanon throughout the 18th and 19th centuries exhausted the prosperity and power the Druzes had accumulated during the Tanūkhī and Maʿnī periods. It was against this historical background that the Druzes began to migrate to Ḥawrān.

What attracted the Druzes to Ḥawrān? Were Druzes already living there? And if so, since when? Prior to the close of the *daʿwa*, Druzes not only lived in and around the mountain areas of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, congregations also existed in the main

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[1] The Qaysī-Yamanī schism was pre-Islamic in origin. With the expansion of Islam throughout the Middle East, the Arabs carried this schism with them to Syria and other provinces. This bifurcation between Qaysīs (northern tribes) and Yamanīs (southern tribes) did not mean that the adherents of each side descended from the ancient tribes, but simply that alliances among tribes of the leading families which changed according to the prevailing political situation preserved the names of ancient factions.

[2] A *muqtāṭaʿjī* is a hereditary landlord. On the Lebanese feudal system, see I. Harik "Iqtāʿ system in Lebanon. A comparative Political View," *Middle East Journal* 4 (Autumn 1965), pp. 405-421. Cf. D. Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban à l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971), pp. 80-105.

cities of the period: Antioch, Damascus, Aleppo, Ramala, and ʿAsqalān.[3] During the period of the early persecutions (1021-1044), these urban congregations ceased to exist, and the Druzes began to seek shelter predominantly in the mountains of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Is it possible that the Druzes already began settling in Ḥawrān during the first *miḥna*?

Although Epistle 46 of the *daʿwa* indicates that Bahāʾ ad-Dīn installed a *dāʿī* for Ḥawrān, no historical evidence exists of Druzes occupying this district before the second half of the 17th century. The classical Arab chroniclers, such as Antākī, Ibn al-Qalānsī, and Ibn al-Athīr,[4] who refer both directly and indirectly to the Druzes, do not allude to any Druze settlement in Ḥawrān. Nor do Druze chroniclers writing during the Tanūkhī period, such as Ibn Sibāṭ (d. 1520) and Ibn Yaḥyā (d. 1435),[5] mention Ḥawrān. Nevertheless, we do have a secondary source which places Druze in Ḥawrān earlier than the 17th century. The Frenchman Bouron, without however citing any sources, stated that the Druze immigration to Ḥawrān began during the formation of the sect. The Druzes, he wrote, "occupy Wādī at-Taym, Gharb, Matn and Shūf up to the gates of Beirut in large numbers. Many families have already started to immigrate toward the interior and occupy Ḥawrān." According to Bouron, whose narration deals with the 11th and 12th centuries, Druzes began settling the Gharb district near Beirut, Jabal al-Aʿlā near Aleppo, and Wādī at-Taym at the foot of the Ḥermon, during the Crusades; and they also moved into Ḥawrān.[6]

A more reliable secondary source on the 17th-century Druze settlement is a manuscript by Ashrafānī, a Druze chronicler from Ashrafiyya near Damascus. The third part of this document contains a history of the Druzes at the time of the propagation of the faith. The detailed information it provides of places and names facilitates some acquaintance with Druze life during the *daʿwa* period; it seems that Ashrafānī collected his information from many Druze documents then still in existence. His description of villages

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[3] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, pp. 127-132.

[4] Antākī, *Tāʾrīkh*; Abū ʿAli Ḥamza Ibn al-Qalānsī, *Ḍhayl Tāʾrīkh Dimashq*, ed. H.F. Amedroz (Beirut, 1908); Ibn al-ʾAthīr, *al-Kāmil fit-Tāʾrīkh*, 13 vols. (Beirut, 1965-1967).

[5] Ibn Sibāṭ, *Tāʾrīkh*; Ibn Yaḥyā, *Tāʾrīkh Bayrūt*.

[6] Capitaine N. Bouron, *Les Druzes, Histoire du Leban et de la Montagne Haouranaise* (Paris, 1938), pp. 96-99.

clearly suggests that these places were in existence in his time, i.e., the first half of the 17th century. Ashrafānī lists five Druze settlements:[7]

(1) In northern Syria, in Jabal al-Aʿlā, or Jabal as-Summāq, which he calls Jabal al-Anwar (the mountain of lights) and where the Druzes formed a large community.

(2) In the Gharb district of Mt. Lebanon near Beirut, where the Epistles of the *daʿwa* were sent to ʾāl-ʿAbdalla's *sheikhs*.

(3) In Wādī at-Taym in the southern Biqāʿ valley, and at the foot of Mt. Ḥermon. The Epistles were sent here to ʾāl-Sulaymān. The great activity of the *dāʿīs* in this district and the events that took place during the *daʿwa*, as Ashrafānī describes them, attest to the importance of religious leaders in the district which may explain why these leaders have maintained their authority to the present day.[8] No distinction apparently existed between the Druze settlement at either the western or eastern foot of the Ḥermon. Ashrafānī includes villages in the latter location within the ʾāl-Sulaymān district in Wādī at-Taym.

(4) In Ghūṭa, the orchards surrounding Damascus, which Ashrafānī calls *bustān* (garden). The following villages are mentioned: Yaʿfūr, ʿAyn al-Khaḍra, al-Maydaniyya, al-Mazza, al-ʿAṣruniyya, at-Tal, and Mnīn. Subsequently these became Sunnī villages or fell into ruins. At present, there are only four Druze villages in this area: Jaramānā, Ṣiḥnāyā, Dayr ʿAlī, and Ashrafiyya. The last was Ashrafānī's birthplace, from which he drew his name and in which he was reared.

(5) In the Galilee, where the Epistles were sent to ʾāl-Ṭurāb. Some of the villages mentioned still exist; others fell into ruins over time.


Under the Tanūkhs (1147-1516) and Maʿnīs (1517-1697), as already mentioned, the south of Mt. Lebanon formed the main center of Druze settlement. Absorbing Druze settlers from other localities, the Druzes expanded the Gharb settlement to the Shūf, to the Matn, and to the Jurd districts (see map 3). Until the end of the first half of the 19th century the entire area was called Jabal ad-Durūz.

Except for the settlement in Jabal al-Aʿlā, the various other Druze localities could maintain close links with this center because of its

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[7] Ashrafānī, part 3.

[8] Even today the religious leaders of al-Bayāḍā in Ḥāsbayā are the paramount Druze *ʿuqqāl*.



Map 3. The main districts of Druze settlement before the migration to *Ḥawrān*.

geographical proximity. Examining the various sites of Druze villages from the Matn in the north to the Carmel in the south and from the Gharb in the west to the Ghūṭa in the east, one can observe obvious links between the various Druze villages, even though they were situated in different mountain chains. Between Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym, for example, a string of several villages comprised such a link. Between Wādī at-Taym and Druze settlements in the eastern foothills of the Ḥermon, the area called Iqlīm al-Billān, the villages of al-Mārī and al-Mṭilla[9] lay not far from ʿAyn Qinyā and Majdal-Shams, closer to the Ḥermon. Wādī at-Taym was also linked with Iqlīm al-Billān in the north, ʿAayḥa, Kafr-Qūq, and Dayr al-ʿAshāyr being situated not far from Rakhla. The latter, in turn, was relatively close to the Druze villages in the Ghūṭa district. Even the Druze villages of the Galilee and those of the Ḥermon could maintain a ready communications link through Mṭilla. Until as recently as 1960, furthermore, the Druzes of Beit-Jan in Upper Galilee cultivated Arḍ-al-Khait, which contained the ruins of a Druze habitat called Maghāwir ad-Durūz, not far from the Ḥūla plain.

The Druzes communicated between the various mountain chains through these linkage points; in times of war or other perils, they would light bonfires on the summits of these mountains, thus mobilizing the whole community. These points also facilitated Druze migration from one place to another. For example, during the period of the migration to Hawrān in the 18th and 19th centuries, the "escape route" led through Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān via those villages that connected the various Druze districts. The same itinerary was followed by several well-known European travelers, e.g., Burkhardt,[10] who journeyed to Ḥawrān or Damascus from Lebanon.

Most of the sources dealing with Druze settlement in Ḥawrān point to the end of the 17th or beginning of the 18th century as the earliest stage of Druze migration. All historical sources referring to Druze immigration to Ḥawrān were transmitted orally and written down only in the 20th century. Some of the second-hand accounts,

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[9] The Israeli village of Metula was until 1900 a Druze village called Mṭilla. It was abandoned by the Druzes after Jewish settlers bought the lands of the village from their Shīʿī landlord.

[10] J.L. Burkhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land* (London, 1882), p. 205.

e.g., have it that in 1685 one of the Druze princes, ʿAlam ad-Dīn al-Maʿnī, led two hundred men and their families as the first emigrants to Ḥawrān.[11] Other sources cite 1711 as the date of the first immigration, following the ʿAyn Dārā battle between the two rivaling Druze factions of the Qaysīs and the Yamanīs: The battle caused a large-scale exodus to Ḥawrān among the defeated Yamanīs.[12]

While Bouron, too, accepted 1685 as the year of an important mass emigration to Ḥawrān, he also suggested that the group led by ʿAlam ad-Dīn was in effect joining coreligionists who had already moved to that region.[13] It is likely that Bouron's information was based on oral testimony, collected during the two years (1925-1927) he lived among the Druzes.[14] Norman Lewis, a long-time resident of Syria and Lebanon, in his recent book, *Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan 1800-1980*, mentions that during the Mamlūk campaigns against the Druzes and other heterodox sects, early in the 14th century, some of the Druzes left their ravaged homeland for Ḥawrān, probably only temporarily.[15] Again, however, the source of the statement is oral, based on Lewis's discussions with the Druzes among whom he lived.

Whether the Druzes who arrived in Ḥawrān at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries were adding to the numbers of their coreligionists already there or initiated new settlements,

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
[11] Shiblī ʿAaysamī, *Muḥāfaẓat as-Suwaydā* (Damascus, 1962), p. 17; H. Abū Rashīd, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, 1st ed. (Cairo, 1925), p. 28; J. Mascle, *Le Djebel Druze*, 3rd. ed. (Beirut, 1944), p. 198.

[12] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 202; Abdul Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus 1723-1783* (Beirut, 1966), pp. 124-125. The French consul in Sidon had referred to the ʿAyn Dārā battle and remarked that "Amīr Ḥaydar is the only one who remained of the family of the famous Amīr Fakhr ad-Dīn." Le Seieur Estelle to Pontchartrian, Sidon, 20 January 1711, *Documents diplomatiques et consulaires relatifs á l'histoire du Liban*, 20 vols. collected by Adel Ismail under the direction of Amir Maurice Chihab (Beirut, 1975-1981) (hereafter *DDC*), vol. 1, p. 89. In May 1711, the consul wrote that the governor of Sidon managed to remove Prince Ḥaydar and replace him with Yūsuf; he also appointed the Druze *sheikh*, Maḥmūd Abū Harmūsh, to fight against Amīr Ḥaydar. This introduced the war between the two factions, "the white banner" (Qaysī) and "the red banner" (Yamanī). The two mobilized their adherents near ʿAyn Dārā, where the red banner was defeated. Estelle to Pontchartrian, Sidon, 23 May 1711, *DDC*, vol. 1, pp. 94-97.

[13] Bouron, p. 126.

[14] *Ibid.*, "Introduction," p. xiii.

[15] N. Lewis, *Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan 1800-1980* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 77.



Map 4. The first Druze settlements in Ḥawrān.

these years saw the beginning of a new era in Druze history, concomitant with the decline of the traditional center of Druze settlement on Mt. Lebanon, and characterized, e.g., by the moves of ʿAlam ad-Dīn. This prince, with a large number of *amīrs* and *sheikhs* of the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, had fled to Ḥawrān seeking temporary refuge. When he returned to Mt. Lebanon, he left behind some of the families who had originally accompanied him to Ḥawrān.[16] None of these belonged to the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, which means that though they were involved in the migration process, the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* did not themselves remain and settle in Ḥawrān.

No adequate information exists on the exact site settled by the first newcomers. According to Sulaymān Abū ʿIzzedīn, they resided for a short period in Maṭḥanat ad-Dnifāt, south of Azruʿ, and then left for Tibnā in the Lajā. Two years later, other immigrants arrived and put down roots in two villages south of Lajā, al-Majdal and Remat al-Luḥf.[17] According to Hanna Abū Rāshid and Bouron, who both assembled a great amount of oral history in the 1920s, however, this second group settled another village, Najrān, south of Lajā and east of Buṣrā al-Ḥarīr, where they took the abandoned ancient palace of Muqrī al-Waḥsh for their residence.[18] Saʿīd Ṣghayar, who also collected oral evidence, stated that the first Druze immigrants came initially to ad-Dibba, south of Brayka, and then moved to Najrān (see map 4).[19]

All oral evidence, although somewhat contradictory on certain points, seems to coincide in the view that the newcomers settled in the northwest of Jabal Ḥawrān and that in short intervals of time they moved from one old ruin to another. The district was full of once-prosperous towns and villages. Doubtless, the Druze migrants, foremost seeking shelter, came without a fixed plan. As sedentaries they looked for unoccupied but defensible sites. The northwest of Jabal Ḥawrān and the narrow strip bordering the Lajā answered their needs for both defense and water. The fact that these people were first constantly on the move and only eventually took occu-

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[16] From the end of the 18th century, Shihābī *amīrs* as well as Druze *sheikhs* who were defeated by their rivals in Lebanon had the habit of taking shelter in Ḥawrān for a while, as will be seen later.

[17] Sulaymān Abū ʿIzzeddīn, "Tawaṭūn ad-Durūz", *al-Kulliya*, May 1926, p. 314.

[18] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 28; Bouron, p. 26.

[19] Saʿīd Ṣghayar, *Banū Maʿrūf fī at-Tārʾikh* (Lebanon, 1984), p. 404.


pancy of a certain spot testifies to their search, first of all, for safety in this strange, somber region. The northwest of Jabal Ḥawrān offered another advantage: It was the nearest point to the Druze villages in both al-Ghūṭa and Iqlīm al-Billān at the foot of the Ḥermon. The route between Jaramānā (in al-Ghūṭa) or Majdal-Shams (in Iqlīm al-Billān) and the new settlement in Ḥawrān could be traversed in a matter of hours (see map 5).

While, thus, the linkage between the new settlement and the community in its ancient localities was maintained, another important point was that Mt. Ḥermon could be seen from all mountain tops of northwest Jabal Ḥawrān. The newcomers, therefore, could continue to use their traditional means of alarm (bonfires) to keep in contact with other Druze congregations. This, e.g., enabled the new settlers not just to contain Bedouin attacks but even to initiate organized attacks of their own.

With the return of Prince ʿAlam ad-Dīn to Mt. Lebanon, leadership of the new area passed to Ḥamdān al-Ḥamdān, who occupied the castle of Najrān along with five villages.[20] Under Ḥamdān and his successors the Druzes succeeded in fending off the attacks of the Bedouins and in extending the area of Druze settlement in Ḥawrān. There are speculations, mostly based on stories told by the Druzes themselves, about the origins of the Ḥamdān family. According to the Druze historian, Najjār, the Ḥamdāns were descendants of a famous tribe, Banū Ḥamdān, which ruled northern Syria during the Fāṭimī period in the 10th century. They received the Druze doctrine when it was propagated in their district; with the decline of Fāṭimī rule, the Ḥamdāns emigrated to Mt. Lebanon.[21] Bouron conveys nearly the same story;[22] however, neither the Epistles nor the Druze chronicles provide any indication that the Ḥamdāns, or even some of them, ever joined the Druze sect. Apparently the theory about their antecedents was invented and promulgated by the Ḥamdāns themselves during their century-and-a-half rule of the Ḥawrān Mountain (1711-1860). As in many similar cases, the Ḥamdāns claimed this ancestry in order to add legitimacy to their rule over the Druzes, who in general have a special respect for genealogy. In Ḥawrān, as in Lebanon, many families reconstructed

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[20] Abū Rashīd, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 28.
[21] Najjār, *Banū Maʿruf fī Jabal Ḥawrān* (Damascus, 1924), p. 85.
[22] Bouron, p. 126.



Map 5. The Druze villages in Mt. Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān and al-Ghūṭa.

for themselves genealogical trees, most of them without a proved historical basis. Thus, the Aṭrashs, who succeeded the Ḥamdāns, and other leading families made similar claims for their descent, especially when the process of migration began shaping the social stratification of the new society both within the villages and within the community as a whole.[23]

Most historians dealing with the Druze settlement in Ḥawrān have concentrated on the Lebanese migrants. Although Mt. Lebanon supplied the greatest number of settlers, Palestine, Jabal al-Aʿlā, and Wādī at-Taym also contributed to the new settlement. These other localities, however, have always been considered peripheral districts vis-à-vis the main Druze center, with the result that their role in the history of the Druze community has largely been ignored. For the same reason, there are insufficient data to follow the complete development of the new settlement in Ḥawrān during its first century. During this period, the Ḥawrān community was still marginal, being small in size and in its political role in comparison with the center, and early 18th-century sources that deal with the Druzes or the province of Damascus all but ignore the developing settlement in Ḥawrān.[24]

From Palestine to Ḥawrān

Although the Druzes in Palestine maintained close links with their brethren in Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm ad-Billān, their district in this period became more vulnerable than it had been ever before. Until the 17th century, Druzes formed a relatively large community in Palestine. During the rule of Fakhr ad-Dīn (1590-1633), notably when the *sanjaq* of Ṣafad was included in his *imāra*, immigrants from Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, and Jabal al-Aʿlā came to settle in Palestine.[25] While the Druze *daʿwa* had been accepted by some of

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[23] The origins of the Ḥamdāns go back to the village of Kafra in the Gharb district of Lebanon; see Abū Izzedīn, "Tawaṭūn," pp. 313-314; ʿAysamī, p. 56; H. Bʿaynī, *Jabal al ʿArab* (Beirut, 1985), p. 165. In fact, today there is an extended family called Ḥamdān in the Gharb villages, as well as in the Galilee and on the Carmel. The oral tradition tells us that Ḥamdān al-Ḥamdān succeeded in strengthening his rule in Ḥawrān after the arrival of his relative Khalīl al-Ḥamdān from Palestine; see Ṣghayar, p. 405; Bʿaynī, p. 175.

[24] Volney wrote: "No European had yet entered it [Hawrān]." C.F. Volney, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, 1783, 1784, 1785*, rpt. edn. (Paris, 1959), p. 332.

[25] Abu Izzeddin, *The Druzes*, p. 131.

the inhabitants of the Galilee, Epistle 97 does not mention the names of Druze villages in Palestine. Ashrafānī, on the other hand, named nine of them in three Galilee districts: as-Saḥil (southwest Galilee), ash-Shāghūr (between Upper and Lower Galilee), and al-Ḥamā (east of Tiberias). Of the six villages he listed only two are still inhabited by Druzes, Yarkā and Jath; the four others (Kuikāt, Mimās, Iklīl, and al-Ḥanbaliyya) are now ruins. For the ash-Shāghūr and al-Ḥamā districts he mentions only three villages, none of which is still extant: ʿAyn ʿĀth (in ash-Shāghūr), ad-Dāmā and as-Safariya (in al-Ḥama) (see map 6).

As mentioned above, Ashrafāni's geographical descriptions of the villages in these three districts give the impression that they were in existence at least from the first part of the 17th century.[26] It is probable that he omitted still others that had been inhabited by Druzes up to the 19th century and that are populated even at the present, since he mentions only villages inhabited by famous religious *sheikhs* and his descriptions completely ignore the Upper Galilee, near Ṣafad. In contrast, a much earlier chronicler, Shams ad-Dīn ad-Dimashqī (1236-1327), referred to the Zabūd Mountain near Ṣafad as the location of the Druze villages of Zabūd and of other Druze communities.[27] Sometime between 1372 and 1376 the Muslim *qāḍī* of Ṣafad, Shams ad-Dīn al-ʿUthmānī, wrote that most of the villages around Ṣafad were inhabited by Druzes.[28] Doubtless, Druze settlement in the Galilee was reinforced during the Maʿnī period at the beginning of the 17th century, when the Druzes became the main military force in the Ṣafad district.[29] Thus Evliya Tshelebe, a Turkish traveler who toured the area from 1646-1650, found all the villages around the Shrine of Ṣayaḥ ibn Yahūd to be populated by Druzes. Tshelebe specifically mentioned two villages, ʿAnabta and Sūq al-ʿAtīq,[30] both later abandoned (see map 6).

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26 Ashrafānī, part 3. On the Druze settlement in the three regions of the Galilee, see also S. Falah, "ha-Druzim be-Israel ba-tkufa ha-ʿUthmanit" (unpublished MA thesis, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 7-12, 31-37.

27 Shams ad-Dīn, Dimashqī, *Kitāb Nukhbat ad Dāhr fī ʿAjaʾib al-Bar wal-Baḥr* (Bagdad, 1923), p. 211.

28 Cited in *The History of Eretz Israel*, ed. Y. Shavit, 9 vols. (Jerusalem, 1981-1982), vol. 7, p. 52.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 229.

30 Evliya Tshelebi, *Travels in Palestine (1648-1650)*, translated from the Turkish by St.H. Stephan (Jerusalem, 1980; facsimile repr. from the *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine*, vols. 4-6, 8 and 9 [1935-1942]), pp. 10-11, 16.



Map 6. The Druze settlement in Palestine, 1600–1900.

Although the Ottomans in 1614 carved out of the province of Damascus a new province, Sidon (Ṣayda), in order to keep a closer watch on the Druzes, the *sanjaq* of Ṣafad, which was part of this province, remained under the suzerainty of Druze *amīrs* until 1660, when the Ottomans reorganized the province.[31] The Maʿnīs, however, were unable to preserve their control of the *sanjaq*, and the Druze villages in the area lost their protection.

A new military power, that of the Zayādina (Sunnīs), now began to consolidate its rule in the Galilee. While their origin and first arrival in the Galilee remain obscure, evidence indicates that the Zayādina first emerged as a leading family near the village of ʿArrabat al-Baṭṭūf in the ash-Shāghūr district, which coincided with the removal of Druze domination from this area. In his introduction to a biography of Sheikh Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar az-Zaydānī (1700-1760), who at one point became the ruler of northern Palestine and a military force for the Ottomans to reckon with, Niqulā Bn Simaʿān Farrāj related that the Zayādina arrived first in ʿArraba in ash-Shāghūr, where they quickly gained victory over a Druze family that had ruled the region.[32] According to Qasṭālī, the chief of the Zayādina became *sheikh* of the ʿArraba district after delivering its inhabitants from the control of the Druze *sheikh* of the nearby village of Sallāma.[33] The destruction of Sallāma and the elimination of Druze rule over ash-Shāghūr acquired for the Zayādina a great measure of influence. One result, e.g., was that the governor of Sidon granted them the tax concession of the district,[34] in which many Druze villages existed until 1680.

Two other biographers of Ẓahir al-ʿUmar, Mikhail and ʿAbbūd aṣ-Ṣabbāgh, do not mention the Sallāma incident. The oral tradition, in both Druze and Muslim villages of the Galilee, does confirm the event, however. From his collection of this oral evidence,

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[31] Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus*, p. 2.

[32] Niqula Bn Simʿān Farrāj, "Qissat ash-Sheikh Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar az-Zaydānī," *al-Mashriq* 24, 8 August 1926, pp. 539-559.

[33] Although Qastālī wrote the article in 1877, certainly he relied on oral evidence; Nuʿmān Qasṭālī, "Mulakhkhaṣ Tāʾrīkh az-Zayādina," *al-Jinan*, 24 December 1877, p. 848.

[34] The Sallāma incident (*hadithat Sallāma*) was also mentioned by Asʿad Manṣūr, *Tāʾrīkh an-Naṣira* (Cairo, 1926), pp. 48-49; by ʿAlī M. Kurd, *Khitat ash-Shām*, 6 vols., 3d ed. (Beirut, 1983), vol. 2, pp. 287-288; by A.J. Hassan, *A History of the Movement of Sheik Ẓahir al-ʿUmar al-Zaydānī* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971), pp. 18-19.

T. Muʿammar has concluded that at least nine Druze villages near Sallāma had been destroyed. These were Njmiyya, Dallātha, Kammāna, al-Marjam, al-Rabaḍiyya, Sabbāna, Umm al-ʿAmd, Jazūr, and Sallāma. All of these were apparently abandoned by their Druze residents at the end of the 17th or beginning of the 18th century as the Zayādina consolidated their power in the Galilee.[35] Although the exact date of the Sallāma incident is still unknown (it probably occurred between 1688 and 1692), the destruction of the Druze villages in the Sallāma area coincided with the first stages of Druze settlement in Ḥawrān.

That at least part of the inhabitants of the Sallāma area fled to Ḥawrān is alluded to in different accounts. According to Ṣghayar, newcomers from the Galilee came to Ḥawrān soon after the first settlement there had been established. These immigrants, whom Ṣghayar termed as-Ṣafadiyya (from north Palestine where Ṣafad was the main town), constituted one of the main factors enabling Ḥamdān al-Ḥamdān not only to sustain the attacks of the Bedouins but even to expand his domination over the northwest section of Jabal Ḥawrān.[36]

Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar took up armed struggle against the Ottomans, and, the alliances made during these wars bore a certain degree of sectarianism: The Druzes of Lebanon were in the Ottoman camp while the Matāwila (Shīʿīs of Jabal ʿĀmil in south Lebanon) were usually allied with Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar. Consequently, a large territorial barrier was created between the Druzes of Palestine and their brethren on Mt. Lebanon and Mt. Ḥermon. The Druzes of Palestine suffered greatly from this rivalry between Ẓahir and the *amīrs* of Mt. Lebanon. According to Rafiq, with the emergence of the military power in the 1730s of Ẓahir al-ʿUmar all Druzes of the Galilee were swept under the authority of the Zayādina.[37] Even today the oral tradition in Galilean Druze villages describes the Zayādina period as one of oppression.[38]

The peripheral nature of the Druze settlement in Palestine, lacking as it did the protection of the Druze *imāra*, made it even more

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[35] Tawfiq Muʿammar, *Ẓāhir al ʿUmar* (Nazareth, 1979), pp. 31-32.
[36] Ṣghayar, p. 405.
[37] Rafeq, p. 128.
[38] The Druze saying, "*Wala ẓulm az-Zayādina*," means that no oppression resembles that of az-Zayādina.

vulnerable, and eventually led to emigration to Ḥawrān. During the first stage of their settlement in Ḥawrān, these immigrants from Palestine apparently had not yet received the appellation Ṣafadiyya. Reference to newcomers according to their areas of origin became the habit somewhat later, when the settlement in Ḥawrān had attained its defined social structure.

From Jabal al-Aᶜlā to Ḥawrān

The Druze settlement in north Syria, in Jabal al-Aᶜlā, was as vulnerable as that in Palestine. A large congregation during the *daᶜwa*, it now saw many of its members migrate to Mt. Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, and Palestine during the Tanūkhī and Maᶜnī periods. When Ḥawrān became an option, the Jabal al-Aᶜlā residents made their way to there, too. Almost every Druze villages in Mt. Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, the Galilee, Mt. Carmel, and Ḥawrān today contains families whose ancestors came from Jabal al-Aᶜlā. Some have preserved their family names, but most are called "Ḥalabiyya" (from the district of Aleppo, Ḥalab in Arabic).

Information on the Druzes of Jabal al-Aᶜlā is scarce, for which there are two main reasons. The first is the fact that chroniclers generally related primarily to the rulers, chieftains, and leaders of the larger towns and ignored rural districts like Jabal al-Aᶜlā. The second reason stems from the attitude of the Druzes of this region toward their environment. The practice of *taqiyya* is more deeply entrenched among the Druzes of Jabal al-Aᶜlā than among their coreligionists elsewhere. The Jabal al-Aᶜlā villages, unlike those in other areas, contain mosques besides the *khalwa*s in which Druzes practice their secret doctrine. Travelers, consequently, found it difficult to distinguish between the Druzes and their Muslim neighbors. Gertrude Bell, visiting the region in 1906, told of these Druze attitudes which led them to hide their faith.[39] Henry Guys, the French consul in Beirut who was acquainted with both the Druze community and its doctrine, mentions one village, Keftīn, in this region, although he doubts the existence of any Druze population even there as well as in any part of the district of Jabal al-Aᶜlā.[40]

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[39] Gertrude Bell, *The Desert and the Sown* (London, 1970), pp. 306-307.
[40] H. Guys, *La Nation Druze, son histoire, sa religion, ses moeurs et son état politique*, rpt. edn. (Paris, 1863, Amsterdam, 1979), p. 188.

Guys attributed the difficulty in distinguishing between the Druzes and their neighbors to the fact that the "Druze religion does not demand any cultic manifestation. On the contrary, it permits the Druzes to hide their observance as much as they can."[41] For this reason, Niebuhr, who called Jabal al-Aᶜlā the mountain of Keftīn, was not certain whether the inhabitants of this district were indeed Druzes. He was reportedly told that there were more than forty villages populated by Druzes; however, he suspected their authenticity because, he said, the people looked like Ismāᶜīlīs.[42]

The villages to which Niebuhr referred at the end of the 18th century doubtless were Druze. During the propagation of the *daᶜwa* this region constituted one of the most important congregations. Ashrafānī's description of the Druzes of Jabal al-Aᶜlā suggests that the community was an important one.[43] A handbook from 1875 told travelers to Syria and Palestine about the Druze community in Jabal al-Aᶜlā in these words: "A few thousand Druzes find a home in Jebel el-Ala from whence the ancestors of many of their brethren in Ḥawrān and Lebanon originally came."[44]

Although the causes of the Druze emigration from Jabal al-Aᶜlā remain obscure, the data that are available point to one probable catalyst. In 1811, the Druzes of the district faced persecution at the hands of Tubal Agha, governor of Jisr ash-Shāghūr (north of Jabal al-ᶜAlawiīn). Upon receiving an affirmative response to their appeal for help from Sheikh Bashīr Junblāṭ, the Druze chief in Lebanon, more than four hundred Druze families left the district and settled in Mt. Lebanon or Wādī at-Taym. Some took occupancy of the houses abandoned by those who had gone to Ḥawrān.[45] It seems, however, that this was only temporary as most proceeded within a

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[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Cartin Niebuhr, *Voyage en Arabie et en d'autres pays circonvoisins* (translated from the German), 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1760-1780), vol. 2, p. 348.

[43] Ashrafānī, part 3.

[44] J. Murray, *Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine* (London, 1875), p. 552.

[45] M. Mishāqa, *Muntakhabāt min al-Jawāb ᶜalā ʾiqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb*, ed. A. Rustum and S. Abū Shaqrā (Beirut, 1955), p. 46; Shidyāq, *Akhbār al-Aᶜyān*, vol. 1, p. 238 and vol. 2, p. 133; H.A. Shihāb, *Lubnān fīᶜahd al-Umarāʾ ash-Shihābiyīn*, ed. A. Rustum, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1933), vol. 3, p. 572; S.H. Hishi, *al-Murāsalāt al-ijtimāᶜiyya wal-iqtisādiyya li Zuᶜamāʾ Jabal Lubnān Khilāl Thalāthat Qurūn 1600-1900*, 4 vols. (Beirut, 1981-1985), vol. 3, pp. 98-99.

short time to Ḥawrān. Burkhardt put the exodus figure at fifteen hundred families, most of which finally migrated to Ḥawrān.[46]

From Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym to Ḥawrān

It was on Mt. Lebanon and in Wādī at-Taym that the Druzes had attained the zenith of their prosperity under the Maᶜnīs. Thanks to Druze-Maronite unity, internal solidarity within the Druze community, and the relative economic development of the region, Fakhr ad-Dīn (1590-1633) had succeeded in establishing on Mt. Lebanon and in Wādī at-Taym a firm political unit. Puget Saint Pierre termed it "the Druze Principality."[47] During the reign of the Maᶜnīs, however, a great number of Maronite immigrants settled in Druze districts in the south of Mt. Lebanon. This Christian immigration continued until the late 18th century, and modified the demographics and socio-economic structure of these regions.[48] In fact, for three generations, between 1790 and 1860, the Maronites comprised the majority of the population, though the area continued to carry the name of Jabal ad-Durūz.[49]

These demographic changes, coupled with Druze factionalism,[50] were to put an end to Druze superiority on Mt. Lebanon. The conversion to Christianity of the Shihābī (Sunnī) and Abū al-Lamᶜ (Druze) *amīrs* in the 1750s,[51] reflects some of the social changes in the region in the course of the 18th century. The Druze-Christian alliance during this century was the major factor enabling the Shihābīs to maintain power. Because Druzes made up the main

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[46] Burkhardt, p. 205.

[47] Puget de Saint-Pierre, *Histoire des Druzes, Peuple du Liban* (Paris, 1763).

[48] See T. Touma, *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druzes et les Maronites du Liban XVIIe siècle à 1914* (Beirut, 1971), pp. 47-56; D. Chevallier, *La Société du Mont Leban à l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971), pp. 30-60; I. Harik, *Politics and Changes in Traditional Society, Lebanon 1711-1845* (Princeton, 1968), pp. 21-23; K. Salibi, *The Modern History of the Lebanon* (London, 1965), p. xx.

[49] See Chevallier, 51.

[50] Until 1711, the Druze community was split between Qaysīs and Yamanīs. In the course of the 18th century, this factionalism bore the name Junblāṭī-Yazbakī. On this the development, see A. Abū Ṣāliḥ, *at-Tāʾrīkh as-Siyāsī lil-Imāra ash-Shihābiyya fī Jabal Lubnān 1697-1842* (Beirut, 1984), pp. 68-76.

[51] For further detail on the conversion to Christianity of Shihābīs and Abū al-Lamᶜ and the role of the Maronite Church, see I. Maᶜlūf and Salīm Daḥdaḥ, "Tanaṣṣur al Umarāʾ ash-Shihābiyīn wal-Lamᶜiyīn fī Lubān," *al-Mashriq* 18 (1920), pp. 546-551; Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 31.

military force of the Shihābīs, chroniclers, travelers, and European consuls alike, all applied the name "Druze" to define the Shihābī fighters.

The year 1754 must be considered a turning point in the history of Mt. Lebanon in general and of the Druzes in particular. Not only did the Shihābī *amīrs* break up into two factions, but a new factionalism, Junblāṭī-Yazbakī, came to replace the old Qaysī-Yamanī split among the Druzes. This internal division on Mt. Lebanon and in Wādī at-Taym inevitably attracted external intervention, and the *wālīs* (Ottoman governors) of Damascus and Sidon soon exploited the situation to impose extra taxes on the peasants. This state of affairs characterized the period of rule of Aḥmad Pasha Jazzār. Jazzār was an adventurer who took advantage of the instability in the *wilāya* of Sidon brought on by the local upheavals of the 1770s in which a number of parties were involved: Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar, the Matāwila (the Shīʿīs), the Mamlūks of Egypt, the Russians, the Turks, and the Druzes of Mt. Lebanon.[52] In 1776, Jazzār was appointed governor of Sidon and given the rank of *wazīr*. His immediate goal upon his appointment was to try and establish authority over the existing power groups within the province.[53] As part of this effort Jazzār proceeded to Beirut to compel Amīr Yūsuf Shihāb, ruler of Mt. Lebanon, to pay seven years of *mīrī* duties that were in arrears as well as to collect a new tax, called *ash-shāshiya*.[54] The latter charge was imposed on the white cloth (*shāsh*) used by Druze women and men to cover their heads. The attempt to collect these two taxes provoked the opposition of the Lebanese population as a whole, but particularly of the Druzes.[55] The religious chief (*sheikh al-ʿaql*) of the Druzes, Sheikh Yūsuf Abū Shaqrā, met with Amīr Yūsuf to try to convince him not to impose the *shāshiya* tax. When, angered, the *amīr* told him that there was no room in the country for two Yūsufs, the Druze *sheikh* responded: "*al-Mazrūk yrḥal!*" (freely translated: "Who doesn't like the idea in that case better get up and leave!").[56] The opposition on Mt. Lebanon and in the Biqāʿ to the

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[52] See Abū Ṣāliḥ, *at-Tāʾrīkh as-Siyāsī*, pp. 109-130.
[53] For details, see Shidyāq, vol. 1, pp. 31-52; also Maʿlūf, *Dawānī al-Quṭūf fī Tāʾrīkh Banī al-Maʿlūf* (Lebanon 1907-1908), pp. 202-210; Rafeq, pp. 244-309.
[54] H.A. Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā al-Jazzār* (Beirut, 1955), p. 71; H. Munayir, *Kitāb*, in *ibid.* (hereafter Munayir), p. 381.
[55] See Maʿlūf, *Dawānī*, p. 211, and Munayir, p. 378.
[56] S. Abū Shaqrā, *Manāqib ad-Durūz* (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 228-229.

taxes prompted Jazzār to send in troops to see that the order was carried out. Led by one of his lieutenants, Ibn Qaramula, this force put to the torch many Druze and Shīʿī villages.[57]

Five years later, Jazzār raised the *mīrī* from one hundred thousand piasters to three hundred thousand. Amīr Yūsuf was able to collect only two-thirds of the levy.[58] Between 1785 and 1790, Jazzār succeeded in exploiting the internal split between the Shihābī *amīrs*, Yūsuf and Bashīr II. Playing hot and cold with the *amīrs*, Jazzār raised the *mīrī* this time to six hundred thousand piasters. The *amīrs* began to bargain, from which Bashīr II eventually emerged the winner when he agreed to collect the new tax sum, levied for 1790-1791. The Druze notables thereupon declared a revolt (*ʿaṣawa*).[59]

In his efforts to suppress the uprising, Jazzār attacked the mountain. In his *marsūm* (declaration) prior to the attack, Jazzār threatened the Druzes, whom he termed *kafara*, heretics, who did not believe in the Prophet.[60] The revolt lasted until 1793,[61] with Jazzār by way of reprisal confiscating property and crops, particularly in the Biqāʿ Valley. The heavy taxes combined with the fighting sent grain prices skyrocketing between 1791 and 1793. That effect, however, was but one part of the general picture of distress and anguish for the population, so vividly described by Munayir. In 1791-1792 people stopped buying and selling property and land in order to try and hide money from the tax collectors.[62] In 1793, in addition to Jazzār's attack, parts of Mt. Lebanon were hit by a plague. Wheat, the staple food of the peasants, became extremely scarce; what grain was available was sold at prices which went up from one half piaster per *kail* (54 kilograms)[63] in the 1780s to twelve piasters in 1792 and to thirty in 1793.[64] According to Munayir, rice, too, saw huge price increases. Unable to afford basic foodstuffs, many people died of

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[57] Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 55; Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā*, p. 74; Munayir, pp. 379-380.

[58] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā*, pp. 81-87; Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 59.

[59] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā*, p. 103; Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 76-77; Munayir, p. 420. According to Maʿlūf, the sum was five hundred thousand piastres, *Dawānī*, p. 226.

[60] The text of the *marsūm* is found in Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā*, p. 109-111.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 104-118; Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 84-91.

[62] Munayir, p. 422.

[63] Wheat prices fluctuated, but in periods of normal supply it was about 1 1/2 piastres per *kail* (a *kail* being about 54 kilograms); see Abū Ṣāliḥ, *al-Tāʾrīkh as-Siyāsī*, p. 302.

[64] Munayir, pp. 434-435.

starvation.[65] The tribulations probably reached their climax in 1794 when Jazzār's troops relentlessly plundered village after village, notably in the Gharb and Matn districts, forcing the villagers to flee from place to place.[66]

Jazzār continued his repressive policies until his death in 1804. Heavy taxes, destruction of villages, burning or confiscation of crops, and not least his control of the Sidon and Beirut trade, combined to undermine the traditional socio-economic and political character of Mt. Lebanon and the Biqāᶜ. During the Maᶜnī period, the economy of Lebanon and the Biqāᶜ had been based on silk production, which had given Fakhr ad-Dīn the economic backing for his political-military power. Until the late 1770s Beirut served as the main port through which the silk of Mt. Lebanon was exported to Egypt or to Europe. The silk producers in turn imported rice and coffee; they also used the money they received to purchase grain from Ḥawrān or the Biqāᶜ Valley. Now this economic feature of Mt. Lebanon was seriously disrupted. During the Maᶜnī period, too, Beirut had belonged to the Druzes—Jazzār decided to evacuate them and bring in Turkish troops. Thus, the city stopped to serve as a Maronite-Druze trade depot.[67] Soon a shortage of coin money developed, which drove up the price of grain and bread.[68] At the end of the 18th century the grain supply on Mt. Lebanon, with a population density of one thousand ninety inhabitants per square *lieu*[69] (2½ miles) was already precarious in any event; the annual grain crop for a population of some two hundred and sixty thousand inhabitants sufficed for only three months.[70]

For those who could not produce or otherwise supply their own grain needs Ḥawrān became an attractive alternative. Not least of the reasons for this attraction was the security the Bedouin tribes afforded in exchange for payment of *khāwa*. As a consequence, those villages in the mountain of Ḥawrān where the Druzes settled soon prospered.[71]

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[65] *Ibid.*

[66] See the description by Munayir, pp. 441-442.

[67] Volney, pp. 289-290.

[68] Munayir, pp. 405, 430, 435.

[69] Volney, p. 241.

[70] Jazzār conducted a census of Mt. Lebanon; Mishāqa, p. 23.

[71] Volney (p. 332) wrote: "Some years ago when a number of Druze and Maronite families tired of the troubles of Lebanon, they were attracted to

The Lebanese chroniclers, Shihāb and Shidyāq, referred indirectly to Ḥawrān as a refuge for Druze victimized by Jazzār's oppression of Mt. Lebanon. The *amīrs* and *sheikhs* who fled with their peasants found safety in Ḥawrān. In 1790, Amīr Yūsuf, who had compelled many to migrate in the 1780s, was himself forced by Jazzār to leave for Ḥawrān.[72] When Jazzār's troops reached the heart of the Shūf district during the *ʿaṣāwa* of 1791-1793, the Junblāṭī *sheikhs*, Ḥassān and Bashīr, escaped to Jawlān and from there proceeded to Ḥawrān.[73]

In 1794 the ʿImādī *sheikhs* took shelter in Ḥawrān for the same reason.[74] The villages of Gharīfa and ʿAyn-Bāl in the Shūf, Ḥāsbayā in Wādī at-Taym, and Kafr Silwān in Matn were among the many scenes of battle between Jazzār and the Druzes which resulted in the destruction of these sites and the emigration of their population.[75] Jazzār confiscated Druze properties near Sidon and Iqlīm at-Tufāḥ, their owners first being made to officially relinquish their right to the land before leaving.[76]

The evidence suggests that it was to Ḥawrān that many of the fleeing Druzes turned for their safety. Each sign of danger in their traditional lands of settlement seemed to instigate a new Druze migration to Ḥawrān. This move also was their initial reaction when Napoleon arrived at Acre in 1798. Although Napoleon's victory over Jazzār effectively released the Druzes from this heavy yoke, uncertitude and fear provided further impetus to migrate to Ḥawrān.[77] The main fear which took hold of Druze religious leaders was that Napoleon would try to impose Christianity upon them, and it made these leaders themselves decide to leave for Ḥawrān.[78] The worsening socio-economic, political, demographic and ethnic factors that combined in the late 18th century to drive the Druzes from the western mountains of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine to the mountain of Ḥawrān on the border of the desert were to gain in severity in the course of the 19th century. As a result, Ḥawrān gradually became Jabal ad-Durūz.

[Ḥawrān]." Guys also wrote that the Druzes who revolted against Jazzār came to Lajā in Ḥawrān in order to defend themselves; Guys, *La Nation Druze*, p. 29.

[72] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā*, p. 100.

[73] Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 90.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[76] Ṣghayar, pp. 222-225.

[77] On the Druze intention to migrate, see Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh Aḥmad Bāshā*, p. 132 and Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarāʾ*, vol. 1, p. 192.

[78] Ṣghayar, p. 225.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROOTS OF THE MARONITE-DRUZE CONFLICT

From Feudal to Sectarian Conflict

After Jazzār's death in 1804, Bashīr Shihāb II, prince of Mt. Lebanon, set out to expand his spheres of influence. Thanks to his close relations with the *wālīs* of Acre,[1] Bashīr was appointed governor of Mt. Lebanon, Jabal ʿĀmil, and Biqāʿ.[2] He now controlled the region from ʿAkkār in the north to Acre in the south,[3] and could no longer be considered merely the *primus inter pares* of the aristocracy of Mt. Lebanon. Bashīr's efforts at consolidating his power not only brought him up against the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, it also put him into conflict with the traditional institutions of the Lebanese feudal system, the *muqāṭaʿjīyya* system.

In 1807 Bashīr instituted a new method of tax collection. In the Kisrawān district he replaced the *muqāṭaʿjīs* with *nāẓirs* (responsibles). In the Jubel district he dismissed Amīr Yūsuf Shihāb's sons and installed his own brother to collect the taxes. In the Druze areas *wakīls* (agents) now became the tax collectors. By establishing new government agents like the *nāẓirs* and the *wakīls* and by confronting the *muqāṭaʿjīs*,[4] Amīr Bashīr II began the first stages of breaking down the feudal structure of Mt. Lebanon. Employing a "divide and rule" policy, he set out to systematically destroy the power of the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*.[5] He exploited both the Junblāṭs and the Yazbaks to push aside the Abū Nakads, who ruled the Shaḥḥār and Manāṣif regions. He later (1816-1818) used the Junblāṭs against ʿAbd al-Maliks, rulers of the Jurd district, as well as against the Talḥūqs, who ruled Gharb Fūqānī. The Junblāṭs' turn to be thrust aside came in 1822-1824.

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[1] Formerly his title was *wālī* of Sidon, but his residence changed during this period; later, in fact, it became Beirut. Jazzār was succeeded in turn by Ismāʿīl Pasha for a short time, Ibrāhīm Pasha until 1806, Sulaymān Pasha until 1819, and finally ʿAbdalla Pasha, who remained until the Egyptian occupation in 1832.

[2] Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 129-133; Mishāqa, pp. 36-44; Maʿlūf, *Dawanī*, p. 232.

[3] Burkhardt, p. 194.

[4] See Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 103-129.

[5] See Touma, pp. 117-118.

Amīr Bashīr conducted his strategy within the framework of the Lebanese feudal system, which gave him the opportunity to manipulate to the full the existing internal factionalism. His campaign against the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* and the setting up of a new cadre of *wakīls* who did not owe allegiance to the traditional hierarchy had the effect of destabilizing the internal balance of Mt. Lebanon society. Every step of his policy led toward the further destruction of the *muqāṭaʿjīs*. Bashīr's execution of his policy soon brought about a conflict of clearly sectarian dimensions, i.e., between Maronites and Druzes. Historically, Bashīr II's ascendancy should be seen as the period during which the roots were planted of the civil war between Druzes and Maronites which lasted from 1841 till 1860.

As in the past, so during the Bashīr years, too, Jabal Ḥawrān was the preferred location for Druze fugitives, *sheikhs* as well as peasants, from Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym. Although the *sheikhs* of the *muqāṭaʿjī* families generally stayed in Ḥawrān only temporarily, the peasants made it their permanent residence. The *sheikhs* and *amīrs* virtually always found a way to return to Mt. Lebanon and even to restore part of their power there through their ability to maneuver within the *muqāṭaʿjīyya*. The peasants, on the other hand, with their villages burned and their property destroyed, generally became completely uprooted. The process may be exemplified by the events in 1818-1819, when Bashīr II took on the Abū Nakads, Talḥūqs, and ʿAbd al-Maliks. The *sheikhs* of these families, deprived of their "rights" in the Jurd and Gharb districts and unable to endure the special levies imposed on these villages, fled to Ḥawrān along with the villagers. Soon, Sheikh Bashīr Junblāṭ, who had collaborated with Bashīr II in fighting the Abū Nakads, Talḥūqs, and ʿAbd al-Maliks,[6] found he himself had become the object of intrigues which seemingly united Bashīr with the Yazbaks. When this scheme was revealed, the *amīr* promptly changed his mind and proceeded to punish the group of families who had plotted with him. Many of the peasant families of this group, such as Banū ʿAṭālla, sought out Ḥawrān.[7]

The first obvious manifestations of the conflict's sectarian nature emerged during the peasant revolts (*ʿāmmiyyāt*) in Anṭiliās and

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[6] Shidyāq, vol. 1, pp. 181-190; vol. 2, pp. 139-142. Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarāʾ*, vol. 2, pp. 641-642, 651-655; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 6-8.
[7] Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 140-142; Ṣghayar, p. 232.

Leḥfed from 1820-1821. In reaction to the new steps in tax farming taken by Amīr Bashīr,[8] a number of peasants from the Matn district met in Anṭiliās and called for a revolt against him.[9] Although several Shihābī *amīrs* and *muqāṭaʿjī sheikhs* supported the uprising, the main instigators were Christian peasants, led by Bishop Yūsuf Iṣṭifān.[10] From Leḥfed, the insurgency quickly spread to the other Christian regions: Kisrawān, Jubel, Batrūn, and Jubbat Beshirre.[11] The motives behind the uprising were primarily economic and social, but sectarian antagonism inserted itself from the start. While Bishop Iṣṭifān encouraged the Christian peasants to maintain a firm stand, the religious leaders of the Druze community (*mashāykh al-ʿaql*)[12] did their utmost to effect a reconciliation between the two rivaling Druze factions in order to put an end to the Christian peasants' revolt.[13] The resultant harmony among the Druzes enabled Amīr Bashīr II to suppress the *ʿāmmiyya* (revolt) of Leḥfed with the help of the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* in 1821.

The tax revolt thus created two camps: on one side the Druze "feudal families" and their partisans; on the other side, the Christian population following the lead of their priests. The division also had a geographic dimension: the southern part of Lebanon was now pitted against the north.[14]

The alliance between Amīr Bashīr and the Druze *sheikhs* proved but temporary and could not halt the general trend of decline in the *muqāṭaʿjiyya*. This deterioration was closely interrelated with the decline of Druze supremacy in Lebanon. The *muqāṭaʿjīyya* was structurally integrated into the communal life of the Druzes. The *sheikhs* were the communal leaders: as their power weakened, the community as a whole deteriorated; similarly, as the community began to lose its unifying force, the *muqāṭaʿjīs*' influence dissipated. This

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[8] Touma, pp. 123-132.

[9] Abū Ṣāliḥ, at-*Taʾrīkh* as-Siyāsī, p. 209; M. Ḍāhir, *al-Intifāḍāt al-Lubnāniyya ḍidda al-niẓām al-muqāṭaʿjī* (Beirut, 1988), p. 67.

[10] N.T. Ḥattūnī, *Nubdha Taʾrīkhiyya fī al-Muqāṭaʿāt al-Kisrawāniyya* (n.d.) [1884], pp. 242-252; Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 145.

[11] Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 154-155; Shihāb, *Taʾrīkh al-Umarāʾ*, vol. 3, pp. 685-90; Ḍahir, pp. 70-75.

[12] The *sheikhs* are ʿAlī Sharaf ad-Dīn, Yūsuf al-Ḥalabī, Yūsuf aṣ-Ṣafadī, Yūsuf Barduil, ʿIzz ad-Dīn Abū Raḥḥāl and Nāṣir ad-Dīn ad-Duayk.

[13] Shihāb, *Taʾrīkh al-Umarāʾ*, vol. 3, p. 676; Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 151; Touma, p. 126.

[14] Touma, pp. 131-132.

interrelationship was clearly reflected in Sheikh Bashīr Junblāṭ's attitude toward Amīr Bashīr II and the demographic supremacy of the Christians. Junblāṭ, well aware of how the demographics of the region could modify the balance of forces on Mt. Lebanon and in the Biqāᶜ, tried in 1805-1806 to annex the Druze district of Iqlīm al-Billān to his *muqāṭaᶜa*. At the same time, he planned to concentrate all Druzes in one single region in order to strengthen both his own rule and the Druze community. To this end he attempted to bring the Druzes of Jabal al-Aᶜlā to the Biqāᶜ, which was under his jurisdiction, and to move the Druzes out of Palestine and settle them into the Jizzīn district. Junblāṭ's ultimate aim was to create a Druze zone, extending from the coast in the west to Ḥawrān in the east.[15]

The *sheikh*'s intention was likely motivated by his covert rivalry with Amīr Bashīr. Burkhardt alludes to this motivation when describing Junblāṭ as virtual ruler of Mt. Lebanon and leader of the whole Druze community.[16] According to Guys, Sheikh Junblāṭ "hoped to attain the highest authority of the Mountain... He was the rival and not the subject of the great prince [Bashīr II]... his large wealth, added to his ability in commanding troops, granted him the leadership of the Druze nation, and gave him the superiority needed to be the second authority in the mountain." Junblāṭ's ambition was "to seize power, taking advantage of the great influence that his coreligionists had on the affairs of the country."[17]

Bashīr Junblāṭ was also well aware of the Sunnī Ottoman context in which the Druzes lived and of the influence of the Muslim *wālīs* of Acre and Damascus. In 1818 he erected a mosque in his village, al-Mukhtāra, and ordered his coreligionists to fast during Ramaḍān and to close their cafés throughout the month of the fast.[18] According to Mishāqa, a contemporary chronicler, the building of the mosque and the "manifestation" of Islamism were interpreted by Junblāṭ's opponents as acts meant to remove the Shihābīs and seize power for himself.[19]

The rivalry between the two Bashīrs broke out into the open in 1822, when Junblāṭ supported the Ottomans and the *wālī* of

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[15] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 15.
[16] Burkhardt, pp. 194-200.
[17] H. Guys, *Beyrouth et le Liban, Relation d'un Séjour de plusieurs années dans ce pays*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1850), vol. 2, p. 79, 121.
[18] Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 139.
[19] Mishāqa, p. 66; see Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, note p. 15.

Damascus against ʿAbdalla Pasha, the *wālī* of Acre and Amīr Bashīr's ally.[20] The *amīr* was forced to flee to Egypt. However, in 1823 the Ottomans restored the *wālī* of Acre and Amīr Bashīr in their favor. Reinstalled, the latter used his return to rid himself of his powerful opponent and to complete his policy of eliminating those he termed the "big heads."[21]

Whereas Sheikh Bashīr Junblāṭ's camp contained Druzes from all the traditional factions, including the Abū Nakads and Arslāns, Amīr Bashīr's force was mainly Christian.[22] The enmity was not merely one between feudal factions. Those few Druze *sheikhs* who did ally themselves with the *amīr* were unsuccessful in mobilizing most of their partisans. Many of these, in fact, disobeyed the order of their traditional chiefs not to join the Junblāṭ ranks. The political rivalry among the three parties of the Abū Nakads, Yazbaks, and Junblāṭs was set aside while instead they consolidated their religious ties.[23] Those Druze religious leaders who had intervened during the peasant revolts of 1820-1821 now made an even greater effort to effect a reconciliation among the Druze factions[24] in order to mobilize the whole community against Amīr Bashīr. More than fourteen thousand armed Druzes eventually enlisted.[25] Mishāqa has in a critical manner described the Druze and Christian religious leaders' intervention in political affairs, the way they mobilized each camp and their use of religious slogans[26] to arouse them. Shidyāq, who saw the conflict as a revolt (*ḥarakat al-mukhtāra*) against the prince of Lebanon, also wrote that the Lebanese generally viewed it as a war between Druzes and Christians.[27]

Reinforced by troops supplied by the *wālī* of Acre, Amīr Bashīr defeated the Druze *sheikh* in a major encounter near Samqāniyyā in 1825. Junblāṭ and three hundred of his supporters attempted to flee to Ḥawrān, but the *sheikh* was captured, taken to Acre, and executed. The Junblāṭ family's various holdings in Shūf, Iqlīm al-

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20 Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 176.
21 Abū Ṣāliḥ, *at-Tāʾrīkh as-Siyāsī*, p. 225.
22 Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 13.
23 Touma, p. 144.
24 Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, pp. 725-26.
25 G. Robinson, *Three Years in the East*, 2 vols. (London and Paris, 1837), vol. 2, p. 13.
26 See Mishāqa, p. 94.
27 Shidyāq, vol. 2, pp. 191-193.

Kharrūb, Iqlīm at-Tufāḥ, Jabal ar-Rīḥān, Jizzīn, and the Biqāʿ were confiscated and distributed among the *amīr*'s allies.[28]

The defeat of Bashīr Junblāṭ constituted a heavy blow to Druze power in Mt. Lebanon and in Wādī at-Taym. Druze leaders increasingly realized that their position of power on Mt. Lebanon had changed. In Wādī at-Taym, from which the Shihābīs emerged, Sheikh Bashīr's downfall had deep repercussions on the Druze attitude toward the Shihābīs. During the fighting between the two Bashīrs, the Druzes of Ḥāsbayā had been badly treated by the Shihābīs—the *sheikhs* of the most important families in this district, the Qays and Shams, had been imprisoned; others were compelled to leave the region entirely.[29] These already bad relations between the Druzes of Wādī at-Taym and their Shihābī rulers now reached their lowest point.[30] Whatever his motives, Bashīr Shihāb's actions further deepened Druze-Christian antagonism.[31]

The Shihābīs had ascended to the status of *amīrs* on Mt. Lebanon invited by the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* and as a result of a compromise among them. The Shihābī family had previously not been counted for much in the stratum of Mt. Lebanon notables. As foreigners, originating in Wādī at-Taym, they had neither "domain nor fief," nor even a militia.[32] This unsung past may explain why the Shihābī family soon divided itself into two factions corresponding to the traditional Druze bifurcation. About the beginning of the 19th century, the split in the Shihābī family took on a religious coloring as Amīr Bashīr began increasingly to draw upon Christian support within Mt. Lebanon society. Nothing in the Druze community could match the organizational and unifying power of the Maronite Church. The closest Druze equivalent were the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, and the emasculation of their power effectively dissolved the community into autonomous villages.[33]

While Amīr Bashīr's actions against the Druzes were probably motivated more by personal and familial considerations than by

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[28] *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 193-198; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 13-15; see also Guys, *Beyrouth*, vol. 1, pp. 279-280.

[29] Mishāqa, p. 104.

[30] Y.H. ʿAmmār, *Tāʾrīkh Wādī at-Taym wal-aqālīm al-Mujāwira* (Yanta, Lebanon, 1985), p. 412.

[31] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 26.

[32] Guys, *Beyrouth*, vol. 1, pp. 283-284.

[33] W.R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840, A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 132-133.

confessional factors,[34] the policy he carried out was to lead to the ultimate decline of the Lebanese Druze community. In his description of the Qunṭār family after Sheikh Bashīr Junblāṭ's death, Maᶜlūf gives a good example of the situation faced by many Druzes: "The *amīr* weakened the Druzes. Among the latter were Banū al-Qunṭār, who had been perpetrating horrible acts around Zaḥla and in Biqāᶜ .... With the help of Zaḥla's residents, the Maᶜlūf family were the main force in excluding Banū al-Qunṭār [from the region]. Some of them [the Qunṭārs] fled to Lebanon, others to Ḥawrān."[35] In fact, Banū al-Qunṭār, like other Druze families such as Banu Ḥāṭūm, were the victims of that period of upheaval that had begun in the last decade of the 18th century and had lasted until Bashīr Junblāṭ's defeat in 1825. Before their exodus to Ḥawrān, these two families wandered about Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym without settling in any one place. Even then they managed to lead several peasant revolts against the authorities.

In the 1790s, Banū Ḥāṭūm had been instrumental in the opposition to the *amīr*'s tax collections in Matn. From their village base at the time, Kafr Silwān, the Ḥāṭūms forced the troops who had come to put down the revolt (*ḥarakat kafr Silwān*) to withdraw from Matn.[36] This insurrection was mainly a Druze action and easily suppressed by Jazzār.[37] In 1799-1800, Banū al-Qunṭār faced the sons of Amīr Yūsuf, who had attacked Matn from Baᶜlbak. At first, the Qunṭārs were able to stop the Shihābī troops. The latter, however, massed against one of the villages, al-Mtayn, and gained entry, burning houses and driving the Qunṭārs out of the Matn district.[38] In 1805, Banū Ḥāṭūm and Banū Qunṭār renewed their revolt against Amīr Bashīr in disobedience of their *muqāṭaᶜjī*, Abū al-Lamᶜ. As in previous cases, Amīr Bashīr employed the troops of the *wālī* of Acre to dash the incipient revolt.[39] Thereafter Banū Qunṭār's opposition to the *amīr* took on a clear sectarian dimension.[40] From 1821 to 1825, Banū Ḥāṭūm and Banū Qunṭār led Druze attacks against Christian villages in Matn and the Biqāᶜ.[41]

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[34] Touma, p. 147.
[35] Maᶜlūf, *Dawānī*, pp. 235-36.
[36] Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 121.
[37] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 1, pp. 161-162.
[38] Munayir, p. 475; Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 1, pp. 206-212.
[39] *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 436-437.
[40] Maᶜlūf, *Dawānī*, p. 124, 235, 494.
[41] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, p. 779.

With the *amīr*'s victory over Junblāṭ, however, the Ḥāṭūms and Qunṭārs and their followers were more easily thrown out of their villages, al-Mtayn and Muʿalaqat Zaḥla, by the Christian villagers and troops. The Druzes escaped to Wādī at-Taym where a woman named ʿAmsha al-Qunṭār mobilized the population to oppose the Shihābīs. The Qunṭārs stayed until 1840, when they began to migrate to Jabal Ḥawrān;[42] later they settled in Dāmā and became one of the leading families of the community.

In his chronicles, Ḥaydar Shihāb relates the migration to Ḥawrān that took place after 1825 and tells of the measures taken by Amīr Bashīr against the defeated Druzes.[43] Abū Shaqrā goes into more detail about these measures: "... property confiscation, exile, destruction of houses, and crop damage. These acts obliged a great number of Druzes, Junblāṭ's supporters, to migrate to Jabal Hawrān. A few years after the fighting against Sheikh [Bashīr], most of the vacant ruins and villages of the Jabal were settled by the fugitives who now crowded in."[44]

In 1831, Poujoulat observed the radical changes that had been introduced on Mt. Lebanon:

> Fifteen or twenty years ago, the Druze people was more numerous and powerful; the vainglorious ambition of the Amir has ruthlessly annihilated them; most of the Druze leaders were immolated or denounced, and now the war-like people who dominated Lebanon for so long a time appear to the traveler more as live remains, attesting to a horrible vengeance. Before their recent misfortunes, the Druzes could easily mobilize thirty thousand men under arms, and their population amounted to more than one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants; today this needy people, men, women, and children, numbers about sixty thousand persons, a population which is docile and trembling under the hand that oppresses it.[45]

The Druzes under Ibrāhīm Pasha

Poujoulat exaggerated in his estimates both of the original Druze population and of their decrease because of Bashīr Shihāb's policy. His description of their status, however, correctly reflects the

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[42] Ṣghayar, p. 779.
[43] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, p. 777.
[44] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 14-15.
[45] M. Poujoulat, *Correspondence d'Orient*, 7 vols. (Paris, 1834), vol. 4, pp. 341-342.

situation of the Lebanese Druzes, and their awareness of the fact that they were losing power in the country. Although in 1831, when he sided with the Egyptians, Amīr Bashīr endeavored to make peace with the Druze *sheikhs* and the Druze fugitives,[46] the behavior of the *sheikhs* during the Egyptian invasion of Syria, under Muḥammad ʿAlī's son, Ibrāhīm Pasha, in 1831-32, testifies to their mistrust and suspicions of the *amīr* and his new allies. Amīr Bashīr's defection from the Ottoman side to that of the Egyptians was considered by the Druze *sheikhs* as offering them an opportunity to regain their lost power. Most of them, including the Junblāṭs, Abū Nakads, and ʿImāds, joined the Ottoman troops to defend the region against the Egyptian invasion.[47] Even Ḥammūd Abū Nakad, the only Druze *sheikh* who had accompanied the *amīr*'s troops to Tripoli, where they were to engage the Ottomans, tried to join ʿUthmān Pasha, the leader of the Ottoman forces. Abū Nakad's plan failed after a letter he had sent to ʿUthmān Pasha was intercepted by Amīr Bashīr.[48]

Ḥaydar Shihāb and Shidyāq, the two chroniclers of Lebanon at the time, describe the mood of the Druze as one of *hayajān* and *iḍṭirāb*, i.e., excitement and agitation.[49] This state found expression in secret correspondence among the Druze *sheikhs*, who clearly hoped for an Ottoman victory.[50] In the event, ʿUthmān Pasha was beaten at Tripoli and ʿAkkār. The defeat, however, did not change the Druzes' general attitude toward Amīr Bashīr and his Egyptian ally, and they refrained from collaborating with him; the Junblāṭs, who had taken the side of the Ottomans, continued to receive Ottoman support, though in secret.[51] The invasion of Syria by Ibrāhīm Pasha only served to deepen sectarian sentiments. There had already been another outbreak of fighting between Druzes and Christians in Dayr al-Qamar, Zaḥla, and Matn in June 1831, even before Ibrāhīm Pasha reached Mt. Lebanon.[52] These hostilities further presaged the conflict that would engulf Mt. Lebanon from

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[46] Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 205.
[47] *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 207.
[48] *Ibid.*, also Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, p. 832.
[49] *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 831; and Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 217. The French consul wrote in the same sense: "agitation ... Des Druzes ex-partisans de ... check Beshir et qu'on nomme encore aujourd'hui Djumblatiês se sont retirés à Damas." Jorell à Sébastien, No. 13, Beirut, 10 April 1832, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 219.
[50] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, p. 831. Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 217.
[51] Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, pp. 840-845.
[52] Shidyāq, vol. 2, p. 207.

1841-1860, when factional antagonism gave way to open sectarian warfare.

In the first year of his occupation of Mt. Lebanon Ibrāhīm Pasha did not introduce any significant changes in either the fiscal system or the traditional organization of the society. In response to the hostile position taken by the Druzes at the beginning of his invasion of Syria, Ibrāhīm Pasha sent troops to Dayr al-Qamar to ensure tranquility. His tactics was to take two hostages from each important Druze family[53] in the area. In the absence of their leaders, who had fled in 1831-32 and joined the Ottomans, and faced with the wall of cooperation between the Egyptians and Amīr Bashīr, the Druzes could do little but swallow their pride—and wait for or hope for an Ottoman victory in north Syria.

In 1833 Ibrāhīm Pasha imposed a head tax, called *firda*,[54] complemented by other taxes and the retention in some areas, such as Mt. Lebanon, of the smaller traditional taxes. The resultant burden of taxation soon became oppressive in the extreme. Two years later, Ibrāhīm Pasha instituted conscription under the now-disarmed Mt. Lebanon population.[55] It were these measures which set in motion the decline of the traditional structure of the Lebanese *imāra*. This state of affairs, as reflected, e.g., in Bashīr's much subordinated status, was observed by Richard Wood,[56] a special British emissary to Mt. Lebanon who visited the *amīr* in September 1835. Writing to Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador to the Porte in Istanbul, Wood said of this meeting:

> Almost the first topic introduced, being the most recent, was the conscription and its results. The prince, overcautious, laid a restraint on his feeling and not choosing to condemn it, observed that all potentates used the same means to recruit their Armies.... That the Emir Bashir takes part contrary to his will with the Egyptian government against his legitimate sovereign.[57]

In October 1835 Bashīr's *imāra* was under the full control of Ibrāhīm Pasha, who arrived in Bayt ad-Dīn, the main seat of the

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[53] Polk, pp. 100-101.

[54] Mishāqa, p. 121.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[56] Wood was a British agent sent to Syria to observe events and establish contact with Amīr Bashīr in order to win him over from the Egyptians.

[57] Wood to Ponsonby, Aleppo, 28 September 1835; A.B. Cunningham, *The Early Correspondence of Richard Wood* (London, 1966), p. 60.

amīr, with fifteen thousand troops in order to disarm all Lebanese.[58] By order of the Egyptian ruler, the *amīr* was obliged to publish a decree to this effect. The locals were allowed three days to deliver up their arms; refusal would lead to having their houses set on fire.[59] The Druzes tried to reach a compromise on conscription, and proposed joining the Egyptian army as irregulars. Meanwhile, they began secretly to prepare for resistance: they "ordered the powder mills immediately to start operating, though this had been prohibited two years before, and made all necessary preparations for resistance."[60]

These actions, though, were to no avail. Without their leaders, it was impossible for the Druze peasants to organize themselves. Those who attempted to do so were seized and imprisoned in Beirut, and the disarming continued without much incident.[61] Amīr Bashīr in effect had lost his sovereignty. Bowring, after visiting him, reported that "the Emir Bashir evidently feels that his political rule is at an end."[62] On 13 October 1835 Wood summarized the position of the Druzes and of Amīr Bashīr as follows:

> It appears that the Emir Bashir, afraid of the intention of the Druzes in case he took up arms against Ibrahim Pasha, is determined to sacrifice them to his personal safety; and according to previous agreement, the Pasha suddenly presented himself at the residence of the prince with a few attendants, but in the course of an hour, from twelve to fifteen thousand troops joined him from various directions. The Pasha immediately demanded the arms of the Druzes, who, panic-struck and without a leader, offered no resistance. The Emir Bashir used his utmost efforts in forwarding the views of the Pasha, and dispatched his sons and other armies to different provinces to collect [arms].[63]

By the end of 1835, not only had the Druzes lost their traditional power and their ability to resist, the entire political framework of the Shihābī *imara* had collapsed. Bashīr, now totally subordinated to Ibrāhīm Pasha, had little choice but to help the Egyptians achieve control over Mt. Lebanon. In so doing, he deliberately perhaps, or

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[58] Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 195, No. 127, Moore to Ponsonby No. 4, Beirut, 2 October 1835; Guys to Broglie, No. 5, Beirut, 1 October 1835; *DDC*, vol. 5, pp. 336-337.

[59] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 4, Beirut, 2 October 1835.

[60] Wood to Ponsonby, Aleppo, 28 September 1835; Cunningham, p. 60.

[61] FO 195/127 Moore to Ponsonby, No. 5, Beirut, 8 October 1835; No. 6, Beirut, 21 October 1835.

[62] Cited by Polk, p. 156.

[63] Wood to Ponsonby, Beirut, 13 October 1835; Cunningham, p. 64.

indirectly at the least, prevented the Druzes of Mt. Lebanon from taking any optional course of resistance. By disarming the Druzes, Ibrāhīm Pasha wanted to obviate any possible cooperation between the Druzes and the Ottomans. The order to disarm had been issued on 16 June 1835 by Muḥammad ʿAlī himself—Amīr Bashīr was the instrument for the execution of this order. Meanwhile, Bashīr had to supply military "assistance" to Ibrāhīm Pasha, not from the traditional manpower source, the Druzes, but from among the Christians, who were subsequently re-armed by the Egyptians. It was within this political context that the sectarian antagonism, of which the first marks had already appeared before the Egyptian invasion, began to draw Mt. Lebanon's society into an increasingly explosive situation.

Besides now enjoying political and military benefits, the Christians also began to benefit from the economic changes introduced by Ibrāhīm Pasha. The Egyptian ruler encouraged agricultural activities and pushed the Lebanese economy to greater linkage with European trade. The role of the Druzes in this economic transformation was limited, and even adversely affected. The Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, in exile, were barred from sharing in the resulting prosperity, while the Druze peasantry was drawn into closer dependence on the foreign market. The Christian communities, in contrast, grew relatively wealthy—those who had been peasants of Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* in the 1830s were, by the end of the Egyptian reign, their moneylenders.[64] The relationship between the political impotency of the Druzes in Mt. Lebanon and their depressed economic situation was analyzed in 1835 by the British consul in Damascus:

> The chief production of those parts [Mt. Lebanon] is silk, which is only valuable to them as a commercial outside, and if during an insurrection their mulberry trees were injured or cut down or their cultivation abandoned for one season only, the resources of the people would be greatly distressed. Their supplies of oil, corn, meat, and cotton were, within their own districts, very insufficient for their wants and drawn from the plain of ... Bekaa, Baalbeck and the coast, the people would soon be reduced by famine if they were cut off from those parts which the Pasha could easily do.[65]

Unable to resist Ibrāhīm Pasha either politically or economically,

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[64] Polk, pp. 173-174.
[65] FO 195/94, Werry to Willington, No. 28, Damascus, 21 May 1835.

the Druzes increasingly migrated to Ḥawrān. As in the past, during the Jazzār period and, later, during the conflict between Sheikh Bashīr and Amīr Bashīr, Ḥawrān became the shelter for Druzes who could not sustain the hardships of Mt. Lebanon. In a report in November, Henry Guys, the French consul in Beirut, described conditions there and their impact on Druze emigration to Ḥawrān thus:

> The Druzes sell their properties in the mountain [of Lebanon] and considering the extreme rarity of the metallic currency, they are forced to sell below half the real prices.... The Druzes, who are moreover held in poor esteem since Sheikh Pashir's defeat, are not far from emigrating to the uncultivated plains of Hawrān and settling there. In this vast region there are already some Druze villages.[66]

The Druze Revolt against Ibrāhīm Pasha, 1837-1838

In 1838, when the Druze revolt in Ḥawrān against Ibrāhīm Pasha put their community momentarily into the limelight, the British consul in Beirut began to report to London on Druze migration into Ḥawrān: "From time to time, fugitives from Mt. Lebanon and other quarters join them [the Druzes of Ḥawrān]. To prevent this as much as possible, the Emir Bashir has stationed troops at different points."[67] In addition to the refugees from Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym, Druzes from Palestine also arrived during the years of Ibrāhīm Pasha's rule. The Druze community in Ḥawrān as a result became more populous than ever before. The oral tradition as well as accounts of European travelers at the end of the 19th century describe the partial destruction of Druze settlements in the Galilee and the Carmel during this period. Thus, in 1872, Major R. Conder, who headed an exploring expedition, wrote that "in 1837 [the Druze] had many villages in the Carmel slopes, but these were ruthlessly destroyed by Ibrahim Pasha and only two now remain."[68] L. Oliphant, who built a house for himself in Dāliat al-Karmel in the 1880s, was able to obtain information from local inhabitants about what had occurred during the period of Egyptian suzerainty in this region:

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[66] Guys to Molé, No. 75, Beirut, 11 November 1837, DDC, vol. 5, p. 369-370.
[67] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 6, Beirut, 4 April 1838; see also No. 11, Beirut, 22 June 1838.
[68] C.R. Conder, *Text Work in Palestine*, 2 vols. (London, 1878), vol. 1, p. 172.

> When the Druzes first settled here, they founded no fewer than eight villages, but when forty years ago this country was conquered by Egypt and governed by Ibrahim Pasha, his rule was distasteful to the majority of Druzes, and the inhabitants of six villages abandoned them, and migrated to Jebel [Ḥawrān].[69]

The Druzes from Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, and Palestine came to Ḥawrān uprooted from their previous social frameworks: the villages, families, and even the prevailing factionalism. In the new region, their sense of communal solidarity grew stronger than ever before, having first been forged in their battles against Ottoman and Egyptian oppression and then shaped in their clashes with the Bedouins who lived in the area. From the start of Druze settlement in Ḥawrān, newcomers were subordinated to the military leaders of the ruling Ḥamdān family, because endemic wars kept the Druzes of Ḥawrān constantly on a martial footing. Until 1832 the Druzes did their best to evade confrontation with the authorities in Hawrān, probably because they lacked the ability to successfully resist the intervention of the officials. This was certainly the case in 1828, when Ṣāliḥ Pasha, *wālī* of Damascus, captured Sheikh Yūsuf al-Ḥamdān, executed him, and confiscated his property. The Ḥamdāns thereafter were compelled to live as refugees in Niḥā on Mt. Lebanon, at least until a new *wālī* in Damascus was nominated.[70] How, then, was it possible for Yaḥyā al-Ḥamdān, Yūsuf's successor, to incite the Druze community to revolt against the most powerful ruler of the region when barely ten years earlier the Ḥamdān family had been forced to flee Ḥawrān?

While it is difficult to precisely follow the peregrinations of the Druze newcomers, the development of their settlement in Ḥawrān may go some way to explain their ability to resist Ibrāhīm Pasha. The first settlement was set up in northwest Jabal Ḥawrān. From here the Druzes spread gradually to the south, to ʿIrā and al-ʿAfīna; to the east, to Shahbā; then turned to the north, to Wādī al-Liwā on the border of Lajā up to Khalkhala. They began to penetrate the Lajā, and occupied the villages of ʿĀhira (now called ʿArīqa) and Kharsa. By the first third of the 19th century, more than thirty

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69 Oliphant, p. 110.
70 Shihāb, *Tāʾrīkh al-Umarā*, vol. 3, p. 795.

villages in Ḥawrān were partly or totally inhabited by Druzes.[71] By settling the villages on the border of Lajā as well as those of the highest mountain chain near as-Suwaydā the Druzes occupied the most strategic areas of Jabal Ḥawrān. By populating Najrān, Kafr al-Luḥf and Rimat al-Luḥf on the southern border, and villages in Wādī al-Liwā on the eastern border, they in fact partly surrounded the Slūṭ tribe, which till then had dominated the heart of Lajā. Earlier, in the south of Jabel Ḥawrān, the Druzes had tried to reach Ṣalkhad and ʿUrmān but were driven out by the Bedouins. Burkhardt tells of the aftermath: "The Castle of Szalkhat [Ṣalkhad] ... is now [1811] uninhabited by fifteen years, since a few Druze and Christian families were [last] established here, as well as at Oemran [ʿUrmān]; the latter retired to Khabab, where I afterwards saw them and where they [are] still called Szalkhalie [Ṣalakhdiyya]."[72]

Unlike the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* on Mt. Lebanon, whose fractious disposition facilitated external manipulation, the family chiefs in Ḥawrān succeeded in overcoming their divisions. The Ḥamdān *sheikhs*, who controlled at least eight villages near as-Suwaydā, their main seat, maintained their status as the paramount figures of the Ḥawrān community,[73] and until the revolt against Ibrāhīm Pasha had no serious rivals. Each of the leading families that had come at the beginning of the Ḥawrān settlement ruled the southeast and northeast sections of the region:[74] the Ḥalabīs and ʿAmīrs, who had arrived from Jabal al-Aʿlā at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, predominated in the vast region encompassing southeast as-Suwaydā and north Shahbā. It was to these areas, too, that the newcomers from Mt. Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, and Palestine had come as refugees in flight from, first, Amīr Bashīr and then Ibrāhīm Pasha.

The Druze revolt against Ibrāhīm Pasha broke out in reaction to his order to conscript a hundred and seventy-five to a hundred and eighty regulars from Jabal Ḥawrān. Yaḥyā al-Ḥamdān was invited by Sharīf Pasha, the *ḥukumdār* (civil governor) of Syria, to Damascus to receive the order. At the meeting, Ḥamdān requested an exemption from the order in return for a payment in grain. Rejecting the

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[71] Burkhardt (pp. 55-100) visited about thirty villages inhabited by Druzes; see also Lewis' map, p. 83.

[72] Burkhardt, p. 100.

[73] Burkhardt tells of eight villages without giving their names.

[74] Bʿaynī, p. 176.

proposed deal, Sharīf Pasha struck the Druze chief across the face. When he returned to Ḥawrān, Yaḥyā immediately convened a general meeting of Druze leaders in as-Suwaydā, which Shiblī al-ʿAryān of Wādī at-Taym also attended, which turned into a council of war: preparations for a revolt began after consultation with the religious head, Sheikh Ibrāhīm al-Hajarī. Two commanders, Ḥusayn Abū ʿAssāf and Ḥusayn Darwīsh, were appointed. The decision was made to evacuate the villages in Jabal Ḥawrān and to withdraw into Lajā, where the Druzes would ally themselves with the Slūṭ tribe.[75]

The exact year of the start of the revolt is subject to controversy, even among the first historians of the event. Maʿlūf dated it the end of 1835.[76] Abū Rāshid and Najjār, both of whom attributed the revolt to the humiliation of Yaḥyā al-Ḥamdān, stated that it was planned and organized in 1836.[77] According to Sulaymān Abū-ʿIzzeddīn, on the other hand, the revolt broke out at the end of 1837 in reaction to Ibrāhīm Pasha's conscription order.[78]

The reports of the French and British consuls, who were watching each and every movement made by Egyptian troops in the region, suggest that Abū ʿIzzeddīn's account comes closest to the mark. In April 1837 the British consul, Moore, reported:

> ... troops from Beyrouth and Sidon and other places in the neighbourhood have been hastily summoned to Damascus.... The cause of this sudden movement is variously accounted for. By some it is believed to be for the purpose of protecting the pilgrims expected on their return from Mecca.... By others, that the troops are destined for Hawran to be employed in destroying the eggs of the locusts.... whilst a third conjecture assigns the Hejaz as their destination.[79]

The stay of these troops, however, was short, as they returned in June 1837.[80] There is no indication in Moore's reports of any insurrection in the area of Ḥawrān.

The first reports in which the French and British consuls refer to

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[75] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 47-48; Bʿaynī, pp. 179-180; Najjār, pp. 92-93.

[76] I. Maʿluf, "Durūz Ḥawrān wa Ibrāhīm Bāshā," *al-Muqtaṭaf*, May 1926, p. 558.

[77] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 48; Najjār, pp. 91-92.

[78] Sulaymān Abū ʿIzzeddīn, "Nuzūḥ ad-Durūz Ilā Ḥawrān wa Ḥarbuḥum ḍidda Ibrāhīm Bāshā," *al-Muqtaṭaf*, March 1926, p. 317.

[79] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 4, Beirut, 3 April 1837.

[80] *Ibid.*, No. 7, Beirut, 17 June 1837.

an uprising were dated January 1838.[81] Four hundred troops, led by ʿAlī Agha al-Būsaylī and the governor of Ḥawrān, ʿAbd al-Qādir Agha Abū-Ḥabīb, attacked the Druzes.[82] The force, sent by Sharīf Pasha to impose the conscription, suffered severely in this first battle of the revolt: ʿAbd al-Qādir Agha himself was killed along with a large number of his troops.[83] The fighting took place at Thaʿla, suggesting that even up to the beginning of 1838, the Druzes had not yet withdrawn into Lajā, nor had the revolt been as planned and organized as some sources would have it.[84] The Egyptian troops despatched from Damascus were slaughtered at night by Druze peasants.[85] When a second force was sent, this one consisting of some six thousand regulars, the Druzes were obliged to organize their resistance in a more serious way. They concluded an agreement with the Slūṭ tribe of the Lajā and, taking with them their families as well as all their movable property, retreated into the interior villages of Lajā, Dāmā and Ṣmaid. The Egyptian force, led by Muḥammad Pasha, the commander of the Egyptian army, followed them there. The government troops, however, exhausted by both the hilly, rocky terrain and the lack of water, were easily repulsed by the Druzes near Ṣmaid.[86] A new force, jointly led by Minikly Pasha, the Egyptian minister of war, and by Sharīf Pasha, was ordered to the scene. Once again, the Egyptians were defeated[87] by some two thousand Druze insurgents employing "attack and escape" tactics devised by Shiblī al-ʿAryān.[88]

The three successive defeats suffered by Egyptian troops led Ibrāhīm Pasha himself to come from Aleppo to take the rebels in

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[81] Guys to Molé, No. 80, Beirut, 10 February 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5., p. 378.
[82] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 1, Beirut, 11 January 1838.
[83] Mishāqa, p. 123.
[84] See notes 77 and 78.
[85] According to some sources, this force numbered five hundred soldiers, all but thirty of whom were killed; see Bʿaynī, p. 181.
[86] According to the British consul, the army's losses were two hundred and fifty-two killed, one hundred and fifty wounded, and about fifteen thousand guns and pieces of equipment captured by the Druzes; FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 2, Damascus, 9 January 1838; see also A. Rustum, *al-Maḥfūẓāt al-Malakiyya al-Miṣriyya* (hereafter, *Maḥfūẓāt*) (A Calendar of State Papers, Egypt, from 1810-1841), 4 vols. (Beirut, 1940-1943), vol. 3, p. 325.
[87] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 4, Beirut, 17 February 1838; FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 3, Damascus, 16 February 1838; *Maḥfūẓāt*, vol. 3, p. 325.
[88] Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Taʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, p. 209.

hand. For this attack he mobilized his best troops, Albanians, who were known in Lajā and elsewhere as skillful fighters. In addition, he sent for reinforcements from Ḥama, Acre, and Aleppo. According to the British consul, the government's army numbered fifteen thousand men, all bearing arms.[89] On the advice of his French general, Sulaymān Pasha (né Clote), Ibrāhīm Pasha proceeded to blockade the Lajā rather than risk entering it. At the same time, the governor of Damascus, Sharīf Pasha, opened negotiations with the insurgents, who were warned to lay down their arms and to accept the conscription order. "The Druzes [however] insisted on keeping their arms and refused to furnish conscripts and to deliver up the chiefs of the revolt."[90] Ibrāhīm Pasha, while training his own troops for the battle until April 1838, used local manpower for forays against the Druzes. The populous tribe of ʿAnza, who occupied the desert on the eastern side of the Lajā, captured considerable stocks of merchandise and animals from the Druzes, while the Wild ʿAlī tribe, who occupied the southern boundary of the Lajā, also openly went to war with the Druzes.[91] Following an appeal by Ibrāhīm Pasha, Amīr Bashīr, too, sent a body of Christian irregulars to act against the insurgents.[92]

Faced with an enemy of such proportions, the Druzes first tried to expand their revolt to other areas in Syria and Lebanon. Emissaries and secret letters were sent to recruit certain notables in Damascus:[93] Shamdīn Agha, leader of the Kurds; Sheikh Ḍiyaʾ al-Hijānī, the *muftī* ; and Būzalī Agha, head of the Maydān quarter. Unfortunately for the insurgents, the letters were discovered by Ḥāfiz Pasha, the *mutasalem* of Damascus.[94] Apart from Būzalī Agha, whom the insurgents invited to lead the rebellion in the city, "no other position of rank or wealth ... has been implicated with the

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[89] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 4, Damascus, 7 March 1838; No. 5, 13 April 1838; FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 4, Beirut, 10 March 1838. Other sources put this armed force for the "last attack" at about forty thousand men; See Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, p. 214; Bʿaynī, p. 183.

[90] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 4, Damascus, 7 March 1838.

[91] *Ibid.*, No. 5, 13 April 1838; Guys to Molé, No. 83, Beirut, 16 April 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 382.

[92] *Ibid.*; Polk, p. 139

[93] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 4, Damascus, 7 March 1838.

[94] Details about the notables to whom Yaḥyā al-Ḥamdān had written, how these letters were discovered, and the Druze effort to incite the population of Damascus may be found in *Maḥfūẓāt*, vol. 3, pp. 334-340.

insurgents."[95] Būzalī Agha was soon arrested, however, and the Druzes' attempt to expand the revolt failed. Their situation aggravated even more when the Slūṭ, the Lajā tribe which had allied itself with the Druzes at the start of the revolt, not merely surrendered to Ibrāhīm Pasha, but even joined the Egyptian army as irregulars.[96]

Since March, when Ibrāhīm Pasha had begun preparing his army for the "final attack," the insurgents employed tactics based on three principles: to open up a new front in the Druze districts of the Ghūṭa, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Wādī at-Taym; to disrupt communications between Damascus and Beirut, Jerusalem, and Cairo; and to negotiate an amnesty. At the beginning of April, Shiblī al-ᶜAryān set out from the Lajā with fifty insurgents to instigate revolts in Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān. Thirty-five to forty Druze villages took up the cause, and the number of insurgents in this area climbed to eight thousand, sufficient to attack the Egyptians everywhere in the area.[97] Soon the Druzes of Mt. Lebanon began streaming in to join their brethren, increasing the ranks of the insurgents daily. From April onward, it seemed that the entire Druze community was in state of rebellion. The roads from Damascus to Beirut, Jerusalem, and Cairo were cut off by the Druzes.[98] From Majdal-Shams in Iqlīm al-Billān Shiblī al-ᶜAryān could maneuver easily to and from Wādī at-Taym and disturb almost at will the Egyptian army supply convoys bringing provisions to Ḥawrān. He also cut off the consular mail between Damascus and Beirut, as several British and French mentioned.[99]

Preoccupied with the Druze reinforcements from Mt. Lebanon, Ibrāhīm Pasha ordered his ally, Amīr Bashīr, to send about one thousand men against the insurgents in Wādī at-Taym.[100] The first

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[95] *Ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 334-336; FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 4, Damascus, 7 March 1838.

[96] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 8, Beirut, 18 May 1838; FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 6, Damascus, 1 May 1838.

[97] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 5, Damascus, 13 April 1838; R. Bāz, *Mudhakarāt*, ed. by Fū'ād al-Bustānī, 2nd. ed. (Beirut, 1968), p. 32.

[98] See al-Baḥrī's letter to Ibrāhīm Pasha, 26 Thī al-Qiᶜda 1253; *Maḥfūẓāt*, vol. 3, p. 337; FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 7, 7 April 1838; De Deval to Molé, Beirut, No. 4, Beirut, 23 June 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 388.

[99] On the Druze moves, see al-Baḥrī to Ibrāhīm Pasha, 26 Thī a-Qiᶜda 1253; *Maḥfūẓāt*, vol. 3, pp. 337-338; Guys to Molé, No. 1, Beirut, 13 May 1838; *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 384; FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 11, Beirut, 22 June 1838, No. 13, Beirut, 28 June 1838 and No. 19, Beirut, 1 August 1838.

[100] This number was suggested by Muḥammad Sharīf Pasha. For the figure of

attack against the rebels in this area occurred in the village of Dirbel al-Fauqa on 7 April.[101] According to the British consul in Beirut, the battle started at nine o'clock in the morning and lasted till evening. The Egyptian army, led by Aḥmad Bek, consisted of the sixth infantry regiment, three hundred Bedouin cavalry, and five hundred irregulars. The Druzes were overwhelmed, losing thirty-three dead, four taken prisoner, and scores wounded. The Egyptian losses numbered thirteen killed and sixty-five wounded.[102]

After this defeat, Shiblī al-ʿAryān took his men to Rāshayā, where he killed the governor and took control of the town. One of his first acts was to levy the *mīrī* on all the surrounding villages.[103] Meanwhile Druzes from different parts of Mt. Lebanon continued to join the insurgents. For example, about forty Druzes left the village of Shwayfāt "firing their muskets in open day [and] calling on their countrymen to join them against the Pasha's troops."[104] Ibrāhīm Pasha reinforced his own troops in Wādī at-Taym, and asked Amīr Bashīr to increase his Christian irregulars. The appeal eventually resulted in another four thousand Christian troops, under the command of Amīr Khalīl, Bashīr's son.[105] The *amīr* also expelled all Druzes who were employed in his palace. He saw to it that the Christians of Dayr al-Qamar and Zaḥla were armed[106] and issued a proclamation threatening to destroy homes and villages of those who would join the insurgents.[107]

Among the Druze who had left Mt. Lebanon for Wādī at-Taym were two *sheikhs*, Ḥasan Junblāṭ and Nāsir ad-Dīn al-ʿImād,[108] who were soon leading the Druzes into battle at Wādī Bakkā in south

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seven to eight thousand Lebanese Christians, see Muḥammad Sharīf to Ibrāhīm Pasha, 29 Thī al-Qiʿda 1253; *Maḥfūẓāt*, vol. 3, pp. 339-340; FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 7, Beirut, 7 April 1838; see also Bāz, *Mudhakarāt*, p. 32.

101 ʿAmmār, p. 269-20.

102 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 7, Beirut, 7 April 1838; A. Rustum, *Bashīr bayna as-Sulṭān wa al-ʿAzīz 1804-1841*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1956-7), vol. 2, p. 141.

103 FO 145/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 11, Beirut, 22 June 1838; No. 14, Beirut, 29 June 1838.

104 *Ibid.*

105 Rustum, *Bashīr*, vol. 2, p. 142.

106 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 14, Beirut, 29 June 1838. According to the French consul, the number was six to eight thousand, among them two thousand cavalries; Alex de Deval to Molé, No. 2, Beirut, 10 June 1858, No. 4, Beirut, 23 June 1838; *DDC*, vol. 5, pp. 385-387.

107 Alex de Deval to Molé, No. 6, Beirut, 30 June 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 392.

108 Alex de Deval to Molé, No. 7, 7 July 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 396.

Rāshayā. These Druzes suffered a grievous defeat, losing more than six hundred and twenty men, among them Sheikh al-ᶜImād.[109] The encounter took place on 4 July 1838, as transpires both from a letter sent by Ibrāhīm Pasha to Amīr Bashīr and from the announcement of the victory circulated by the governor of Beirut among the European consuls.[110] Subsequently, Shiblī al-ᶜAryān moved to the southern part of Wādī at-Taym. Here the rebels were attacked by the Lebanese Christians, led by Amīr Khalīl, in a place called Janᶜam. This assault failed,[111] however, and the Druzes were able to resist further attacks until 17 July, when Egyptian troops finally overwhelmed them in the village of Shabᶜa.[112] Accompanied by about fifteen hundred men, Shiblī al-ᶜAryān fled to more defensible locations on Mt. Ḥermon;[113] however, most of the insurgents in Ḥawrān as well as elsewhere surrendered and, in keeping with the negotiated agreement, were granted amnesty.

Actually in May, while the revolt was disrupting communications and road travel, the Druze chiefs of Ḥawrān had been trying to reach an accord to put an end to their uprising. The British consul in Beirut, however, saw this attempt as a ploy to gain time.[114] It is likely that the Druzes were waiting for the intervention of the Ottomans. Indeed, at this time, Ibrāhīm Pasha himself was concerned over events on his northern border, where the Ottoman Sultan was steeling himself for the reoccupation of Syria.[115] Ibrāhīm Pasha, on his part, was by now ready to negotiate with the Druzes and even to offer a pardon, on condition that they lay down their arms and furnish a certain number of men as conscripts. While

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[109] Kurd ᶜAlī, vol. 3, p. 62; Rustum, *Bashīr*, vol. 2, p. 143. According to Bāz, the Druzes lost twelve hundred killed; Bāz, *Mudhakarāt*, p. 33.

[110] FO 195/127; copy of letter from Ibrāhīm Pasha to Amīr Bashīr and French text of the letter of Muḥammad Bek, governor of Beirut to consuls Rabiᶜ al-Awal 1254 (6 July 1838).

[111] Rustum, *Bashīr*, vol. 3, p. 143; Mishāqa, p. 120.

[112] Mishāqa, p. 120; FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 17, Beirut, 19 July 1838. From a letter of Bashīr to Muḥammad Bek, it seems that the Christians, led by Amīr Khalīl, participated in this battle; see text in French, 18 Rabīᶜ al-Akhir 1254 (11 July 1838); Annex of de Deval to Molé, No. 9, Beirut, 20 July 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, pp. 401-402.

[113] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 19, Beirut, 1 August 1838.

[114] *Ibid.*, No. 8, Beirut, 13 May 1838.

[115] D. McDowell, *The Druze Revolt 1925-27 and its Background in the Late Ottoman Period* (unpublished thesis, Oxford, 1972), p. 13. The Druzes' hope of Ottoman intervention remained until July; see de Deval to Molé, No. 8, Beirut, 16 July 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 398.

extending this offer, however, he tried at the same time to take control of the water sources in the Lajā.

Ibrāhīm Pasha's terms for amnesty were rejected by the Druze and, as a result, "the hostilities have been renewed with such vigor as to give the war the character of one of extermination." A merciless struggle for every single well of water now began between the Egyptian troops and the Druzes in Ḥawrān.[116] Ibrāhīm Pasha apparently begun this water war at the end of April, when he occupied the most important source, Sawara al Kabīra—called Sahurah in the British consul's report—which formed for the Druzes their principal water supply. The Druzes attacked this site three times, but were unable to evict the Egyptians.[117] Fierce fighting seemed to envelop every well until, eventually, the Egyptians were driven out of the Lajā after the battle of Dāmā. They succeeded, nevertheless, in holding onto or occupying some of the water sources and in destroying others.[118] The Druze victory, however, would prove to be a Pyrrhic one in the end.

In the beginning of June, the British consul in Beirut described the situation of the Druzes as hopeless in their efforts to win the actual war—the one for water. "The insurgents have been driven to great straits," he reported, "from water and a great number of them are stated to have retreated to the southern extremity of the Ledjea [Lajā] with their families with a view to effecting their escape."[119] Many Druzes died either from lack of water or from well water poisoned with arsenic by Egyptian troops.[120] By the end of June, Druze resistance in Lajā had diminished considerably.[121] Within a short time, all but one thousand Druze resisters left the Lajā.[122]

The water war and the defeat of the insurgents in Wādī at-Taym finally convinced the Druze chiefs in Ḥawrān to conclude an agreement with Ibrāhīm Pasha in order to bring an end to the revolt. The

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116 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 8, Beirut, 13 May 1838.

117 FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 6, Damascus, 1 May 1838. This source supplied about 45 percent of the water in the area; see Ṣghayar, p. 386.

118 Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tā'rīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, p. 220.

119 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 9, Beirut, 4 June 1838.

120 *Ibid.*; also No. 10, Beirut, 11 June 1838; vice-consul of France to de Deval, Sidon, 25 June 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 393.

121 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 14, Beirut, 29 June 1838.

122 de Deval to Molé, No. 8, Beirut, 16 July 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 398.

Druze Sheikh Ḥasan al-Bitār of Rāshayā and the Christian Jīrīs Abū ad-Dibs of Mt. Lebanon were the two people who mediated between Ibrāhīm Pasha and the Druzes. In the agreement drawn up, Ibrāhīm Pasha not only amnestied the insurgents; he also guaranteed them exemption from conscription and *corvée*, forced labor, in return for the surrender of seven hundred of their own guns and an additional two hundred that they had captured from Egyptian troops. The Druze chiefs finally declared their submission on 23 July. Sharīf Pasha, the governor of Damascus, remained in Ḥawrān to see that the Druzes complied with the terms of the amnesty.[123]

The Druzes, at first, did deliver up arms, but it soon became apparent that these were not all of the kind they had used in the fighting. Ibrāhīm Pasha, therefore, sent one of his officers to demand the immediate surrender of all their weapons,[124] but the Druzes, still, did not make any haste in delivering them. The Egyptians even encountered great difficulty in recovering the arms captured from their own army since many of these had been spirited away.[125] The Druzes' surrender of arms in Lajā proceeded slowly and in small quantities and took until the end of August.[126]

The amnesty terms offered to the Druzes were also accorded Druze insurgents in other localities. That the Druze revolt was general is reflected in a letter from Ibrāhīm Pasha to Amīr Bashīr in July 1838. This letter, which later circulated among Druze leaders in Lebanon, tells how Sheikh Ḥasan al-Bitār had asked for pardon for Druzes in the Shūf, Rāshayā, Ḥāsbayā, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Ḥula districts.[127] Although it is difficult to ascertain whether Galilean Druzes participated in the revolt, it is known that they attacked the city of Ṣafad on 5 July, and that the inhabitants of the city took refuge in Acre.[128] The French consul likely referred to the Druzes of the Galilee and the Carmel when he reported on unarmed men from Ṣafad and Nablus who joined the insurgents in

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123 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 18, Beirut, 25 July 1838.

124 *Ibid.*, annex.

125 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 19, Beirut, 1 August 1838; FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 8, Damascus, 3 August 1838.

126 FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 22, Beirut, 30 August 1838.

127 *Ibid.*; Ibrāhīm Pasha to Amīr Bashīr, 17 Rabīʿ al-Awal, 1254. Text (Arabic) annex, No. 14, Beirut, 16 July 1838.

128 *Ibid.*, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 14, Beirut, 16 July 1838.

Wādī at-Taym, where they had been "massacred by the Egyptian troops."[129]

In Ḥawrān as well as in Wādī at-Taym, a relatively small proportion of the rebels refused to submit even after the amnesty. This group was led by two chiefs, Shiblī al-ᶜAryān in the Ḥermon districts and Sheikh Ḥusayn Abū ᶜAssaf in Lajā. Accompanied by hundreds of his followers, Shiblī al-ᶜAryān retired from Wādī at-Taym. During his flight, he was met "by some European travellers whom he treated with great courtesy and offered them an escort."[130] He reached Baᶜlbak and turned in the direction of the mountains inhabited by the Shīᶜīs, with a view of inducing them to join him. His final objective probably was to cross to the Ottoman Sultan's territories or to unite with the Druzes of Jabal al-Aᶜlā in the neighborhood of Aleppo. The Egyptians, however, had issued strict orders to all the governors in the region to stop him.[131] Escaping from one village to another, Shiblī al-ᶜAryān managed for a while to elude Ibrāhīm Pasha's forces. Eventually, worn out, he surrendered,[132] and when he met Ibrāhīm Pasha in Damascus he offered him his services as an irregular. By December, he was in the service of the Egyptian, who, amazingly enough, assigned him to arm three or four hundred Druzes and attack the Slūṭ tribe in the Lajā.[133] In early 1839, Ibrāhīm Pasha apparently had second thoughts about his dubious ally and shipped the notorious Druze chief out of the country by appointing him to a petty command on an expedition to Sinār.[134] It seems that Shiblī al-ᶜAryān was still in the services of Ibrāhīm Pasha in late November 1840, when the Egyptians began to evacuate Syria and Lebanon.[135]

The small number of Druzes who continued to rebel joined the Slūṭ tribe in Lajā. Most were from Mt. Lebanon and had come to Ḥawrān as refugees during the revolt.[136] In February 1839, the

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[129] de Deval to Molé, No. 7, Beirut, 7 July 1838, *DDC*, vol. 5, p. 396.

[130] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 19, Beirut, (annex) 3 August 1838.

[131] Rustum, *Bashīr*, vol. 2, pp. 144-145.

[132] There are no data on his decision to surrender except that Ibrāhīm Pasha at that time was trying to deal with the Druze in two ways: by threats and by negotiations; see *ibid.*; Bāz, *Mudhakarāt*, pp. 159-163.

[133] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 18, Damascus, 21 December 1838.

[134] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 2, Beirut, 14 January 1839.

[135] Wood to Ponsonby, Beirut, 19 November 1840; Cunningham, pp. 183-184.

[136] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 48, Damascus, 21 December 1838.

British consul in Damascus reported that some four hundred Druzes had "joined the one hundred who were still in rebellion under [Sheikh Ḥusayn Abū ʿAssāf] and proceeded to [Ḥāsbayā], where they devastated a village and carried off the flock of sheep and animals of others and retired to the Ledja."[137]

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[137] *Ibid.*, No. 25, Damascus, 27 February 1838.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MARONITE-DRUZE CONFLICT, 1841-1845

Civil Strife and the Fall of the Shihābīs

The period of Egyptian rule in Lebanon, which lasted from 1832 to 1840, and the internal changes it engendered, led to the signficant decline of Druze power on Mt. Lebanon and increasingly shifted its center to Ḥawrān, where the Druzes were finding refuge. Closely connected with these developments was the deterioration of Druze-Maronite relationships, which were soon characterized by sectarian conflict.

Although Ibrāhīm Pasha recognized the Lebanese *imāra*, the economic and military policies he conducted were contradictory to the traditional principles upon which the *imāra* was based. Besides emasculating the power of the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, Ibrāhīm Pasha imposed a new form of conscription, previously unknown in the *imāra*. The Druzes, who constituted the main military resource of the Shihabī *imāra*, had till then been mobilized for short periods as irregulars under their *muqāṭaʿjī* chiefs whenever a war needed a *levée en masse* from the population. The disarming of the Druzes by Ibrāhīm Pasha represented an extraordinary act in Mt. Lebanon, where the Druzes had always considered themselves as the primary military force of the area. While the Druzes were being disarmed, about sixteen thousand pieces of arms were distributed among the Christians in July 1838 so that they could join in the fight against the Druze insurgents of Wādī at-Taym.[1]

The new taxation Ibrāhīm Pasha introduced had also been unknown in the *imāra*. It included the *firda* tax, a kind of adult male head tax; *al-khaḍra*, a tax of five percent on the crops of trees; the previously mentioned *corvée*; and a monopoly tax. The monopoly was placed on both imports and exports and brought about a lack of gold currency at least for, e.g., the silk growers. At the same time, Ibrāhīm Pasha encouraged silk production through various inducements and Christian merchants emerging as middlemen between

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[1] FO 195/127, Moore to Ponsonby, No. 17, Beirut, 19 July 1838.

the cocoon producers and the market began to invest their capital in mulberry trees.

Along with the accelerated decline of the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* and the consequent emergence of a new and mostly Christian elite stratum, Egyptian rule in effect strengthened the political position of the Maronite Church, which grew into a independent body within the *muqāṭaʿjī* system.[2] Exploiting the Egyptian presence and the absence of the most powerful *muqāṭaʿjīs*, who had fled from Mt. Lebanon in 1832, the Maronite patriarch became the "temporal as well as spiritual Pope in Mt. Lebanon"[3] and the key figure in mobilizing the Maronites against their Druze opponents. C. Churchill, who lived on Mt. Lebanon during the sectarian wars from 1842 to 1860, noticed the radical change in the status of the Christians under Ibrāhīm Pasha:

> Christians were admitted into the local councils. Their evidence, before mixed tribunals of Christian and Musulman [Muslims], was valid. All distinction of dress was abolished. As secretaries, as local governors, even as military officers, in all departments of the state their services were accepted and rewarded. Numbers, who had for years been hiding themselves up in the mountain among the Druzes, to escape the tyrannous exactions of Djezzar [Jazzār] and of Abdallah Pasha, returned to sea coast towns, and recommenced their commercial business. A brisk trade with European merchants was quickly opened.[4]

The new legal structures instituted by Ibrāhīm Pasha granted equality of status between Christians and Muslims. This equality, however, seems to have been emphasized more in Syria than in Egypt.[5] Amīr Bashīr exploited the new situation to use the Christians in his battles against the Druzes, as is reflected in his letter to the Christians who had been armed by Ibrāhīm Pasha:

> To all the Christian soldiers on Mt. Lebanon, thank you for your love and obedience to this government [the Egyptian government]; the great Khedive issued an order by which he distributes among you ... arms

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[2] On its development, see I. Harik, "The Maronite Church and Political Change in Lebanon," in Leonard Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York, London, Sydney, 1966), pp. 31-55.

[3] A.A. Paton, *The Modern Syrians 1841-3, by An Oriental Student* (London, 1844), p. 68.

[4] C. Churchill, *The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860* (London, 1862), pp. 29-30.

[5] A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, new edn. (New York, 1988), p. 60.

from his arms stores, in order to defend your property and to manifest your pride against your enemy, the community of the heretical Druzes, who deny the prophets.[6]

Mitigating the deteriorating relations between the Druzes and the Maronites, however, were the severe taxation and the conscription orders introduced by Ibrāhīm Pasha in 1839. These stringent measures also aroused Syrian opposition, and the new sense of religious equality that Ibrāhīm Pasha tried to create ironically found expression in an alliance of the various religious communities against him.[7] Druzes, Christians, and Shīʿīs united to resist his policies.[8] By June 1840, Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym were in open revolt against the Egyptians.

The uprising, however, was not completely spontaneous. The British had been attempting to incite the Lebanon against Ibrāhīm Pasha since 1835, when the British ambassador to the Porte, Lord Ponsonby, despatched Richard Wood to Mt. Lebanon to try to convince Amīr Bashīr and the Druzes to resist the Egyptian occupation.[9] The attempt was unsuccessful and Amīr Bashīr remained loyal to Ibrāhīm Pasha till 1840, while the Druzes of Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym and Ḥawrān made common cause against him.[10] On the whole, Europeans played a large part in preparing and organizing the Syro-Lebanese revolt.[11] In July the European powers—Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia—signed an agreement concerning the "Syrian question." Their intention was to compel the Egyptians to withdraw from Syria and to restore it to the Ottoman Empire. Following Egypt's rejection of their demand, the allied powers landed on Lebanon's coast in September 1840.

After failing to recruit Amīr Bashīr to work in concert with the Druzes against Ibrāhīm Pasha, Richard Wood suggested to the Ottomans to appoint Amīr Bashīr Qāsim Milḥim Shihāb as prince of Lebanon and leader of the revolt against the Egyptians.[12] As Bashīr III, the newly-appointed prince vied with Ibrāhīm Pasha for

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[6] A. Rustum, *al-Uṣūl al-ʿArabiyya li Tāʾrīkh Sūriya fī ʿAhd Muḥammad ʿAlī Bāshā*, 4 vols. (Beirut, 1929), vol. 4, Document No. 466.
[7] Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 60.
[8] FO 195/170, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 53, Damascus, 30 June 1840.
[9] Cunningham, p. 10.
[10] McDowell, p. 16.
[11] Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 61-62.
[12] Mishāqa, p. 12; Bāz, *Mudhakarāt*, pp. 35-36.

Druze manpower. The Egyptians sent for the Druze *sheikhs* Saᶜīd Junblāṭ and Milḥim al-ᶜImād, who were in exile in Aleppo, and invited them to take over the government of Mt. Lebanon provided they could form a united party among the Druzes.[13] The same was done with *sheikhs* Nuᶜmān Junblāṭ, ᶜAbd as-Salām al-ᶜImād, and Nāsīf Abū-Nakad, who were in exile in Egypt. Bashīr III also wrote to Sheikh Shiblī al-ᶜAryān, who was then still with the Egyptian forces, to ask him to join the revolt. The Druze "hero" thereupon absconded from the Egyptian camp with four hundred horsemen and joined the insurgents.

Early in 1841, following European invertention,[14] Ibrāhīm Pasha withdrew with his forces to Egypt, and Ottoman rule was restored in the region. Druze *sheikhs* who returned to Lebanon demanded the restoration of their inherited *muqāṭaᶜāt*, as well as former properties which were now in the hands of Christian merchants and peasants. Bashīr III rejected their demands and even arrested some of the more adamant *sheikhs*. However, the *amīr* proved incapable of controlling the principality. Druze chiefs suggested to the Ottomans to replace the Christian Amīr Bashīr with Sulaymān Shihāb, a Sunnī prince. This proposal met quick opposition from the Maronite patriarch, Yūsuf Ḥubaysh, who insisted that only a Maronite *amīr* was acceptable in Lebanon.[15]

The defeat of Sheikh Bashir Junblāṭ in 1825 and the collaboration of the Maronites with Ibrāhīm Pasha against the Druze insurgents in 1838 were still fresh in the minds of the Druzes. The Maronite Church, furthermore, supported Bashīr III, all the more since he refused to restore the prerogatives of the Druze chiefs. By 1840-1841, both religious groups were conscious of the shift that had taken place in the expectations of the two communities and in the balance of power between them. This shift was keenly registered by the Druze chronicler, Abū Shaqrā, when he described the Druzes' desire to regain what they once possessed and the Christians' wish to maintain their new-found prosperity.[16] It was a situation that could not but lead to open conflict between Druzes and Maronites.

The internal antagonism which divided Lebanon after the down-

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[13] Bashīr al-Qāsim to Wood, 18 November 1840; Wood to Ponsonby, Beirut, 28 November 1840, Cunningham, pp. 182, 188.

[14] Cunningham, p. 186.

[15] See Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, p. 45-47.

[16] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 32-33.

fall of Bashīr II and the withdrawal of Ibrāhīm Pasha to Egypt was a virtual invitation for external intervention. First, the Ottomans seized the opportunity to apply a policy of centralization.[17] Thereafter, England, France, and Russia moved in to take advantage of the situation in order to try and reinforce their respective positions in the Near East.

Because of its major role in forcing the Egyptians out of Syria, Great Britain, through Richard Wood, had been in a position to advise the Sultan to nominate Amīr Bashīr Qāsim as prince of Lebanon.[18] Wood, who was thoroughly acquainted with the country, took upon himself the task of reorganizing its government. He appointed governors and other officials for different districts and instructed the new *amīr* in the establishment of provisional regulations for Lebanon's administration until the sanction of the Porte could be obtained. Wood explained the purpose of these regulations:

> [They] are framed so as to produce three effects—the strengthening of the affections of the [Lebanese] for the Sultan's government, alienation in the same proportion from their Sheiks or feudal lords, by which these turbulent men will be weakened and will be less in a position to oppose either the government or create mischief among themselves, and lastly, while this is in operation, the most powerful and influential of them will have their attention diverted by occupying themselves with the duties of the offices they will be called upon to fill.[19]

Wood's policy aimed at establishing a new order that would be loyal to the Ottomans and restrict traditional French influence in Lebanon.[20] Through Bashīr III Wood tried to integrate Lebanon into the sphere of the Ottoman government in Syria. To accomplish this objective, he advised weakening the position of the Druze *sheikhs* who were demanding the restoration of their ancient privileges.[21] This British policy toward the Druze *sheikhs* changed in the course of 1841, however, when the intervention of various European states became a common feature of Lebanese political life, the most effective of which was the intervention of the French consuls.

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[17] Sultan ʿAbd al-Majīd had issued in 1838 the *Hatt-i Sherif* of *Gülhane*, a decree implementing general reforms, among which was the increase in the central government's direct control.

[18] H.W. Temperly, *England and the Near East* (London, 1964), p. 483.

[19] Wood to Ponsonby, Beirut, 17 February 1841, Cunningham, pp. 213-215.

[20] Temperly, pp. 170-171.

[21] Wood to Ponsonby, Beirut, 24 February 1841, Cunningham, pp. 222-224.

A special relationship existed between France and the Maronites, which dated back to early Ottoman times. In 1841 the Maronites began to seek advice and support exclusively from the French consuls. During the previous two years France's effort had been directed at keeping both the Druzes and the Maronites away from the influence of British, Austrian, and Russian representatives when there was a necessity to mediate between the two Lebanese communities. Although both the British and the French tried to bring about a reconciliation between Maronites and Druzes, each country had its own objective. While Britain's efforts were devoted to helping the Ottomans to restore their rule in Lebanon, France's agents endeavored on the contrary to preserve the autonomy of the Lebanese principality. In the course of 1841, however, the two European powers were forced to act in consort when a bitter dispute erupted between the two communities.

The Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, insisting on the restoration of their traditional "rights," faced a coalition of Bashīr III and the Maronite Church. As the leaders of the Druzes, the entire Druze community backed the claims of the *muqāṭaʿjīs*. The Maronite patriarch and his clergy, however, had meanwhile acquired sufficient political influence to enable them to reject the Druze demands. This influence yet increased as a result of France's financial support,[22] which amounted to no less than twenty thousand Turkish livres. Feeling self-assured because of this backing, the patriarch issued a circular (*iʿlām*) calling upon Christians in the Druze districts to renounce any judicial authority still held by the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*.[23] Colonel Hugh Rose, in command of the British detachment on the coast of Syria, faulted the Maronite Church for its hostile attitude toward the Druze chiefs and perceived dire consequences: "The Maronite clergy show a determination to uphold their supremacy in the mountains at the risk of a civil war."[24]

Another consequence of this attitude loomed large: the risk of bringing to an end British policy in Lebanon. Thus, the British began to seek a counterpoise to Maronite and French influence. They knew that the Christian communities in Lebanon traditionally

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[22] See "Note of Political Direction" to Guzot, Paris, 28 February 1841, *DDC*, vol. 6, pp. 338-340.
[23] Churchill, pp. 38-40; Salibi, p. 48.
[24] Cited in Churchill, p. 39.

looked to the European consuls for help and protection; such consular protection had considerably gained in importance during the decade of Egyptian rule. The Druzes, however, had never enjoyed this protection. Looking upon France's relation with the Maronite community with foreboding, the chiefs of the Lebanese Druzes communicated with the British consul, Moore, in an attempt to win his, and British, support.[25] The Druze requests for British backing, which was transferred to Colonel Rose by the head of the American Missionary Society in Syria, William Thompson, came not from Mt. Lebanon but from Ḥawrān.[26] On 15 June 1841, Rose received Palmerston's permission to establish a special link with the Druzes. The British foreign minister emphasized, however, that the basis for these ties had to be the strengthening of the relationship between the Druzes and their rightful sovereign, the Ottoman Sultan. The British government, in return, would use its influence in Istanbul in their favor. Albeit conditionally, the British thus in fact welcomed the Druze connection. There were, however, some British politicians closer to the scene, like Wood and Ponsonby, who tried to restrain these ties.

French support of the Maronites and British efforts to re-establish Ottoman sovereignty over Lebanon led the Druzes at the end of July 1841 to address a petition to the Sultan demanding restoration of their ancient status. The petition reflected Druze fears that the rise of the Maronites would introduce further adverse changes in Lebanon's balance of power. In backing up their case, the Druze petitioners stressed their Islamism as well as their loyalty to the Sultan. They wanted an end to the bad hostile treatment being meted out against to Druzes by the Christian Shihābī *amīrs*, who, they charged, were trying to put the Druzes "under the protection of foreign powers." The petitioners said they sought a renewal of the tranquility and the security that had prevailed in the Druze areas when Sheikh Bashīr Junblāṭ, Sheikh ʿAlī ʿImād, and Sheikh Aḥmad Abū Nakad were ruling their *muqāṭaʿas*.

> We are Musleman and subjects of the Turkish government to which we have ever submitted.... We beg and solicit of the Sublime Porte... to be graciously pleased to appoint one of our own nation chief over us, the

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[25] FO 195/187, Moore to Palmerston, No. 37, Beirut, 2 June 1841.
[26] S. Saleh, "The Anglo-Druze Connection, 1841," *Bar-Ilan Studies in History*, ed. Pinhas Artzi (Tel-Aviv, 1978), p. 172.

> same as it was previously in the days of Sheikh Bashir.... In brief, we are Musleman and it is impossible for us to forego our allegiance to the Sublime Porte at all times and under any circumstances. It is true that the Christians are more numerous than ourselves but by the aid of the Sublime Porte, we have always conquered them in all our wars.[27]

At the end of July relations between the Druze *sheikhs* and Bashīr III further deteriorated. Their request to have him replaced was, as already mentioned, rejected by the Maronite clergy, who also negated any political solution to the Druze demands. The tenseness of the situation led the French consul in Beirut to express the fear that an open sectarian confrontation was inevitable between the two communities.[28]

Until this point the dispute seemed to have involved mainly the Druze *sheikhs*, seeking to restore their status, and Amīr Bashīr III, supported by the Maronite clergy. Now, however, the conflict began to develop at a different level, i.e., between Druze peasants and their Maronite neighbors. On 4 April 1841 the Druzes of B^caqlīn and the Christians of Dayr al-Qamar were brought into collision, an event that may be regarded as the actual starting point of the Druze-Maronite conflict which lasted from 1841 to 1845. What was at first only a dispute between sportsmen of the two villages ended in an armed battle in which fourteen Druzes were killed and thirty wounded, and five Christians killed and fourteen wounded.[29] Although formal reconciliation was effected through the intervention of the Maronite patriarch, the accumulated antagonism between the two communities had reached the breaking point.

While the competition between France and England to gain friends among the Lebanese continued apace, reports by both the French and British consuls at the beginning of October clearly reflect the mutual mistrust which reigned between Maronites and Druzes. On 7 October Bourée, the French consul, wrote to his superiors about the "small Syrian nations": Maronites, Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Druzes, all of whom were seeking

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27 FO 195/170, Petition of the Druze Nation [end of June 1841], annex, Wood to Ponsonby, No. 4, Damascus, 11 October 1841; see also A. Ismail, *Histoire du Liban du XVII siècle à nos jours*, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1958), p. 118.

28 Des Meloizes to Guzot, No. 55, Beirut, 20 July 1841, *DDC*, vol. 6, p. 42.

29 Salibi, p. 49; FO 195/170, Wood to Ponsonby, No. 3, Damascus, 23 April 1841. Other sources date the incident 14 September 1841; see J. Abraham, *Lebanon at Mid Century, Maronite-Druze Relations in Lebanon 1840-1860* (London, 1981), p. 83.

foreign protection. The Druzes, through Nuʿmān Junblāṭ, had been in touch with the British. Bourée tried to convince the Druze chief that the tie with England was "dangerous for him and for his country." Although Nuʿmān Junblāṭ expressed a desire to change his attitude vis-à-vis the French, the Druzes remained suspicious of the Christians, an attitude which was mutual. Bourée hastened to inform the patriarch of Junblāṭ's new positive position in regard to the French.[30] Making efforts to keep the Druzes away from British agents, Bourée visited the Druze village of Btāter, where he met the *sheikhs* of the ʿAbd al-Malik and Talḥūq families, who belonged to the Yazbakī faction.[31] While there he also tried to mediate between the Maronites and the Druzes in order to preserve the unity of the Mt. Lebanon, but without success: mutual mistrust still prevailed.[32]

The British, meanwhile, actively sought the support of at least one of the Druze factions, either Yazbaks or Junblāṭs. Wood, in his report of 11 October, referred to the attempt by the French and the Maronite patriarch to take advantage of the Druze factionalism. In the British agent's evaluation, it was through Shiblī al-ʿAriyan that

> the patriarch and the French agents hope to gain the Druzes of Hawrān and of the Ledja [Lajā].... [Shibli al-ʿAryan] whose notoriety is well known in the country, is capable of any act and will not hesitate to destroy the few Druze sheikhs ... who hope to make us [the British] the blind instruments of their designs. It is by such means the Patriarch and the French hope to annihilate the English party among the Druzes, however insignificant that party may be, and to replace it by a faction of their own.[33]

Wood's impression paralleled Bourée's that the Druzes and the Maronites would continue to oppose each other. He confessed that British influence was declining because of two factors. One was a shift in Bashīr III's attitude—the *amīr* had become mistrustful of British intentions, as certain prominent British politicians supported the Druzes. The second was the position of the patriarch, who "has lately adopted the resolution of favouring secretly the return of the

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[30] Bourée to Guizot, No. 11, Beirut, 7 October 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 17-22.

[31] Bourée to Guizot, No. 12, Beirut, 11 October 1841, *ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

[32] In his visit to Btāter the French Consul did not find "footprints," as he wrote, of British agents. "There is no evidence that they come to renew their intentions, which failed four months ago"; *ibid.*

[33] FO 195/170, Wood to Ponsonby, No. 4, Damascus, 11 October 1841.

ex-Emir Bashir [Bashīr II] with the view of striking a final blow to our [British] influence."[34]

The fighting which erupted between the Druzes and the Christians was to be the beginning of the end for Bashīr III himself. On 13 October 1841 he summoned the Druze chiefs to a meeting in Dayr al-Qamar ostensibly to consider the distribution of taxes among other matters. When the Druze chiefs marched toward the town each accompanied by four or five hundred armed men, Bashīr III realized with alarm that they were preparing an insurrection against him, and sent a party of one hundred and fifty Christians to prevent the Druze from entering the town. Inside Dayr al-Qamar, the Druzes had been greatly reinforced with coreligionists from Wādī at-Taym and Ḥawrān who had infiltrated into the town's Druze quarter. When these started shooting from everywhere, the Druzes took the Christian residents by surprise.[35] The fighting in the town went on for three days, whereby the Druzes also attacked neighboring villages. "The war cry," Churchill wrote, "had now been sounded throughout the Lebanon. Both sects throughout all their districts rushed to arms."[36] Like a rolling snowball, the conflict could no longer be halted.

The British learned this soon enough. Two days after the outbreak of the troubles, Hugh Rose, the British consul, hastened to intervene in order to stop the fighting. Rose first of all proposed to Bourée, the French consul, that they work together and proceed to Dayr al-Qamar in order to harangue the two parties, stop the civil war, and obviate "the bloodshedding."[37] Bourée, however, did not trust the British, and the thought of Ottoman intervention made him wary of collaborating with the British consul.[38] Thus Rose, accompanied only by Ayūb Pasha, an Ottoman officer, started out for Dayr al-Qamar.[39] He never made it into the town, however, because Christian militia blocked the road and compelled him to return to Beirut.[40] At the end of October, Rose once again tried to

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[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Bourée to Guizot, No. 13, Beirut, 15 October 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 29-30; Salibi, p. 49.

[36] Churchill, p. 49.

[37] Bourée to Guizot, No. 14, Beirut, 16 October 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 31.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 32-34.

[39] Churchill, p. 49.

[40] Bourée to Guizot, No. 15, Beirut, October 22, 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 34-35.

convince the French consul to address a joint demand to Salīm Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Beirut, to put an end to the civil war. Again the French consul hesitated to cooperate with the British,[41] and Rose again acted on his own. The subsequent intervention by Salīm Pasha stopped the fighting inside Dayr al-Qamr, but the Druzes kept the town in a state of siege. Meanwhile, the British and the Ottomans were powerless to halt fighting that broke out in other parts of the country.[42] In less than ten days, the Druzes, sacking and burning Maronite residences, had completely subdued the Maronites who resided among them. They now prepared to carry the war into the purely Maronite district, north of the Kalb River.[43]

The Druze-Maronite strife spread to districts beyond Mt. Lebanon. The town of Zaḥla, on the eastern flank of Mt. Lebanon, was the leading Christian center in the Biqāᶜ. When Zaḥla residents answered the appeals of the Maronites of Dayr al-Qamar and sent armed parties to help them, the Druzes of Rāshayā set out to attack Zaḥla,[44] and Druzes from Wādī at-Taym and Ḥawrān, led by Shiblī al-ᶜAryān, were sent to invade the town. The notables of Zaḥla thereupon requested Wood's intervention. They also accused Najīb Pasha, the Ottoman *wālī* in Damascus, of supporting the planned attack. Wood had repeatedly warned the pasha about Shiblī al-ᶜAryān who was then still in Damascus and had suggested arresting him. He also expressed his fear that the reaction of Shiblī al-ᶜAryān would arouse the Druze community in Ḥawrān to follow him, possibly leading to the interruption of communications between Damascus and Beirut.[45] Wood, who did not hide his sympathy toward the Christians of Lebanon and Biqāᶜ,[46] wrote a letter in French in November 1841 to Rifᶜat Pasha, the Ottoman foreign minister, in which he blamed the attitude of Najīb Pasha of Damascus for the events in the Biqāᶜ and Mt. Lebanon. The letter reported that at least eighty villages had been burned by the Druzes.

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41 Bourée to Guizot, No. 16, Beirut, 29 October 1841, *ibid.*, p. 37.
42 Salibi, p. 50.
43 Churchill, p. 50.
44 Salibi, pp. 50-51.
45 FO 195/170, Wood to Aberdeen, No. 27, Damascus, 3 November 1841.
46 Wood was Greek Catholic while Rose, the British consul in Beirut, was Protestant; these facts may have influenced their respective attitudes toward the events in Mt. Lebanon.

According to Wood, among the causes of the civil war was the encouragement—and actual distribution of arms—given by the government of Damascus to the Druzes. It was Damascus' help and protection that enabled Shiblī al-ʿAryān to attack the Christians of Zaḥla.[47]

On his way to Zaḥla, Shiblī al-ʿAryān disarmed the Christians of Rāshayā and Ḥāsbayā and ravaged several villages in the Biqāʿ.[48] The Christians of Zaḥla, assisted by the Shīʿīs of Baʿlbak under Khanjar Ḥarfūsh,[49] set out to meet the Druzes at the nearby village of Shtūra. Here the Druzes were repulsed; they then launched another thrust, which was also blocked.[50] Encouraged by the Druze failure in attacking Zaḥla, the Maronites, with a force estimated at between four and eight thousand, gathered in Baʿbdā on 5 November for an attack on the Druze-Greek Orthodox village of Shwayfāt. This time, the Christians were turned back.[51] The Druzes' counter-attack included the burning of Maronite villages in the Baʿbdā district.[52] The same day, the consuls of England, Russia, and France convened and decided together to call upon Salīm Pasha to take measures which would end the conflict. The British and Russian consuls demanded that Ottoman troops be sent to the Mountain. The French consul, who previously had rejected this solution, proposed that a delegation representing the three powers accompany the Pasha to meet the Druze *sheikhs*. On 6 November a meeting did take place, in which the Druze sheikhs signed an agreement to cease hostilities and obey Ottoman orders.[53]

However, exploiting, on the one hand, the rivalry between the French and the British and, on the other, the incapability of the Ottoman regime to effectively intervene, even with the collective consent of the European consuls, the Druzes continued their attacks both in the Mountain and in the Biqāʿ. The consuls continued to argue over the steps to be taken to bring the war to an end. The

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[47] FO 195/170, Wood to Rifaʿat Pasha, No. 4, Damascus, 22 November 1841.

[48] Letter of the consuls of the Five Powers in Beirut to Salīm Pasha, Beirut, 30 November 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 57.

[49] Bourée to Guizot, No. 21, Beirut, 21 November 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 51.

[50] FO 195/170, Wood to Aberdeen, No. 39, Damascus, 2 December 1841.

[51] Bourée to Guizot, No. 17, Beirut, 6 November 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7., p. 39, also, Bourée to Guizot, No. 18, Beirut, 7 November 1841, *ibid.*, p. 41.

[52] Salibi, pp. 51-52.

[53] Bourée to Guizot, No. 18, Beirut, 7 November 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7., p. 42.

Maronites meanwhile seemed to have become more unclear as to their cause; and the Ottomans hesitated deploying their troops even though they wanted to put an end to Lebanon's self-rule. The Druzes, thus, were the only actors to benefit from the situation. They remained determined to overthrow the prince and to restore their lost prerogatives. In spite of their promise of a cease-fire, therefore, the Druzes continued their raids against Christian villages.[54] In the meantime, Bashīr III found himself still the helpless prisoner of the Druzes in Dayr al-Qamar. He finally decided to agree to conditions drawn up by the Druzes and ratified by the pasha of Beirut, upon which the Druze let him evacuate the town.[55]

The Maronite-Shihābīs' distress proved no more than a temporary victory for the Druzes. The intervention of the consuls, the decision of the Maronite clergy to restore Bashīr II, French support, coupled with the Ottoman determination to put Lebanon under its direct administration[56]—all these were factors which prevented the Druzes from filling the political vacuum left by the fall of the Shihābīs. The Ottomans, however, soon took advantage of this tentative situation. Under pressure from the European powers to end the civil war, Muṣṭafā Pasha, a leading officer, was sent to Beirut[57] as mediator in the conflict. He ordered both the Christians and the Druzes to send him reports detailing their grievances.[58] However, he soon began to establish a more direct rule over Lebanon.[59] In a meeting with representatives of the Lebanese communities on 15 January 1842, Muṣṭafā Pasha appointed ʿUmar Pasha[60] as governor of Mt. Lebanon. The following day he summoned the Lebanese chiefs again and announced the end of Shihābī rule in Lebanon.[61] The Druzes hailed his actions with unreserved enthusiasm. Their hope was that this would annihilate any aspirations still harbored by the Maronites to restore the Shihābīs to power.

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[54] Letter of the consuls of the Five Powers in Beirut to Salīm Pasha, Beirut, 30 November 1841, DDC, vol. 7., p. 5.

[55] Churchill, p. 51.

[56] Bourée to Guizot, No. 30, Beirut, 13 January 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7., pp. 80-85.

[57] Salibi, p. 52.

[58] Bourée to Butenval, No. 33, Beirut, 27 December 1841, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 63.

[59] Bourée to Guizot, No. 30, 13 January 1842, *ibid.*, p. 81.

[60] He was originally an Austrian who was born in Croatia in 1806 and given the name of Michel Lattas.

[61] Bourée to Guizot, No. 31, Beirut, 18 January 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 86.

Until the beginning of April ʿUmar Pasha apparently could still count on the full support of the Druzes. At the same time, he sought not to alienate the Christians altogether, by employing in his service such Maronite notables as Abū Samra Ghānim and ash-Shantīrī, who had been involved against the Druzes in 1841. This double game was not at all to the liking of the Druzes who felt that it was only through their own efforts that the Shihābīs had been overthrown and direct Ottoman rule could be implemented on Mt. Lebanon. ʿUmar Pasha thereupon found himself quickly embroiled in the Druzes' unrest.[62]

The Druze Revolt against the Ottomans, 1842

Early in April, ʿUmar Pasha received an order (*faramān*) to restore to the exiled Amīr Bashīr III some two thousand six hundred *bourses* (Ottoman currency) presumably taken from him by the Druzes during the events of October 1841. The Pasha decided to use this as a pretext to teach the Druze *sheikhs* a lesson. On 6 April, he invited the chiefs of the leading Druze families—Junblāṭ, Arslān, ʿImād, Talḥūq, and Abū Nakad—to dinner. After the repast, the guests were suddenly surrounded and taken prisoners.[63]

Led by Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Malik, *sheikh* of the Jurd district, the Druzes in retaliation began to block the roads to Bayt ad-Dīn. To further induce the Druzes to a rebellion, a rumor was spread that the Ottoman regime had decided both to disarm and to conscript them.[64] Through the French consul, the arrested Druze chiefs proposed to "negotiate with the Maronite patriarch for a union which alone could stop their common ruin."[65] But memories still too fresh of the recent civil war and the accumulated mistrust caused the Maronites to turn a deaf ear. Also unavailing were the Druzes' promise to agree to the return of the Shihābīs and the French consul's advocacy of such a union.[66]

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[62] Salibi, p. 59.
[63] Bourée to Guizot, No. 41, Beirut, 7 April 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 117; Churchill, p. 73; Salibi, p. 60. There is controversy over the number and the names of the Druze *sheikhs*; see Abū Ṣaliḥ, *Tā'rīkh al-Muwaḥḥudīn*, p. 251.
[64] Ismail, *Histoire du Liban*, vol. 4, pp. 190-191.
[65] Bourée to Guizot, No. 45, Beirut, May 7, 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 129-130.
[66] Salibi, pp. 60-61; Churchill, p. 75; Ismail, pp. 193-4.

To ʿUmar Pasha any alliance between Maronites and Druzes looked ominous. He therefore attempted a reconciliation with the Maronites by offering the patriarch protection and promising to free the Maronite leaders who had been arrested for refusing to sign a petition praising the direct rule of the Ottomans. The Ottoman general also said he would restore Maronite property confiscated by the Druzes.[67] When this attempt to win over the Maronites proved unsuccessful, ʿUmar Pasha turned to manipulating the Druzes. Having thrown their key chiefs into prison, he now took others into his pay and favor.[68] At the end of April, he released Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād in an attempt to neutralize part of the Druze community.[69] Al-ʿImād was appointed to his staff as a *kitkhadi* (lieutenant).[70] Druze litigation for the release of their imprisoned leaders did not cease, however. ʿUmar Pasha then tried to secure the loyalty of other Druze *sheikhs*, whom he summoned to a meeting in Bayt al-Dīn on 24 June. Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād expressed the Druze *sheikhs*' loyalty to the Ottoman rule in Lebanon. In order to soothe their anxiety regarding the still imprisoned chiefs, he assured them that they would be treated with dignity. Concerning relations with the Maronites, al-ʿImād advised that any reconciliation with them had to be avoided, otherwise Druze relations with the Porte would be negatively affected.[71] On 15 July ʿUmar Pasha took another step in the Druze direction. He invited one of the Junblāṭs, Aḥmad, to return to the Mountain and promised to appoint him governor of Shūf.[72]

ʿUmar Pasha's attempts to change the general mood of the Druzes failed. Apart from a small proportion, the Druzes—peasants, *sheikhs*, and *ʿuqqāl*—were completely alienated by the pasha's policy. Direct Ottoman rule represented a threat not only to their traditional autonomous spirit, but also to their religious particularism. Early in 1842, when the Druzes were still supporting direct Ottoman rule, ʿUmar Pasha invited a number of Muslim *ʿulamāʾ* to initiate the Druzes into the "true Islamic faith." The

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[67] Churchill, p. 76.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[69] Bourée to Guizot, No. 44, Beirut, 29 April 1842, DDC, vol. 7, p. 125.
[70] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 44.
[71] Bourée to Guizot, No. 54, Beirut, 25 June 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 146-147.
[72] Bourée to Guizot, No. 57, Beirut, 24 July 1842; *ibid.*, p. 164. It seems that Aḥmad Junblāṭ was a fugitive hiding in Ḥawrān or in Damascus.

ʿulamāʾ required the dissolution of the Druze *ʿuqqāl* and the destruction of *khalwās*.[73] Toward the end of August ʿUmar Pasha's relations even with the ʿImād family deteriorated when Ḥusayn al-ʿImād refused his order to lead a troop of Druze irregulars in a military mission to the Christian districts of Kisrawān and Zaḥla.[74] In retribution the pasha arrested the following October the head of the family, Khaṭṭār, along with his colleague, Sheikh Ḥammūd Abū Nakad. What until then had been Druze unrest now became open insurrection.[75]

As usual in cases of a Druze uprising, the entire Druze community throughout its various localities coalesced. Letters demanding assistance in their struggle against the Ottoman troops were sent from the chiefs and *ʿuqqal* of Mt. Lebanon to their brethren in Wādī at-Taym and Ḥawrān. One recipient was Shiblī al-ʿAryān, who promised to deploy his forces against the enemy; at the same time, he urged his coreligionists to renew their alliance with the Christians. He also informed the Mt. Lebanon Druzes that he had addressed an appeal on their behalf to the *sheikhs* of Ḥawrān.[76] Toward the end of October, Sheikh al-ʿAryān and Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash[77] led the Druzes of Wādī at-Taym and Ḥawrān across the Biqāʿ into the ʿAmmāṭūr in the Shūf.[78] The Christians were invited by al-ʿAryān, once again in vain, to "forget the past" and join the Druzes in their revolt.[79] The Druzes proceeded to block the roads from Beirut and Sidon to Damascus; they then occupied all the heights around Bayt ad-Dīn and cut the supply lines to and from the Turkish garrison.[80] Before attacking al-ʿAryān wrote to Asʿad Pasha, who had meanwhile replaced Muṣṭafā Pasha in Beirut, demanding the release of the Druze *sheikhs* still under arrest and the

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[73] Jouanin to Bourée, 7 February 1842, cited in Ismail, p. 188. It should be noted that the Russian consul, Bazili, reported the same; cited in I.M. Smilianskaia, *al-Ḥarakāt al-Fallāḥiyya fī Lubnān 1800-1850* (Arabic translation from the Russian) (Beirut, 1972), p. 148.

[74] According to the French consul, he refused the order because he wanted to avoid a renewal of the civil war; Bourée to Guizot, No. 61, Beirut, 26 August 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 192-193.

[75] Bourée to Guizot, No. 63, Beirut, 1 October 1842, *ibid.*, p. 223.

[76] Shiblī al-ʿAryān to the Druze *sheikhs* of Lebanon (n.d.), *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 235.

[77] This was the start of the rise of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash as one of the Ḥawrānese chiefs.

[78] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 44.

[79] Shiblī al-ʿAryān to the Christian notables (n.d.), *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 232-234.

[80] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 45; Salibi, p. 61.

return of the Shihābīs.[81] Alarmed by their success, Asʿad Pasha accepted the Druzes' offer to negotiate. Shiblī al-ʿAryān continued, however, to insist on specific conditions before he would withdraw from the Shūf, viz., the release of the Druze chiefs, a three-year exemption from taxation, immunity from conscription and disarmament orders, and the return of the Shihābīs.[82]

Although Asʿad Pasha was ready to free the Druze chiefs, he could not on his own authority accept the other conditions, since these needed a decision by the government in Istanbul, which apparently he had not been given. When the negotiations failed, the guns again began to sound, and Asʿad Pasha sent a body of Turkish and Albanian troops with artillery to the Shūf. ʿUmar Pasha, though under siege from the Druzes, was ordered to attack. The Druzes failed to withstand this double thrust, their resistence giving way within only a few hours, and Shiblī al-ʿAryān was forced to surrender. Although the Druze revolt had foundered, it resulted in the intervention of the Great Powers, whose consuls had not ceased throughout the period of direct Ottoman rule to criticize ʿUmar Pasha's policies. On the same day as the surrender, the Powers and the Porte agreed on a new plan for the government of Mt. Lebanon.

Ottomans, French, and British, and a New Political System

The withdrawal of the Egyptians, the growing sectarian conflict, the fall of the Shihābīs, the Ottoman direct rule in 1842, and finally the Druze revolt combined to intensify European consular intervention. Indeed, this intervention became the pivot around which Lebanese politics now began turning. The reports of both the French and the British consuls reflect the sardonic analysis given by one Christian leader, Yūsuf Karam:[83] "Our affairs have become the concern of Britain and France. If one man hits another, the incident becomes an Anglo-French affair."[84] At the end of 1842, this foreign inter-

[81] Ismail, p. 195. The demand for Shihābī's restoration was probably no more than a gesture to the two Shihābī *amīrs* who had joined the ʿAryān forces; see Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 44.

[82] Bourée to Guizot, No. 67, Beirut, 17 November 1842; No. 68, Beirut, 19 November 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7., pp. 238-239.

[83] Karam was a Lebanese Christian leader from the north of Mt. Lebanon who played a significant role in the period 1860-1866.

[84] Cited by Salibi, p. 79. An example of this intervention may be seen in the

vention became even more direct and decisive. Through their "suggestions," the politicians of Paris and London were in effect deciding the fate of Lebanon, while the internal balance of forces both between and within the several communities had already been determined by the consuls.

After a long series of discussions between the European powers and the Ottomans, the double *qā'immaqāmiyya* regime[85] was adopted as the best solution for Lebanon's political problem. The plan, put forward by the Austrian chancellor, Metternich, offered a compromise between the French, who wanted to restore the principality, and Ottomans, who wanted direct rule, and was accepted by the British, Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. The regime imposed on the Lebanon was instituted on a false account of the demography of Mt. Lebanon, viz., that the northern district was inhabited entirely by Christians and southern part wholly by Druzes. In fact, of course, Druzes also lived in Matn, on the northern Beirut-Damascus road, under Christian administration, while Christians outnumbered the Druze themselves in the Druze district. There was only one part of the Druze *qā'immaqāmiyya*, namely the Shūf, where the Druzes possessed a clear majority.[86]

The demographic issue introduced a number of judicial problems for the two districts. In Metternich's original scheme, each *qā'immaqām* was responsible for his own community. This division introduced heavy dissatisfaction among the Christians as well as the Druzes. On 1 January 1843 Asʿad Pasha appointed Amīr Ḥaydar Abū al-Lamʿ as the Christian *qā'immaqām*.[87] The appointment of

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incident in Bārūk village when Saʿīd Junblāṭ was humiliated by Sheikh Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād at the end of 1842. Junblāṭ quickly informed the British consul about this slight; see Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 45-46.

85 The division of Mt. Lebanon into two administrative districts: north of the Beirut-Damascus road became the Maronite *qā'immaqāmiyya*, and south of it the Druze one. Both districts were attached to the Ottoman *wālī* of Sidon, whose residence was now transferred to Beirut.

86 In the Christian district, the Druzes constituted less than 5 percent (5,390) of the total population (129,595), while the Christian population (32,715) constituted more than 55 percent of the total population (58,750) of the Druze district, the Druzes themselves (20,080) amounting to less than 35 percent; see Chevallier, p. 61.

87 Ḥaydar came from one of the three principal families: Shihāb (Sunnīs, though some of them converted to Christianity), Arslān (Druze), and Abū al-Lamʿ (originally Druze but converted and became Maronite at the end of the 18th century).

the Druze *qā'immaqām* was more difficult because of the deeply rooted internal factionalism between the Junblāṭs and the ʿImāds. Appointing one of these two factions would disturb, and perhaps undermine, the stability of the planned regime. A request was addressed by Nuʿmān Junblāṭ to Rose, the British consul, to support his candidacy for the Druze *qā'immaqām*.[88] In the beginning, Asʿad Pasha was ready to accept the British suggestion and appoint one of the Junblāṭs; however, Druze clans' rivalry, on the one hand, and the great influence of the Junblāṭs among the Druzes, on the other, changed the pasha's mind. He decided to call upon the Druze *sheikhs* who were still under arrest in Beirut to choose a candidate. Their choice fell on Amīr Aḥmad Arslān.[89] The Arslān family at that time, stood aloof from the Yazbakī-Junblāṭī factionalism. Before the final choice was put into effect, however, an agreement was formulated consisting of two main paragraphs, one relating to the obligations of the *sheikhs*[90] toward the *qā'immaqām* and the second to the obligations of the latter toward the *sheikhs*. The two items reflect the Druze chiefs' concern over maintaining their prerogatives and grant the *qā'immaqām* no more than the authority of *primus inter pares*, even to the point of sharing with them his revenues as *qā'immaqām*.[91]

From the very beginning the actual demography of the two districts, coupled with the divergent expectations of the two communities, put obstacles in the way of the double *qā'immaqāmiyya* system. Both Druzes and Christians hoped that the new regime would respond to their own particular aspirations. The two, as Bourée noted

> had two different manners of understanding the new administrative system adopted for the Mountain. Conforming to feudal traditions, the Druze *sheikhs* wanted all families that formed the *sheikhs*' lands or provided them a personal service to be dependent on them, whether they were Christian or Druze. This interpretation was rejected by Amīr Ḥaydar.[92]

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[88] FO 195/221, Rose to Canning, Beirut, No. 1, 14 January 1843. According to Ismail, the Junblaṭī suggested was Saʿīd; see vol. 4, p. 208.

[89] Bourée to Guizot, No. 77, Beirut, 25 December 1842, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 272-273.

[90] The text was signed by Nuʿmān Junblāṭ; Khaṭṭār and ʿAbd as-Salām al-ʿImād; Nāsīf and Ḥammūd Abū Nakad; Khaṭṭār, Ḥamad, and Maḥmūd Talḥūq; Shiblī, Ismāʿīl, Fārūq, and Khanjar ʿAbd al-Malik.

[91] See the two paragraphs in Ismail, vol. 4, pp. 212-215, fn.

[92] Bourée to Guizot, No. 79, Beirut, 7 January 1843, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 285.

The latter put two demands to As'ad Pasha: to include the Christians who lived in the Druze *qā'immaqāmiyya* into the Christian jurisdiction; and to arrange indemnities which the Druzes were to pay to the Christians for losses suffered in 1841.[93]

The rejection of these and subsequent demands introduced a verbal dispute concerning the historical rights of each community on "mixed territories." The Maronites considered the Mountain, both the Christian and Druze *qā'immaqāmiyya*, as belonging to the Shihābī principality.[94] The Druzes contended that the southern parts of the Mountain historically were a Druze district carrying the name Jabal ad-Durūz; and that its *amīr* had always been called "prince of the Druzes." The Druze arguments were explicitly presented by Amīr Aḥmad Arslān before Asʿad Pasha:

> This is, in one word, their homeland inherited from father to son since long ago, and before the Christians came, because the first families who settled our country were Druzes. There was no admixture with Christians. These districts were distributed among their leaders, the *amīrs*, the *sheikhs* and the nobles of the Mountain, a very long time ago. Some Christian families... came to serve the chiefs of the districts as *shurakā'* [peasants].[95] The Shihāb family, who arrived from Ḥāsbayā, became Christian and imputed crimes to the Druze nation. Some Christians became proprietors by buying lands from the Druzes. But even up to the present time, most of them are still *shurakā'* on the property belonging to a district chief.... From the time the Mountain began to be settled, the *amīr* has had no contact with the inhabitants. For his affairs, he has had to appeal to the chiefs of the districts.[96]

Druze insistence on full *muqātaʿjī* rights challenged the whole system of the new regime. It was the attempt of the Maronite patriarch in 1839 to remove such rights that had been the direct cause of the civil war.[97] Countering this challenge, Asʿad Pasha removed the Druze *qā'immaqām* from office and threw him into jail a mere three days

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[93] Request of Amīr Ḥaydar to Mushīr Asʿad Pasha (n.d.), *DDC*, vol. 7, 282.

[94] On the development of the principality notion among the Maronite clergy and historians, see Harik, *Politics and Changes*, pp. 127-152.

[95] *Sharīk* (pl. *shurākā'* = partners) as a kind of sharecropper who shares the crops with his landlord; see K. Firro, "Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon 1860-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22(1990), pp. 151-169.

[96] Request of Amīr Aḥmad Arslān to Asʿad Pasha (n.d.), *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 284-285. The arguments presented by Arslān were later repeated by the Druze chronicler Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, (see pp. 25-26) as well as by contemporary Druze historians; see Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tā'rīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, pp. 142-143, 188.

[97] Churchill, p. 80.

after his appointment. As no other Druze would agree to replace the *qāʾimmaqām*, however, Asʿad Pasha was compelled to reinstate him.[98]

Asʿad Pasha tried in vain to settle the matter through obtaining mutual concessions. Month after month, until the end of June 1844, he sought for some common ground on which the two communities could solve their differences. During this time, negotiations were conducted in the presence of the Ottomans and the European consuls; proposals and counter-proposals were advanced. Nothing, however, succeeded in removing the difficulties inherent in the new system.[99] Desperate for a solution, Asʿad Pasha even considered a mutual transfer of populations. This idea was presented to the British and the French consuls along with three other propositions:

> (1) that there should be five Christian and five Druze Mookattaas [*muqataʿas*] or feudal districts and that a Wakil or municipal official be appointed over and represent the interests of his coreligionists under the orders of the Kaimakam [*qāʾimmaqām*] of the district; (2) that those feudal chiefs who plundered or ill-treated the inhabitants should be removed from their Mookattaas and replaced by others of the same family who were not guilty; (3) that voluntary emigration and immigration should be allowed.[100]

Throughout the eighteen months of negotiations, not one proposal was advanced that could have served as the basis for a compromise between the two communities, and between the French and the British consuls as well. The mutual mistrust of the two consuls and their relations with the two communities prevented a joint Anglo-French proposal that could be imposed on the Ottomans as well as on the Druzes and Maronites. Rose thought that Bourée's position ignored the rights of the Druzes in their districts and treated carelessly the causes of the civil war in 1841.[101] Bourée, on the other hand, faulted Rose for his unreserved support of all Druze

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[98] Salibi, p. 65.

[99] On the proposals, see FO 195/221, Rose to Wood, No. 24, Beirut, 30 April 1843; Rose to Aberdeen, No. 42, 6 May 1843; Rose to Canning, No. 29, Beirut, 29 June 1843; Rose to Canning, No. 31, Beirut, 3 July 1843; No. 33, Beirut, 15 July 1843; No. 36, Beirut, 31 July 1843. See also Churchill, pp. 82-83; Salibi, p. 65; Ismail, vol. 4, pp. 232-243.

[100] FO 195/221, Rose to Aberdeen, No. 35, Beirut, 10 April 1843. In Bourée's report, the fourth principle related to Dayr al-Qamar. See Bourée to Guizot, No. 86, 28 April 1843, *DDC*, vol. 7, pp. 309-310.

[101] FO 195/221, Rose to Wood, No. 24, Beirut, 30 April 1843.

demands for maintaining judicial rights over the Christian inhabitants of the Druze *qā'immaqāmiyya*.[102]

Failing to find a solution, As'ad Pasha had no choice but to turn the issue over to the Porte, who then sent the admiral of the fleet, Khalīl Pasha, to settle the dispute. Khalīl Pasha proposed that each *qā'immaqām* have two *wakīls* (agents), one Christian and one Druze, to deal with matters of their own community. Dayr al-Qamar was to be free of *muqāta'ji* authority. The admiral fixed a sum of three thousand five hundred *bourses* as the indemnity the Druze had to pay the Christians. Naturally, the new proposals were immediately rejected by the leaders of the two communities, the Druze *sheikhs* and the Maronite clergy.

On 2 February 1845, the Druze chiefs held a general meeting in Mukhtāra, which signaled to the Christians to take precaution. The patriarch declared: "[It is either] Maronite or Druze supremacy—the blow must be struck, and he who strikes first will have two chances to one in his favour."[103] Within weeks, the deeply rooted antagonism surfaced anew, and a series of inter-sectarian fights erupted throughout the mixed districts. Khalīl Pasha left Lebanon on 2 May to return to Istanbul. Pressured by the European consuls, the Ottomans again intervened to stop the internecine fighting.[104] The Ottoman *mushīr* (field marshal) of Sidon summoned the Druze and the Christian chiefs to Beirut on 2 June 1845. Although each side agreed to stop the hostilities, the fighting continued until July, when the Ottoman foreign minister, Shakīb Afandī, arrived in Beirut. Afandī sent a memorandum to the ambassadors of the five powers in Istanbul in which he presented the broad outlines of the latest Ottoman plan by which settlement was to be achieved. It contained four principles: (1) the temporary deployment of Ottoman troops in Lebanon; (2) an indemnity amount would be set that the Druzes had to pay until a definitive solution of this particular question could be found; (3) the foreign consuls were to stop intervening in the internal affairs of the country; (4) the *qā'immaqāmiyya* regime

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[102] Bourée to Guizot, No. 80, Beirut, 19 January 1843, *DDC*, vol. 7, p. 294; No. 86, Beirut, 28 April 1843, p. 311.

[103] Cited in Churchill, p. 83.

[104] Note of the consuls of the Five Powers to Wajīhī Pasha, field marshal of Sidon, 21 May 1845; letter of Wajīhī Pasha to the five consuls, 21 May 1845, *DDC*, vol. 8, pp. 123-133.

would remain, but with a new arrangement of the judicial, administrative, and executive spheres.[105]

On 14 September 1845 Shakīb Afandī went to Beirut and summoned the consuls in Beirut to a meeting on 22 September. Informing them that he was delegated to execute the declaration of principles contained in his memorandum, he insisted that the consuls not interfere in the internal matters of Lebanon. In order to be able to carry out his plan successfully, Afandī further demanded that all Europeans living on the Mountain should leave. He also intended to disarm the entire population and to arrest a number of chiefs.[106] Fearing that Shakīb Afandī's settlement of the conflict would affect them adversely, the Druze chiefs did what they had done in previous years: they began to negotiate with the Christian leaders for a renewal of a Maronite-Druze alliance.[107] The implementation of Afandī's measures, however, did not allow sufficient time for the crystallization of such a union. In order to forestall any opposition to his plan, the Turkish foreign minister hastened on 15 October to arrest the two *qā'immaqāms* as well as the most important chiefs of the two communities. Aḥmad Arslān was replaced by his brother, Amīn. Because the removal of the Christian *qā'immaqām* could open the way for Shihābī return, however, Afandī kept Ḥaydar Abū al-Lamᶜ in office.[108] On 16 October the Ottoman troops began their disarmament campaign. They met with a certain amount of resistance in the Druze districts, but about three thousand Druzes fled the Mountain,[109] towards the Ḥermon and Ḥawrān.[110]

At the end of October, Shakīb Afandī published the organic law for Lebanon which bore his name, "Tanẓimāt [the regulations] of Shakīb Afandī," in which he tried to follow the Ottoman Tanẓimāt, announced in 1838, for the *Hitt-i Sherif* of *Gülhane*. Shakīb Afandī's

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105 Memorandum of Shakīb Afandī to the five ambassadors, 28 July 1845, *DDC*, vol. 8, pp. 210-216.

106 Poujade to Guizot, No. 83, Beirut, 23 September 1845; No. 83 bis, 2 October 1845, *DDC*, vol. 8, pp. 235-250.

107 Poujade to Guizot, No. 88, Beirut, 11 October 1845, *ibid.*, p. 254.

108 Salibi, p. 71; Ismail, vol. 4, pp. 281-282; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 65.

109 Poujade to Guizot, No. 90, 31 October 1845, *DDC*, vol. 8, p. 267.

110 In 1842, during the Druze revolt against ᶜUmar Pasha, about five thousand people intended to migrate and to settle in Ḥawrān: see Lewis, p. 80.

regulations maintained the double *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* system, with for each a *majlis* (council) composed of a deputy *qāʾimmaqām*, a judge, and an adviser for each community: Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Sunnī, and Greek Catholic. The council, like the *qāʾimmaqām*, was subordinated to the governor of Sidon.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROAD TO THE CIVIL WAR OF 1860

The Regulations of Shakīb Afandī

While the regulations of Shakīb Afandī formed a first step toward the establishment of an independent administration vis-à-vis the *muqāṭaʿjī* system, they failed to overcome the accumulated antagonism between the Druzes and the Christians that since the continuous upheavals from 1825 onward had become part and parcel of the political life of Lebanon. Though they had lost some of their privileges,[1] the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, by being integrated in the new administration, continued to play a predominant role within the country's sectarian politics. By ratifying the *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* system, the regulations in effect not only legitimized these sectarian politics but even assured a sequence of further sectarian conflicts. Neither did the regulations respond to the aspirations of the two communities, the Druzes hoping to regain the status they lost with the ascent of Bashīr II and the Christians determined to maintain what they had gained since the period of Bashīr II and Ibrāhīm Pasha.

During the years of inter-communal strife, other important factors which were at play in Lebanon were the economic and social development of the country, the onset of the commercial invasion of Europe, and the consequent stratification of a mercantile class. Apart from Dayr al-Qamar, Zaḥla,[2] and a few other small places, the economy of the Mountain continued to depend mainly on agriculture. The commercial invasion affected the mountain only indirectly; its impact was more profound in the coastal cities: Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli. Thus, until 1860, the *muqāṭaʿjīs* faced no real danger from the local nouveaux riches. Although some farmers became financially indebted to this new class,[3] the *muqāṭaʿjīs* still constituted

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[1] Such as the right of making fiscal decisions, which was put in the hands of the councils; see Ismail, vol. 4, pp. 283-298.

[2] The two were trade centers of the Mountain as well as trade bridges between the coastal cities and the Syrian interior; see Leila Fawaz, "Zaḥle and Dayr al-Qamar, Two Market Towns of Mount Lebanon during the Civil War of 1860," in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., *Lebanon A History of Conflict and Consensus* (London, 1988), pp. 49-63.

[3] Firro, "Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon," p. 160.

the leading stratum of the country. The nouveaux riches did not succeed in forming a cohesive social stratum backed by political motivation. Moreover, within the Druze district, the nouveaux riches were generally Christians.

Although the period of upheavals had introduced a sharp decline in the economic power of the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, the legitimacy of their political leadership was not affected from the Druze peasants' point of view. The clientele relationship of the peasants with their chiefs, which had always contained a certain amount of social antagonism, formed the continuing base on which the latter could rely in their struggle to survive as leaders.[4] This loyalty of the Druze peasants to their chiefs certainly was motivated by the fact that the Druze district had a Christian peasant majority, which from the 18th century onward had managed to accumulate economic and political power. Threatened by the rise of the Christians under a well-organized church, the Druze peasants mitigated their traditional social antagonism toward their chiefs, and sectarian hostility took its place.

Even after the successive blows that had pommeled the *muqāṭaʿjīs* since the days of Amīr Bashīr II, the outcome of Shakīb Afandī's regulations would prove devastating since they were implemented through the judicial instrument of central government. At the outset the *muqāṭaʿjīs* tried vehemently to obstruct the new system. The Ottoman authorities soon promoted the taking of a census and a cadastral survey, in order to facilitate the work of tax collectors and enable more effective control by the governor of Sidon. Those *muqāṭaʿjīs* who had become debtors to the merchants were extremely alarmed by the Ottoman initiative. Cognizant of the foreign consuls' ability to influence Ottoman policy, they requested the intervention of the foreign powers in the hope that such action would obviate a crisis. Because of their factionalism, however, the Druze chiefs could reach no consensus on which means to take in order to survive in face of the new situation. The British and Russian consuls took up the *muqāṭaʿjīs*' requests, whereas the French consul succeeded in exploiting Druze division by convincing some of them to accept the impending census and cadastral survey.[5]

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[4] The clientele relationship is explicitly reflected in Abū Shaqrā's description of the peasants' reception of their chiefs who returned from the exile in 1841; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 32.

[5] The crisis of the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, the Druze factionalism, and the consuls interven-

Although Bourée, who was then French consul in Beirut, and Baron de Bourguency, the French ambassador in Istanbul, were still hoping to restore the Shihābī principality, they supported the Ottoman measures against the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, explaining their position as humanely motivated on behalf of the Christian peasants, who were suffering under a "feudal" yoke in the mixed districts. In mid-1847, the French foreign minister sent a special delegation to Lebanon charged with investigating the entire Lebanese problem.[6] The report of the French commissioners attempted to give a historical perspective to the successive civil wars between the two communities as well as an account of the decline of the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, notably after the implementation of Shakīb Afandī's regulations. It concluded that the flow of civil wars could not be kept in check: "It is true," the commissioners wrote, "that it [the Druze aristocracy] would be impoverished by [the regulations]. ... Experience has proved that a poor and dissatisfied nobility is always dangerous."[7]

In trying to cope with the new regime of Shakīb Afandī, the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* became increasingly divided among themselves. Two main factions eventually emerged, one led by Saʿīd Junblāṭ and backed by the British consul, the second led by Nāṣīf Abū Nakad and supported by the French consul. Saʿīd Junblāṭ recruited to his side Ḥusayn and Maḥmūd Talḥūq, the chiefs of al-Gharb al-Fūqānī (the upper) and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Malik, chief of the Jurd; while Nāṣīf Abū Nakad gained as allies Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād, chief of al-ʿArqūb, and Sulaymān and Qāsim Ḥamāda of Bʿaqlīn.[8] Taking advantage of this rivalry, Amīr Amīn Arslān, the Druze *qāʾimmaqām*, renounced the 1842 agreement between his brother and the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* according to which the *qāʾimmaqām* had to be *primus inter pares* and could not act freely, without the consent of the *muqāṭaʿjīs*.[9] As the most powerful *muqāṭaʿjīs*, the Junblāṭs now demanded the

tions were broadly dealt with in the correspondence between Beirut and Paris in 1847; see *DDC*, vol. 9, pp. 53-106.

[6] Guizot to Bourée, No. 26, Paris, 14 July 1847, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 86.

[7] See the text of the report written by Le Comte de Lallemand (the French attaché in Istanbul), who was sent by the foreign minister to Lebanon, *DDC*, vol. 9, pp. 131-170; the quotation is from p. 167.

[8] Bourée to Guizot, No. 63, Beirut, 16 May 1847, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 76. The Ḥamāda family never belonged to *muqāṭaʿjīs* until this period when they began to rise owing to French support.

[9] See Ismail, vol. 4, p. 313; Salibi, p. 76.

office of *qā'immaqām* for themselves.[10] With the backing of the British consul, Sa'īd Junblāṭ attempted in 1853-1854 to remove Arslān from office and replace him.[11]

With the Arslān family having taken control of the Yazbakī faction, till then led by the 'Imād family, the new split was no other than the old Yazbakī-Junblāṭī factionalism in slightly new colors: a competition of the two main Druze chiefs for governmental functions. Thus, the *qā'immaqāmiyya* not only introduced a crucial turn in the fate of the Druze *muqāṭa'jīs*, it also produced a further shift, the third such one since the beginning of the 18th century, in the Druze factionalism. What had started as the Qaysī-Yamanī bifurcation and evolved into the Junblāṭī-Yazbakī division after the Druze civil war now became the new Junblāṭī-Yazbakī split which characterized the crisis of the 1840s.

This period furthermore witnessed a fissure in the internal unity of the Junblāṭ family itself between the two sons of Sheikh Bashīr, Nu'mān and Sa'īd. According to Bourée, the split between the brothers dated from 1842, when the British consul, Rose, tried to establish a Druze government in the mixed districts under the Junblāṭs and selected Sa'īd as the candidate to head this regime. The elder of the two brothers, Sheikh Nu'mān, retired politically in 1842, but in 1846 tried to restore his authority; Nu'mān claimed that it had been stolen from him by his brother. With it, he also demanded his share of the patrimonial property.[12] The British consul's reports indicate that Sheikh Nu'mān continued his contact with Rose until the end of 1843 in his efforts to restore Junblāṭs' property taken by the Ottomans in the Biqā' Valley.[13] The inheritance dispute between the two brothers lasted until the 1860s, with the British consuls attempting throughout to effect a reconciliation.[14] Like the inter-family rivalry, this intra-family dispute represented, in fact, a continuation of the argument between the sons of Sheikh Bashīr and those of Sheikh 'Alī, one of the Junblāṭ family branches.[15] This sibling contentiousness became especially acute in

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[10] FO 195/271, Rose to Canning, No. 1, Beirut, 14 January 1843.

[11] FO 195/458, Wood to Clarendon, No. 12, Damascus, 25 February 1854; Ismail, vol. 4, pp. 313-314.

[12] Bourée to Guizot, No. 25, Beirut, 25 September 1846, *DDC*, vol. 9, pp. 24-25; Ismail, vol. 4, pp. 311-312; Salibi, p. 75.

[13] FO 195/221, Rose to Canning, No. 49, Beirut, 10 October 1843.

[14] FO 195/727, Moore to Radcliffe, No. 37, Beirut, 5 November 1862.

[15] See Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 85-93.

periods of crisis, such as in 1846-1852 and following the civil war of 1860.

Like the European consuls, the Ottomans took advantage of the Druze factionalism to try and oppose the Junblāṭs, who in the mixed districts could place obstacles in the way of such Ottoman initiatives as the census and the cadastral survey, and naturally chose the Arslāns to lead the opposition against Saʿīd Junblāṭ. In 1849-1850, the Ottomans also made great efforts to neutralize British influence on the Druzes so as to be able to successfully conduct the cadastral survey. In May 1849 a special commissioner, Amīn Afandī, was sent by the Porte to carry out Shakīb Afandī's regulations.[16] Alarmed by the commissioner's arrival, the Druzes began to hold meetings discussing measures to counter Amīn Afandī's intentions.[17] The opposition to the survey was led by Saʿīd Junblāṭ, chief of the Shūf. In June and July 1850, Amīn Afandī was forced to suspend the survey in the Shūf district and call for additional government troops to make it possible for him to continue carrying out the survey.[18] Saʿīd Junblāṭ's opposition even compelled the commissioner to be on the spot and conduct the survey himself and to remain in the district until its completion.[19]

Amīn Afandī, protected by Ottoman troops, hastened to complete the survey in Saʿīd Junblāṭ's district before Rose's return. Rose, who had gone for the summer to Istanbul, would have obstructed this action had he been present. The survey caused several "incidents" between Druzes and Christians over property, notably in the neighborhood of Jizzīn. In May 1850 Saʿīd Junblāṭ complained about the treatment of the Ottomans in this region, which was part of his *muqāṭaʿa*. "Such [is the] state of feeling in the neighborhood of Djezin [Jizzīn]," he wrote to the British consulate, "brought about by the late encouragement of the authorities that the most trivial circumstances may cause a collision between the Christians and the Druzes."[20]

Although the signs of sectarian conflict were already obvious, the Ottomans' show of force in the mixed districts deterred the two com-

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[16] Bourée to De Lhuys, No. 9, Beirut, 4 June 1849, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 331.
[17] Bourée to De Tocqueville, No. 13, Beirut, 1 September 1849, *ibid.*, p. 341.
[18] De Lesparda to de Hitte, No. 3, Beirut, 5 July 1850, *ibid.*, p. 368.
[19] De Lesparda to de Hitte, No. 4, Beirut, 5 August 1850, *ibid.*, p. 373.
[20] FO 195/351, Moore to Canning, No. 22, Beirut, 8 May 1850.

munities from going at each other. In addition, the Druze leaders were still not united and furthermore remained in fearful expectation of the final objective of the Ottoman measures, the census and land registration.[21] Attempting to obviate any support given by the British, the Ottomans forbade the Druze *sheikhs* from having any connection with the foreign consulates.[22]

The cadastral survey had been suspended at the beginning of 1851 when Amīn Afandī, because of illness, returned to Istanbul.[23] Nevertheless, the census of the male population was accomplished by the mid-1850s under the supervision of the Ottoman military authorities. These activities were interpreted by the Druzes as a prelude to a radical change in the *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* system. The Ottomans, in fact, had made use of the traditional means of local petitions, habitually addressed to the Porte, which in this case they themselves initiated and sent to the Porte.[24] In August, Moore reported that Amīn Afandī "has not scrupled to incite the chiefs of the Druze district to petition for a total change of the existing system of government in Lebanon."[25]

Druze Unity and Factionalism

The regulations of Shakīb Afandī and the course of action pursued by Amīn Afandī reflected the main endeavor of Ottoman policy in this period: the increase of the direct power of the central government. The *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* system, though it preserved some elements of autonomy for Mt. Lebanon, in effect allowed the Ottomans to introduce modifications in the governing system that increased their authority. The two *qāʾimmaqāms*, e.g., were actually officials of the Ottoman governor of Sidon. The French consul described the situation:

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[21] This is reflected in the French consul's correspondence from 1849-1851; see *DDC*, vol. 9, pp. 325-422.

[22] FO 195/351, Moore to Canning, No. 33, Beirut, 5 August 1850.

[23] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 11, Beirut, 4 February 1851, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 398.

[24] De Lesparda to de Hitte, No. 9, Beirut, 5 December 1850, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 387. According to de Lesparda, the British consul (Rose) claimed that Amīn Afandī intimidated the petitioners in order to annul the agreed arrangement with Shakīb Afandī in the name of the Porte and the Five Powers.

[25] FO 195/351, Moore to Canning, No. 40, Beirut, 29 August 1850.

> The authority in the mountain lies on so weak a basis. The combined power in the hands of the *qā'immaqāms*, appointed by the Porte, is very much an artificial creation, which also proves that the 'arrangement' is no more than transitory, that sooner or later the force of things will introduce into Lebanon a completely Turkish government.[26]

The Druzes soon realized that the Ottoman authorities were preparing for further measures in Lebanon as well as in Syria as a whole. In September 1850 information being circulated throughout Syria of an approaching call for a general conscription of Muslim males[27] caused great commotion among the Druzes of Lebanon and they began negotiations with the Matāwila (Shīʿīs) of Jabal ʿĀmel in order to form a coalition to fight the hated act as soon as it would be officially announced. Secret meetings were held and arms bought,[28] while the Druzes of Wādī at-Taym began to plan the course

> which they should adopt in respect to the conscription. Part of the meeting wished to send, at once, the young Druzes liable to be taken as conscripts, to Ḥawrān, and there oppose the Government. But the elders and Aakals [*ʿuqqāl*] successfully combated this opinion, promising that when the Government should demand conscripts, they would then consent to go, in one body, to the Ḥawrān.[29]

The approaching conscription led many Druzes to beg the British consul to take them under British protection.[30]

Early in November 1850 the first signs of the coming Druze insurrection appeared in Ḥawrān. Druzes of Mt. Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, and Ḥawrān met secretly to organize a common uprising against the Ottomans. They also communicated with the inhabitants of the Ṣafad district,[31] Nāblus, and Jabal ʿĀmal, south of Mt. Lebanon,[32] in order to coordinate their efforts.

The anticipated *faramān* was issued early in 1852: the Porte called for a general conscription of all Druzes aged 20 to 25.[33] Although

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26 De Lesparda to de Hitte, No. 9, Beirut, 5 December 1850, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 387.

27 The Druzes, the ʿAlawīs, and the Ismʿailīs were considered Muslims.

28 De Lesparda to de Hitte, No. 5, Beirut, 5 September 1850, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 376; and No. 6, Beirut, 5 October 1850, *ibid.*, p. 381.

29 FO 195/351, Rose to Palmerston, Brummānā (Lebanon), 4 October 1850.

30 *Ibid.*, Bekfayyā (Lebanon), 30 September 1850.

31 The Ṣafad district was inhabited by a Druze population.

32 De Lesparda to de Hitte, No. 6 and No. 7, Beirut, 5 October and 5 November 1850, *DDC*, vol. 9, pp. 381, 382-384.

33 De Lesparda to de Turqot, No. 38, Beirut, 3 February 1852, *ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 425.

the Druze chiefs of Lebanon manifested their obedience, most of those liable for conscription fled either to Ḥawrān or to the Anti-Lebanon. Ottoman troops, sent from Acre, proceeded to the Biqāᶜ to intercept communications between the Druzes of Lebanon and those of Ḥawrān. Regiments were also sent from Beirut and Damascus for the same purpose. In Ḥawrān, the Druzes allied with the Bedouins, left their fields and villages, and took refuge in the Lajā.[34]

On the outbreak of the insurrection in Ḥawrān, in spite of the hardships it brought with it, every young male Druze who was subject to military call-up fled there together with his family in what now became a collective emigration. The French consul observed the exodus: "All of them retired into the Ḥawrān, bringing with them their families and friends. The emigration is continuing and entire villages remain without inhabitants."[35] When the Druze chiefs in Lebanon continued to manifest their loyalty toward the Porte, a new militant leadership sprung up in Ḥawrān. One of the new leaders was Shiblī al-ᶜAryān, who did not belong to the *muqāṭaᶜjīs* in Lebanon but had made his name in the Druze revolt against Ibrāhīm Pasha. Another was Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash, whose military leadership was to be confirmed by the revolt of 1852.[36]

Although Ottoman troops succeeded in penetrating parts of the Ḥawrān, these military leaders refused to relinquish control before attaining their demands: the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from Ḥawrān, the abolition of the conscription order issued by the Porte, and a re-examination of the fixed duties imposed on the Druzes.[37] The Druze terms were unacceptable to the Ottomans, who sent more troops in the hope that they could suppress the revolt within a month, or before the caravan of the *ḥaj* (pilgrimage to Mecca), which had departed from Istanbul, would arrive in Damascus.[38] Mobilizing some fifteen thousand soldiers, the Ottoman generals tried in September, after having suffered successive defeats during

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[34] De Lesparda to de Turqot, No. 42, Beirut, 14 March 1852, *ibid.*, vol. 9, p. 427; No. 46, Beirut, 3 May 1892, pp. 428-429; No. 47, Beirut, 14 May 1852, pp. 430.

[35] De Lesparda to de Turqot, No. 48, Beirut, 1 June 1852, *ibid.*, p. 432.

[36] Bᶜayni, p. 200.

[37] De Lesparda to de Turqot, No. 48, Beirut, 1 June 1852, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 433.

[38] *Ibid.*

the spring, to bring the Druze insurrection to an end. Part of their strategy was to incite Maronite farmers to take part in fighting their traditional rivals, or at least to persuade them to stop the Lebanese Druzes from assisting their coreligionists in Ḥawrān. Secret propositions were addressed to the Maronite *qāʾimmaqām*. The Ottoman attempt at rousing the Christians was stymied, however, by the intervention of the French consul who did not want to see them involved. Although some Druze villages were partly destroyed, the Druze resistance sustained and most Ottoman attacks were repelled.[39]

Early in December, when the Druzes obviously were "dominating the war field," Wood offered his mediation between the belligerents. Inviting Sheikh Saʿīd Junblāṭ to accompany him on this mission,[40] the British consul proceeded to the Lajā, where they met with about forty *sheikhs*. Wood's suggestion that they meet the Ottoman representatives in Damascus was turned down: the Ottoman authorities had first to respond to their demands.[41] In the end, it was Saʿīd Junblāṭ who succeeded in bringing the hostilities to an end in early 1853, without the conscription question coming to a head.[42]

Junblāṭ's mission into the Ḥawrān region led to the rumor that the Ottoman authorities would replace the current Druze *qāʾimmaqām*

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[39] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 56, Beirut, 18 September 1852, *ibid.*, pp. 435-37; No. 60, Beirut, 9 October 1852, *ibid.*, p. 439; No. 63, Beirut, 9 November 1852, *ibid.*, p. 441.

[40] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 64, Beirut, 6 December 1852, *ibid.*, pp. 445-446.

[41] Les Archives de Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (hereafter MAE), *Correspondence politique et consulaire* (hereafter *CPC*), *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 2, Murry to de Lhuys, No. 7, Damascus, 13 December 1852.

[42] Since the British had tried to reinforce the Ottoman authorities in Syria, they did not listen to the demands of the Druzes for an exemption to the conscription order. The Druze *sheikhs* of Ḥawrān, therefore, addressed their demands to the French consul. The arguments of the *sheikhs* for the exemption were economic, i.e., that their lands needed the manpower. For the texts of these demands: MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 2, Annex A of Report No. 13, Murry to de Lhuys, Damascus, 13 February 1853. The letters were signed by the leading chiefs of Jabal Ḥawrān and Lajā: Fāḍil al-Maḥāmīd (Bedouin), Muḥammad Abū ʿAssāf (Druze), Faḍl as-Sannūr (Bedouin), ʿAbbās al-Qalʿānī (Druze), Hazima Hnaydī (Druze), Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash (Druze), Qāsim Abū Fakhr (Druze), Wākid al-Ḥamdān (Druze), and Muḥammad al Rifāʿī (Bedouin). Similar communications were sent later: Annex 3 of Report No. 15, Damascus, 12 March 1853, signed by Fāris ʿAmer, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, and Muḥammad al-Rifāʿī. Report No. 16, Damascus, 19 March 1853, contained a letter signed by thirty-five chiefs (Annex 4).

with Junblāṭ, since he had convinced the Druzes to stop their revolt. This rumor induced a certain amount of agitation among the rival Druze *sheikhs*. The *qā'immaqām*, Amīr Amīn Arslān, succeeded in bringing together the *sheikhs* of the Talḥūq, ʿImād, and ʿAbd al-Malik families in order to prevent this appointment. Backed by the French consulate, they managed to convince the Ottoman authorities to quash such an initiative, even though it had the support of the British and of Seriʿaskar Muḥammad Qubersalli Pasha.[43]

The Junblāṭs' ties with the British, the Yazbaks' with the French, and the manifestation of loyalty toward the Porte evinced by both factions reflected the dependency of the *muqāṭaʿjīs* on foreign forces. Each faction used its relations with its respective consul to gain closer access to the Ottoman authorities. Indeed, outward manifestations of loyalty appeared frequently from 1853 to 1860. Thus, e.g., may be explained the promise made by the *qā'immaqām*, Amīn Arslān, leader of the Yazbakī faction, to recruit thousands of Druzes for Istanbul to ship to the front in Crimea, where the war against Russia was fast approaching.[44] The promise, however, was little more than a gesture, as only fifteen hundred Druzes declared a readiness to join the Ottoman troops, not ten thousand.[45] Even this relatively small force, when called up, conditioned their departure on that of a similar number of Christian Lebanese.[46] Eventually only one hundred Druze cavaliers started out toward Aleppo, and most of these absconded when they reached Ḥoms.[47]

Just as the consuls manipulated the rivalry between the Druze factions, so, too, the Druze *sheikhs* had learned how to play one Great Power off against the other. Thus, during the Crimean War, the Yazbakīs, ostensibly manifesting loyalty to the Porte, very likely at the same time responded to appeals by Russian agents, as the British consul, Wood, assumed at the time:

> The connexion between the Russian Consul General and the Druze faction of the Yezbecks was further developed previous to that agent's

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[43] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 69, Beirut, 2 January 1853, *DDC*, vol. 9, p. 448; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 2, Murry to de Lhuys, No. 11, Damascus, 7 January 1853.

[44] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 107, Beirut, 28 October 1853, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 32.

[45] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 15, Beirut, 27 December 1853, *ibid.*, p. 45.

[46] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 117, Beirut, 7 January 1854, *ibid.*, p. 47.

[47] De Lesparda to de Lhuys, No. 120, Beirut, 25 January 1854, *ibid.*, p. 48. See also Churchill, p. 111.

> departure at a secret conference which they held together at the convent for the purpose of concerting measures with a view to the prolongation of the insurrection in the [Ḥawrān].[48]

Through his friend, Wood, Saʿīd Junblāṭ continued to claim the *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* for himself. He and Wood exploited any small event in the mixed districts to demonstrate Amīn Arslān's lack of competence. One such event occurred on February 1854, when Sheikh Nāṣīf Abū Nakad died and Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād left Lebanon.[49] Wood thought he now had good reason for the replacement of the *qāʾimmaqām*:

> The departure of Hattar Bey el Amad ... and the sudden death of Nasif Bey Abu Necked, two of the most reckless leaders of the Yezbecks, have not only weakened that party, but have deprived the Kaimakam of his principal instruments for disturbing the peace of the Lebanon.[50]

In the same way, but of course from the opposite viewpoint, the French consul consistently attacked Saʿīd Junblāṭ whom he accused of disturbing normal life in the mixed districts, thereby pointing out the weakness of the government. The consul's report of April 1855 in this respect was explicit: "In the mixed part of the Lebanon, the Caimacam is impotent; it cannot govern.... The vexations of the mokatuajis [*muqāṭaʿjīs*] are unceasing: their negative attitudes toward their official chief are boldly demonstrated."[51]

This internal division between the Druze leaders continued until the outbreak of the civil war in 1860. It worsened in 1859, when Amīr Amīn died and was succeeded as *qāʾimmaqām* by his son, who possessed neither the authority nor the experience of his father.

The lack of civil order in the mixed districts and the dispute within the *muqāṭaʿjī* stratum translated themselves into disorder among the inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon, who now underwent one of their most violent period since the Egyptian rule. Watching their chiefs contending for the leadership, the Druze peasants themselves were anxious to retain their solidarity. Communal solidarity among the

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[48] FO 195/458, Wood to Radcliffe, No. 2, Damascus, 14 January 1854. Wood probably accused this faction of "treachery," as he wrote, in order to replace the incumbent *qāʾimmaqām* with Saʿīd Junblāṭ.

[49] He led the Druze volunteers who departed in January 1854 for Aleppo in order to join the Ottoman troops.

[50] FO 195/458, Wood to Clarendon, No. 12, Damascus, 25 February 1854.

[51] De Lesseps to de Lhuys, No. 16, Beirut, 2 April 1855, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 61.

Druze peasants in this period was stronger than any cleavage between *sheikhs*. The Druzes' struggle against Ibrāhīm Pasha and his ally Bashīr II, their war against the Maronites early in 1840s, and their successive revolts against the Ottomans all had left a legacy of solidarity. Although internal factionalism existed in every-day life and affected the community's unity, its sense of ultimate solidarity prevailed throughout. Each side made extreme efforts to show an attachment to the community's cause, such as in 1850 when the two Druze faction leaders, Saʿīd Junblāṭ and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Malik, acted together against the measures instituted by Amīn Afandī. These efforts contributed to preserving the legitimacy of the leadership. The Druze chiefs' attitude greatly impressed the British consul.[52]

The incessant upheavals during the years 1825-1860 also left a military legacy. The Druzes had no need to organize formal militias, since a prominent feature of their social life was based on an inherent military organization. Each chief had his own *rijāl* or *zulm* ("clientele following"), who in effect comprised a ready militia. Whether these disparate, private armies could merge into a single Druze fighting force depended on circumstances. No serious incidents had occurred between 1845 and 1852 that could serve to unite the Druzes to do battle for one common cause, till the Ottoman conscription order in 1852. While this in itself was not sufficient to bring together the various chiefs, who at the time were seeking the Ottoman pasha's aid in settling their own internal dispute, their followers joined their coreligionists in Ḥawrān and Wādī at-Taym en masse in a common fight against the Ottomans. Returning to Lebanon,[53] they carried back with them heroic stories about Druze resistance and victories.

Druze-Maronite Rivalry in a Fragile Political System

The world outside the Druze community during the period 1845-1860 changed drastically—Ottoman reforms, coupled with European penetration, were bringing about radical changes and a new Lebanon was developing. While the Ottoman government in-

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[52] FO 195/351, Rose to Palmerston, No. 54, Beirut, 15 December 1850.

[53] No sufficient data exist on the number of Lebanese Druzes who had chosen to settle permanently in Ḥawrān, but Ḥawrān in 1850 became more populous than ever before; see Lewis, p. 94.

creased its power on Mt. Lebanon, Europeans introduced Western modernization. The Druze community, however, was ready to receive neither Ottoman reforms nor European innovations. Firmly attached to their traditional economic and social life, the Druzes increasingly enclosed themselves within their sectarian particularism.

While the Druzes, as it were, marked time, their Christian neighbors were advancing both economically and educationally, their church accumulating wealth and power. Between 1845 and 1860, the European commercial invasion led to growing prosperity in certain Christian areas, such as Zaḥla and Dayr al-Qamar, in or nearby the Druze district. Dayr al-Qamar, situated in the heart of the Druze district, became a regional commercial center because of its silk, soap, and textile industries and other enterprises.[54] The Druzes looked upon this economic prosperity as a challenge to their power. Churchill described the process as follows:

> Under the patronage of the Emir Beshir [Amīr Bashīr II], it [Dayr al-Qamar] rose to be an important town with a large Christian population, principally composed of Maronites and Greek Catholics and amounting latterly to nearly eight thousand souls. It became reputed for its silk manufacturers. Its merchants built spacious houses ... in a style of costly luxury. All the Druze landed property in the neighbourhood passed into their hands. [This] excited the jealousy and cupidity of their feudal superiors, the Druze sheikhs.... The few Druzes who still inhabited the town were reduced to absolute insignificance, were always obliged to be on their good behaviour.... In their general intercourse with the Druzes, the Christians of Deir el Kamar assumed an air of independence and superiority, commensurate with their privileged emancipation from Druze control.[55]

The expansion of European trade gradually integrated Mt. Lebanon into the economy of the Western world. The silk industry, which had been developing since 1830, further accelerated this process in the 1850s. The development of the silk industry was accompanied by a sectarian aspect. The local merchants and the broker intermediaries between the producers of the cocoons and the market[56] were mainly Christians. The occupation of the Druze

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[54] Fawaz, "Zaḥle and Dayr al-Qamar," pp. 50-51.

[55] Churchill, pp. 104-105.

[56] To produce cocoons the peasant has to feed the silk worm with mulberry leaves. There were two kinds of markets: one in Beirut and Tripoli, from which the cocoons were sent to France; the second on Mt. Lebanon, where the raw silk

peasants remained limited to the production of cocoons and cultivation of the mulberry tree groves. The spinning mills for silk, which arose from 1840, belonged either to Europeans or to local Christians.[57]

In the mixed district, the socio-economic relations among the different social ranks—*muqāṭaʿjīs*, peasants, and merchants—did not display the same features as in the Christian *qāʾimmaqāmiyya*, where a peasant revolt broke out in 1858. Social cleavages characterized this latter district, and several factors brought about the revolt, all of them related to the interrelationship of the different forces: the role of the church, the attitude of the *muqāṭaʿjīs*, the policy of the *qāʾimmaqām*, and the growing demands of the peasants.[58] In the mixed area, those same socio-economic gaps could not efface the rooted sectarian boundaries. The silk factories, established in Lebanon between 1840 and 1860, were mainly concentrated in the Druze *qāʾimmaqāmiyya*. These factories were viewed by the Druzes as a Christian invasion of their territory, an attitude which may explain the Druze attacks on these new establishments.[59]

In addition to their lack of economic growth, the demographic balance was also working against the Druzes. Taking, as an example, the Christian population of Dayr al-Qamar and Zaḥla alone in the 1850s (about 20,000[60]) and the total Druze population in the Druze *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* (some 24,000[61]), one gains an impression of the demographic dimension of the sectarian conflict. Druze emigration into Ḥawrān continued; meanwhile, Christian immigration into the mixed district did not cease until 1860.[62] A look at the total Christian population of Lebanon (about 160,000 inhabitants) and the total Druze population (about 27,000 inhabitants) in the two *qāʾimmaqāmiyyas* clearly shows the demographic predominance of the

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was produced. For further details, see Firro, "Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon," pp. 150-151.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] For details on the revolt, see D. Chevallier, "Aux origins des troubles agraires Lebanais en 1858," *Annales* 14 (1959) pp. 35-64; Y. Porath, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858-1861 in Kisrawān," *Asian and African Studies* 2 (1966), pp. 77-157.

[59] See Chevallier, *La Societé du Mont Liban*, pp. 210-221.

[60] Dayr al-Qamar (7,000 to 10,000 inhabitants), Zaḥla (10,000 to 12,000); see Fawaz, "Zaḥle and Dayr al-Qamar," p. 51.

[61] Calculation according to Registrar of Census, 1850, FO 195/351, Moore to Canning, No. 33, Beirut, 5 August 1850.

[62] This was the case with Zaḥla and Dayr al Qamar; see Fawaz, p. 51.

Christians. Even in the Druze *qāʾimmaqāmiyya*, as mentioned above, the balance was in favor of the Christians; 40,000 of the latter as against 24,000 Druzes.[63]

The demographic dimension of the sectarian conflict during these years cannot be completely understood without reference to the dynamics of the two communities. In the 1850s, the Druzes still saw the Christians as foreigners who had migrated from the northern part of Lebanon; the latter's economic prosperity and demographic growth was considered as a result of Druze "hospitality."[64] In other words, while a minority the Druzes did not bear the feelings of a minority; on the contrary, they retained the feelings of a majority. In their own eyes, they had simply lost their demographic predominance because of their gracious reception of the Christians. The Maronites, on the other hand, due to their rapid economic and demographic growth, as well as French support (notably after 1845),[65] increasingly began to see the two parts of Mt. Lebanon as a single entity, a unity. Maronite clergymen could be found in every village and town; through them and their highest representatives, the patriarch, the Maronites developed the self-image of a "nation," with even a distinct historical tradition: the political unity of the whole of Mt. Lebanon.[66] This conception particularly stood out in the thinking of the Maronite Bishop Nqūlā Murād, for whom the Druzes were an "undeserving minority rebelling against the legitimate rulers of the country."[67] To the Maronites, the Druze population was a minority in what for them was their homeland.

Economic, social, political, and demographic factors thus combined to form an explosive mix for the two communities. Isolated incidents between Druzes and Christians continued to disturb the normal life of the two communities in the mixed district throughout the 1850s. Although the British and French consuls reported some of these events,[68] they did so as a matter of course, without drawing

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[63] Registrar of 1850 census; FO 195/351, Moore to Canning, No. 33, Beirut, 5 August 1850.

[64] See Abū Shaqrā's description of this migration and Druze hospitality; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 25.

[65] The French consul's reports explicitly reflected this support.

[66] Harik, *Politics and Change*, pp. 127-141; J.P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1914* (London, 1977), pp. 20-21.

[67] Harrik, *Politics and Change*, p. 141.

[68] ʿAqīqī tells about some of them. He probably referred to the years 1854; Antūn *Ḍāhir Aqīqī, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism 1840-1868*, trans. with notes

special attention to their effect. As the French consul found in 1855, "the fears of troubles on the Mountain seem to be assuaged a little for the moment, or at least they have lost their grave character. Although there are isolated acts and attempts, there is no fear that the population will rise up en masse."[69]

In fact, in a country rife with sectarian conflict, these "isolated acts" were the early manifestation of renewed violence. The fragile "arrangement" implemented by Shakīb Afandī as a solution to the problem was bound to collapse if and when affected by any untoward event, internal or external. Such events came soon enough. In May 1854 the Christian *qā'immaqām*, Amīr Ḥaydar Abū al-Lamʿ, died and his nephew, Bashīr ʿAssāf, was appointed to fill the office temporarily until an appropriate successor could be found. It was now the turn of the Christian *qā'immaqāmiyya* to experience internal fragmentation. On the recommendation of both the British and French consuls, as new *qā'immaqām* was elected Aḥmad Abū al-Lamʿ.[70] His appointment, however, led to fierce disputes among the Christians. After the death of Yūsuf al-Khāzin that same year, a new patriarch, Būlus Masʿad, was elected. Unlike his two predecessors, the new patriarch did not have *muqāṭaʿjī* origins. The infighting of the Christian leadership and the peasant revolt of 1858 had a mutual influence.[71] In 1856 the Ottoman Porte issued the edict of *hatt-i humayun* (Imperial Rescript), which promised further equalities both for individuals and for the different communities.[72] In May 1859 came the death of the Druze *qā'immaqām* at a time when the Christian peasants' revolt in Kisrawān had raised their hopes throughout Lebanon.

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and commentary by Malcolm H. Kerr (Beirut, 1959), p. 36. Wood also tells of such collisions in nearby Zaḥla in April 1854. His report contained an annex of two letters, one from a Christian and the other from a Druze, who both accused each other of the responsibility for the incident; FO 195/458, Wood to Radcliffe, No. 12, Damascus, 12 April 1854.

[69] De Lesseps to de Lhuys, No. 16, Beirut, 2 April 1855, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 60.

[70] A convert to Christianity, he had been born a Druze.

[71] Details may be found in Porath, pp. 88-93.

[72] Further on the impact of the reforms in Lebanon, see Samir Khalaf, *Persistence and Change in 19th Century Lebanon* (Beirut, 1979), pp. 76-79.

The Final Stage of the Decline

Under such circumstances, any incident between Christians and Druzes could set off a general explosion. This occurred in Bayt Mīrī in mid-August 1859.[73] Whatever its cause, the incident[74] provoked serious fighting between Druzes and Christians in the Biqāᶜ. Meanwhile, militias organized themselves in the Christian villages under the leadership of *shiūkh shabāb*, i.e., "chiefs of young men." These small forces adopted a special uniform and went from village to village to mobilize Christians for their "struggle."[75] The Druzes, of course, were already militarily prepared. The sectarian battles that took place in the mixed districts, which were the most populous in Mt. Lebanon,[76] and the proximity to one another of Christian and Druze villages were to give the conflict the character of mutual annihilation. Following a series of collisions in several villages, civil war broke out in earnest on 28 May 1860.

Descriptions of the severity of the fighting by chroniclers or travelers who lived in Lebanon during that period were actually written after the war itself, and of course reflect the writers' respective personal attitudes. They are unanimous, however, in blaming foreign intervention when trying to explain the severity of the war. The only

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[73] Churchill dates the quarrel 30 August; see Churchill, p. 132. Salibi dates it 30-31 August; Salibi, p. 88. On 18 August 1859, however, the French consul reported a clash between Christians and Druzes without mentioning the place. He invited the Europeans to deal with this dangerous incident. His report stated: "La guerre qui vient de s'allumer depuis trois jour entre les Druzes et les Chretians.... Cette...question est assurément la plus grave et celle qui peut amener le plus de complications en renouvelant les scènes de 1845." Bentivoglio to Walewski, No. 4, Beirut, 18 August 1859, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 146. On 1 September 1859, he gave the description of the clash: "Dans ma dépêche No. 4 j'ai en l'honneur d'entretenir votre excellent du mouvement... entre les christiens et les Druzes... La guerelle ... a commencé dans un village situé près de Beyrouth appelé Beit Mèry..." Bentivoglio to Walewski, No. 5, Beirut, 1 September 1859, *ibid.*, p. 148-149.

[74] Druzes and Christians had different versions of the incident, but both confessed that it began as a quarrel between Druzes and Christians in Bayt-Mīrī. See Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 100 and ᶜAqīqī, p. 106.

[75] See the description, the names of *shiūkh shabāb*, and villages in which they appeared in Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 103-104. It might be noted that there had been the same kind of organization during the peasant revolt in Kisrawān; see Aqīqī, p. 40ff.

[76] Shūf, Matn, Jizzīn, Zaḥla, and Dayr al-Qamar had a combined population of 117,368, representing more than 56 percent of the total population of Mt. Lebanon (210,110 inhabitants). The area in which they lived constituted only about 40 percent of the total area of the Mountain. See Chevallier, *La Société du Mont Liban*, p. 62, and illustration, p. i, vi.

contemporary Druze account we have is that given by Ḥ. Ghaḍbān Abū Shaqrā (d. 1903) written down by Yūsuf Abū Shaqrā. The narrator, who fought and was wounded in the war,[77] accused the Christians of initiating the hostilities with the support of the French, who were out to enlarge their influence in Lebanon. The account provides details about the events, the names of places and the fighters, without, however, referring to "massacres"; it suffices with giving the number of those killed and injured.[78] On the Christian side, ʿAqīqī in his contemporary account stated that the war began as a conflict between the Christian peasants and the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs*, with the latter as the promoter of the disturbances between the two communities. He also accused the Ottomans of encouraging the Druzes and told of the "slaughters" committed by the Druzes against the Christians in Zaḥla, Dayr al-Qamar, and other places.[79] Churchill, who lived in Lebanon at this time, described the war as harsh and blamed the Ottomans and the French for causing it: the former for their encouragement of the Druzes and the latter for their support of the Christians. Like ʿAqīqī, Churchill assumed that the conflict originated between the Druze *muqāṭaʿjīs* and their Christian tenants, who had partially succeeded in liberating themselves during the period of Egyptian rule and continued to seek total freedom from the "tyranny" of the Druze *sheikhs*. The *sheikhs* were said to be especially favored by the Ottomans, who had in 1857 begun to conduct an anti-Christian policy.[80]

In actual fact, the civil war that broke out in May 1860 came as a surprise to all three foreign parties in Lebanon—the French, the British, as well as the Ottoman authorities. Until May 1859, the French and British consuls, dealing with the Bayt Mīrī incidents, urged the Ottomans to take strict measures against any similar collision in the future. At the end of October 1859 the French consul reported his understanding and "cordial" friendship with his British colleague. He praised the "deference" of Khūrshīd Pasha, the governor of Sidon,[81] for cooperating with the consuls to prevent

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[77] See publisher's Introduction to the Abū Shaqrā Chronicle, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. H-Ḥ (Arabic letters).

[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-132.

[79] ʿAqīqī, pp. 106-116.

[80] Churchill, pp. 97-107, 113-120.

[81] Kūrshīd Pasha was appointed in July 1857 as successor to Namīq Pasha.

fighting between the two sects.[82] The governor had to deal with two questions of disorder: the Kisrawān revolt and the sectarian conflict. Early in January 1860 the French consul demanded that Khūrshīd Pasha pay more attention to the mixed districts in order to reach a definitive reconciliation between Christians and Druzes.[83] The consul remained preoccupied with the peasant revolt until 24 May; in a report bearing this date he wrote: "The news I have received from the Mountain is very dangerous. The events there have moved with such rapidity, it is feared that war between the Druzes and the Christians has broken out."[84]

Both the Europeans and the Ottomans most probably would have wanted to avoid the war, but when the fighting began it was almost impossible to contain. The French, British, Austrians, and Russians continued to follow events anxiously and did not leave off calling for the rapid intervention of the Ottomans to put an end to the war. While paying lip service to these demands Kūrshīd Pasha did nothing to intervene. Zaḥla, the last remaining Christian town, was captured on 20 June by the Druzes.[85] The French consul described the great suffering of the Christians in defending themselves against the "aggression" of the Druzes, although he did not present as harsh a picture as drawn by some chroniclers and travelers.[86] The fact is that no one at the time knew what exactly was occurring in the mountain.

Over the course of two bloody months, May and June 1860, Druze forces attacking for all sides and estimated "at twelve thousand routed some fifty thousand Christian warriors." In the Shūf, the Druze seized the principal Christian town of Dayar al-Qamar, and brought the entire area under their control. In the Biqāʿ and Wādī at-Taym, they captured and burned the main Christian villages; finally, on 20 June, they took Zaḥla.[87] Victorious, the Druzes assumed that their struggle to restore their ancient predominance was completed. On 5 July the Ottomans presented a

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[82] Bentivoglio to Walewski, No. 67, Beirut, 29 October 1859, *DDC*, vol. 10, pp. 154-156.

[83] Bentivoglio to Walewski, No. 8, Beirut, 7 January 1860, *ibid.*, p. 167.

[84] Bentivoglio to Walewski, No. 15, Beirut, 24 May 1860, *ibid.*, p. 173.

[85] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 17, Beirut, 3 June 1860, *ibid.*, p. 177; No. 20, Beirut, 9 June 1860, *ibid.*, p. 180-181; No. 22, Beirut, 17 June 1860, *ibid.*, p. 182.

[86] See ʿAqīqī, pp. 106-177; Churchill, pp. 132-206.

[87] See Salibi, pp. 88-105; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 100-130.

peace proposal based on the principle of *maḍa ma maḍa* ("the past is forgotten"), which the Druzes had demanded. The offer was rejected by the Christian leaders apart from the *qāʾimmaqām* and a few chiefs.[88] For several weeks, British and French warships patrolled near the Lebanese coast. Early in July, the French proposed to the British some form of common intervention as a prelude to an international inquiry on Lebanon.[89]

The Porte, coming under increasingly heavy pressure from Europe to try and stop the civil war, at last prepared to send troops to Beirut to take the situation in hand. Then, on 9 July, Muslims in Damascus made sudden attacks on the Christians there and inflicted a great number of casualties.[90] On 17 July, Fūʾād Pasha, the foreign minister of the Porte, arrived in Beirut to deal with the Lebanese crisis, which now also had spread to Damascus.[91] Before leaving Beirut for Damascus on 27 July, he removed Khūrshīd Pasha from office and replaced him temporarily with a military officer. Several high-ranking Ottoman officials, accused by the Christians and the French of either not having done enough or even having assisted the Druzes, were arrested.[92] The events in Damascus, however, strengthened French intentions to send troops to the Levant on a "rescue mission."[93] While Fūʾād Pasha continued making arrests in Damascus,[94] the French force landed on the Lebanese coast on 16 August "singing war songs against the Druzes."[95] These intervention actions by Fūʾād Pasha and the French indicated that the destiny of Lebanon was not to be determined only by internal forces. Moreover, the so-called "rescue mission," sent out by the Ottoman and French, soon deteriorated into punitive measures to compensate for their inability to stop the

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88 Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 34, Beirut, 7 July 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 199. Neither the patriarch nor those such as Yūsuf Karam who rose to leadership in this period wished to sign the peace agreement.

89 Spagnolo, p. 33.

90 MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Lauress to Thouvenel, No. 88, 17 July 1860.

91 On the connection and the differences between the two disturbances, see Spagnolo, pp. 31-33.

92 Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 41, Beirut, 28 July 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 212.

93 Spagnolo, p. 35.

94 As of 11 August, he had arrested more than five hundred persons. Fūʾād Pasha to Bentivoglio, Damascus, 4 August 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 229.

95 Churchill, p. 246.

"massacres." "With the arrival of the French troops," as Bentivoglio, the French consul, summed up the situation, "the Druzes, greatly scared, hastened to look for a way by which they could escape from the punishment that now menaced them."[96] The Druze victory again proved a Pyrrhic one, the beginning of their final decline on Mt. Lebanon.

Although the French troops remained at first for about a month in bivouac in the pine woods near Beirut, their presence in Lebanon provoked panic among the Druzes[97] and led to a large-scale emigration toward Jabal Ḥawrān until mid-September. The latter only slowed down, according to the French consul, when the Druzes began to negotiate with the Shīᶜīs of Baᶜlbak on a military alliance against the French should these attack the Mountain.[98] The presence of the French troops encouraged the Christians, on the other hand, "to incite the foreign soldiers against the Druzes."[99]

After a month's bivouac outside Beirut, the French "rescue mission" was finally allowed to move[100] and proceed to the mixed district, while Lebanese Christians were assigned to "supervise the movement of the French army in the mountain."[101] The French expedition introduced further fear and agitation among the Druzes, who began to prepare for a collective move toward Iqlīm al-Billān and Ḥawrān.[102] Further threatening were the anticipated actions of Fūʾād Pasha, who under pressure from General de Beaufort, the commander of the French force, had issued a proclamation ordering thirty-seven Druze *sheikhs* and thirty-five Christian leaders to come to Beirut within five days.[103]

> For some days, the Druzes have been in a great state of agitation.... The last news I received from the mountain, said that Said Jumblatt [Saᶜīd Junblāṭ], Khattar Amad [al-ᶜImād], Hussein Talhouk [Ḥusayn Talḥūq], Bashir Abou Nēked [Bashīr Abū Nakad], Soleiman [Sulaymān]

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[96] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 57, Beirut, 3 September 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 252.

[97] Churchill, p. 246.

[98] Bentivoglio to Touvenel, No. 58, Beirut, 9 September 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 256.

[99] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 57, Beirut, September 3, 1860, *ibid.*, p. 254.

[100] Churchill, p. 246.

[101] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 62, Beirut, 20 September 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 265.

[102] *Ibid.*, also see Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 134.

[103] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outry to Thouvenel, No. 97, 17 September 1860; Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 134.

> and ʿAli Hamāda, Youssef Abdul Melek [Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Malik], and all their families and with part of their men, just left or are preparing to leave ... on their way toward Aklim al Bellane [Iqlīm al-Billān] and the [Ḥawrān].[104]

Only fifteen Druze *sheikhs* submitted to Fūʾād Pasha's notice, among them Saʿīd Junblāṭ, Ḥusayn Talḥūq, and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Malik. A second proclamation issued by Fūʾād Pasha announced the replacement of the Druze *qāʾimmaqām* by a provisional military governor and sequestered the properties of the absent *sheikhs*.[105]

In a meeting on 23 September General de Beaufort and Fūʾād Pasha agreed on military collaboration on Mt. Lebanon. According to their plan, Ottoman troops would ascend the Mountain from Sidon while the French troops at the same time were to leave Beirut for Dayr al-Qamar. There the two forces would join up in a common operation. The departure date was set for the following day, 24 September.[106] Meanwhile, Fūʾād Pasha issued a third proclamation, this one inviting Christian refugees to return under the protection of the French and Ottoman troops.[107] An accord, signed by the French consul and Fūʾād Pasha, gave the military cooperation a legal base.[108]

Before the troops reached the Mountain, the French consul in Damascus reported the exodus of the Druze from Lebanon toward Ḥawrān,[109] with Druze chiefs who refused to obey Fūʾād Pasha being among the migrants.[110] A few days after their arrival, the French and Ottoman troops descended into the Biqāʿ and met at the village of Jib Jinnīn, at the foot of the Anti-Lebanon, in order to block the roads to Ḥawrān.[111] The cordon established by the Ottomans ran from Ḥawrān to Jib Jinnīn, connecting Ḥāsbayā and Rāshayā, but many of the Druzes managed to escape. Khaṭṭār al-

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[104] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 62, Beirut, 20 September 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 265.

[105] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 63, Beirut, 23 September 1860, *ibid.*, p. 266.

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 266-268; see also Churchill, p. 247.

[107] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 63, Beirut, 23 September 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 267.

[108] Accord between the *commissionaire extraordinaire* (Fūʾād Pasha) and Le Comte Bentivoglio, 23 September 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, pp. 269-270.

[109] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outry to Thouvenel, No. 97, 17 September 1860.

[110] *Ibid.*, Outry to Thouvenel, 22 September 1860.

[111] Churchill, p. 248.

ʿImād, with one hundred and eighty horsemen, and Bashīr Abū Nakad and ʿAlī Ḥamāda, with two hundred to two hundred and fifty men, accompanied by a great number of their coreligionists estimated at about three thousand contrived to flee safely into Ḥawrān.[112]

The original task of the French and Ottoman intervention had been to rescue Christians affected by the civil war. Since the Christians had been defeated and many were now unarmed, they had become the clear victims of the civil war, and the Ottoman and French intervention turned into a punitive mission directed against the Druzes. At least, that is how the Druzes came to see this Franco-Ottoman campaign. Even before the French landed, the assumption was that the French and the Ottomans had but one mission in Lebanon; i.e., to punish the Druzes, a feeling clearly described by the Druze historical narrator, Abū Shaqrā:

> The spread of the news about the arrival of the two fleets [Ottoman and French], provoked panic among the Druzes who began to consider what they should do and began to collect their movable properties and their booties, hiding them everywhere ... and then three thousand men proceeded into Ḥawrān and took with them valuables that were easy to carry and went through Majdal Shams ... and reached Jabal ad-Durūz.[113]

By the end of 1860, the long, bloody conflict between the two communities seemed to have come to an end. The Druzes, though at first victorious in the war, were ultimately the defeated ones. A minority, which had retained for itself the behavior and feelings of a majority, the Druzes in the mixed districts of Mt. Lebanon now faced a new reality. The fragile political system of the *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* had been the last political framework through which the Druzes were able to play an important role in Mt. Lebanon politics. With the civil war and the foreign intervention, the double *qāʾimmaqāmiyya* system collapsed. In order to set up a new system an international commission, representing Turkey, Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, met in Beirut and began holding sessions under the chairmanship of Fūʾād Pasha. The commission met from

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[112] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6: 1 October 1860, Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 133. According to Churchill, the number of Druze fugitives was two thousand; see Churchill, p. 248.

[113] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 133. The term Jabal ad-Durūz was attributed to Ḥawrān around 1860.

October 1860 until May 1861, trying through the debates, proposals, and counter-proposals of the different representatives ultimately to wield into shape and create a new Lebanon.[114]

On 9 June 1861, a basic constitutional document, the *Règlement fondamental à l'administration du Mont Liban*, was signed.[115] It established in Mt. Lebanon a political entity governed by a Christian governor, *mutaṣarrif*. In addition, an administrative council was formed representing the six religious communities of the mountain; it consisted of four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunnī Muslim and one Shīʿī.

Based on sectarian representation, the *muttaṣarrifiyya* deprived the Druzes of their leading role in the politics of the Mountain and reduced them to the same level as communities that had never exercised such a role in the history of Lebanon. The years 1860-1861 completed for the Druzes of Mt. Lebanon the process of decline which had been developing in various forms since the beginning of their migration into Ḥawrān. Now, Ḥawrān, which early in the 18th century had been no more than a shelter for the Druzes, emerged as their new political center.

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[114] See *Procès-verbaux* (official reports) of the sessions of the International Commission, *DDC*, vol. 10, pp. 285-456; and vol. 11, pp. 17-79.

[115] Text of the document; *ibid.*, pp. 102-111.

PART THREE
JABAL ḤAWRĀN BECOMES JABAL AD-DURŪZ

CHAPTER ONE

THE ḤAWRĀN REFUGE

After the French Intervention

From August 1860, when French troops landed on the coast of Lebanon, until at least mid-1861 many Druzes of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon could be seen wandering "about their mountains like wild beasts, the sword suspended over their heads, or hid[ing] themselves in caves in the earth—feeding on black bread made of acorn, and on the roots of the field."[1] Large numbers fled to Ḥawrān, where they began to prepare their resistance against a possible attack by the Ottomans, who they knew were looking for the main Druze offenders. In September 1860 Ottoman troops indeed proceeded to the plain of Ḥawrān and set up camp in Qaṭana; meanwhile, about fifteen hundred soldiers left Damascus for Ḥāsbayā in Wādī at-Taym. These Ottoman troop movements led Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash to conclude an agreement with the Slūṭ tribe of Lajā in order to give further backing to the Druze resistance.[2]

The first station for Druzes fleeing Lebanon was the village of Najrān.[3] Abū Shaqrā's description of the arrival there of these fugitives reflects the resident Druzes' excitement and agitation:

> As was the custom in such cases, the *sheikh* [of Najrān] ordered the lighting of bonfires on the summit of the village... Then bonfires were lit as a signal of war on the summits of every village of Jabal Ḥawrān.... In the morning, [the Druzes] came to Najrān from every village. The three thousand Lebanese [Druzes] were distributed over the different parts of Ḥawrān.[4]

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[1] Churchill, p. 276.

[2] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outry to Thouvenel, No. 98, 22 September 1860.

[3] Najrān was one of the first villages to be settled by the Druze immigrants in Ḥawrān. The village was the residence of Ibrāhīm Abū Fakhr, one of the leading chiefs of Ḥawrān; see Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 133. According to the French consul, the head of the Abū Fakhr family at that time was Ḥamad. MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran et du Ledja," 10 July 1862, Annex to Report No. 9, Hecquart to Thouvenel.

[4] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 133.

This concentration of Druze refugees coupled with Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's defense preparations worried an anxious French consul in Damascus, who began to accuse the Ottoman authorities of deliberately leaving the Druzes free to concentrate in Ḥawrān. Urging an Ottoman attack before they had time to organize themselves, he warned: "If all these provisions [of the Druze concentration in Ḥawrān] will be realized, the problem will be transported from Lebanon into the interior [of Syria]."[5] Six days after his report of the dangerous concentration of the Druzes the French consul wrote that the Druzes were exploiting the "inaction of the Turks" in order to incite the Muslims of Damascus against the Christians. In his view the Druze chiefs of Lebanon and Ḥawrān—Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād, as guest of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash in his village of ʿIrā; Bashīr Abū Nakad, as guest of Muḥammad Abū ʿAssāf in Slīm; and ʿAlī Ḥamāda, as guest of Ḥamad ʿAzzām in ʿĀhira—were busy holding meetings to plot their course of action.[6]

The position taken by the consul vis-à-vis the Druzes merely followed French policy as presented in the debates of the International Commission, then meeting in Beirut. The objective of the commission was to determine responsibility among all parties involved in the hostilities and to consider what punishment or compensation might be due.[7] At the very first meeting the French representative expressed as his country's point of view that the commission's task was the "evaluation and the reparation of the damages caused to the inhabitants of the Christian villages."[8] He claimed that the Ottomans were to blame for allowing the Druzes to escape unpunished and the Christians on the mountain to be in danger of starvation.[9] He also charged that the massacres committed by the Druzes had taken place only in districts where Ottoman troops were stationed.[10]

These initial debates over responsibility led Fūʾād Pasha to declare that the commission should first of all occupy itself with a

[5] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outry to Thouvenel, No. 99, 1 October 1860.
[6] *Ibid.*, No. 100, 6 October 1860.
[7] See Churchill, pp. 255-256.
[8] First meeting of the International Commission, Beirut, 5 October 1860, *DDC*, vol. 10, p. 289.
[9] Second meeting, Beirut, 9 October 1860, *ibid.*, p. 295.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

general inquiry into the recent events.[11] The European delegates, however, insisted instead on treating the question of the Christians first, in order to have their villages restored to them. Since a great many houses had been destroyed during the civil war, the French delegate demanded that the Christians be given permission to occupy former Druze premises now left vacant by Druzes who had fled to Ḥawrān. The Russian delegate showed himself concerned with the question of the Christians of Rāshayā, Ḥāsbayā, and those in Ḥawrān who were under "Druze danger." The British delegate reported on the humanitarian rescue mission of a Christian "Anglo-American Committee" which had arrived in Lebanon following the civil war.[12] On 10 November the British consul addressed the question of the Ottoman officers and Druze insurgents who had not been punished, and he demanded that Fūʾād Pasha carry out further arrests. The consul did, however, make a distinction between two kinds of turbulence that had taken place: assassinations executed by the Druzes and the actual civil war between the two groups of fighters. This evoked strong debate between Dufferin, the British delegate, on one side, and Béclard of France, Weckbecker of Austria, and Novikow of Russia, on the other, the latter three claiming that the so-called civil war in actual fact had been no more than a massacre perpetrated by the Druzes against the Christians.[13]

At the meeting of 14 November Fūʾād Pasha informed the members of the commission that he had launched an arrest campaign directed against the Druzes of Lebanon. In his opinion, however, severe difficulties would be encountered in bringing the guilty parties to light; therefore, he proposed the adoption of "summary procedure." The French delegate did not

> hesitate to declare ... that the summary procedure [*procédure sommaire*] was the only one not just suitable but even possible for adoption. The normal application of the ordinary pattern of justice would lead, if not to the conviction, at least to the arrest and accusation of all the Druzes because all of them were implicated to a greater or lesser extent in the events that had stained the mountain with blood and destroyed the Christian population of Lebanon.

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[11] Meeting of 11 October 1860, *ibid.*, p. 303.
[12] Meeting of 30 October 1860, *ibid.*, p. 328.
[13] Meeting of 10 November 1860, *ibid.*, pp. 340-346.

In fact, the European representatives on the commission all agreed to adopt the summary procedure.[14] This meant in practice that every adult Druze male could be summarily arrested. At least, this was the general feeling among the Druzes as described by Abū Shaqrā.[15]

The confusing news about French and Ottoman operations reaching the Druzes in Ḥawrān engendered a great amount of anxiety among the chiefs of the community, who subsequently met in Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's home and drew up a plan for the collective emigration of the Lebanese Druzes. According to this plan, three hundred horsemen would first be sent to Lebanon to investigate the situation. If they found the suffering to be too great for the Druzes in Lebanon to sustain, then these horsemen were to light bonfires on the summit of the Ḥermon as a signal for three thousand more Druzes to proceed to Lebanon to help bring out all Druzes there and lead them into Ḥawrān.[16] The plan was never put into action, but the confusion, the uncertitude, and the anxiety of the Druzes of which it spoke led many Druzes in Lebanon not to wait for any fact-finding horsemen to arrive but to take immediate refuge in Ḥawrān.

The growing concentration of the Druzes in Ḥawrān, the rise of a militant leadership under Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, the "inaction" of the Ottomans vis-à-vis the Druzes, and the debate being waged among the international commissioners over a punitive system against them—all these were factors that combined to persuade the French consul in Damascus to suggest energetic measures to be taken against the whole community, not merely against the Druze chiefs, and in a long report dated 15 October 1860 he presented the Ottomans with a general plan for dealing with "the Druze question":

> It seems to me it will be difficult to raise up the Christians again from the terrible blow they have suffered if energetic measures are not taken against the Druzes, whose superiority has been jeopardized by the arrest of some of their chiefs. The manner in which Fūʾād Pasha has acted permitted him to assume that by punishing those chiefs he would attain [his objective] without having to place the heavy weight of a fit punishment on the whole nation.... Probably there are some leaders who must be put down and some larger properties must be destroyed, but it is necessary not to forget that the Druze nation is the only one in all of Syria that can

[14] Meeting of 14 November 1860; *ibid.*, pp. 349-352.
[15] Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, p. 137.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

> easily sustain temporary abuse.... All those who have studied even a little about Syria [will see] there is not the slightest doubt that once the recent events are concluded, the Druzes' influence will be irresistible and the Porte will never be able to exercise any action upon them.[17]

The consul suggested exploiting the presence of the French troops in Lebanon: These should launch an attack against the Druzes in Ḥawrān. In his view, Fūʾād Pasha had "a unique opportunity" to consolidate Ottoman authority in Syria: "The Muslims of the country, for the first time in many years, had lost their pride. Damascus, too, had lost the prestige of its sacred spirit." Thus only the Druzes remained to be subjugated: "If they will be crushed, the Porte will assure itself some breathing space through which it will become organized in a more serious manner."

The first of the conditions the consul listed for attaining this objective was the dissolution of the union of the Druzes, since it was this union which made them a rich, compact body reaching all the way from the Mediterranean coast to the borders of the desert in Ḥawrān. With firm determination, he advised, it would be possible to drive one part of them toward the south and to transfer the other to the plain of Ḥama. "The mixed districts [in Lebanon], which would be exclusively delivered to the Christians up to the Sidon-Damascus road or even up to the Liṭānī, could be more or less part of the compensation for the damage inflicted by them [the Druzes]."[18]

Under pressure from the International Commission, notably the French delegate, Fūʾād Pasha indeed launched at the end of 1860 and early in 1861 an Ottoman campaign of "summary procedure of punishment" against the Druzes. The large number of Druzes which were taken prisoner on Mt. Lebanon as well as in Wādī at-Taym and in the neighborhood of Damascus produced great consternation among all the Druzes and provoked still another flow of refugees to Ḥawrān.[19] In Iqlīm al Billān and Hāsbayā about one hundred and fifty Druzes were captured by the Ottoman troops and sent to Beirut for trial, while in Rāshayā the number was seventy,

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[17] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outrey to de LaValette, No. 124, 15 - October 1860.

[18] *Ibid.*.

[19] *Ibid.*, Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 107, 24 January 1861.

and in Ghūṭa about eighty.[20] Meanwhile, Ottoman authorities in Damascus dispatched a colonel, Ṣāliḥ Zakī Bek, to Ḥawrān to meet with Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād and Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash in order to demand the return of property claimed to have been stolen from the Christians in June 1860. Aṭrash and al-ʿImād rejected his demand.[21] Spurred on by the news about the arrest of their countrymen and the great number of refugees reaching Ḥawrān, the Druze chiefs in Ḥawrān instead allied with the Bedouins for an attack on the Ottoman troops near Damascus. Immediately after the failure of the negotiations with Colonel Zakī, two hundred Druze horsemen, assisted by the Bedouins, attacked on the night of 11 January near Ṣiḥnāyā, a Druze village in the Ghūṭa. Three Ottoman soldiers were killed and several wounded. The attackers took back with them into safety Druze families who had fled from their villages. Several days afterwards thirty-five Druze horsemen proceeded from the Lajā to the Druze-Christian village of Qalʿat Jandal and absconded with some twelve to thirteen hundred goats belonging to the Christians. A Muslim caravan coming from Ṣafad was also plundered. As a result more Ottoman troops were being sent to protect the roads to Damascus from further Druze attacks.[22]

According to the French consul in Damascus, the raids by the Druze increased their prestige among the Muslim population of Damascus against which Fūʾād Pasha had carried out his punishments, and this would put the government onto a disastrous road. He discerned two motives behind these Druze attacks: to obtain provisions for three to four thousand refugees for whom there was no sufficient grain or meat in the Ḥawrān, and to put pressure on the government to release their chiefs who were still under arrest and to grant them amnesty as the price of restoring peace.[23] In order to convince the Druzes to give up their raids and obey the orders of the

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[20] FO 195/677, Wrench to Bulwer, No. 2, Damascus, 10 January 1861.

[21] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6; Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 107, 24 January 1861.

[22] *Ibid.*; FO 195/677, Wrench to Bulwer, No. 2, Damascus, 10 January 1861, No. 3, Damascus, 24 January 1861.

[23] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6; Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 107, 24 January 1861. See also Max L. Gross, *Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus 1860-1909*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 86.

Damascus government, the French consul suggested to enlist the intervention of Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī.[24]

Jazāʾirī agreed and sent several letters to Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād and Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash urging them to stop their attacks on Ottoman troops and promising to seek a way for granting them amnesty. In two letters sent in return to Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir, one jointly signed by Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād and Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash and the other signed by the Druze religious *sheikhs*, the Druze chiefs expressed their disappointment with, and feelings of alienation vis-à-vis the Ottoman authorities. Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād and Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's letter especially reflected Druze sensitivities following the exodus from Lebanon:

> We have received your letters in which you demanded that we submit in order to attain a state of calm and tranquillity. We had shown all possible submission by paying the taxes and supplying the provisions [to the government], but it seems that the fruit which we have gathered from this was the same as that which our coreligionists of Mt. Lebanon had gathered.... [They] left their families, moving away out of respect for the Sublime Porte....
>
> The fruit of our [misplaced] confidence and our submission is what we are seeing now. [For the authorities] the prosperity or the ruin of our country is the same. So we beg you not to lay the responsibility for the ruin or prosperity of the country on us. Those who were the masters ... are now living as the Bedouins under the tent .. because we are not a weak tribe.... Our coreligionists of Lebanon face the intrigues of those who want to take possession of their country, who seek to uproot them, and even to wipe out all trace of them in order to attain their objective.... The government did not do anything except to encourage their enemies.... It sacrificed the Druzes in order to make their enemies content...by ruining their country.... But we have decided to unite all the inhabitants of all the districts, Bedouin and others [against the government's policy].[25]

For Fūʾād Pasha the Druze problem was one of the most delicate issues he had to deal with. On the one hand, under pressure from the international commissioners, he did want to punish the Druze

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[24] ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī had left his native country of Algeria in 1848. He had been exiled to Damascus as a result of the French occupation of Algeria, but he had good relations with the French consuls in Damascus. ʿAbd al Qādir played an important role in protecting the Christians of Damascus during the troubles of 1860.

[25] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, French translation of a letter from Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, and Khalīl al-Yūsuf to Amīr ʿAbd al Qādir, 25 Jumād al-Akhir 1272, Annex No. 2 to Report No. 107, Outrey to Thouvenel, 24 January 1861.

insurgents who had fled to Ḥawrān; on the other, he hesitated taking the risk of sending troops to Ḥawrān, as he well bore in mind the disasters that had befallen the Egyptian army and the Ottoman expedition of the 1850s. The head of the ʿArabistān army, Ḥalīm Pasha, thought that a military expedition to the Lajā was the only way by which the Porte could successfully extricate itself from the precarious position in which it was caught up. The troops, he advised, could launch such an expedition if they left the French army to deal with the Lebanese problem and concentrated their battalions in a main offensive against the Druzes in Ḥawrān.[26] Because Ḥalīm Pasha could not send a force to the Lajā without Fūʾād Pasha's consent, he meanwhile resorted to two tactics in order to keep the Druzes off guard: one was to send in small groups of soldiers to try and recover the animals and merchandise captured by the Druzes; the other was to try and break up the internal Druze unity. Neither tactics succeeded. The Druzes realized the true danger they were confronting and remained highly alert—and unified. It was the dispatching of eight hundred Ottoman soldiers led by a high-ranking officer, Khalīl Pasha, to repossess the goats of Qalʿat Jandal which induced the Druzes to mobilize fully. They assembled in the village of Shaʿra under the leadership of Ḥamad ʿAzzām,[27] one of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's supporters. The war bonfires were duly lit on the summits, with the result that when they saw these bonfires on all sides, the Ottoman soldiers fled even before reaching the village.[28] Meanwhile, in order to weaken Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's position among the leading families and to try and disunite them, Ḥalīm Pasha granted *ʾāmān* (pardon) to nine Druze chiefs. But, as the French consul wrote: "The Druzes are very united and in a time of danger they concede [their rivalries]."[29]

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[26] *Ibid.*, No. 108, 20 January 1861.

[27] Ḥamad ʿAzzām was head of the ʿAzzām family, which occupied three villages in the interior of Lajā to which the Lebanese refugees came. He was a supporter of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash. MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, "Note sur les Druze du Hauran et du Ledja," Annex to Report No. 9, 10 July 1862.

[28] FO 195/677, Wrench to Bulwer, No. 4, Damascus, 25 February 1861; MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, 110, 21 February 1861.

[29] *Ibid.*, vol. 6, No. 109, 12 February 1861. The chiefs were Fāris ʿAmer, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, Hazima Hnaydī, Abū ʿAbdī al-Aṭrash (a cousin of Ismāʿīl), Muḥammad Abū ʿAssāf, ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Ḥalabī, Ḥamza Darwīsh, Qablān al-Qalʿānī, and Aḥmad Abū Salāma.

Fūʾād Pasha now decided to adopt a tactic of "divide and rule." Since the Druze militants were led by Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash and Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād, his choice as a counterpoise fell upon Asad ʿAmer, head of the ʿAmer clan which occupied eight villages. Asad ʿAmer's role as leader, as well as that of his brother, Fāris, stemmed mainly from their relative wealth.[30] Fāris ʿAmer, moreover, maintained good relations with the French consulate in Damascus, where he had spent most of his time during the events of 1860. In September and October, the ʿAmers were the only Druze chiefs in Ḥawrān who continued to supply grain to Damascus, and the French consul had even attempted at the time to integrate Asad ʿAmer into the Ottoman administration.[31] In February 1861 Asad ʿAmer was appointed by the Damascus government to lead a force of one hundred and fifty horsemen charged with supervising the Lajā.[32] In his comments on ʿAmer's appointment, the French consul observed:

> As long as there is no [hostile] event in Ḥawrān, the ʿAmers will be faithful [to the government], but in the case of a [punitive] expedition, they will not ensure the success of the Ottoman troops by separating themselves from their coreligionists.[33]

Fūʿād Pasha's attempt to split Druze unity served only to further provoke the militant Druze leaders, especially Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash. Persisting in their decision to resist, they convened most of the chiefs of Jabal Ḥawrān, including some of the Bedouin ones, in order to discuss the response to be taken toward the Ottoman authorities in Damascus. They also transmitted a threat to Asad ʿAmer so as to induce him to resign from the position he had been given by Fūʾād Pasha.[34] The unity of the Druze seemed to hold strong, and all Ottoman attempts to shatter it were unavailing—at least until June 1861.

The growing numbers of the Lebanese Druze refugees streaming into Ḥawrān had become a major problem for the Ottoman governors of Damascus by 1861, since this worked against their endeavors to strengthen their authority over the countryside. By enlisting the

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[30] *Ibid.*, vol. 7, Annex to Report No. 9, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran."
[31] *Ibid.*, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 100, 6 October 1860.
[32] FO 195/677, Wrench to Bulwer, No. 4, Damascus, 25 February 1861.
[33] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6; Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 111, 27 February 1861.
[34] *Ibid.*, No. 116, April 18, 1861.

support of the Bedouins, the militant Druze leaders challenged Fū'ād Pasha's plans for overall reform in Syria; even when the question of the Lebanese Druzes was later to be solved, the Druze problem in Ḥawrān continued to vex Damascus' governors, and the subsequent rise of Ḥawrān as Jabal ad-Durūz[35] saw at the same time strenuous Ottoman efforts to put their reforms into effect in the mountainous areas.

Jabal ad-Durūz and the Ottoman Reforms

Since the Egyptian occupation the region that later became Jabal ad-Durūz was perhaps the only area where first the Egyptians and later the Ottomans were utterly unable to impose full authority. The position of the Ottomans after 1840 may be said to have been even worse than that of the Egyptians. In the 1850s, for instance, the Druzes successfully rejected conscription orders and repulsed all Ottoman attempts to institute conscription by force. The Ottomans subsequently refrained from challenging the Druzes in Ḥawrān until 1860.[36] Furthermore, the great exodus of Druzes from Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Ghūṭa in 1860 and early 1861 to the Ḥawrān led to a strengthening of the Druze community and its will to resist and ward off any new attempt to impose direct Ottoman rule in Jabal ad-Durūz.

The events in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, however, only hardened Ottoman determination to introduce further reforms into Syria. This task was entrusted to Fū'ād Pasha, one of the leading figures of the Ottoman reform movement and well known for his radical views on the subject. Fū'ād Pasha, however, was prudent not to take steps that could lead to the failure of his mission because his aspirations were aimed higher, i.e., at the Office of Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire. His personal reputation would be made not by solving the Druze question, but by neutralizing European intervention in Syria and reestablishing Ottoman authority over the various areas of the country.[37] By navigating between these two

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[35] The name Jabal ad-Durūz, was officially used for the first time in a June 1861 text regarding Fū'ād Pasha's extraordinary taxes; *ibid.*, Annex No. 1 to Report No. 22, 13 June 1861. The inhabitants of the Ḥawrān area also called it Jabal ad-Durūz, *ibid.*, No. 129, 27 August 1861.

[36] See M. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840-1861* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 84, 123-128.

[37] For more details, see Gross, pp. 33-37.

beacons, i.e., motivation to succeed in his "higher" mission and prudence so as to introduce the reforms successfully, Fū'ād Pasha tried to deal with the matter of Jabal ad-Durūz.

Although he manifested force and authority in Mt. Lebaonon, Fū'ād Pasha did not follow all the suggestions of the European commissioners in their demands for severe measures against the Druze offenders. The "summary procedure" adopted by the commissioners was soon abandoned. Apart from two hundred and forty-five prisoners exiled to Tripolitania, all Druze captives were released,[38] an act which astonished Churchill who had formed a certain sympathy for the Druzes because, in his view, their actions during the war had only been in self-defense. This was an attitude which in the end was to find an echo within the Commission itself, when it agreed to abandon the plan of summary procedure against the Druzes.[39]

Beginning in May 1861, the French consuls in Beirut and Damascus reported on the British agents who became the intermediaries between the Ottomans and Druzes, both those on Mt. Lebanon and in Ḥawrān.[40] Colonel Frazer, the British commissioner in Damascus, was the active figure who tried to effect a rapprochement between Fū'ād Pasha and the Druzes. Visiting Ḥawrān, Wādī at-Taym, and Mukhtāra on Mt. Lebanon, Frazer created good relations with the whole community.[41] As a consequence of their closer contacts with the Druzes, the British began to draw a picture of the events of 1860 in Lebanon which differed from that painted during the debates of the International Commission. Thus, in January 1862, Frazer rejected the idea of compensating only the Christians, because the Druzes had equally suffered from Christian attacks. The British commissioner gave this justification:

> My European colleagues appear to account that the Christians alone should receive a substantial compensation, and that at the expense of the Druzes. I cannot but object in toto, to such an arrangement. It can be distinctly proved that the Maronites of Kisrawan and the Christians of the important town of [Zaḥla] had been long preparing and threatening

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[38] Sheikh Saʿīd Junblāṭ died in prison on 11 May 1860. Further details on the Ottoman treatment of the Druzes in Lebanon may be found in Salibi, p. 108-109.

[39] Churchill, p. 227.

[40] Bentivoglio to Thouvenel, No. 120, Beirut, 6 July 1861, DDC, vol. 11, p. 128; No. 123, Beirut, 18 July 1861, *ibid.*, p. 134; No. 135, Beirut, 10 October 1861, *ibi.*, p. 173.

[41] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 117, 3 May 1861.

> to attack the Druzes.... The Zahlamites sacked and burned the Druze houses of the mixed village of Kubb Elias [Qub Iliyās], as well as of several neighbouring villages in the plain of the Bekaa [Biqāʿ].

He went on to describe the attacks by the Christians in Matn prior to May 1860:

> It was not till towards the end of May and beginning of June that the Druzes were able to rally their forces, when they quickly drove back the invaders and retaliated...

To prove his contention that the Christians were the ones to be charged with having started the war, Frazer asked his colleagues to look into the mixed villages within the Druze territory, south of the Beirut-Damascus road: "It will be found that wherever the Christians maintained a passive attitude ... not a single house was burned, nor anyone injured in person or property." Frazer therefore demanded compensation for the Druze victims.[42] He became the defender of Druze demands within the International Commission and vis-à-vis the Ottoman administration, and also intervened in the question of the Druzes who had been exiled as well as of the refugees in Ḥawrān.[43]

With regard to the Druzes in Ḥawrān Frazer's mediation was especially effective. In their efforts to reestablish order the Ottoman authorities had to deal with four issues concerning Ḥawrān: the special tax, called the penal tax, as an indemnity for the Christians;[44] the ordinary tax; conscription; and the Druze refugees. Until Fūʾād Pasha's departure for Istanbul at the end of 1861, when he was called back to assume the Office of Grand Vezir, the matter of conscription in Jabal ad-Durūz had not been high on the agenda of the Ottomans who had otherwise succeeded in extending conscription throughout Syria.[45] The British agents, therefore, mediated the three other issues.

In regard to taxes, there was a difference of opinion among the

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[42] FO 195/740 Syrian commission, Frazer to Bulwer, No. 5, Beirut, 11 January 1862.

[43] *Ibid.*, No. 36, 31 Beirut 31, 1861; No. 43, ʿAitāt (Mt. Lebanon), 8 July 1862; No. 44, ʿAitāt, 10 July 1862.

[44] Jabal ad-Durūz had to pay 8,229 *bourses*; Iqlīm al-Billān, 428 *bourses*; Hāsbayā 2,441; Rāshayā 1,761. Of the total penal tax of 90,000 *bourses* imposed on the whole of Syria (*vilayet* of Damascus) (one *bourse* = 500 piastres). MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 122, 13 June 1861.

[45] For details on conscription in Syria province, see Gross, p. 41-44.

Druzes themselves. The ʿAmers and the Ḥamdāns declared their readiness to pay, while Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, supported by most of the other leading families including the Lebanese refugee *sheikhs*, conditioned any such payments on being given amnesty. The penal tax was collected, apart from the Jabal ad-Durūz population, early in September 1861.[46]

Despite the concentration of Ottoman forces in the area at the end of August and the fact that "the plain of Ḥawrān accept[ed] to pay [its portion] the Druze Mountain has not yet formulated any response ... [apart from] *des paroles evasives*."[47] When at the end of September, however, the Druzes did begin to pay their portion of the extraordinary tax, the penal tax, it was in the hope that this gesture would persuade the Ottomans to introduce a new policy in regard to Druze demands.[48] Meanwhile, the British kept up their mediating efforts between the Druzes and their authorities in Damascus.[49] When the latter still remained unresponsive, the militant Druzes allied themselves with dismissed Kurdish irregular cavalry officers and began to form bands for the purpose of intimidating the local Ottoman governors.[50] These groups refused to pay the remaining portion of the taxes; worse, they began committing acts of robbery. Rogers, the British consul, explained that these acts had only one motivation: to pressure the government into granting the Druzes amnesty. Fūʾād Pasha, before his departure for Istanbul, expressed the policy towards the Druzes in Ḥawrān as follows:

> I cannot consent to the free pardon of the Druzes of the Lebanon who are now concealed in the fastnesses of the Lajā and the Jabal Ḥawrān. Of all the Druzes these are probably the most deeply implicated in the atrocities committed last year, and their pardon would be a scandal. Justice demands their punishment, but for many reasons we are not at present able to commence hostilities against them. The Authorities must content themselves with very vigilant action in this neighbourhood and deal with those who fall into their hands with the utmost severity, and

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[46] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6., Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 131, 24 September 1861.
[47] *Ibid.*, No. 129, 27 August 1861.
[48] FO 195/677, Rogers to Bulwer, No. 42, Damascus, 3 October 1861.
[49] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 129, 27 August 1861.
[50] FO 195/677, Rogers to Bulwer, No. 44, Damascus, 10 November 1861.

I feel persuaded that Ḥalīm Pasha will strictly follow the injunction which I have given him in this sense.[51]

Early in 1862, the Druzes intensified their raids, notably in the Ḥawrān plain and near Damascus. They wanted their brethren in the Damascus district to intimidate the acting governor, Ḥalīm Pasha, who in 1860 had wanted to carry out a military campaign against the Druzes. Their attacks near Damascus greatly disturbed the trade roads.[52] Supported by a number of Damascene *aghawāt* who had interests in the Ḥawrān,[53] Ḥalīm Pasha held back from attacking Jabal ad-Durūz and instead sent his troops to punish two Druze villages near Damascus, Ḥalwa and Yanṭa. All movable property was confiscated and sold in order to compensate some of the merchants who had been robbed by the Druzes. The inhabitants of the two villages were taken to Damascus, to be dispersed among other Druze villages in the area; Ḥalīm Pasha assumed that his action would deter at least those Druzes who were living in the neighborhood of Damascus.[54]

In March 1862 Ḥalīm Pasha decided to challenge Jabal ad-Durūz directly, and in addition to taxes demanded conscripts. As before, the Druzes formed an alliance with the Bedouins to resist any attempt to impose the conscription order by force.[55] Meanwhile, the raids by Druzes, Kurds, and Bedouins against villages near Damascus did not let up.[56] The Druzes' alliance with Bedouins and the inhabitants of the plain, furthermore, stood in the way of the realization of Ḥalīm Pasha's plans in Ḥawrān in general and in Jabal ad-Durūz in particular.[57]

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[51] *Ibid.*, No. 50, 6 December 1861; Ḥalīm Pasha was the *mushīr* (commander). Fū'ād Pasha had left the province of Damascus under military rule and charged Ḥalīm Pasha with the task of restoring Ottoman rule in the Syrian countryside. See Gross, p. 70.

[52] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Lanusse to Thouvenel, No. 1, 10 February 1862.

[53] The *aghawāt* were notables in Damascus who owned lands and livestock in the Ḥawrān plain. The most important among them was Aḥmad Agha al-Yūsuf, commander of the *ḥaj*. Later he was appointed district governor in Ḥawrān. For further details, see L.S. Schilcher, "The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s: A Chapter in the Rural History of Modern Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13(1981), pp. 162-163, 165-166.

[54] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Lanusse to Thouvenel, No. 1, 10 February 1862.

[55] *Ibid.*, No. 3, 25 March 1862.

[56] *Ibid.*, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 1, 2 April 1862.

[57] *Ibid.*, No. 2, 21 April 1862; No. 3, 6 May 1862.

At this point, the *aghawāt* of Damascus, whose interests coincided with those of Ḥalīm Pasha, began to intervene. Aḥmad Agha al-Yūsuf, the leading figure of this group, suggested that the government follow a policy of "divide and rule" in order to try and dissolve the Ḥawrānese alliance. Exploiting rivalries among the Bedouin tribes of the area, al-Yūsuf formed a counter-alliance with some Bedouins who supported the authorities, and employing intrigue upon intrigue, succeeded indeed in breaking up the anti-government alliance led by Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash.[58]

Two occurrences initially worked to weaken al-Aṭrash's position; one was the dissolution of his alliance with the Bedouin and inhabitants of the plain; the second, the renewed internal division among the Druze clans. In April 1862 two incidents caused the break-up of his alliance with the Bedouins. Aḥmad al-Yūsuf managed to provoke a dispute between al-Aṭrash and the inhabitants of Buṣrā Eskī ash-Shām—a quarrel that took place between Ismāᶜīl's brother and the son of Ḅusrā's chief ended in the latter's death. Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash tried to reach a peaceful solution by paying *diyya* (bloood money), and the chief of Buṣrā was inclined to accept. The day after the incident, however, Ismāᶜīl's brother came to Buṣrā, where he was killed along with two companions. This murder, which was planned by Aḥmad Agha al-Yūsuf, not only produced a rupture with the inhabitants of the plain, but it also brought about a split in the community itself. The Druze chiefs, led by Khaṭṭār al-ᶜImād and Asad ᶜAmer, were aware that the division with the inhabitants of the plain would be exploited by the Ottoman authorities to attack Jabal ad-Durūz. When, nevertheless, the latter seized the opportunity to weaken al-Aṭrash's position within the community,[59] Sheikh al-ᶜAql Ḥusayn al-Hajarī intervened to try to overcome both this internal disunity and the rupture with the Druzes' neighbors in the plain. To effect a reconciliation with the inhabitants of the plain, a *ṣulḥa* (tribal peace agreement) was concluded. In the meantime, *sheikh al-ᶜqal* managed to assemble the Druze *ᶜuqqāl* as well as the chiefs in order to deal with the anticipated attack by the Ottoman troops and their local allies.[60] The Druzes decided to reject the authorities' demand to

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[58] Schilcher, pp. 167-169.
[59] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hequard to Thouvenel, No. 4, 6 May 1862.
[60] *Ibid.*, No. 7, 15 June 1862.

pay the arrears of the penal tax. They also planned a surprise raid on the troops in Buṣrā to disrupt Ottoman battle preparations. Finally, in order to avoid rivalries among themselves, the Druze chiefs mandated *sheikh al-ʿaql* to decide for them either to make peace with or to declare war against the government.[61]

Early in July, Ḥalīm Pasha decided to use force in Ḥawrān: ten thousand men, consisting of nine battalions of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery, were shipped to the region. Aḥmad Agha al-Yūsuf formed a local alliance comprising the inhabitants of the plain and the Rwalā tribe, under Fayṣal ash-Shaʿlān. In turn, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash concluded an alliance with the Wild ʿAlī tribe, led by Muḥammad ad-Dūkhī.[62] These preparations led to the intervention of the British agents, who tried to come up with some sort of a peaceful solution to rein in both the Ottomans and the Druzes. The British assumed that the most urgent question involved the refugees who had fled from Lebanon and were now defying Ḥalīm Pasha in Ḥawrān, and the consul in Damascus attempted to persuade Ḥalīm Pasha to deal patiently with the issue. But Ḥalīm Pasha showed himself insistent on reestablishing order in Ḥawrān. In addition to the regular and extraordinary taxes, he now demanded a tax known as *badal ʿaskarī* (equivalent of conscription).[63] British mediation efforts, however, yielded a proposal concerning the Lebanese refugees which, based on further indemnities, was studied by the Porte and the representatives of the Powers, and introduced some hope for the Druzes. At least, any immediate outbreak of hostilities was delayed. As Frazer noted: "A meeting of Druzes [the refugees] has been convened in the Ḥawrān at which it was resolved that they should patiently wait the result."[64] Thus, with a renewed cause for hope some of the Lebanese refugees relented in their desire for an attack on the Ottomans.

Meanwhile, the ʿAmers continued to keep their distance from

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[61] *Ibid.*, No. 8, 30 June 1862.

[62] *Ibid.*, No. 9, 10 July 1862. The two alliances represented a shift in the traditional local alliances. Generally, Fayṣal ash-Shaʿlān was an ally of the Druzes and Muḥammad ad-Dūkhī their enemy (the latter sometimes cooperated with the Ottoman authorities); see Annex Report No. 7, letter from "local persons," 17 June 1862.

[63] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9, 10 July 1862; No. 10, 24 July 1862.

[64] FO 195/740, Frazer to Bulwer, No. 51, Beirut, 8 September 1862.

their political opponents, the Aṭrash faction, whom they much wanted to see weakened. Because of their good relations with the French they knew that the French considered Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash to be one of the chiefs most deeply implicated in fomenting the Lebanese civil war. When hostilities at last did break out again between Druzes and Ottomans on 22 July, Asad ʿAmer did not join his brethren.[65] From ʿAmer's correspondence it appears that the French consul was responsible for this course of action. In a letter dated 21 July ʿAmer replied to him as follows: "We have the honor to make known to you that we have received your order and completely understand what you have written ... The Druzes are in state of high irritation ... For my part, ... I cannot do anything without your order. I will remain in my residence until hearing your desires. Could our caravans and our men bring the wheat to Damascus?"[66] The French consul was quick to hail ʿAmer's loyalty to the Ottoman government, and informed him that the *mushīr*, Ḥalīm Pasha, would invite ʿAmer to send his wheat caravans.[67]

The Druze militants this time fared badly. Under great pressure because of the quick defeat of his ally Muḥammad ad-Dūkhī and incapable of unifying the Druze factions, Ismā'īl al-Aṭrash decided to agree to negotiations with the central Ottoman government. ʿAmer informed the French consul of the Druzes' decision to submit: "Following your suggestions, the clan of ʿAmers sent to the Ottoman camp provisions and taxes.... knowing that, one day after, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's son had been sent to the camp ... of Buṣrā Eskī ash-Shām with provisions and taxes."[68]

Encouraged by this success, the commander (*raʾīs*) of the Ottoman troops, Muṣṭafā Pasha decided to attack Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's home village, ʿIrā. The Druzes and Bedouins, however, succeeded in rapidly regrouping in the village and surprised the troops at night. When the Ottoman commander saw that Druze families, as preparation for war, were being sent to the Lajā, he sent word to the

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[65] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 10, 24 July 1862.

[66] *Ibid.*, Annex No. 1 to Report No. 13, Asad ʿAmer to Hecquard, 24 Muḥaram 1279 (21 July 1862). The letter was brought to the French consul by Sheikh Abū Aḥmad Saʿīd.

[67] *Ibid.*, Hecquard to Asad ʿAmer, 22 July 1862.

[68] *Ibid.*, Annex No. 2 to Report No. 13, Asad ʿAmer to Hecquard, 1 Ṣafar 1279 (30 July 1862).

principal chiefs that there was one way to avoid war: through payment of the penal and regular taxes. The chiefs, including Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, again manifested their readiness to pay the taxes, but on condition that the Ottoman troops evacuate Buṣrā. An agreement was reached by the end of July, and the Druzes began to pay the taxes in grain. Instead of evacuating Buṣrā, however, the pasha sent in reinforcements. The Druzes, in return, stopped their grain supply to the Ottoman army and, reviving their former alliance, invited Muḥammad ad-Dūkhī, who had been defeated by Fayṣal, to take refuge in their mountain. The pasha notified al-Aṭrash that he had two days to start redelivering the grain. He also ordered that Ismāʿīl's son be detained as a hostage until the end of the grain delivery. Ismāʿīl rejected these demands and when the Ottoman artillery replaced the negotiations and started firing into the Lajā, Ismāʿīl's guns were quick to respond. While some of their coreligionists from Lebanon hastened to join in the struggle,[69] Ismāʿīl continued to insist on the withdrawal of the troops from Buṣrā as had been previously agreed.[70] The French consul, discussing the Ḥawrān question with Ḥalīm Pasha, gained the impression that the Ottomans were in a dilemma: Withdrawing from Buṣrā would be interpreted as giving in to the Druzes, whereby all efforts to reorganize the Damascus province would be seriously jeopardized. On the other hand, launching an expedition to the Lajā would likely lead to Ottoman military defeat.[71] This situation may explain the intensive Ottoman correspondence with Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash which now took place. The pasha, however, was not the only one in a dilemma. Al-Aṭrash had to contend with internal opposition among his fellow Druzes. In addition, his allies, the Slūṭ and the Wild Alī tribes, had been exhausted already at the beginning of the campaign. Submitting unconditionally to the Ottomans meant losing face—his reputation as the paramount leader of the Druze community would be severely damaged. In such an event, the ʿAmers, who already had the support of the French and the Ottomans, would be strengthened. Thus, when the war became foremost a matter of maintaining honor, Ismāʿīl answered the pasha's demand for submission in this

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[69] *Ibid.*, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 14, 11 August 1862; letter from a Druze chief to Damascus resident (n.d.), Annex to Report No. 14.
[70] *Ibid.*, Annex to Report No. 14.
[71] *Ibid.*, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 14, 11 August 1862.

manner: "I am a rebel, I do not want to send you either products or money. I desire nothing but the war, and if your Excellency doubts that, come and lead your troops [against me] in order to receive proof of this. This is my single response, I have no other."[72]

The Ottomans' breach of the July agreement quickly revived solidarity among the Druzes. The Lebanese refugees under the leadership of Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād by now had lost hope for an anticipated settlement of their problem. Although the settlement proposal had been put forth by the British agents, the Druzes expressed their disappointment with the British, who to them seemed to prefer to sacrifice their Druze cause in return for the favor of the Ottoman government.[73] The Druze chiefs professed to want a peaceful settlement of the problem, but, in fact, apart from the ʿAmers, all were ready to counter any Ottoman attack, and even the ʿAmers confessed, at least verbally, solidarity with their brethren.[74]

The two sides continued to play for time until the end of August. While the Druzes continued to demand the fulfillment of the July agreement, which called for the withdrawal of the troops from Buṣrā as a precondition for the Druzes tax payment, Muṣṭafā Pasha announced that he would march to Mazraʿa, a place which was located between Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's headquarters and those of Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād, in order to force the Druzes to supply further grain as taxes. For the Druzes, this was again a breach of the July agreement and equivalent to a declaration of war. Beacons were instantly lit on the mountain tops, the well-known Druze signal calling out every man capable of bearing arms.[75]

When their forces met, the Druzes at first succeeded in inflicting on the Ottomans a large number of casualties and captured one of their two canons. The news of the Ottoman defeat, as the French consul reported, soon reached Ḥama, Ḥoms, and even the ʿAlawīs' mountain.[76] Ottoman troops quickly regrouped, however, and

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[72] *Ibid.*, cited in Druze *sheikh*'s letter to a resident of Damascus (n.d.), Annex to Report No. 14.

[73] *Ibid.*, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 16, 25 August 1862.

[74] *Ibid.*, letter of Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād to one of his friends (n.d.), Annex No. 2 to Report No. 16.

[75] FO 195/740, Frazer to Bulwer, No. 51, Beirut, 8 September 1862.

[76] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 18, 9 September 1862.

again proceeded to Mazraʿa. In the ensuing skirmishes, two Druzes were killed while the Ottomans now took occupancy of the place. The next morning the Druzes counter-attacked, but lost four of their men who were killed while twenty were injured, including Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād.[77] Unsuccessful in driving out the Ottoman troops and with their Bedouin allies defeated, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash and the Druze chiefs let go of their hard-line attitude and opted for the negotiation of another agreement with the Ottomans in October 1862, which may be considered as a turning point in the history of Ḥawrān and the Damascus province: Aṭrash agreed to collect from the Druzes as well as the Bedouins all arrears in taxes, including the extraordinary fines that were due the government following the events in Damascus and Lebanon in 1860. The Druzes, moreover, also agreed to pay *badal ʿaskarī* in lieu of conscripts.[78] The Ottoman troops furthermore stayed where they were.

The events of 1860-1862 may be seen in retrospect to have mainly benefited two parties. One was the Porte, which had been searching for a way to reestablish direct rule over the countryside and mountainous region of Syria. That objective was partly achieved after the unsuccessful attempt of both the Druzes and the Bedouins to prevent this reimposition of authority. The second party to benefit was the Aṭrash family, not just in Jabal ad-Durūz but in the Ḥawrān region as a whole: the Aṭrashs became the intermediaries between the Ottoman government and the Druzes. The agreement of 1862 was based, therefore, on new norms of interrelationship between the Druze settlement in Lebanon and Palestine and that in Jabal ad-Durūz. Through the Aṭrash clan, now Jabal ad-Durūz became the main Druze center, and Druzes everywhere soon joined in saying: *Niyāl alli ilū kharāba fis-Suwaydā* ("In as-Suwaydā, even the man who has only a cottage is happy"). Thus, Jabal Ḥawrān became a magnet attracting Druzes from the various other provinces of the Ottoman Empire to come and settle there.

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[77] *Ibid.*, Asad ʿAmer to Hecquard (n.d.), Annex to Report No. 19. There were rumors that Khaṭṭār al-ʿImād had been killed; see Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 20, 18 September 1862; also Schilcher, p. 169. On 4 January 1863, however, the French consul reported that the Druzes had denied these rumors; *ibid.*, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 1, 4 January 1863.

[78] Schilcher, p. 169.


Waiting for Settlement

Until the mid-nineteenth century, newcomers to Ḥawrān concentrated on two principal regions: the southern and southeastern sections of the Lajā and the western and northern slopes of Jabal Ḥawrān. Travelers who visited the area before 1860 observed the capacity of Jabal Ḥawrān to absorb further immigrants even in districts that were already settled. Bukhingham, who toured the area in the 1820s, saw how around the village ᶜIrā, which later became the headquarters of the Aṭrash family, most of the ruins were still inhabited. From al-Mjaymer, east of ᶜIrā, to al-Qrayā in the south, deserted villages (like al-Kāris and Ḥibrān) were still awaiting inhabitants.[79] Al-Mjaymer itself contained in this period only about fifty Muslim families, but no Druzes or Christians. Ṣalkhad, just as in 1810 when Burkhardt mentioned it,[80] was still an uninhabited town by the end of the 1850s,[81] with five hundred houses waiting for newcomers. Porter noted that: "from three to four hundred families might settle in it at any moment without laying a stone, or expending an hour's labour on repairs."[82] In its immediate neighborhood to the south, there were several deserted towns[83] that could also be instantly inhabited (see map 7).

In the vicinity of as-Suwaydā, the capital of the Druze settlement, almost every town that had been deserted by its former inhabitants was still in ruins; but the inhabited villages, too, could absorb great numbers of settlers. ᶜIrā in the 1820s was a small village of about fifty families, twenty of which were Christians.[84] Thirty years later, when Rey visited Ḥawrān, the village still contained only several score families.[85] ᶜAtīl and Qanawāt, which after 1860 became relatively big villages, were populated by only a few families in the 1820s; ᶜAtīl could count no more than twelve Druze families, and Qanawāt five or six and these were newcomers.[86] Although

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[79] N.S. Bukhingham, *Travels among the Arab Tribes Inhabiting the Countries East of Syria and Palestine* (London, 1825), pp. 212-279.
[80] Burkhardt, p. 99.
[81] In the 1820s its ruins were visited by Bukhingham, p. 213.
[82] R.J.L. Porter, *The Giant Cities of Bashan and Syria's Holy Places* (London, 1867), p. 75.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 223.
[85] N.E. Gulhaume Rey, *Voyage dans le Haouran and aux bords de la mer morte, Executé pendant les annés 1857-8* (Paris, 1859), p. 163.
[86] Bukhingham, pp. 232-247.



Map 7. Development of the Druze settlement in Ḥawrān.

Qanawāt, with its paved streets, empty houses ready for immediate occupancy, and sources of water absorbed residents during the two decades from 1830-1850, it remained small. It was probably not widely known that Qanawāt was the residence of the religious *sheikh* of the community, since Rey wrote: "The *sheikh* of Qanawāt does not enjoy great respect in order to go and visit him."[87] During the 1850s and 1860s, however, Qanawāt began developing gradually until it became "the center of power and intrigue"[88] as the residence of *sheikh al ᶜaql*.

From ᶜAtīl to Najrān, where the first settlement had begun, many ruins in the 1820s lay uninhabited. In this area the only village to which Bukhingham referred was Majdal. In the village of Najrān the Christians were still more numerous than the Druzes: one hundred and fifty Christian and fifty Druze families.[89] In the late 1850s, before the great impetus of the 1860 immigration, Rey observed the geographical framework in which immigrants could be absorbed and throughout his travels he mentioned the ruins as testimony of both an ancient civilization and of the readiness of the region to revive its long-lost prosperity.[90] The fertile land of the region only required more workers: "We passed through fields with dark and deep earth, excessively fertile: but, Alas! the hands of the rare inhabitants are not sufficient for the cultivation."[91] Rey, in trying to understand the transient character of Druze settlement,[92] pointed to two causes: the recurrent Bedouin attacks and government pressures. This was the Druze chief, Fāris ᶜAmer's, opinion:

> The Druzes are not able to undertake any durable work; because what kind of peasant is that who would think to plant trees in a land which does not belong to him and who is not sure that he will not be forced to leave in [a few] months the village in which he lives? What kind of sheikh is that who could in such a situation, think to consolidate the ruins or even to build a convenable house?[93]

In order to overcome these two problems, the leading families much

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[87] Rey, p. 128.
[88] Porter, *The Giant Cities*, p. 47.
[89] Bukhingham, pp. 250-254.
[90] Rey, pp. 56-67.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[92] For a description of this transient character, which was also noticed by others, see J. Murray and A. Street, *Handbook for Travellers in Syria, Palestine* (London, 1875), p. 472.
[93] Cited in Rey, p. 102.

encouraged settlers to come to their regions. Newcomers meant more fighters and more payers of taxes the amounts of which were generally fixed for the entire Druze area. Thus the Druze refugees from Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym between 1825 and 1860 were easily absorbed in their new country. This was especially true of the northeast region and in the district stretching from as-Suwaydā to al-Qrayā (see map 7). Under the leadership of the al-Qalᶜānī family, which ruled Shaqqā and Nimra, newcomers in the 1850s expanded southwards along the eastern slopes of Jabal Ḥawrān: "A year ago," Graham noted in 1858, "not a simple town amongst the mountain south of [Nimra] was inhabited, but in August of last year, immediately after the harvest was over, a few Druzes made settlements in two places, Bshennef [Mushannaf] and Busan."[94] In a two-year period, 1856-1858, seven villages were settled in this area: Dūmā, Taymā, Tarba, Umm Ruwāq, al-ᶜAjaylāt, al-Mushannaf, and Būsān.[95]

In the region from Najrān to Qanawāt, the land was well exploited, as Rey observed, the district southwards being mainly pastureland.[96] Until 1860 the region south and southeast of ᶜIrā was still largely unoccupied, though the Druzes made attempts to settle there. The main village in this area was al-Qrayā. In 1810 it contained only a few Druze families; Bukhingham passing through on his way to Ṣalkhad in the 1820s did not refer to it as an inhabited village.[97] Although al-Qrayā became the residence of the Aṭrash family in the 1830s and 1840s, it was still vulnerable to Bedouin raids. Thus, in April 1838, Ibn Smayr, chief of the ᶜAnza Bedouin tribe, took advantage of the absence of the Druze young men who were then fighting against Ibrāhīm Pasha and attacked the southern villages of the Jabal.[98] According to Druze oral history, al-Qrayā was sacked and many of its inhabitants were massacred.[99] The same misfortune happened again in 1842 and 1846.[100] The al-Qrayā area remained vulnerable to such attacks until the beginning of the 1850s and Druze settlement, consequently, was not durable.

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[94] Cited in Lewis, p. 84.
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Rey, p. 164.
[97] Bukhingham, p. 212.
[98] FO 195/94, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 5, 13 April 1838.
[99] Bᶜaynī, pp. 194-95.
[100] *Ibid.*, p. 195; Lewis, p. 87.

This explains why Ṣalkhad and ʿUrmān, which had been abandoned at the end of the 18th century, were not settled until the 1850s.[101] In 1858, when a group of Druzes and Christians moved to Ṣalkhad,[102] a new era of settlement had begun in Ḥawrān which coincided with the final decline of the Druzes in Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym.

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101 Murray and Street, p. 488.
102 Lewis, p. 87.

CHAPTER TWO

CENTRIPETAL IMMIGRATION

Pull or Push?

The Druze refugees from Mt. Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān continued waiting for a solution to their problem until the beginning of 1863. Because the agreement concluded at the end of 1862 between the Druzes and the Damascus government did not deal with their plight, they began losing hope of ever being able to return to their native villages. Most of them had taken refuge in the Lajā during the bitter events of 1860. "On the eastern side of [the district]," as the British consul described it for London, "there is still a vast number of deserted villages and thousands of acres of the richest soil in the world."[1] Unsupported, these helpless Druze refugees now had no choice but to begin competing for territory with the Slūṭ tribe, who until 1860 had been sole masters of this area. The inevitable conflict between these two groups broke out at the end of 1864 when the Druzes attacked the "insubordinate tribes" of the Lajā.[2] These attacks were in fact encouraged by the government in Damascus which was seeking instruments to strengthen its power over the Bedouin tribes. The Druzes were turned into one of those instruments.[3] Until 1860 the Druzes had on the whole avoided confrontation with the Bedouin Lajā tribes. With, however, the changing balance of forces in the area, brought on by the presence of increasing numbers of refugees, the Druzes gained the upper hand, and the Druze chiefs of Lajā, e.g., the 'Azzāms, and those of Lebanon now became the new masters of the district. Thus "the Pasha invited them to Damascus and authorized them to demand the submission of all the inhabitants of the Lajā, and to obtain it by force if necessary.... On the appointed day the Druze chiefs assembled with their followers and marched into the Lajā."[4] Attacking

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[1] FO 195/806, Rogers to Stuart, Damascus, No. 6, 18 February 1865.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 27 January 1865.
[3] See Schilcher, pp. 170-173.
[4] FO 195/806, Rogers to Stuart, Damascus, No. 6, 18 February 1865.

Slūṭ as well as Christian villages, the Druzes seized from the latter a large number of sheep and goats.[5]

The arrangement achieved in the Ḥawrān by the end of 1862, as mentioned above, proved an important landmark in the development of Jabal ad-Durūz. The mutual understanding between the Druzes and the government produced another agreement at the end of 1864, which settled the conscription issue. The Druzes received partial exemption, being obliged to pay the military exemption tax (*badal ʿaskarī*) instead.[6] The importance of this agreement lay in the different treatment that Jabal ad-Durūz was being accorded in comparison to other places in the countryside of Syria and Palestine. Thus, Jabal ad-Durūz became even more attractive to the Druzes of Palestine, Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Jabal al-Aʿlā,[7] who kept immigrating there until 1890. As early as 1864, Rogers attempted to convince the Ottoman authorities to apply the same agreement to Druzes residing within Palestine, and predicted: "Unless some similar arrangement be made in behalf of the latter, they will in all probability flee to Ḥawrān where, living with their coreligionists, they will be exempted [from conscription]."[8]

In 1865, the Porte furthermore announced its decision to give amnesty to the Druzes who had participated in the 1860 civil war in Lebanon. The amnesty covered the Lebanon refugees as well as the Druze chiefs of Ḥawrān and finally permitted them to return to their homes in Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym. Many of those who went back to their homes, however, found it impossible to take up their old lives and decided to emigrate and settle for good in Ḥawrān.[9] Families that had acquired land in Ḥawrān preferred to stay where they were in the first place. This was the case, e.g., with the Ḥamāda family and some of their followers.[10]

The refugees, both those who decided to stay and those who joined them later, provide an indication of the "pull force" of

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[5] *Ibid.*; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 8, Hecquard to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 3, 21 February 1865.

[6] FO 195/806, Rogers to Stuart, Damascus, No. 50, 7 December 1864.

[7] Mt. Lebanon's Druzes were also exempted from ordinary military service by virtue of the *mutaṣarrifiyya*'s Organic Reglement, which allowed service in the local militia as a substitute.

[8] FO 195/806, Rogers to Stuart, Damascus, No. 50, 7 December 1864.

[9] Lewis, p. 80.

[10] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Hecquard to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 14, 1 May 1866.

Ḥawrān. For motives to be discussed below, centripetal migration toward Ḥawrān commenced in earnest in 1866. In October and November of that year, according to both the British and the French consuls in Damascus, there was a large trek of Druzes from Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Palestine to Jabal ad-Durūz. The British consul duly reported "a considerable number of Druzes from the districts of Hāsbayā, Rāshayā, and Jabal Ṣafed, amounting according to some reports to between seven and eight hundred families have within the last few weeks left their villages and settled in the Ḥawrān."[11] The French consul referred to three departure localities: Rāshayā, Hāsbayā, and Iqlīm al-Billān. He pointed to a possible adverse consequence: "This emigration ... has continued [for three months] in such manner that it might lead to the complete abandonment, in a short time, of one of the most productive parts of this country."[12] Both consuls tried to fathom the reasons behind this great migration. The Frenchman simply related it to the excessive taxes demanded by the government.[13] Rogers, however, in his speculation about the reasons for it, incidentally approached some internal aspects that usually cannot easily be understood by someone foreign to the Druze community:

> The governor general of Syria ... said that he had heard various reports as to the reason for this flight; some say that a league is being formed with Yūsuf Karam and the disaffected Christians of Mt. Lebanon; others say that a Druze astrologer has predicted an organized movement against the community will occur at about this time, and that they are collecting their forces so as to be prepared for any emergency.[14]

In fact, the feelings of foreboding expressed by Rogers were of course the popular belief in *miḥna* which hovers over the Druzes at all times. Anticipation of the *miḥna* invariably leads to complete solidarity among the Druzes, since all of them will be facing the same danger.[15] The revolt of Yūsuf Karam was probably coupled with a belief in an approaching *miḥna* because, from the point of view

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[11] FO 195/806, Rogers to Lord Lyons, No. 30, Damascus, 27 October 1866.

[12] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Bertrand to Moustier, No. 1, 21 November 1866.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] FO 195/806, Rogers to Lord Lyons, No. 30, Damascus, 27 October 1866. Yūsuf Karam, a Christian chief from the Ihdin district, refused to submit to the *mutaṣarrifiyya*'s government, and continued to revolt until 1867.

[15] See Part I.

of the Druzes, he represented the extremist Maronites clamoring for a renewal of hostilities in retaliation for the events of 1860. It should be noted that in 1866 some of the Druze insurgents who had returned to their homes in Lebanon had not been arrested and executed as was the case in 1860. Examining the internal relationship between Druze factions in this period one finds that even the French consul in Damascus, who had widely reported the internal division, was surprised in May 1866 by the cordial relations among the leading families in Ḥawrān. The Druze chiefs, he observed to his superiors, "had settled existing rivalries, and in order to achieve more unity of action, they had constituted a sort of government formed by the three most influential chiefs: Hazīma, Fāris ʿAmer, and Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash."[16]

If there were mystical reasons behind the emigration, these were very likely coupled with material distress: the ravages of the locusts, cattle plague, excessive taxes. In contrast, light taxes, numerous deserted villages, extremely fertile land and a well-organized community attracted the impoverished Druzes of Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Palestine to Ḥawrān.[17] According to the French consul, the pasha of Damascus sent a special delegation to Ḥawrān in order to try and convince immigrants to return which offered certain promises as inducement. The result was that at the end of November a great number of them again did return.[18] In attempting to account for the emigration from Wādī at-Taym, the British consul in Beirut, who visited the area, told of the great suffering and dissatisfaction that existed among the various levels of the population. He repeated Rogers' speculation concerning the excessive taxes, the destruction of crops by the locusts, and the cattle plague, but he also referred to another issue: European trade. In his view, many Druzes had from sheer want taken to becoming highwaymen, which had made most of the roads between the coast of Palestine and the interior unsafe, whether for the European traveler or for trade.[19]

It seems, however, that by 1866 the migratory process had

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[16] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Hecquard to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 14, 1 May 1866. The rivalries were renewed at the end of the year.

[17] FO 195/806, Rogers to Lord Lyons, No. 30, 27 October 1866; see also Lewis, p. 81.

[18] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Moustier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 1, 21 November, 1866.

[19] FO 195/866, Eldridge to Lord Lyons, No. 81, Beirut, 30 October 1866.

become general, no longer limited to the above-mentioned areas. From Mt. Lebanon, where, at least in the mixed districts peace was restored, the trek of the Druzes to Ḥawrān set in toward the end of 1866. It worried Dāuud Pasha, the *mutaṣarrif*, and led to speculation among the foreign consuls as to its reasons. The French consul was astonished because Mt. Lebanon in this period seemed to be prospering and the Druzes like others were enjoying this newfound prosperity:

> For two months, I have observed in the mountain a situation whose causes I could not define, movement, whose scope is impossible to perceive. It seems that it agitates a portion of the Druze population of Lebanon. Influential men who, after being deeply committed in 1860 and since then have been closed up in absolute reserve, have begun to show signs of life and to demonstrate the desire to come out of their privacy. Meanwhile, the popular masses, who suffered all the oppressions, have prepared themselves for unknown enterprises which would shed a certain anxiety in the country. For the present, we see a considerable number of the poorest Druze families are abandoning their homes and emigrating into the Ḥawrān. What could be the causes of this movement, which, at certain times, seems to take on great proportions?[20]

Rogers, who continued to deal with the migration question throughout 1867, attributed it to two causes: the failure of the silk crops and the want of land for cultivation.[21] Thus in July he reported:

> The silk crops are now over in Mt. Lebanon, and the Druzes, having sold their produce, have recommended the emigration from there to the [Ḥawrān]. Many families have gone and many more are preparing to start. I do not know whether this movement is simply for the purpose of bettering their condition or whether there is any political motive or object in view.[22]

An examination of the production and prices of silk in Lebanon during the 1860s shows that Rogers' speculation was based on mistaken personal impressions. Just in the years 1860 to 1867 cocoon production in Lebanon increased considerably, rising from 960,000kg in 1861 to 1,100,000kg in 1862, to about 1,500,000kg in 1863; then to 2,000,000kg in 1865 to 3,400,000kg in 1866 and 2,450,000kg in 1867. Average production in these three years was

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[20] Des Essards to Moustier, No. 6, Beirut, 12 December 1866, *DDC*, vol. 12, p. 361.

[21] FO 195/866, Rogers to Lord Lyons, No. 22, Damascus, 23 April 1867.

[22] *Ibid.*, No. 52, Damascus, 21 July 1867; see also Lewis, p. 81.

the highest until the early 1880s.[23] In the 1860s, as a result of a decrease in the European production of silk, the price of Lebanese silk rose and continued its upward direction until 1872. Only then was a drop in price experienced, which lasted until 1890. A look at the price of silk in Marseilles, the main importer of Lebanese silk, shows that prices there rose until 1872. Most important was the upward trend in the price of the cocoons produced by the peasants.[24] The impact of silk production and silk prices on emigration came only after 1880. In the 1860s, the economic "push" forces should be related rather to a lack of land stemming from agrarian changes that took place on Mt. Lebanon and in the Biqāʿ, as will be dealt with below.

Whereas Rogers stressed the "push" forces, the French consul in Beirut saw that the migratory movement was motivated by "pull" forces:

> Today it is completely proved to me that the movement of the Druze emigration from Lebanon toward Hawrān was advised, aroused, and directed by their coreligionists abroad, in Damascus. This warlike, noisy, active race is thought ... to reinforce their preponderant position, and their chiefs called for those of Lebanon on whom they exercise some influence.[25]

It is difficult to ascertain the reason for such speculation on the part of the French consul, but from the way in which the report was written one is led to assume that he had been motivated by France's anxiety over a renewal of sectarian conflict. There were, however, many other reasons for the Druze chiefs in Ḥawrān to encourage such emigration. In addition to their intention to increase their manpower, which, as we have seen, would augment crop production and consequently reduce the tax burden, a larger population would also increase the *sheikhs*' share in the crops, since agriculture in Ḥawrān was based mainly on the *sharika* system, and it is likely that this encouragement followed the new tax agreement of 1866 according to which the total amount of tax was fixed at 200,000 piasters, including the *badal*.[26]

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[23] See Firro, "Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon 160-1914," p. 156.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 161-163.
[25] Des Essards to Moustier, No. 61, Beirut, 12 December 1866, *DDC*, vol. 12, p. 362.
[26] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Hecquard to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 14, 1 May 1866.

While the economic "pull" and "push" factors in the 1860s thus were certainly related to the great scale of Druze emigration to Ḥawrān, the question remains: Why did economic factors propel emigration just in this decade? Had the economic situation before this period been that much better? Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym had previously suffered serious economic pressures, e.g., during the Jazzār period, but then there appeared to have been no such forces driving people to Ḥawrān. Economic reasons may explain why migration occurred at a specific time but they are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of the entire migration process. This process set in for the Druzes before 1860, with the increasing decline of what till then had been their main center of power, Mt. Lebanon. After 1860 the Druzes began to lose any hope of ever restoring to its full glory their ancient power in this area. It is in this context that the great scale of migration in the 1860s must be understood and explained. In other words, the play of economic factors at a specific time only served to reinforce the decision of the Druzes to migrate, although these time-specific factors, of course, continued to accompany the process of migration until 1889, and, to a smaller extent, even until 1914.

In July 1867, the French consul in Damascus incidentally referred to the general trend of the process, without dealing with the specific reasons impelling people to migrate. He cited it as "*une emigration assez importante,*" and went on to describe it as follows:

> [It] commenced about a year ago, and people say that it already attained a figure of about three hundred families. All the emigrants came from the party which was formed in the mountain in opposition to Amīr Melḥim Arslān, who seems patronized and favored by the government of Dāuud Pasha. It is true that they belong to the low class, but it is to be feared that the movement, which is gradually gaining force, will probably not stop before dragging in the wealthy classes of the same party.... This gradual but steady increase in the Druze element within Ḥawrān will at a certain time, result in grave consequences and face the government with great difficulties.

Thus the consul suggested to the Ottoman authorities to make great efforts to maintain a separation between the Druzes of Ḥawrān and those of Mt. Lebanon. A concentration of sixty thousand Druzes, known for their "ferocity," would prevent the government from controlling the four or five actual chiefs of the Druzes, he warned.

The government, therefore, should try and stop this emigration.[27]

The increased concentration of Druzes in Jabal-Ḥawrān and its inevitable impact on Druze relations with the Ottoman government were also mentioned by Rogers, the British consul, who made similar observations and warnings:

> At any rate it is a question of immense importance to the country and to the Government, involving as it does the abandonment of a considerable portion of Mt. Lebanon by its natural population, and the strengthening of an almost independent colony of warriors in a district difficult of access by the military authorities in Syria and traditionally invincible.[28]

Referring to the opposition party in Mt. Lebanon, the French consul alluded to the Junblāṭī faction, which had been considerably affected by the upheaval of the 1860s. Their leader, Saᶜīd Junblāṭ, had died in prison; the new "Regulations" in Lebanon had abolished Junblaṭ's prerogatives; Melḥim Arslān had been appointed *qāʾimmaqām*; and finally measures taken by the Damascus government against Junblāṭī properties in the Biqāᶜ Valley had weakened not only the Junblāṭ *sheikhs* but also their peasant clients. These latter lost most of the lands they had cultivated before 1860. The intensive correspondence (lasting from 1867 to 1872) between the Junblāṭī *sheikhs* and British consuls and officials concerning the loss of lands in Biqāᶜ sheds light on the entire problem and explains some aspects of the Druze emigration from Mt. Lebanon and Biqāᶜ.

Under the old, pre-1860 administration, much land in the Biqāᶜ plain had been cultivated by Druze inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon. Many villages were hired and farmed by Junblāṭī peasantry. According to Ottoman law, these lands belonged to the government of Damascus, which could decide to sell it to the people under its jurisdiction. After the intervention of the British agent, the Ottoman authorities in Damascus promised an official enquiry to examine the claims of the Druze peasants and their *sheikhs*, the Junblāṭs.[29] Several petitions were presented by the Junblāṭs, but without result. In one example, the petition stated:

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[27] *Ibid.*, Rousseau to Moustier, No. 9, 8 July 1867.

[28] FO 195/866, Rogers to Lyons, No. 52, Damascus, 21 July 1867; see also Lewis, p. 81.

[29] *Ibid.*, Rogers to Barron, No. 62, Damascus, 31 August 1867; Eldridge to Elliot, No. 8, Beirut, 16 February 1869; FO 195/927, Eldridge to Elliot, No. 29, Beirut, 2 August 1869.

> Up to this present time we have presented several petitions to the Government in which we begged that justice may be done to us respecting the restoration of our property in the Biqāʿ according to the accompanying list. We stated in our above-mentioned petitions that the villages and lands we now claim are our own property and our *mashad miskitnā* [survival base], of which we have had legal possession from older times.... Now we understand that the government has been handing over certain locations of our above-stated property to persons who have no right whatever to them and to whom documents of Tabo [title] are being granted.... It seems ... the Government is continuing to give away [our property] piece by piece until we are deprived of it altogether.... If those villages are not restored to us, our family will be utterly ruined... Our [property] concerns many of the poorer class of the Druzes, of whom several, owing to the sequestration of this property, have already left for the Hawrān. We have no doubt, should the sequestration and the above state of things continue, the rest of the Druzes who depend on us will be compelled to leave for the same place.[30]


According to the British consul in Beirut, these Biqāʿ lands were the subject of quasi-purchases, which for instance involved "a brother and some of the friends of a person named Kikano [who enjoyed the] almost intimate confidence of H. Ex Franco Pasha." By virtue of these fictive purchases a claimant was able to declare that he had made over a portion of the property claimed by him in consideration of a certain sum. Of course, he never received any monies, but these declarations were registered in the proper public offices and were regarded as good title to the property. The proportions disposed of in this way usually varied from one-third to two-thirds of the whole claim. The purchaser then gave a counter-declaration to the vendor that in the event of the land not being received, the former would have no claim against the latter for the purchase money. Several of these documents had been signed by Kikano's brother. It was through such operations that many Druzes were deprived of land and "obliged to emigrate to Ḥawrān."[31]

Land speculators succeeded in conducting such transactions by exploiting the cadaster that the Damascus government had implemented as a prelude to fiscal reorganization. The peasants who

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[30] *Ibid.*, memorandum Najīb and Nasīb Junblāṭ to Eldridge, Mukhtara, 26 July 1869. The villages claimed are as follows: Khiḍr ʿAbbās, Khirbat Qinfār, ʿAyn Zabdā, al-Ḥas, Maydūn, Lūsa, Ayn at-Tīna, Mashghara, Mḥaytha, Labbaya (incl. ʿAyn-ʿAjūz and Qadʿūs), Barūtiya, Saḥmūr, Yaḥmūr, Zalaya, Majdal Bahlis, Qarʿūn, Baʿlūl, Lālā.

[31] *Ibid.*, Eldridge to Elliot, No.30, Beirut, 2 August 1869.



Map 8. Druze settlements in Biqaʿ and Wādī at-Taym, ca. 1860.

had cultivated these *mīrī* (state) lands were tenants of the Junblāṭ family, but according to Ottoman land law the Junblāṭ had no legal right to *mīrī* lands. Faced with this judicial restriction, the Junblāṭī family tried to safeguard a large proportion of their lands by turning it into *waqf* (mortmain), especially certain tracts of land in the Biqāᶜ. In 1871 the Junblāṭ tried to restore ownership of at least three land plots, and also to register other *mīrī* plots in their name by arguing that land in other places, e.g., Bilād Bshara and ash-Shūmar, had been registered in the names of the landlords of Zaghyr, Ṣabᶜiya, and Manakera families.[32] The Junblāṭ tried to restore portions of their ancient estate in Biqāᶜ until the end of 1872, but were unsuccessful in their efforts. Consequently, great numbers of their Druze tenants decided to emigrate to Ḥawrān.[33] Realizing that the cadaster in the Biqāᶜ was a *fait accompli*, the Junblāṭ endeavored to find other ways of solving the problem of their landless peasants. Thus, they wrote to the British consul: "Because the Druzes from our community cannot dwell in Lebanon as a result of their being deprived of their lands in the Biqāᶜ, it is necessary that steps be taken... to give them deserted villages where they could live."[34]

From Peripheral Region to Center

Disputes over property in Biqāᶜ and Wādī at-Taym, where the Ottoman had imposed the cadaster, also existed among the Druzes themselves. Thus, the Qays and Shams families of Ḥāsbayā fought over the possession of land in the village of Mārī. Here the authorities intervened when it seemed that peasants connected to the Qays family would be unduly deprived.[35] In Rāshayā, a quarrel broke out among the villagers over both land and sources of water.[36]

The Druzes of Wādī at-Taym as well as those of Biqāᶜ and Iqlīm al-Billān did not enjoy the privileges that had been extended to their brethren on Mt. Lebanon and in Ḥawrān. In addition to the heavy taxes that they had to pay, the Druzes of Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm

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[32] FO 195/976, Najīb and Nasīb Junblāṭ to Eldridge, 7 March 1871.
[33] FO 195/976, Eldridge to Elliot, No. 25, Beirut, 22 May 1871; No. 31, Beirut, 17 June 1871; No. 59, Beirut, 10 October 1871; FO 195/994, No. 3, 15 January 1872; No. 47, 1 July 1872.
[34] FO 195/976, Najīb and Nasīb Junblāṭ, 19 July 1872.
[35] FO 195/976, Buton to Elliot, No. 12, 23 June 1871.
[36] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Guys to Deazes, No. 30, 7 June 1877.

al-Billān rarely received exemptions from active military service. When they succeeded in obtaining *badal ʿaskarī*, it was only at the highest price.[37] Conscription as well as the heavy taxes in these areas, which are not far from Damascus, the capital of the province, inevitably invited trouble. In 1878 Druze and Shīʿī inhabitants of Marjʿiyūn confronted the Ottoman troops when they came to enlist conscripts. The former were led by a notorious Druze *sheikh* named ʿAlī al-Ḥajjār, of the village of Mṭilla. In order to suppress his resistance, the Ottoman troops attacked his village, killing thirty and wounding twenty-two. ʿAlī al-Ḥajjār escaped to the Druze village of Majdal-Shams, where he began to call for a revolt against the government of Damascus. Druzes from Ḥawrān, Mt. Lebanon and Ḥermon joined him. Only the intervention of the Junblāṭs, the *qāʾimmaqām* of the Shūf, and other Druze chiefs prevented a confrontation between the Druzes and the Ottomans. ʿAlī a-Ḥajjār along with many of his followers from the Ḥermon area took refuge in Ḥawrān.[38] It was because of such hardships that during the 1860s and 1870s the districts of Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān probably supplied the greatest portion of the newcomers to Ḥawrān. At the beginning of 1870, Richard Burton and Charles Drake observed that many ruined villages in Ḥawrān

> began to be occupied by the Druzes, whom poverty and oppression drove from their original seats in the Wady Taym, and upon the slopes of the Lebanus and the Hermon... We can hardly wonder at the Exodus when we are told that nearly half the settlement of Jaydūr district [Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān]—eleven out of twenty-four—have been within twelve months ruined by the usurer and the tax-gatherer. The fugitives find in the Jebel-Durūz Haurān [*sic*] a cool and healthy [place].[39]

Because of increasing Ottoman attempts to reform the fiscal system and to bring military conscription to the countryside, the peripheral areas of Jabal al-Aʿlā and Palestine became from 1870 more exposed to the tax-collectors and government agents. For the Druzes of these areas, Jabal Ḥawrān became their refuge. Although

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[37] *Ibid.*, No. 37, 7 August 1877.

[38] FO 195/1201, Eldridge to Layard, Beirut, No. 13, 4 February 1878; and Jago to Layard, No. 3, Damascus, 6 February 1878. Later al-Ḥajjār returned to his village. At the end of the century the lands of his village were sold to Baron Rothschild.

[39] R. Burton and C. Drake, *Unexplored Syria*, 2 vols. (London, 1872), vol. 1, pp. 178-180.

insufficient data exist concerning the Druzes of Jabal al-Aʿlā, the rise of the Ḥalabīs as one of the leading families after 1870 seems to indicate that many Druzes called Ḥalabiyya came from Jabal al-Aʿlā and settled in Ḥawrān in the 1870s. With regard to Jabal al-Aʿlā's Druzes, two indicative documents are extant: one is a British consul's report dated November 1875, the second a petition addressed to the British consul in Aleppo. In his report, the British consul of Beirut told how in mid-1875 the Druzes of Jabal al-Aʿlā, through the intermediary of the Junblāṭs, complained "that the authorities were desirous of depriving them of their lands... which had been in their possession and on which they had paid the taxes for many generations and a portion of which they had planted with olive trees."[40] The British consul in Aleppo intervened in vain on behalf of the Druzes of Jabal al-Aʿlā, who complained that their properties were being sold by the authorities. That the Druze were being driven out was in his view because of the frequent changes of *wālīs*, who consequently were unable to exert their full control over the permanent authorities of the Aleppo provinces, who "have become all powerful to oppress such of the inhabitants as they consider unprotected."[41]

The emigration from Palestine toward Ḥawrān continued until 1914, as is testified to both by Western travelers and by Druze sources. From the survey of western Palestine written by Condor and Kitchener in 1881, it seems that many original Druze villages in Galilee were then either deserted or occupied by members of other communities. In the district of Shāghūr the villages of Biʿna and Dayr al-Asad had been inhabited by Druzes when Guerin saw them in the early 1860s, but they were already abandoned by the time Condor and Kitchener made their survey in the 1870s.[42] The survey forms a clear description of the decline of the Druze villages in Upper Galilee, near the city of Ṣafad. The village of Beit Jan was populated in the 1870s by nearly one hundred Druzes; in Guerin's time, by two hundred. Condor and Kitchener wrote that "a few years ago, it [Beit Jan] was much larger, as indicated by the abandoned houses which are beginning to fall into ruins. I am told that

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[40] FO 195/1067, Eldridge to Elliot, No. 47, Beirut, 13 November 1875.

[41] *Ibid.*, "A petition of the Inhabitants of Keftīn [in Jabal al-Aʿlā] to the British Consul, Eskine, in Aleppo" (n.d.).

[42] C.R. Conder and H.H. Kitchener, *The Survey of Western Palestine*, 3 vols. (London, 1881), vol. 1, p. 150.

their occupants have fled to Ḥawrān to escape conscription."[43] The Druze village Jarmaq near Beit Jan went into decline in the 1830s, as E. Robinson mentioned: "The Druze village of Jermuk is situated on the level western brow of the mountain [Miron]; and enjoys a view of the lake of Galilee. It is said to be at present almost deserted."[44] In 1877 it was still "a small, half ruined village of stone containing about thirty Druzes."[45] In the 1880s all of Jarmaq emigrated to Ḥawrān. It is certain that the Jarmaqānī family which settled in the villages of Ṣalkhad, al-Qrayā, and ʿUrmān, came from Jarmaq (see map 6).

Early in the 1860s the Druzes of Palestine demanded to be treated by the Ottoman authorities like their brethren in Lebanon and Ḥawrān in regard to military conscription, but their arguments produced no results. In 1877 they again addressed a similar demand to the British consulates in Damascus and Beirut. Earlier, in December 1876, Jago, the vice consul in Damascus, had written that "In the district of St. Jean d'Acre .. and notably near the town of Safet, are numerous Druze families mingled with the Muslim population of the villages thereabouts, and with respect to these, no exemption [from military service] has been ordered to be made by the authorities." The consequence was flight to Ḥawrān.[46] The Druze chiefs in Palestine, Ḥammūd Ḥassūn, Ṭarīf al-Muḥammad, and ʿAlī-Muʿadī, presented the British consul in Beirut with a petition also demanding exemption from conscription.[47] The petitioners wrote of the "causes which have tended to the ruin and destruction of [the] Druze community" in Palestine. They added:

> Whenever any one of us is registered as a conscript or *radīf* [reservist], in order to escape he flees either to the Ḥawrān or to some other place of refuge. Our local authorities thereupon begin to exercise upon the remaining inhabitants of our villages all kinds of extortion, insults and ill treatment, which will eventually end in our entire destruction. We thereupon humbly solicit you [the consul] to communicate our case and ruined condition to the proper quarter... in order that we should be treated on the same footing as the other members of our community.[48]

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[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Edward Robinson, *Biblical Researches in Palestine and Adjacent Region, A Journal of Travels in the Years 1838 and 1852*, 3 vols. (repr. Jerusalem, 1970), vol. 1, p. 75.

[45] Conder and Kitchener, *Survey*, vol. 1, p. 198.

[46] FO 195/1113, Jago to Elliot, No. 6, 17 December 1876.

[47] FO 195/1153, Eldridge to Elliot, No. 4, 17 January 1877.

[48] *Ibid.*, Letter from Ḥammūd Ḥassūn, Ṭarīf al-Muḥammad, and ʿAlī Muʿadī to Eldridge (n.d.).

In the 1880s Oliphant, who lived with the Druzes of Palestine, noticed how the migration process extended to all the Druze villages: "They are slowly migrating to the Jebel a-Druz, where about two-thirds of the nation have already asserted their semi-independence."[49] During his residence on the Carmel Oliphant dealt at length with the Druzes of the villages of Shafaʿamr, ʿIsfiya, and Dāliat al-Karmel. In Shafaʿamr, he wrote, "the Druze population is ... rapidly diminishing. A slow but steady migration takes place annually to the Druze mountains to the east of the Hauran."[50]

The private papers of the Muʿadī family, whose members were tax collectors at the end of the Ottoman period, show the continuation of Druze emigration from Palestine to Ḥawrān. The Muʿadī papers refer to tax collections from 1299 to 1322 Hijrī (1882 to 1904). The rolls were divided into two categories: the peasants who had acquired *faddāns* of lands, and the landless peasants called *al-falatiyya*. Of thirty-nine peasants who held land in Yarkā village in Galilee in 1882, nine family names disappeared from the rolls between 1882 and 1904; of forty-nine landless families, twenty-four no longer appeared on the lists in the latter year. It is difficult to ascertain that all of the families that had left Yarkā village arrived indeed in Ḥawrān, but certain lists (for example, those of 1887, 1899 and 1900) do explicitly show that many of the absent families had emigrated to Ḥawrān. Although the Muʿadī papers refer to but one of eighteen Druze villages in Palestine, the case of Yarkā could point to a general tendency that was developing among the Druzes of Palestine in this period.[51]

The trek from Mt. Lebanon to the Jabal abated after 1890, although individuals continued to arrive until 1918. After 1890, because of the changes that were taking place on Mt. Lebanon, most Lebanese Druzes who left emigrated to North and South America, Australia, and Africa. The Lebanese Druze community as a whole had by then become integrated into silk agriculture and the silk industry. This was, however, as producers of cocoons rather than as merchants or silk mill proprietors. Of the twenty-three silk spinning

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[49] Oliphant, p. 114.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.
[51] The documents consulted from the Muʿadī papers are: *ʿAdad al-Fadadīn wal-Falatiyya* (1299 H); *Adhdhukūr al-Ladhīn Dafuʿū aḍ-ḍarība* (1318-1320); *Bayān al-Mutawaffīn min al-Anfār bi-Kashf aḍ-ḍarība* (1318); *al-Anfār al-Mawjudūn bil-ʿAskariyya* (1317).

mills that existed in Shūf districts at the end of the century, only two were run by Druzes (Saᶜīd Ḥamdān and Muḥammad Salīm Ḍaū in the village of Dayr-Kūshī and Saᶜīd Abū Ismāᶜīl in Bᶜaqlīn village); all the others were owned by local Christians. Of the one hundred and four mills in the Matn area, just four belonged to Druzes; the mill in Qarnāīl village belonged to ᶜAlī Abū ᶜAlī, in Ṣalimā village two mills belonged to the Miṣri family; a mill in Mtayn village belonged to Bashīr Nuwayhid. Even work in the mills had an ethnic character. Of fourteen thousand mill workers in 1914, Druzes numbered only one thousand, a proportion that did not at all correspond to the population distribution on Mt. Lebanon. Of the one hundred and seventy-four active mills there in 1910, one hundred and thirty-two were concentrated in the mixed districts; Druze workers represented only 7.2 percent of the total labor force on Mt. Lebanon, whereas the Druze population numbered 12.4 percent of the total. Meanwhile, notable Druze families, such as Junblāṭ, Arslān, Abū Nakad, ᶜAbd al-Malik, and Talḥuq, became increasingly dependent on the Christian merchants. In order to maintain their leadership among the Druzes, they started to integrate themselves in the official administration of the *mutaṣarrifiyya*.[52]

Lebanese Druzes did not share in the prosperity of Beirut, which since 1860 had become the commercial center of Lebanon and Syria. Of its population of more than one hundred thousand in the 1890s, Druzes constituted less than two percent. As cocoon producers, the Druzes suffered from the fluctuation of silk prices, in particular the relative price declines that occurred in the final decade of the nineteenth century.[53] By that time, however, Ḥawrān no longer offered much attraction to Lebanese Druzes. Instead, they integrated into the migratory process of the Lebanese and Syrians who began to leave in great number for North and South America and Australia. In 1892 about forty-five hundred persons, most of them Christians from Mt. Lebanon,[54] left Beirut. In 1893 some three thousand left Beirut and four thousand Tripoli.[55] In 1897 the

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[52] For further details, see K. Firro, "Silk and Socio-Economic Changes, 1870-1914," in E. Kedourie and S. Haim (eds.), *Essays on the Economic History of the Middle East* (London, 1988), pp. 30-37.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

[54] FO, Annual Series Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Trade and Commerce of Beirut and the Coast of Syria, No. 1279, 1893.

[55] *Ibid.*, No. 1418, 1894.

French consul reported that there were Druzes among the fifty-five hundred Lebanese who left for South America.[56]

Newcomers in a New Land

Figures detailing the population development of Jabal Ḥawrān, during the period of the Druze immigration are both insufficient and unofficial. Most of the extant data are based on the personal estimates of travelers or consuls, thus making for discrepancies between such evaluations.[57] The lack of data, furthermore, does not permit the researcher to measure the impact of emigration, wars, epidemics, and birth and death rates on the demography of the Jabal. Even consulting the Ottoman censuses conducted at the end of the nineteenth century proves unhelpful because of the simple fact that until 1911-12 Ḥawrān was not included in these censuses;[58] attempts to take a census of this population in 1886,[59] and in 1889[60] were abortive.

Drawing a general picture of the population development, therefore, can only be done with great caution. According to Burkhardt, Jabal Ḥawrān in 1812 had about six to seven thousand inhabitants.[61] Between then and 1840, estimations give the Druzes of Ḥawrān a population of five to nine thousand.[62] The French consul in 1842 numbered the Druzes in all of the Damascus pashalik at seventeen thousand seven hundred, of which those of Ḥawrān were only thirty-six hundred.[63] According to these estimates, the Druze population, while absorbing newcomers, did not increase over these years.

Insufficient data also exist on the demographic effect of Ibrāhīm

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[56] Moniteur Officiel du Commerce, *Report on Beirut 1896* (Paris, 1897), pp. 667-668.

[57] See Lewis, Figure 2, p. 94.

[58] For further details on the difficulties of population statistics, see J. McCarthy, "The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq 1828-1914," *Asian and African Studies* 15/1(1981), pp. 11-17.

[59] FO 195/1548, Dickson to Thornton, No. 14, Damascus, 14 April 1886.

[60] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Goblet, No.8, 2 March 1889; *ibid.*, Guillois to Ribot, No. 13 ("Note sur le Hauran"), 25 April 1890; the same report is found in MAE, *Correspondence Commerciale Consulaire* (hereafter *CCC*) *Damas*, vol. 7, 30 January 1890.

[61] Burkhardt, p. 291.

[62] See Lewis, p. 94.

[63] MAE, *CCC, Damas*, vol. 1, Beaudun to Giuzot, 4 June 1842.

Pasha's war against the Druzes. The consular reports from that period stressed that great number of Druzes were killed both by the troops and through starvation, but they did not refer to the size of those losses. About 1860 Guys estimated that the Druzes of Ḥawrān could mobilize about one thousand fighters, those of Wādī at-Taym fifteen hundred, and those of Mt. Lebanon three thousand. The whole Druze population in these areas, according to Guys, numbered forty-eight to fifty thousand. Thus, a simple calculation shows that the Druzes of Ḥawrān counted less than ten thousand residents.[64] In 1879 the British vice consul, Jago, estimated the number of fighting men at between five and ten thousand.[65] At a minimum, this would yield a population of twenty thousand, a figure which corresponds to the French consul's estimation of the same year.[66]

Murray's handbook in the 1870s gives the Druzes of Damascus province (Ḥawrān, Ghūṭa, Palestine, Iqlīm al-Billān and Wādī at-Taym) a population of seventy-eight thousand.[67] This number increased in 1896, according to Cuinet, to one hundred thousand four hundred and fifty, of which the Ḥawrān share was over half—fifty-five thousand.[68] Because Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Ghūṭā supplied Ḥawrān with newcomers between 1870 and 1896, one cannot divide the estimate given by Murray according to Cuinet's calculation, in which the Ḥawrān population represented about fifty-five percent of the total Druze population in Damascus province. According to Cuinet, the Druze settlement in Ḥawrān in the 1890s was the most populous of all Druze localities.[69] On the other hand, the French consul in Damascus numbered the Druzes in Ḥawrān in 1890 at twenty-four thousand[70]—quite at variance with Cuinet's figure.

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[64] Guys, *La Nation Druze*, p. 189.

[65] FO 195/1264, "Report of the Journey made by Vice-Consul Jago of Damascus during May and June 1879 to the Haurān."

[66] MAE, *CCC, Damas*, vol. 6, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 10, 18 June 1879.

[67] Murray and Street, p. 4.

[68] V. Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine* (Paris, 1896), p. 307.

[69] On Mt. Lebanon, there were about 50,000 (40,140 in Shūf and 9,608 in Matn), in Beirut Province 1,575 (400 in Beirut City and 1,175 in Palestine), and 45,450 in Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and near Damascus; *ibid.*, p. 93, 235, 307, 386, 417.

[70] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 13, "Note sur le Hauran," 25 April 1890, and MAE, *CCC, Damas*, vol. 7, 30 January 1890.

The first census of the male population undertaken by the Ottomans in this area came in 1911-12. It counted about thirty thousand Druzes in Ḥawrān. Taking into account the opposition of the Druzes to any census and the fact that some of the Druzes in the border areas of Mt. Ḥawrān were probably registered as Muslims,[71] the actual figure was likely much higher. The first reliable census was that of 1927; it numbered the Druzes at about forty thousand.[72] This figure helps in approximating the Druze population in Ḥawrān at the end of the Ottoman period when one considers the hundreds of Ḥawrān families who took refuge in Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan in the 1925-1927 period, and the refugees who came to Ḥawrān during the First World War and returned later to their original localities in Lebanon, Palestine, and Wādī at-Taym.

Despite their discrepancies and inexactitudes, all sources show that a steadily rapid growth of the Druze population of Ḥawrān occurred between 1860 and 1914 (see Figure 1).

The most useful instrument perhaps with which one can measure the demographic aspects of the Druze immigration is that of the development of the villages in Ḥawrān. There is satisfactory information about the occupation of ruined villages with the help of which one can follow Druze settlement. The main problem in this case, however, is the different spelling of the names of villages as written by travelers and consuls, but a careful comparison of the names and the village sites can help in constructing a scheme of the settlement and its distribution, especially after 1860. Thus, it seems that the number of villages from 1812 until 1842 did not increase. The French consul reported on thirty-one inhabited villages in Jabal Ḥawrān without making any distinction between Christians and Druzes.[73] In 1862, there were forty-nine Druze or Druze-Christian villages; about twelve of these were settled in the 1850s or in the very early 1860s. By the mid-1860s some seventeen new villages had been settled by the newcomers. Between 1867 and 1883 most of the inhabitable ruins of Jabal Ḥawrān were occupied by Druzes. In 1883 the French consul prepared a list naming one hundred and nine Druze villages. This number could correspond to the one hundred

[71] McCarthy, pp. 16-17.
[72] Bouron, p. 413.
[73] MAE, *CCC*, vol. 1, Beaudun to Guizot, 4 June 1842; see also Map 9 in Lewis, p. 83. Some of the villages in the Lajā, such as Azruʿ and Tibnā, were inhabited by Druzes; Burkhardt, pp. 56-57.




Figure 1. Druze Population in Growth in Ḥawrān, 1860-1927.

Sources: 1810 - Burkhardt, p. 291.
1820-1860 - Lewis, p. 94.
1879 - FO 195/1264, Report of a journey of Jago in Ḥawrān, May to June 1879.
1890 - MAE, *CPC*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot. No. 13 ("Note sur Hauran," 25 April 1890).
1910 - McCarthy. "The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq," *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 15/1(1981), p. 14-17.
1927 - Bouron, p. 413.

and seventeen villages given by Bouron in 1927. The consul's list, however, did not include villages that were independent of the influence of the *sheikhs*.[74]

Soon after 1860, as the refugees of Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym began pouring into Lajā, the Druzes tried to extend their settlement into this area, which till then had been dominated by the Slūṭ tribe. In 1862, for instance, the French consul reported a Druze attempt

[74] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran," 10 July 1862; vol. 9. Rousseau to Monstier, No. 6, "Les Districts du Hauran," 6 June 1867; vol. 13, Gilbert to Challemel-Lacour, No. 13, "Druzes de la Montagne Hauranese," 3 April 1883.

to occupy the ruined village of Dāmā in the heart of the Lajā. The great scale of immigration by 1867 and the immigrants' gradual colonization of the Lajā led to an inevitable dispute with the Slūṭ tribe in June 1868. Till then, as we have seen, the Druzes had made great efforts to avoid any confrontation with the Slūṭ, since they were their putative allies against the government of Damascus. The refugees, however, tended to align themselves with Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash, who challenged the traditional, established leadership of Jabal ad-Durūz. The dispute with the Slūṭ was exploited by all parties in Ḥawrān, with both the established leadership (the Ḥamdāns and the ᶜAmers) and the government of Damascus, each for their own reasons, intervening in the Lajā events. Eventually, an agreement was worked out between the Druzes and the government, the thirteen articles of this pact reflecting the fact that the core of the dispute was the new element of the settlers in the Lajā. According to Article 3 of the agreement, the Druze chiefs

> will not accept any immigrant family either from Hawrān or from other places [to settle in the Lajā] and [any such family] should be returned to its original home. All the Druze immigrants who took refuge over the last three years should be returned to their original villages, except those of Mt. Lebanon for who there will be an arrangement with the government of Lebanon.

The most significant section of the agreement, however, was Article 4, which stipulated: "All the villages that the Druzes seized should be immediately evacuated."[75] In the end, the agreement was no more than a temporary expedient for the Druzes who were searching out every inhabitable ruin that could be settled. By 1879, the Druze had become the powerful element in the Lajā:

> This is the Druze, small colonies of which people, elbowed out of the neighbouring Druze Mountain, have taken up their abode both in the ruined cities which dot the eastern edge of the Legah [Lajā] as well as those to be found in the interior of the southern half of it, occupying themselves in the cultivation of the few but extremely fertile plots of arable land existing among its lava beds, and holding their own with ease against the Arabs [actually Bedouin], who have long learnt to dread and

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[75] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 10, Rousstan to Monstier, No. 1, 30 June 1868; No. 2, 20 July 1868; No. 5, "Résumé des conditions aux quelles L'Amnistie a eté accordée aux Druzes," 28 July 1868. In this résumé there are several issues concerning Damascus' new policy toward the Jabal, which will be dealt with below.

respect a people who make short work of any attempt to interfere with them.[76]

The colonization of the interior and of the eastern edge of the Lajā was undertaken from 1867 till 1883. In 1862 there had been six Druze villages in the interior of the Lajā (Dāmā, ʿĀhira, Ṣalākhīd, al-Kharsa, Ṣmaid, and Ḥarrān) and two on its eastern edge (Umm az-Zaytūn, inhabited since before 1810, and Lāhitha),[77] in addition to the ancient villages on the southern edge of the Lajā. In 1867 the Druzes settled two other ruined villages: az-Zabāyer (by the ʿAzzām family), and aṣ-Ṣawara aṣ-Ṣaghīra (Ḥalabī family).[78] Within seventeen years the Druzes occupied almost every inhabitable former ruin in the Lajā and on its eastern border. In the interior, the Murshid and Abū-Ḥassūn families settled the Lubayn and Jurayn villages, respectively. The Shalghīn family added al-Mjādil to its colonized villages. On the eastern border of the Lajā, Druze families, most of whom had come to the Jabal during the late 1860s and the 1870s under the leadership of the Ḥalabīs, put down new roots in many deserted ruins from Jādayā in the south to aṣ-Ṣawara al-Kabīra in the north[79] (see map 7).

On the northeastern slope of the Jabal, Druze settlement had weakened after 1860 because of the low productivity of the land and the water scarcity in the region; nevertheless, about eight villages were settled there between 1862 and 1883: as-Salmiya, Ḥuqf, Bthayna, Bārk, ʿArrāja, Umm Ḍabīb, Tayba, and Rama.[80] Owing

[76] FO 195/1264, "Report of the Journey made by Vice-Consul Jago of Damascus during May and June 1879 to the Hauran."

[77] The villages are ʿAhira, Ṣalākhīd, al-Kharsa, Smaid, Ḥarrān, and Dāmā. The three former ones were under the rule of the ʿAzzām family; the latter two under the Shalghīn family, Dāmā was under the Hamāda family. All of these villages were under the influence of the establishment family, ʿAzzām. Shalghīn and Hamāda were newcomers. On the eastern edge, there was one village, Lāhitha, which was inhabited by ʿIzz ad-Din al-Ḥalabī; still it was under the influence of the ʿAmer family; see MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran."

[78] Apart from the year 1867, az-Zabāyer does not appear; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9; Rousseau to Monstier, No. 6, 6 June 1867 Annex, "Les Districts du Hauran."

[79] The villages are Jādayā (Ḥalabī), al-Mtūna (ʿAmer), Dhākīr, Khakhala (Ḥalabī) Umm Ḥartayn (?), Ḥāzim (Ḥalabī), aṣ-Ṣawara al-Kabīra (?).

[80] The first four villages fell under ʿAmer, ʿArraja and Umm Ḍabīb under Qalʿānī, and Rama under the newcomer, the Ghānim family, while Tayba was under Aṭrash's rule.

to the restricted capability of the eastern areas of absorbing new settlers, the expansion took place mainly in the southern part of the Jabal and toward the plain of Ḥawrān. The colonization of some villages in the plain in part lay behind the dispute of 1879-1881 between the Druzes and some Muslim villages in the plain. Damascus took advantage of the situation to introduce tighter control over the Druzes of the Jabal.

After 1862, when other refugees to Ḥawrān from Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym had lost hope of returning home, the colonization in the plain of Ḥawrān began in earnest, i.e., at about the same time as the attempts to settle the Lajā. From 1862 to 1867, twelve villages were occupied by Druzes in the area stretching from the village of Taᶜra at the edge of the Lajā to Mjaymer and Kharba in the south.[81] The expansion toward the plain was accompanied by violent clashes with the inhabitants of this area.[82]

After its intervention in 1869 the question of the occupied villages in the plain was part of the Ottoman government's agenda. Exploiting the internal division of the Druzes as well as the dispute now reigning between them and their neighbors, the Slūṭ, the *wālī* of Damascus succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Druze chiefs on administrative issues, among which were the separate taxation of the Druze villages in the plain and the levying of the same level of duties as that imposed on the Muslim villages in Ḥawrān.[83] This agreement represented a de jure recognition of Druze settlements in the plain.

In 1879, the inhabitants of the plain seized the opportunity of the clashes that were taking place between the inhabitants of the Muslim village of Buṣrā al-Ḥarīr and the Druzes to present the government with a demand to evacuate seventeen villages in the plain.[84] When

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[81] The villages are Taᶜra, ad-Dūr, Samiᶜ, Ṭīra, Ṣammā, Thᶜala, Dārā, Kanaker, Umm Walad, Jubayb, Kharba, Mjaymer (on the edge of Jabal-Ḥawrān). Apart from Umm Walad and Kharba, all the others continued to be Druze villages in 1883 and afterwards; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran"; vol. 9, "Les Districts du Hauran."

[82] Lewis, pp. 90-91.

[83] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 10, Roustan to La Valette, No. 6, 8 March 1869, Annex, "Engagement Contracté par les soussignés en presence du gouverneur-general de Syrie à Damas" (signed by Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash, Wākid al-Ḥamdān, Ḥammūd ᶜAmer, Hazīma Hnaydī).

[84] *Ibid.*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 12, 14 August 1879; also No. 13, 27 October 1879.

this condition was accepted, a peace plan between the Druzes and the inhabitants of Buṣra included the following: "the restoration of the Muslim villages that have been seized by the Druzes some years ago in the plain."[85] Although the Druzes evacuated some villages, the French consul's list in 1883 testifies to the fact that they continued to occupy about ten villages (see map 7). Limited in the east by the desert; in the Lajā, where the area's inhospitable terrain surprised Jago, who wrote: "how human beings could be found thus voluntarily to expatriate themselves to such a rocky wilderness"; and in the west by the resistance of the Ḥawrān plain inhabitants, the Druzes had no area open for settlement except in the south of Jabal-Ḥawrān. This region had been called Jabal al-ᶜArab because of its indigenous inhabitants, many small tribes known as al-ᶜArab.[86] The Druzes found in the area many ruined towns, "if not ready-made habitations, at least ample materials at hand to construct them at little trouble."[87] Until 1862 there had been no more than four inhabited villages south of the villages of ᶜIrā and Sahwat al-Khaḍer, and most of these occupied only in the late 1850s, while between 1862 and 1867 another two ruins were turned into new villages: al-Mjaymer and al-ᶜAfina.[88] By the end of the 1870s, however, "extensive ruins of note, which ten and thirteen years ago were the haunt of the Arabs, are now the residence of large and apparently flourishing Druze settlements, under the rule of some minor branch of one or other of the powerful families of the country."[89] The next period, 1867-1883, saw the settlement of seventeen villages by the Druzes under the Aṭrashs, who now ruled over twenty-three villages.[90]

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[85] *Ibid.*, according to Abū-Rāshid, these were Tīra, Taᶜra, Ṣammā, Dārā, Walghā, Barᶜa, Samiᶜ, Thaᶜla, Aṣluḥāʾ, as-Sijin, ad-Dūr, Mjaymer, Ghūthā, Bakka, Jbāb, Kharba, ad-Duwayre; see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 53.

[86] FO 195/1264, "Report of Jago."

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, "Note sur les Druze"; vol. 9, "Les Districts du Hauran."

[89] FO 195/1264, "Report of Jago."

[90] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 13, Gilbert to Challemel, No. 45, Annex, "Druzes de la Montagne."

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRUZE *MASHYAKHA* IN THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT

The Leading Families

Whether in Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine, the traditional social structure of the Druze was based on the extended family, or *ḥamūla*. The name *ḥamūla* is given to a group of people who claim descent from a common ancestor, usually five to seven generations back.[1] Among the Druzes the terminology for *ḥamūla* varies from one locality to another. While in Lebanon and the Ḥermon districts the term used is *bayt*, in Israel it is *dār*; in Arabic, both have the same meaning: house.

Although the Druze emigrants to Ḥawrān carried with them this traditional social structure of the family, the social crystallization during the migratory process gave to the *ḥamula* in Ḥawrān certain important nuances that had not existed in the original areas. Settlement in the deserted ruins in Ḥawrān was done by *ḥamulas*: Usually the occupied village belonged to the first extended family that reconstructed and settled it. Sometimes, however, the settlement process itself created the extended family. People who came to an already-occupied village might integrate into the established family in the village by claiming the same village origin. This was the case with families such as the al-Qalʿānī, aṣ-Ṣiḥnāwī, al-Ḥalabī, aṣ-Ṣafadī, whose names relate to the native localities from which they emigrated. Some of the established families, which maintained their ancient names, accepted the newcomers into their villages on the basis of such claimed origin or descent.

The framework of the *ḥamula* was important for the immigrants to survive in the new society of Mt. Ḥawrān. Family meant not only social structure but also economic existence and power. Thus, newcomers looking for protection and land would often try hard to integrate themselves into an already established family.[2]

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[1] See "Ḥamūla," *EI*², vol. 3, pp. 149-150.

[2] This description is based on personal interviews with Druze elders in Galilee and the Carmel who had migrated in 1914-1916 to Ḥawrān and who returned to their original villages, as well as on interviews with many people who had emigrated from Jabal Ḥawrān to Palestine between 1930 and 1948.

Another nuance that did not exist in the ancient Druzes settlement was the *al-ʿashīra* social framework. The term *al-ʿashīra* is usually a synonym of *qabīla*, or tribe. In Bedouin societies, the *ʿashīra* (pl. *ʿashāʾir*) consists generally of several *afkhādh* (branches) and the *qabīla* of several *ʿashāʾir*.[3] Since the Druzes of Jabal-Ḥawrān lived in a Bedouin environment where the Bedouins were divided into several *ʿashāʾir*, the term *ʿashīra* came to replace the term *bayt* for the leading Druze families. This replacement was more than semantic or formal as Druze regrouping during the migratory process took on many features of the Bedouin *ʿashīra*. Thus, several different families which regrouped under one leading family were called *ʿashīra*. The Ḥamdans, the ʿAmers, and the Aṭrashs, for example, were all called *ʿashāʾir Jabal ad-Durūz*.[4]

Each *ʿashīra* had a *sheikh*, who represented *al-ʿashīra* in Druze meetings, in consultations with other *sheikhs*, or in negotiations with governmental representatives. The *sheikh* also led the *ʿashīra* fighters during wars or even when they set out to collect tax. Above all, the *sheikh* of an *ʿashīra* held economic power by virtue of his owing all the real estate under his rule. Their distribution of economic resources granted the *sheikhs* certain prerogatives, such as being entitled to some of the duties imposed on nearby Bedouin tribes and receiving *khulaʿ al-ʿarīs* (some of the wedding presents of couples who got married in their *ʿashīra*). This economic power created in Jabal ad-Durūz a form of feudalism, which went by the name of *niẓām al-mashāykh*, or *mashyakha* system. In fact, the *ʿashīra* structure and the *mashyakha* system formed the two faces of the same coin, i.e., *al-ʿashīra*, as the social framework, and *al-mashyakha*, as the economic political context, reinforced each other. This interrelationship, which had come into existence with the very first steps of the Druze immigration into Ḥawrān, strengthened markedly with the impetus the migratory process received in 1860.

Present information on the *mashyakha* system as it operated during the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century relies on the oral history collected by such historians as Abū Rāshid, Najjār, and Abū ʿIzzedīn (Sulaymān) in the 1920s. It seems that until the first decades of the 19th century two families, Ḥamdān and Abū Fakhr,

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[3] See *EI*², vol. 1, p. 700.

[4] See Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 29; Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, pp. 129-36, pp. 128-132; Bʿaynī, pp. 51-55.

headed the Druze community in Ḥawrān. Thereafter several new leading families emerged from among the newcomers, the foremost being Abū ʿAssāf and Hnaydī.[5] Two other families, which ruled the eastern area of the Lajā, were ʿAmer and Qalʿānī who apparently came to the Jabal around the year 1800. The Aṭrash family came later, as the French consul noted in 1862: "The Aṭrash family is the newest among the [leading] families of Ḥawrān; it did not acquire importance until some fifteen years ago."[6]

The immigrants who arrived between the last decade of the 18th century and the first three decades of the 19th century began to form a challenge to the old leading families whose importance had begun to decline in the 1850s and notably in the 1860s. A measure of the rise and decline of the important families can be assessed by tracing the petitions, letters, and agreements signed by Druze *sheikhs*, because only the leading *sheikhs* had *ḥaqq al-khatm* (the right of signature). This prerogative led to instances of what was called *al-ikhtilāf ʿalā al-khatm* (controversy over the signature), which itself showed the status of the families.

The correspondence between Druze *sheikhs* and the foreign consulates reflects some of the internal development of the Jabal-Ḥawrān leadership. Although Ḥamdān and Abū Fakhr were ceding their position as the paramount families in the 1850s, they remained among the four or five families possessing *ḥaqq al-khatm*. The correspondence between Qāsim Abū Fakhr and the British consul, Wood, in 1852, i.e. during the Druze revolt against the Ottomans, because of the style and the subjects of the letters he wrote on behalf of other Druze *sheikhs*, testifies to the fact that Sheikh Abū Fakhr's was still among the most important leaders.[7] The petitions to the French consul in 1853 also show that, though the ʿAmer, Qalʿānī, and Aṭrash families represented the Druzes, Abū Fakhr and Ḥamdān were still, at least nominally, the leaders: Wākid al-Ḥamdān's signature appears at the end of the list of names, after Qāsim Abū Fakhr's, while before these two leaders in second and first place

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[5] The two families occupied the area of South Lajā near the first villages settled by the newcomers.

[6] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, No. 9, "Note sur Les Druzes," 10 July 1962.

[7] FO 195/458, Qāsim Abū Fakhr to Wood, 29 Ḍhū al-Qiʿda 1269 (1852).

respectively, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash , who in this period was the rising chief, and Fāris ʿAmer signed their names.[8]

In time, the continuing arrival of newcomers brought about a new constellation of leadership. At the beginning of 1860 there were eight leading families: al-Qalʿānī, ʿAmer, Abū Fakhr, ʿAzzām, Hnaydī, Abū ʿAssāf, Ḥamdān, and Aṭrash, each ruling several villages.[9] The Abū Fakhr family began to decline in the 1860s because it occupied but a small district and because of its quarrels with the Lebanese refugees from 1860-1862,[10] and with the ʿAzzām family, which ruled the Lajā villages.[11] On the other hand, the Ḥamdān family, though it, too, was challenged by the rising families, especially the Aṭrashs, was powerful enough to resist. In 1853, when Porter visited as-Suwaydā, the Ḥamdān were still considered the "noblest family in Ḥawrān." Sheikh Wākid's face was "expressive and his features regular and noble-looking."[12] His brother, Hazzāʿ, by then was *sheikh* of ʿIrā, the second "seat" of the Ḥamdān family.[13] By 1857-1858, however, when Rey visited Ḥawrān, Wākid, the grand Ḥamdān *sheikh* of as-Suwaydā, now had about him a look of "*la veille*" (sleeplessness) as well as of being "*discret et sensé*," wary

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[8] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol.2. Murray to Lyhus, No. 13, 23 February 1853, Annex 1, petition signed by Druze, Bedouin and Muslim representatives of Ḥawrān. The signatures of the following Druze chiefs appeared: ʿAbbās al-Qalʿānī, Hazīma Hnaydī, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, and Wākid al-Ḥamdān; see No. 15, 12 March 1853, Annex 3, petition signed by Fāris ʿAmer, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, and Wākid al-Ḥamdān; *ibid.*, Annex 4, the signatures are as follows: Hazzaʿ al-Ḥamdān, Fāris ʿAmer, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, and Wākid al-Ḥamdān; *ibid.*, Annex 5, where the signed names represented all the Druze chiefs at that period: Muḥammad Abū ʿAssāf, ʿAbbās al-Qalʿānī, Hazzāʿ al-Ḥamdān, Hazīma Hnaydī, Fāris ʿAmer, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash , Qāsim Abū Fakhr; then came the signatures of the second rank of chiefs: Muḥammad Abū Rās, Fandī Abū Fakhr, Qāsim al-Aṭrash, Ḥamad ʿAzzām, Qablān ʿAmer, Fāris Abū Fakhr; *ibid.*, vol. 3, No. 14, 7 April 1853, Annex 1, petition signed by Fāris ʿAmer, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, and Wākid al-Ḥamdān.

[9] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran," 10 July 1862. Number of villages belonging to the different families: Qalʿānī (7), ʿAmer (8), Abū Fakhr (3), ʿAzzām (3, and 2 under Shalghīn family), Hnaydī (3), Abū ʿAssāf (3), Ḥamdān (4), Aṭrash (3). Another thirteen new villages, imcluding Dāmā, were not yet in the jurisdiction of the eight families.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, p. 112.

[12] R.J.L. Porter, *Five Years in Damascus*, 2 vols. (London, 1855), vol. 1, p. 128.

[13] *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 135.

and sensitive.[14] This was after Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash had expelled Wākid's brother from the family's second residence.[15] In 1862 the French consul reported on the Druzes of Ḥawrān as follows:

> The Ḥamdān family is generally known as the first and the noblest of the region. [But] in recent times, it has lost much of its real influence [because] of the indigence and the little energy of its chiefs, who are disunited. In the [minds] of the people, [though,] it is still the first family of the country.[16]

This legitimacy of the Ḥamdāns as the first family relied on the importance of the district in which as-Suwaydā and Qanawāt were situated. The former, the headquarters of the family, was considered by the Druzes as the capital of the Jabal; the latter was the residence of the religious *sheikh*, Ḥusayn al-Hajarī, under whom *mashayakhat al-ʿaql* in Ḥawrān had become a recognized religious institution.

The first steps leading to the development of *mashayakhat al-ʿaql* in Ḥawrān were taken in the 1830s. As a respected figure, known for his deep attachment to the faith, Sheikh Ibrāhīm al-Hajarī had added to his status during the revolt against Ibrāhīm Pasha when the *sheikh* played a major role in mobilizing Druzes for the resistance. Al-Hajarī died in 1840 and was succeeded as *sheikh* by his son, Ḥusayn. The institution of *mashayakhat al-ʿaql* took shape gradually; there is no evidence that it had already been established at the beginning of the Druze immigration into Ḥawrān as an instrument with which the Ḥamdān family attracted newcomers.[17] In the years of upheaval, i.e., in the 1850s and 1860s on the other hand, the Ḥamdān family certainly did make an attempt to preserve its legitimacy in Qanawāt through the instrument of *mashayakhat al-ʿaql*. By then *sheikh al-ʿaql* had come to possess a great deal of power and influence. Porter called him the "chief Sheikh of the Druze religion in Syria,"[18] and both the British and the French consuls describe his influence on the leading *sheikh*s of Ḥawrān.[19] The Ḥamdān

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[14] Rey, p. 90.
[15] See McDowell, p. 35.
[16] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran," 10 July 1862.
[17] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 29.
[18] Porter, *Five Years*, vol. 1, p. 95.
[19] FO 195/677, Rogers to Bulwer, No. 32, Damascus, 10 July 1861, MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7; Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 8, 30 June 1862.

family lost ʿIrā toward the end of the 1850s; when in the 1860s they also lost as-Suwaydā and Qanawāt, it meant that they had forfeited their legitimacy as the leading family.

While the older families tended to close themselves off, physically, within their original districts, and, mentally, in their inherited authority over the Druze peasants, newcomers who were settling everywhere began effecting changes in the traditional world of these families. Families that rose to prominence only in the first third of the 19th century saw the importance of opening their districts to the newcomers and encouraged them to found new villages near or in their district. In 1862 the Abū Fakhrs ruled three villages: Najrān, Rimat al-Luḥf, and Kafr al-Luḥf; while the Ḥamdāns controlled four villages: as-Suwaydā, Rasās, Maṣād, and Qanawāt; the ʿAmers eight villages: al-Hit, al-Hayāt, Shahbā, ʿAmra, Umm az-Zaytūn, Brayka, Murdūk, Lāhitha; and the Qalʿānīs seven villages: Shaqqā, Nimra, al-Jnayna, Tayma, Dūmā, Taḥla, and ar-Rḍayma. These four rival families encouraged the rise of other families near their districts. The ʿAmers, for instance, urged the Ḥalabīs to occupy the ruins at the eastern edge of the Lajā. The Qalʿānīs helped other families, such as the Ṣiḥnāwī, to settle the northeastern ruins bordering the desert.[20]

In contrast to other leading Druze families whose influence rested on their inherited authority, the ʿAmers gained their power from their activities in trade. They controlled Druze trade to Damascus through their district in Wādī al-Liwā.[21] This explains their moderate position vis-à-vis the government of Damascus, their protection of the Christians during the hostilities of the 1860s, and their good relations with the French consulate, which had protected the Christian merchants of Damascus.[22] The ʿAmers' relations with the merchants of Damascus were described by Rey when he met in Shahbā "a Christian merchant who is a French protogé" who had come to settle with the Druze *sheikh* of the locality a debt of two thousand piasters, a sum the *sheikh* had borrowed from the merchant not because the former needed the money, "but because this was the habit

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[20] *Ibid.*, No. 9, "Note sur les Druzes du Hauran," 10 July 1862. The village of Taḥla was listed in this report, but afterwards it did not again appear.

[21] See McDowell, p. 33.

[22] See above Part Three, Chapter One, on their attitude toward the government and their relations with France.

of the Druze *sheikhs* at that time."[23] Thanks to their wealth, the ᶜAmers were the rivals of the Aṭrashs, who had by then succeeded the Ḥamdāns as the premier family.

In part because of the great scale and influence of immigration, the *mashyakha* system was radically transformed by 1867. Of the eight families that ruled the area in 1862 some strengthened their authority while others, like the Ḥamdāns, continued to decline and had their place taken by newcomers. The Abū Fakhrs lost their headquarters to the ᶜAzzām family, which had led the refugees in the Lajā; relying on these as their source of manpower and support, the ᶜAzzāms expanded their rule in the Lajā and pushed toward the plain. Meanwhile, the Hnaydī family, because of its energetic chief, Hazima, also expanded its rule toward the plain by seizing two villages, Ṭira and Samiᶜ. Ḥamdān soon lost Qanawāt, the residence of *sheikh al-ᶜaql*. Although this village now came indirectly under the influence of the Aṭrash family, Sheikh Ḥusayn al-Hajarī, as *sheikh al-ᶜaql*, gave it a great amount of independence vis-à-vis the *mashyakha* system. The Ḥamdāns attempted to compensate for their loss by including in their district two villages, one on the plain, Aṣluḥa, the second near as-Suwaydā, Maṣād. The most significant change, however, was indeed the emergence of the Aṭrash *mashyakha*, which will be discussed separately below.[24]

In 1862, about thirteen villages which had been settled in the 1850s and 1860s were outside the rule of the eight leading families. By 1867 some of these had passed to the rule of the leading families; others gave rise to new leading families. Allied with the Aṭrash family, these latter included the Abū Rās, which ruled two villages, ar-Raḥa and Kanākir, and Sharf ad-Dīn, which controlled Khirbat ᶜAwād. The Ḥalabīs continued to invite settlers to the northern part of Wādī al-Liwa.[25]

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[23] See Rey, p. 82:

> Le pauvre diable [the merchant] va comme nous a Chohba [Shahbā] non pour en étudier des ruines mais pour régler avec le Cheikh du lieu dont il se trouve étre le Creàncier d'une somme de 2000 piastres qu'il lui préta un beau matin, non pas que ce jour lá de Cheikh eût besoin d'argent, car il est riche, et n'en manque jamais, mais il est d'usage, chez les Druzes, de ne jamais laissez échapper une occasion d'en emprunter.

[24] The information is based on MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Rousseau to Monstier, No. 1, "Les Districts du Hauran," 30 February 1867.

[25] *Ibid.*

The Aṭrashs—From al-Qrayā to as-Suwaydā

The origins of the Aṭrashs and their first arrival in Ḥawrān are still obscure. As elsewhere in the Middle East, genealogical trees were only reconstructed after the consolidation of a family's powers. This was also the case with the Aṭrashs, who claimed to be descendents of ʿAlī al-ʿAks, the ruler of Jabal al-Aʿlā. Since it was made after the rise of the Aṭrash family in Ḥawrān, it is difficult to substantiate this claim.[26] It seems, however, that the Aṭrashs themselves could construct their genealogy only from the time of Muḥammad, the father of Ismāʿīl,[27] or his grandfather who carried the same name. The emigration of the Aṭrash family to Ḥawrān also involves some controversy; some relate it to the grandfather of Ismāʿīl, others to a person called Ṭrūdī. It was from Ismāʿīl's deaf (*aṭrash*) father, Muḥammad, that the family took its appellation.[28] The only source that provides different information on the origin and epithetical name of the family is Maʿlūf's book, *Dawānī al-Quṭūf*, written in 1907, according to which the name Aṭrash came from the village of Ṭursha in Wādī at-Taym; three brothers, Ismāʿīl, Qāsim, and Ṭrūdī, emigrated from there to Ḥawrān and settled in the area controlled by the Ḥamdāns.[29]

Nor does any exact information exist about the date when the Aṭrash family first arrived in Ḥawrān. According to Abū Rāshid, Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, Ismāʿīl's uncle, had been killed during the revolt of 1837-1838.[30] Even this, though, does not prove that the Aṭrashs were already established in Ḥawrān since many Druzes from other localities had joined the insurgents during that revolt. Its first clear appearance as a prominent family came in the 1840s when Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash joined Shiblī al-ʿAryān, who led the Druzes of Wādī at-

26 Most of the historians who refer to Aṭrash repeat the claim of this ancestry; see Abū Rāshid, *Ḥawrān ad-Dāmiya* (Cairo, 1926), pp. 179-180; also: Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, p. 290; Ṣghayar, p. 773; Bʿaynī, p. 202; Hishshī, *al-Murāsalāt*, vol. 3, p. 98, K. Thabit, *ad-Durūz wath-Thawra as Suriyya wa Sirat Ṣulṭān Basha al-Aṭrash* (Cairo, 1925), p. 56. Some of the Aṭrashes went further on their claim to the Maʿnī family; see Ṣghayar, p. 773.

27 See genealogical tree, Bouron, p. 217; also, Abū Rāshid, *Ḥawrān ad-Dāmiya*, p. 179-180.

28 See Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tāʾrīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, p. 290; Bʿaynī, p. 202; McDowell, p. 30.

29 ʿIsā Maʿlūf, *Dawanī al-Quṭūf fī Tāʾrīkh Banī Maʿlūf* (Baʿabdā, Lebanon, 1907-1908), p. 690.

30 Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 48.

Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān and Ḥawrān, to help their brethren during the Druze-Maronite upheavals. In these battles, Ismāʿīl gradually acquired a reputation as an eminent fighter and, eventually became Shiblī al-ʿAryān's successor.

Living in al-Qrayā, the Druze village in southern Ḥawrān, Ismāʿīl was independent of the *mashyakha* system. Encouraging Druzes and Christians to settle in his village, he began to consolidate his own *mashyakha*. According to the French consul in 1862, "Ismāʿīl is nearly the only one among the chiefs of Ḥawrān who employs Christians, armed horsemen who mount [their horses] as do the other."[31] By dint of both his personal courage and an uncanny ability to know when to employ force, when to negotiate or when reconciliation might prevail, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash in the late 1840s and early of the 1850s became the military chief of the Druzes, leading them in their wars against the Bedouins and the Ottoman authorities. He resided in an area frequented by several tribes, and he learned to deal with them either in doing battle or in establishing peaceful co-existence with them. As a master manipulator, he succeeded in creating suitable alliances for his struggle against internal and external enemies. Cognizant of Bedouin power games, Ismāʿīl gained for the Aṭrash's *ʿashīra* the ability to bargain on behalf of the Ḥawrānese: Druzes, Bedouins, and sometimes the inhabitants of the plain.[32] His visits with the Bedouin *sheikhs* in the area are reflected in his son's poems—Shiblī, who often accompanied his father on these meetings and visits, was a talented poet who adopted the Bedouin style.[33]

In the early 1850s Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash found himself competing for supremacy with the powerful Jabal-Ḥawrān *sheikh*, Wākid al-Ḥamdān, and Jabal Ḥawrān soon broke up into two factions.[34] Like many Druze chiefs, Ismāʿīl knew the importance of connections with the foreign consuls, who could mediate between the Druzes and the Ottoman authorities. In February 1854, for

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[31] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9 "Note sur les Druzes," 10 July 1862.

[32] This is based on his behavior during the wars against the Ottomans as well as against his Druze rivals. See his role in 1852 and 1860-1867 in the above two chapters.

[33] The poems were collected in *Diwān fī ash-Shurūqī awz-zajal* (Damascus, 1950). Recited by many Bedouins, the poems even reached the Sinai Bedouins.

[34] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 2, Segur to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 28, 20 September 1851.

instance, Ismāʿīl sent a letter to Wood, the British consul in Damascus, in which he requested such mediation.[35] Earlier, Ismāʿīl's military activities in 1852 against Ottoman troops had earned him the reputation as the chief with whom the authorities might well have to negotiate. Between 1853 and 1854, almost all the Druze petitions sent to the French and British consuls bore Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash's signature.[36]

The rise of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash as the leading figure in Jabal Ḥawrān in fact created a duality in power. The Ḥamdāns continued to claim their traditional right to represent the Druzes while the Ottoman authorities from 1852-1856 recognized Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash as the de facto leader. In many cases, consequently, they bargained with the Druzes mainly through this rising leader, which naturally provoked apprehension among the older well-established families. With the exception of the Qalʿānīs,[37] these families (Ḥamdān, Abū Fakhr, ʿAmer, Hnaydī, ʿAzzām, and Abū ʿAsssf) thereupon formed an alliance to stem Ismāʿīl's rising tide. In October 1856 their chiefs addressed a letter to Misk, who had been appointed by the British consulate to mediate between the Druzes and the authorities, in which they implored him to send a petition to the Ottoman *mushīr* in Damascus asking him to proclaim "a decree appointing Sheikh Wākid el-Ḥamdān as first [*sheikh*] of this land, that through him all plots should be cut from among us and the quiet shall be kept."[38]

But it was too late since by then Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash had succeeded in transforming his village al-Qrayā into the military headquarters from which the Druzes mobilized and planned their wars. Porter, who visited the place a year after the 1852 revolt against the conscription order, already then wrote that al-Qrayā "had been the headquarters of the Druzes during the late war, and not any part of the Lejah [Lajā] .... When an attack was to be made, or a caravan

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[35] FO 195/458, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash to Wood, 13 Jamādī al-Awal 1270 (16 February 1854).

[36] See note 8.

[37] The Qalʿānī family was allied with Aṭrash because of the former's bad relations with the ʿAmers.

[38] FO 195/458, letter signed by the Druze chiefs to Misk, 1 October 1856. The signatures were the following: Wākid al-Ḥamdān, Qāsim Abū Fakhr, Fāris ʿAmer, Hazīma Hnaydī, Asad ʿAmer, Ḥammūd ʿAzzām, Qāsim ʿAzzām, Qablān ʿAmer, Muḥammad Abū ʿAssāf, Sulaymān Abū ʿAssāf. This means that until 1856 the Ḥamdāns and Abū Fakhrs were formally the two leading families; the ʿAmers were the real rivals of Aṭrash.

of supplies to be cut off, [it was] from this place [that] the expedition always set out."[39] The ascendence of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash clearly introduced a shift in power in the whole of Ḥawrān. By now the Bedouins were no longer master of the area. When G. Robinson had toured Ḥawrān in the early 1830s, the Druzes still paid the *khāwa*, the Bedouin tribute. The "heaviest contribution paid by the villages," Robinson noted, "is the Khoue (brotherhood), the tribute claimed from time immemorial by the Bedouins, in return for their protection, or rather forbearance, in not touching the harvest, or driving off the cattle."[40] By 1853, when Porter asked Ismāʿīl if the Druzes still paid this tribute, the latter was able to reply that all the Muslim villages continued to do so: "but that [now] the Druzes exacted this tribute from them [the Bedouins] for the privilege of permitting them to water their flocks at their fountains and reservoirs."[41]

This power shift followed upon and was brought about by the arrival of the Druze newcomers, i.e., the many refugees settling the vacant ruins of the southern Ḥawrān. This settlement activity intensified after 1869, but its beginnings date to the late 1850s. The newcomers came in from other older Druze locations as well as from the Ḥamdān district because Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash granted them better conditions than did the older Druze families. This new blood enabled Ismāʿīl to try and spread his influence even further toward the Muslim villages in the plain, as the French consul reported in 1857: "Gradually they [the Druzes] have extended the circle of their influence.... In this manner, the Druzes of Jabal Ḥawrān recently sought to obtain by force from the inhabitants of the plain villages that are situated at the foot of the Jabal."[42] As in 1852, al-Qrayā in 1856-57 again became the headquarters of the Druze mobilization in their excursions against the inhabitants of the plain. These, however, allied with the Bedouin tribes of the Slūṭ and Wild ʿAli, and the Bedouins of al-Jaydūr (the area between Ḥawrān and the Jawlān). Reinforced by his brethren, Ismāʿīl was able to defeat this

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[39] Porter, *Five Years*, vol. 2, pp. 190-191.
[40] G. Robinson, *Three Years in the East*, vol. 2, p. 167.
[41] Porter, *Five Years*, vol. 2, p. 191.
[42] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 4, Outry to Walesski, No. 34, 24 April 1857.

alliance; however, the Druzes in the end agreed to withdraw from the villages of the plain.[43]

Between 1852 and 1857, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash accumulated sufficient power to extend his new *mashyakha* at the expense of the Ḥamdāns. Porter, after a visit to al-Qrayā in 1853, foresaw the challenge that the older families would face:

> Sheikh Ismaʿil el-Atrash ["Ishmael the Deaf"] is universally acknowledge to be the bravest of a brave race. He far excels in personal prowess all the other chiefs, and has thus obtained an influence which neither his rank nor his wealth could have secured. He is not descended, like his brethren, from an ancient and noble family; but, a soldier of fortune, he has carved his way to power by his sword.[44]

In the course of 1857 Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash attacked the secondary headquarters of the Ḥamdān family, ʿIrā, and expelled Hazzāʿ al-Ḥamdān, Wākid's brother.[45] Between then and 1860, newcomers settled the villages of Ṣalkhad, ʿUrmān, al-Kafr, Sahwat al-Khaḍer, and Ḥibrān with Ismāʿīl's encouragement though these continued until after 1862 to be excluded from the *mashyakha* of Aṭrash—the only villages under his direct rule were ʿIrā, al-Qrayā, and Bakka.[46] In other words, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash continued to offer the newcomers more freedom than did the older ruling families.

By 1860, the year the civil war in Lebanon broke out, Ismāʿīl was known to the entire Druze community, which lionized him for his military skills and bravery. According to Churchill, Saʿīd Junblāṭ appealed to Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash to head the Druzes of Ḥawrān:

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[43] This conflict was widely reported by the French and British consuls; FO 195/458, Misk to Redcliffe, No. 6, Damascus, 23 April 1857; and No. 13, 1 July 1857; FO 195/557, Moore to Redcliffe, No. 33, Beirut, 2 May 1857; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 4, Outrey to Walesski, No. 34, 24 April 1857; No. 35, 6 May 1857; see also Kurd ʿAlī, vol. 3, p. 78.

[44] Porter, *Five Years*, vol. 2, p. 190.

[45] Druze historians date this attack in 1859; e.g., Bʿaynī, p. 206. This date is based on the oral evidence and on the story of the *amwās al-ḥilāqa* merchant (the razor merchant) who was sent by Wākid to Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, alluding that the latter's beard should be cut; see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 50-51. McDowell, on the other hand dates the attack between 1853 and 1857; MacDowell, p. 35. Rey, who visited the village in 1857, does not mention any changes in possession of ʿIrā; Rey, p. 163; but Graham Cyril found in 1857 that Ismāʿīl had already evicted the Ḥamdāns (cited in McDowell n. 80, p. 35).

[46] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9, "Note sur les Druzes," 10 July 1862.

> For the sake of their common religion, let him advance at once to the rescue, or the Druzes as a people would be exterminated. This notable letter, after it was written, was burnt at the four corners, to show the imminence of the danger—the sign of unutterable despair.... Ismail-il-Uttrush [al-Aṭrash] and his Druzes, on the receipt of this terrible appeal, sprung like tigers from their lairs.[47]

Leading three thousand men, Ismāᶜīl marched directly to Wādī at-Taym, with fighters from that area and from Iqlīm al-Billān joining his forces, which thus grew to five thousand men. At Wādī at-Taym, Biqāᶜ, and Zaḥla, Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash waged the sort of war that was well known in Ḥawrān, i.e., the sudden and rapid raids employed in attacking Bedouin tribes.[48] This military prowess and skill further strengthened Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash's leadership among the Druzes of Ḥawrān, which led to a great amount of resentment among the older, leading families. The attempts by the ᶜAmers to stop the rising star of Aṭrash through the French must be seen in this light. The relations between the French and the ᶜAmers developed further after 1860, the ᶜAmers being called the "French Party" among the Druzes. Backed by the French consul in Damascus, Asad ᶜAmer approached the Damascus authorities on behalf of his family. The Ḥamdāns by now were seen as dependent on the ᶜAmers.[49] From 1861 until 1914, it was the Aṭrash-ᶜAmer competition for supremacy among the Druzes that was to accompany all the events of the Jabal.

Thus, it were the refugees and the newcomers from 1860-1867 which gave Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash the power to bargain with the authorities in Damascus, to create alliances with the local Bedouins and to extend his *mashyakha*. By 1867 he controlled eight villages: ᶜIrā, Mjaymer, Umm Arrummān, Malaḥ, Dhibīn, ᶜUrmān, Ṣalkhad, and al-Qrayā. In addition, four villages ruled by other Druze

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[47] Churchill, pp. 149-150.

[48] See the descriptions given by Churchill, pp. 179-187 and Abū Shaqrā, *al-Ḥarakāt*, pp. 124-129. Although each stresses a different aspect—Churchill the ferocity and Abū Shaqrā the hastiness and impatience of Ismāᶜīl's force—both dedicate a special place to the Ḥawrānese.

[49] Relations had been established before 1860. In 1861, the consul, Outrey, strengthened these relations with Asad ᶜAmer; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, No. 3, 27 February 1861; No. 131, 24 September 1861. Early in 1862, when Hecquard became consul, the ᶜAmers were consulting with the French consul on their attitude vis-à-vis the government and on their competition with Ismāᶜīl al-Aṭrash; *ibid.*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 1, 2 April 1862; No. 10, 10 July 1862; No. 13, 31 July 1862; and several letters from Asad ᶜAmer.

families—Sahwat Balāṭa by al-Ḥinnāwī, ar-Raḥā and Kanākir by Abū Rās, Jubayb by Seif and Khirbat ʿAwād by Sharaf ad-Dīn—were under his influence.[50] The relations between Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash and the authorities in Damascus began to improve in 1862, though owing to their part in the events of 1860 Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash as well as many Druze chiefs were still considered, at least formally, lawbreakers. At the beginning of 1866 the Druze chiefs were pardoned,[51] following which relations between the government and Aṭrash began to carry even a formal coloring. In November 1866, two months after his arrival in Damascus as the new governor, Rāshid Pasha invited Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash to visit the city.[52] Furthermore, a counterpoise to French relations with the ʿAmer family, Aṭrash also had the support of the British.[53]

Sheikh Ismāʿīl was received by Rāshid Pasha in Damascus on 1 December. In this very first meeting, the *sheikh* was appointed governor (*mudīr*) of Jabal ad-Durūz.[54] This act was no more than the de jure recognition by the authorities of the supremacy of Aṭrash over the older families, but it sparked further enmity among the ʿAmers and Ḥamdāns and, consequently, deepened the division among the Druzes.[55] Opposing the appointment, the *sheikhs* of the ʿAmer and Ḥamdān families established an alliance with the inhabitants of the plain and with the Bedouins, exploiting the expansion of Druze settlement which had taken place under Aṭrash's encouragement, into Lajā and the plain.[56] Several incidents occurred between the partisans of the older families and Aṭrash followers that threatened once again to split the Druze community into two opposing camps.

As was to happen so often in Druze history, the religious leadership intervened. Through the influence of *sheikh al-ʿaql*, Ḥusayn al-

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[50] *Ibid.*, vol. 9, Rousseau to Moustier, No. 6, "Les Districts du Hauran," 6 June 1867.

[51] *Ibid.*, vol. 9, Hecquard to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 5, 11 January 1866.

[52] *Ibid.*, Bertrand to Moustier, No. 2, 1 December 1866; FO 195/806, Rogers to Lyons, Damascus, No. 35, 24 November 1866.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*, No. 38, Damascus, 1 December 1866; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Bertrand to Moustier, No. 2, 1 December 1866. In fact, the Ottomans had established this office in 1864 and appointed an Ottoman *mudīr*.

[55] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Bertrand to Moustier, No. 3, 18 December 1866.

[56] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 30 December 1866.

Hajarī, a reconciliation formula was suggested based on a division of the administration into five districts. Accordingly, the Aṭrashs with their allies would rule eighteen villages; the Hnaydīs, Abū ʿAssāf, and Abū Fakhrs, fifteen villages; the ʿAmers and ʿAzzāms, twelve villages; and the Ḥamdān, five. Qanawāt, the residence of *sheikh al-ʿaql*, was to remain independent.[57] Although the new arrangement temporarily resolved the internal dispute among the Druze chiefs and also further extended Damascus' control over the Jabal,[58] it did not put an end to the competition among the *sheikhs*.

When Fāris ʿAmer died in August, rumors were spread that he had been poisoned by order of the *wālī* who in turn had been instigated by Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash and Hazima Hnaydī.[59] Thus, in June 1868, Wākid al-Ḥamdān and the new chief of the ʿAmers, Asad, took the side of the Slūṭs in their quarrel with Aṭrash. Made anxious by the situation, Rāshid Pasha called the rival *sheikhs* to Damascus. The meeting ended in the dismissal of Ismāʿīl as *mudīr* and his replacement by his son, Ibrāhīm. The *wālī* also began to elaborate a new plan for the administration of Jabal Ḥawrān based on a *majlis* (council) which would consist of appointed Druze *sheikhs* and be presided over by a *qāʾimmaqām*.[60] By the beginning of 1868 the new plan was indeed put into effect: Jabal ad-Durūz became a *qadāʾ* (district) with four *nāḥiyas* (sub-districts) which followed the division of the Druze *mashyakhas*.[61]

Thus, the Ottoman administration did not create the social stratification of the Druze society in Jabal ad-Durūz, but followed and adopted the existing one. The Ottoman administrative organization, before and during the Tanẓimāt period, in many cases and places fostered the stratum of *aʿyān* (notables) with whom the

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[57] *Ibid.*, Rousseau to Moustier, No. 6, 16 June 1867; and Annex, "Les district du Hauran." The total number of Druze villages at that period was about sixty-two. Therefore, eleven villages were not incluced in this distribution because they were still not in the *mashyakha* system (see map 7).

[58] *Ibid.*, Rousseau to Jame, No. 12, 10 August 1867; No. 15, 28 September 1867 and No. 16, 10 October 1867.

[59] *Ibid.*, No. 13, 28 August 1867.

[60] *Ibid.*, Roustan to Moustier, No. 1, 30 June 1868; No. 2, 20 July 1868; No. 3, 20 July 1868 (two letters); No. 5, 28 July 1868; FO 195/806, Rogers to Elliot, No. 3, Damascus, 12 June 1868; No. 5, Damascus, 7 July 1868; No. 6, Damascus, 16 July 1868. See also Gross, p. 142.

[61] MAE. *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 9, Gay de Tunis to LaValette, No. 6, 30 January 1869; Rouston to LaValette, No. 6, 8 March 1869.

authorities dealt in all matters pertaining to official business. The *aʿyān* families in other regions of Syria were thus able to perpetuate their status and became an established ruling class. The interaction with the government augmented their position and influence, especially since such families were able to gain control of the tax farming (*iltizām*). Fearing for their acquired position, this stratum at first viewed the reforms with suspicion and often attempted to oppose them. Nevertheless, the developments after 1840 show that the *aʿyāns*' rise and decline continued to be dependent on the Ottoman administration, and the *aʿyāns*, generally speaking, reconciled themselves to and integrated into the reformist administration, following the Ottoman reorganization in order to safeguard their interests.[62]

In Jabal ad-Durūz, the leading families, on the contrary, emerged from the internal process of stratification. The rise and decline of this stratum continued to be a function of the shifts in the internal balance of forces within the community. Therefore, the division of Jabal ad-Durūz into four *nāḥiyas*, according to the borders of the *mashyakha* system, could not confine this system within constant borders. The division, e.g., could not stop the decline of the Ḥamdāns and the ascendancy of the Aṭrashs. The Ottoman authorities, for their part, continued to follow the developments within the Druze *mashyakha* system in their administrative arrangements, all the while manipulating the internal division of the Druzes. The years 1867-1869, therefore, became, as will be seen below, a turning point in the Ottoman policy toward Jabal ad-Durūz.

Two documents through which the authorities attempted to establish a solid administrative framework in this region in the late 1860s directly reflect the relationship between emigration and sociopolitical changes. The first document, of July 1868, consists of thirteen articles, some of which were already dealt with above. The rest of the articles relate to the administrative division of the region and the taxes. The second document was the formal agreement signed in March 1869 by which Jabal ad-Durūz became a *qaḍāʾ*, and contained the subdivision into *nāḥiyas*, and the obligation of every *mudīr* toward the authorities.[63] While these arrangements temporarily

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[62] On notables and reforms, see A. Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in W.R. Polk and R. Chambers (eds.), *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 46-63; Maʿoz, pp. 88-101.
[63] See above, Part Three, Chapter Two, notes 75, 83.

solved the internal dispute among the *sheikhs*, the Druze peasants soon became aware of the government's objective, i.e., they perceived these steps as a prelude to conscription[64] and also as a means of preventing them from extending their settlement in the west, thus entirely enclosing them within the Jabal. During this period, Rāshid Pasha planned a population exchange between the Jabal and the plain by transferring the Christians to the Druze villages in the plain and settling the Druzes of these villages in the Jabal.[65] Although this plan stipulated the evacuation of five villages on the plain, the Druzes did not withdraw from them because of this. Those who left these villages did so because the tax arrangement put them on the same level as the other inhabitants of the plain; they also feared conscription if they stayed. Thus, the Ḥalabī family left the villages of the plain and attempted to settle in the Ḥamdāns' district, but were not well received. The resultant feud between the Ḥamdāns and the Ḥalabīs again instigated Druze factionalism. Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash, as the defender of the newcomers, intervened in favor of the Ḥalabīs. The camps which now divided the Druzes were: Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash with his ally Hazima Hnaydī and their partisans, most of them newcomers, on one side, and the Ḥamdāns with the ʿAmers, on the other side. When several Ḥalabīs were killed by the partisans of Wākid, Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash retaliated forcefully against the Ḥamdān district.[66]

It was, however, the last manifestation of the rising power of the Aṭrashs under Ismāʿīl; he died in November. This time rumors were spread accusing Wākid al-Ḥamdān of having planned the poisoning of Ismāʿīl.[67] Soon after, the *wālī* appointed Ismāʿīl's eldest son, Ibrāhīm, as *mudīr* of ʿIrā, which brought about a split between the Aṭrash sons, Ibrāhīm and Shiblī. The Aṭrash family partisans favored the latter as successor, since he was the more popular of the two. The competition between the brothers led to quarrels between their followers. In January both brothers were called to Damascus, where the crisis was resolved when Shiblī professed loyalty to his older brother.[68]

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[64] FO 195/927, Wood to Elliot, No. 20, Damascus, 26 October 1869.

[65] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 10, Roustan to d'Auvergne, No. 19, 8 September 1869.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.*, No. 25, 30 November 1869; and Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 52.

[68] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 10, Roustan to d'Auvergne, No. 27, 9 February 1870.

Almost all the written sources date the ejection of the Ḥamdāns from their residence in as-Suwaydā to 1869;[69] however, neither the British nor the French allude to such an event in that year. It seems that the rivalry between the two brothers preceded Ḥamdān's expulsion from the capital of the Jabal, probably when Rāshid Pasha, the *wālī*, was absent from Damascus.[70] The final decline of the Ḥamdāns and their expulsion early in 1870 by Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash completed Ismāʿīl's attacks in October 1869 and apparently occurred without great effort on the part of Ibrāhīm's fighters. The capture of as-Suwaydā not only extended the *mashyakha* of Aṭrash, it also granted Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash supremacy over the other *sheikhs*.

The Druze Mashyakha *System and the Ottoman Reforms*

The administrative basis established in 1869 and the expulsion of the Ḥamdāns from the Jabal capital afforded Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash the possibility of extending and consolidating his *mashyakha*. He maintained good relations with the Ottomans and evaded confrontation with them. Apart from sporadic raids by Bedouins, which were easily handled,[71] a relative tranquility prevailed in the area, thus obviating any interference by the authorities in the internal life of the Jabal. This situation gave the French consul the impression that vis-à-vis Damascus the Druzes had reached an independent existence. "The sovereignty of the Porte in it [the Jabal]," he wrote in 1877, "is so precarious that one can say that it does not exist but for the name."[72] This was nearly the same view expressed by Jago who after his visit to Ḥawrān in 1879 summarized the situation since the agreement of 1869 in these words:

> The mountain is nominally governed by a resident Turkish Kaimakam [*qāʾimmaqām*], but in reality by the feudal Druze chieftains, three of the most powerful of whom were a few years ago appointed Mudirs of their respective districts, with a view to the exercise at least of a shadow of

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[69] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 52; Bouron, p. 213; McDowell, p. 48; Bʿaynī, p. 207.

[70] Rāshid Pasha left Damascus for Beirut in February 1870 and did not return to Damascus until late June; see Gross, p. 163.

[71] FO 195/1027, Green to Elliot, No. 4, Damascus, 27 January 1873; also McDowell, pp. 48-49.

[72] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Guys to Decazes, No. 32, 20 June 1877.

Imperial authority over a portion of the country practically independent, and which had, so far, defied all attempts to subjugate it.[73]

Although this independence and calm attracted many Druzes to come and settle in the Jabal in the 1870s, the very situation itself carried with it the seeds of future troubles. Because the power and the autonomy of the Druzes extended to the plain, Muslim and Christian villages there demanded their protection against the Bedouins.[74] The Druzes' seeming independence in their Jabal inspired both dread and respect among the Bedouin tribes,[75] some of which had been accustomed to take refuge in the Jabal with the bounty gained from their raids. This was the case with Banū Ḥasan of Zbayd ᶜAshīra, who had "lightened the road" of a British Post contractor.[76] People from various locations who had run into trouble with the Ottoman authorities found refuge in the Druze area. From the point of view of the authorities, as well as outsiders, the Druzes' self-protection was actually an outright act of law-breaking. From the viewpoint of the Druzes, however, the need to protect *dakhīl* (who demand the protection) was a moral obligation, and constituted one of the ethical foundations of Druze society. As such, it accompanied the Druzes until the Mandate period, when, e.g., their leader, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, attacked French troops in 1922 simply because they had arrested his *dakhīl*, Adham Khanjar, and so had violated this principle.

The Druzes' independence during the 1870s, with its *mashyakha* system and its ethics of protecting *dakhīls*, ran counter to the reformist spirit of the new *wālī*, Midḥat Pasha, who was appointed in November 1878. Soon after his appointment, the *wālī* proclaimed his intention to extend direct reformist rule to Jabal ad-Durūz.[77] Physical confrontation became imminent, even inevitable, in 1879. At the end of 1878, Muḥammad Abū ᶜAssāf, *sheikh* of the village of

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[73] FO 195/1264, "Report of a Journey made by Vice-Consul Jago during May and June 1879 to Hauran, including the Lejah, the Jabal Druze of Hauran Mountain, and Mount Aglon"; the same report in FO 78/2985, Jago to Salisbury, No. 12, Damascus, 16 August 1879.

[74] FO 195/1262, Jago to Layard, No. 1, Damascus, January 1879.

[75] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 3, 18 June 1879.

[76] FO 195/1201, Jago to Layard, No. 13, Damascus, 11 May 1878; also McDowell, pp. 50-51.

[77] On this intention, see Gross, pp. 268-269.

Slīm, accepted the request of the peasants of Azruᶜ for protection against the Bedouins.[78] Midḥat Pasha connected this act to the spreading of the independent spirit of the Druzes over the plain toward the *ḥaj* route and Damascus.[79] An incident in the course of 1879 exemplifies this spirit. A Bedouin from Jauf Arabia went with his intended bride to the Muslim village of Buṣrā al-Harīr in the southern Lajā. While the Bedouin was waiting for his wedding to take place, the local *sheikh* kidnapped the young girl, named Fhaydī. The Bedouin thereupon called on the Druze *sheikh*, Ḥammūd Naṣr, of the nearby village of ad-Duwayre, to protect him and his bride. In their attempt to release the kidnapped girl, two Druzes were killed by Yāsīn al-Ḥarirī's partisans. Retaliating, the Druzes attacked Buṣrā and inflicted severe losses among Yāsīn's men.[80] Midḥat Pasha had been waiting for just such an incident to start executing his reformist plan in Jabal ad-Durūz. Responding to the appeal of the *sheikh* of Buṣra for support, Midḥat Pasha began to organize a large expeditionary force. Meanwhile, he called upon the Muslim inhabitants of Ḥawrān to help their coreligionists against the Druzes. The newspaper *Sūriya* was also enlisted in this campaign against the Druzes in order to report the "official version" of the Buṣrā incident.[81]

Midḥat's objective was to establish direct rule on Jabal ad-Durūz by manifesting rather than actually using military force in the field. He likely assumed that by putting a large force of troops into Ḥawrān, he could compel the Druzes to negotiate on his terms. He himself was instructed by the Porte to deal patiently with the Druzes in order to indeed attain the ultimate objective.[82]

While the troops were proceeding to Ḥawrān, a new government took office in Istanbul, which caused the *wālī* to tender his resignation. This created a certain momentary uncertitude regarding Damascus' policy toward the Druzes. On 24 October, Midḥat

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[78] FO 195/1262, Jago to Layard, No. 1, Damascus, 1 January 1879.
[79] See McDowell, pp. 52-53.
[80] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 12, 22 October 1879; No. 13, 27 October 1879; Najjār, *Banū Maᶜrūf*, pp. 100-101; Bᶜaynī, p. 210-211; Kurd ᶜAlī, *Khiṭaṭ ash-Sham*, vol. 3, p. 102.
[81] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 13, and Annex 1, 13 October 1879.
[82] A.H. Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903), pp. 183-184, 185-186, 187; see Gross, p. 297; McDowell, p. 53.

Pasha received a telegram saying that the Sultan did not accept his resignation and continued to grant him his full confidence.[83] However, behind the uncertainty and even confusion in Damascus' attitude toward the crisis in Ḥawrān actually stood a conflict between Midḥat Pasha and Aḥmad Ayūb Pasha, the *mushīr* of the army, who had been dispatched to Ḥawrān. The latter had been critical of the *wālī* for mixing his personal views in the political decisions in the Ḥawrān question whereupon Midḥat had accused the *mushīr* of launching an expedition not just for show, as Midḥat had wanted, but an actual one and of having done so, moreover, without any battle plan whatsoever.[84]

Damascus' mobilization of three to four thousand soldiers[85] following the incident of Buṣrā was seen by the Druzes as manifesting the determination of the Ottomans to transform this "unimportant" incident into a war against them.[86] The prevailing mood was such that any movement of the Ottoman army in the area could ignite hostilities between the Druzes and the government troops. Jamīl Pasha, the commander of the expeditionary force, entered the Lajā and camped near the water source of the village of Qarrāṣa, with the intention of detaching the Druzes from their traditional allies in such cases, the Slūṭ tribe. Meanwhile, Jamīl Pasha presented three demands through the Druze religious chief, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥinnāwī:

> (1) the restoration of the Muslim villages the Druzes seized some years ago in the plain; (2) The delivery to the hands of justice of the guilty parties who caused the conflict [of Buṣrā]; (3) The immediate payment of the tax arrears.[87]

The Druze inhabitants of several villages in the plain took refuge in the Jabal. Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, Hazima Hnaydī, Muḥammad Abū ʿAssāf, and Sheikh Abū Alī al-Ḥinnāwī addressed a letter to the Junblāṭs in order to appeal for British mediation.[88] In fact, the

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[83] Telegram in Midhat, p. 180.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 184; Gross, pp. 297-298.

[85] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 12, 22 October 1879.

[86] *Ibid.*, No. 15, 5 November 1879, Annex 1. Letter of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, Hazīma Hnaydī, Hazzaʿ ʿAmer, Qāsim al-Halabī, Muḥammad ʿAbū ʿAssāf, and Qablān al Qalʿānī to Gilbert, 31 October 1879.

[87] *Ibid.*, No. 13, 27 October 1879.

[88] *Ibid.*

British ambassador to the Porte had returned from a visit in to Syria two days before the Buṣrā incident[89] and was now attempting to exert his influence on the government in Istanbul to seek a peaceful settlement of the Jabal ad-Durūz crisis.[90]

Encouraged by the presence of the Ottoman troops, the inhabitants of Buṣrā recruited a great number of villagers of the plain and attacked the Druze village of ad-Duwayre at two o'clock in the morning of 28 October. Meanwhile, an Ottoman battalion marched on the Druzes near Qarrāṣa. The two attacks were repulsed by the Druzes, who forced the Muslims of the plain to withdraw to their villages with heavy losses. The Druzes also succeeded in routing the Ottoman troops, on whom they inflicted great casualties. The Druzes themselves, however, also suffered heavy casualties, especially in the battle with the Ottomans at Qarrāṣa, which later they termed *dhabḥat* (massacre of) *Qarrāṣa*.[91]

Before this battle the Druzes had made efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. Three meetings were held between their representatives and the commander of the Ottoman expeditionary force. The negotiations reflected the conflicting, seemingly unbridgeable, points of view. The Druzes argued that there was an unwritten agreement between them and the inhabitants of the plain according to which they would pay as *diyya* ten thousand piastres for each death in case of any bloody incident. They demanded that a settlement be reached with the Buṣrā inhabitants through the mediation of the local *sheikhs* of the *ʿashāʾir*. The Ottoman commander, however, persisted in following his instructions to punish the attackers of that village.[92]

The great number of casualties suffered by both the Ottoman troops and the Druzes and the subsequent intervention of the British finally convinced the two parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The mediation of the British consul in Beirut and of Sheikh Saʿīd Talḥūq of Lebanon resulted in a settlement plan drawn up by

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[89] *Ibid.*, Gilbert to Waddington, telegram, 23 October 1879.

[90] Gross, p. 299.

[91] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, telegram, October 29, 1879; No. 15,5 November 1879; FO 195/1264, Jago to Layard, No. 28, Damascus, 9 November 1879. The Druze casualties numbered 61 dead and many more injured, while the Ottoman troops saw 100 dead and great number injured. Since the history of Jabal was based on oral evidence, *dhabḥat Qarrāṣa* has been dated in 1876 and in 1878; see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 54; Sghayar, p. 431.

[92] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, letter of the Druze *sheikhs* to Gilbert, 31 October 1879.

Midḥat Pasha, according to which the Jabal-ad-Durūz *qaḍā'* would be ruled by the Druze *qā'immaqām* instead of the Ottoman *mutaṣarrif*. A detachment of Druze gendarmerie would be formed, and an administrative *majlis* (council) and a Court of First Appeal established. The Jabal *qaḍā'* would be directly subordinated to the Damascus *wālī*. The plan, therefore, on the face of it, corresponded to the Druze *mashyakha* and shared its autonomous feature. In addition to the administrative aspects, Midḥat Pasha demanded that the Druzes pay ten thousand TL to cover the cost of the Ottoman expedition to Ḥawrān. Meanwhile, in order to strengthen control over the Druze area, he also demanded that they accept the building of a road through the Lajā to as-Suwaydā, where he wanted to place an Ottoman garrison.[93]

However, Midḥat Pasha's plan and its proposal of a nominal autonomous *qaḍā'* was in actual fact intended to destroy the communal independence and the particularism that the Druzes had won for themselves in the course of their migratory process. Their social structure as well as their communal solidarity could only be threatened by the direct intervention of the Ottomans. Because Druze independence was predicated on the Druze *mashyakha* system, Midḥat Pasha's plan was seen by Jago to herald the end of Druze "feudal power."[94] Jago's assumption was incorrect, however, because he compared Druze *mashyakha* to European feudalism. The fact is that instead of weakening the Druze *mashyakha* after 1879, the Ottoman plan paradoxically further strengthened it.

The Druzes rejected the government's demands to pay indemnity; they naturally also opposed the new road proposal and the garrison in as-Suwaydā. On the other hand, the Druzes did accept the administrative proposals. Midḥat Pasha, eager to reach a settlement, did not press further and the administrative proposals began to be put into execution. Sheikh Saʿīd Talḥūq was appointed *qā'immaqām* of the Jabal and ordered to continue carrying out the remainder of the proposals.[95]

As with the agreement of 1869, which had established the institution of *mudīrs*, the new administrative organization also followed the

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[93] FO 195/1264, Jago to Layard, No. 28, Damascus, 9 November 1879; No. 31, 22 November 1879.

[94] *Ibid.*

[95] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, No. 18, 25 November 1879.

mashyakha system, attempting to integrate it wholesale into the Ottoman reformist reestablishment of the Syrian province. While the two arrangements proved successful for the Ottomans, they also imparted legal Ottoman recognition to the Druze *mashyakha*. In a contradictory process, the Druze *mashyakha* strengthened itself as Ottoman control over it developed. This contradiction could only induce friction and lead to conflict between the Ottoman authorities and the Druze *mashyakha*—which indeed characterized the situation all through the period until 1914.

Despite the *mashyakha* of Jabal Ḥawrān, factionalism continued to divide the Druze *sheikhs*, although held in check by their solidarity against the stranger, whether Ottoman, Christian or Muslim. When Druze *sheikhs* competed among themselves during crises such as the one in 1879, it was in order to prove their loyalty to the entire community, which always stood above their own social position, an attitude notably manifested when the dispute with their neighbors bore a sectarian character. This was the case in the 1879 crisis, and is clearly reflected in the letters addressed to the consuls.[96]

In 1880, the Druzes became engrossed in their competition over the *mudīrs*, which the *qā'immaqām* had to appoint. The new administrative reorganization introduced internal dispute on two levels: one stemmed from the appointment of a *qa'immaqām* who was not from the Ḥawrānese Druze rank of *sheikhs* and whom the Aṭrashs opposed; the other, from the choice of four *mudīrs*, which stirred up the leading families. The *qā'immaqām*, Sa'īd Tulḥūq, was threatened by an armed gang and pressured to leave the Jabal.[97] Until July, after the death of the 'Amer family's *mudīr*, it was difficult to appoint the fourth *mudīr*.[98] Aṭrash's opposition to the *qā'immaqām* was motivated by his aspirations to subjugate the Lebanese system to the *mashyakha* system and its norms. Sa'īd Tulḥūq insisted on carrying out the judicial system according to Midḥat Pasha's original plan; that is, disputes between the Druzes and their Muslim neighbors had to be adjudicated by regular legal procedures; the Druze *sheikhs*,

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[96] *Ibid.*, letter of the Druze *sheikhs* in October 1879.

[97] *Ibid.*, Schmid to Freycinet, telegram, 3 July 1880.

[98] *Ibid.*, Schmid to Freycinet, No. 11, 17 July 1880; Annex, "Situation du Djebel Hauran." The 'Amers accused the Aṭrash family of the assassination of 'Amers' *mudīr*, probably Asad 'Amer, who was *mudīr* from 1869.

meanwhile, continued to rely on the traditional *ʿashāʾirī* procedures as the judicial instrument for solving disputes.[99]

Talḥūq could not keep in check the *sheikhs*' dissatisfaction especially when in August 1880 Ḥamdī Pasha was appointed as the *wālī* of Damascus instead of Midḥāt Pasha.[100] Under the pressure of the Druze *sheikhs*, who did not cease to petition against Talḥūq, Ḥamdī Pasha was ordered by the Porte to effect an exchange of posts between the *qāʾimmaqāms* of Rāshayā, Munīr Bek, and of Ḥawrān, Talḥūq.[101]

The relations between the Druzes and their neighbors on the plain had started to deteriorate in 1879. The dispute now spread to Damascus itself and became openly sectarian. In the Maydān quarter of Damascus, where the Druzes of Jabal-Ḥawrān traditionally sold and bought their goods, they were now badly treated.[102] In the course of 1880 it became ever more difficult for the Druzes to visit Damascus or even to pass through the villages of the plain: many Druzes were murdered on the roads of Ḥawrān by inhabitants of the plain or by Ottoman troops.[103] The Druzes, a proud and warlike people, began to realize that the 1879 arrangements which they thought underpinned their autonomy, actually had abased them and that they were being humiliated in their own environment. Several meetings were held in as-Suwaydā to deal with the new atmosphere reigning in the region, while the Druze chiefs intensified their visits to the British and French consulates.[104]

Toward the end of 1880, three Druzes were killed in the village of al-Karak on the plain. A meeting in as-Suwaydā soon after this

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[99] *Ibid.*, Annex, "Situation du Djebel Hauran."

[100] *Ibid.*, Schmid to Freycinet, No. 13, 13 September 1880.

[101] *Ibid.*, No. 11, Annex, "Situation du Djebel Hauran"; Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 3, 17 December 1880; FO 195/1306, Jago to Coschen, No. 21, Damascus, 22 December 1880.

[102] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 9, 29 January 1881, "Renseignement sur le mouvement des Druzes du Djebel Hauran"; No. 10, 31 January 1881.

[103] *Ibid.*, No. 13, 2 March 1881. Annex No. 1, "Extrait d'une lettre addressée au Consulat de France à Damas par M. Fallouh [Mūsā Fallūḥ], Chef Chretien du Hauran," 28 February 1881. In fact, Fallūḥ was a French agent who collected information in Jabal Ḥawrān. This letter mentioned the names of those killed such as Fandī ʿAzzām; the attacks of Jamīl Pasha near ʿIrā, and the Druzes who were killed in Jizza.

[104] *Ibid.*, No. 7, 23 January 1881. FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John , No. 4, Damascus, 13 February 1881.

incident decided on retaliation, and more: punishing the Maydān and to block the roads between Damascus and Ḥawrān.[105] On 26 January the Druzes took their revenge: First they attacked al-Karak and Umm Walad, slaughtering a total of one hundred and four men and one woman in al-Karak.[106] Although the "massacre" at al-Karak brought consternation among the villagers in the plain and especially unnerved the residents of the Maydān quarter of Damascus,[107] Ḥamdī Pasha received orders from Istanbul to solve the problem peacefully.[108] In Damascus, however, excited accounts of the attacks appeared in the city's newspapers, which incited the Muslims against the "ferocity" of the Druzes. In a manifestation of force, the Ottoman army proceeded to the region with the intention of encircling the Jabal, and measures were taken to prevent Druzes from Mt. Lebanon, Ghūṭa, Palestine, and Mt. Ḥermon from joining their coreligionists.[109] In order to calm the Damascenes as well as the population of the plain, the Ottoman authorities issued a circular, which was distributed among the *qāʾimmaqāms* and published in the local press, condemning the massacre and promising to punish the offenders. Ottoman officials were instructed to inform the authorities about Druzes who left for Jabal Hawrān.[110]

The *wālī*, on the orders he had received from the Porte, made preparations for dispatching a special commission to investigate the causes of the conflict in Ḥawrān. Almost two months passed, however, before the *wālī* formed this commission.[111] During the interval, the Druze chiefs continued to hold meetings in which they discussed two main questions: the measures they should take in case of an Ottoman attack; and the position that should be adopted

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[105] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 9, 29 January 1881.

[106] FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John, No. 2, Damascus, 30 January 1881; No. 4, Damascus, 13 February 1881; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 10, 31 January 1881.

[107] FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John, No. 2, Damascus, 30 January 1881.

[108] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 9, 29 January 1881.

[109] FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John, No. 2, Damascus, 30 January 1881.

[110] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 12, 19 February 1881; Annex No. 2, the newspaper, *Ḥadīqat al-Akhbār*, of 17 February 1881.

[111] *Ibid.*, No. 16, 15 March 1881; FO, 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, No. 9, Damascus, 30 April 1881.

toward the anticipated commission. Concerning the first matter, the Druzes strategy was to withdraw to Lajā, and they sent emissaries to the Rwalā and Slūṭ tribes in order to renew their alliance against the Ottomans.[112] As for the second question, the Druzes demanded the formation of a commission which would be made up of European representatives. They addressed letter after letter to the consuls to solicit their support. The Druzes' arguments were based on the assumption that the conflict would inescapably become sectarian.[113] The commission, headed by the *mushīr*, Ḥusayn Fawzī, finally arrived at as-Suwaydā on 24 March.

Before its departure for Ḥawrān, the commission met with the Druze *sheikh*, Maḥmūd ʿAmer, the protegé of the French, who explained the difficulties that would face the commission.[114] In its first meeting in Ḥawrān, the Druzes "adopted a very independent tone towards the authorities, demanding a joint commission and foreign guarantees."[115] The commission did not cave in but decided to continue its investigation and, in the end, reached a settlement: The attempt to arrest individual offenders would be abandoned; in return, the Druze community would accept collective responsibility for the al-Karak incident by paying a certain sum as *diyya* (blood money); the inhabitants of the plain were judged to have started the crisis, and were warned to leave the Druzes alone.[116]

In February, when the Ottomans were assembling their force to march on Jabal ad-Durūz, Jago wrote as follows:

> The Druzes ... have now to elect between surrendering the accused (a measure opposed to their traditions and customs) and submitting to conditions that will extinguish the independence they have not enjoyed since

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[112] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 13, 2 March 1881; Annex 1, letter of [Fallūḥ] to consulate, 28 February 1881.

[113] FO 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, No. 4, Damascus, 27 March 1881; enclosed letter from *sheikhs* Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥinnāwī and Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash to the British consul(n.d.); MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to St. Hilaire, No. 20, 5 April 1881; item No. 8, letter from *sheikhs* Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥīnnāwī and Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash to the French consul, 21 March 1881. This report contains eight annexed documents, letters from Sheikh Ibrāhīm al-Qaḍamānī and Maḥmūd ʿAmer and letters of Mūsā Falluḥ, the French agent in Ḥawrān.

[114] *Ibid.*, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 19, 26 March 1881.

[115] FO 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, No. 9, Damascus, 30 April 1881.

[116] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 35, 8 July 1881; Gross, p. 242.

> ... they migrated from Lebanon and established themselves by the force of their swords as masters of the Jebel Hauran.[117]

It was clear from the beginning that the crisis of 1881 was merely a continuation of that of 1879 and even of that of 1869, and a certain logic connects these events. As pointed out above, two parallel but contradictory processes were developing in the interrelationship between the Jabal and Damascus: the strengthening of the *mashyakha*, on one side, and the extended hand of Ottoman control, on the other. The crisis of 1881 distinctly demonstrated these two processes. As the troops streamed into Ḥawrān, the Ottomans began to build military barracks at Mazraʿa near as-Suwaydā and at ʿIrā, where the village well had always represented an assured revenue for Sheikh Shiblī al-Aṭrash who sold the water to the inhabitants of the plain.[118] This Ottoman objective of having a garrison station at Mazraʿa was achieved in return for a number of concessions on the *mashyakha* system, as embodied in the Aṭrash *sheikhs*. The first was the acceptance in 1881 of Aṭrash's demand that blood money be paid according to the *ʿashāʾir* judicial system. The second concession was the appointment of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash as *mudīr* of as-Suwaydā, Shiblī al-Aṭrash as *mudīr* of ʿIrā, Muḥammad al-Aṭrash, as *mudīr* of Ṣalkhad, and the long-time partisan of the Aṭrash family, Hazīma Hnaydī, as *mudīr* of al-Majdal.[119] Through these appointments, Ḥamdī Pasha gave further legitimacy to the Aṭrash family's place at the top of the Jabal ad-Durūz's *mashyakha* hierarchy, a process which was completed in January 1883 when Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash was appointed *qāʾimmaqām* of Jabal ad-Durūz.[120]

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[117] FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John, No. 4, Damascus, 13 February 1881.
[118] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Portalis to Saint-Hilaire, No. 10, 15 November 1881.
[119] *Ibid.*, No. 31, 20 June 1881; No. 35, 8 July 1881; Gross, p. 344.
[120] FO 195/1448, Dickson to Wyndham, No. 3, Damascus, 25 January 1883; see, too, McDowell, p. 57 and Gross, p. 344.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDEPENDENT SPIRIT VS. OTTOMANIZATION

A Dualist Structure

The years 1881-1883 completed a process that had begun in October 1862, with the agreement signed between Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash and the Ottoman authorities which formed the basis for the later development of relations between Damascus and the Jabal. The determining phases in this process occurred in 1869, 1879, and 1881-1883, when, in close interconnection with the migratory process, this interrelationship was to have deep repercussions for Jabal ad-Durūz. Thanks to the support of the now-settled immigrants, the Aṭrashs were able to eclipse the authority of the Ḥamdāns in 1870, and, also with the new settlers' help, to extend their *mashyakha*, which made it possible for Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash to become *sheikh mashāykh al-Jabal*.

In 1883 official Ottoman imprimatur was given to the existing reality when Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash was appointed *qāʾimmaqām*. But there was a price to be paid: the factual Ottomanization of Jabal ad-Durūz. The key figure in this process was Ḥusayn Fawzī Pasha, the *mushīr* of the 5th Army Corps in Damascus. Fawzī's policy was based on maintaining formal autonomy for the Druzes and introducing Ottomanization through the clever and initially unobtrusive use of the internal elements of the Druze community. For this purpose, he stationed his troops within the Jabal itself, not nearby. He refrained from using military force to deal with the small incidents between the Druzes and their neighbors, and granted Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash a large measure of authority in the Jabal.

One of the first problems that faced Ibrāḥīm in his new function as *qāʾimmaqām* concerned the Druzes' relations with the inhabitants of the plain. Early in 1883 the inhabitants of Buṣrā al-Ḥarīr violated the agreement reached after the crisis of al-Karak and stole horses belonging to Druzes. The incident took place in the district overseen by Hazīma Hnaydī, *mudīr* of al-Majdal. Ibrāhīm took the initiative to return the horses in order to prevent the outbreak of a crisis. From Hnaydī's point of view, however, Ibrāhīm had no right to intervene in his area, especially not, as he had done, without prior consultation. Already some time in the past a blood feud existed between

Buṣrā al-Ḥarīr and the ʿAzzām family, who were intimate friends of Hnaydī, and the latter now wanted to teach Buṣrā al-Ḥarir a lesson.[1] His action represented the first manifestation of protest against the purported legitimacy granted to Ibrāhīm by the Ottomans. Al-Aṭrash, by accepting the office of *qāʾimmaqām* had elevated himself and was no longer the *primus inter pares* which had been the accepted formula among the Druze chiefs since the ejection of the Ḥamdāns.

The biggest opponent of such a breach of the accepted formula was, in fact, Ibrāhīm's brother, Shiblī al-Aṭrash. This may have been the result of Fawzī's Ottomanization policy, which was intended, among other things, to introduce division among the Druzes, in order to reach its ultimate purpose: "to incorporate completely this [Ḥawrān] district with other Sanjaqs of the province."[2] The British vice-consul in Damascus speculated that one of two possibilities lay behind Ibrāhīm's appointment: either to effect discord among the Druze leaders or to attract the sympathy of the Druzes. He reported that the appointment had already divided the Aṭrashs into two factions: one, led by Ibrāhīm, which accepted Ottomanization; the second, headed by Shiblī, which found the French "ready to lend an ear."[3] The French were also not averse to using this internal dissatisfaction in order to increase their influence among the Druzes.

Since the 1840s, the Druzes both on Mt. Lebanon and in Ḥawrān had relied almost exclusively on British support when bargaining or negotiating with the Ottoman authorities. Although the British consular agents often mediated successfully at such times, their efforts were always based on the principle of maintaining the sovereignty of the Porte in the Syrian province. Until 1881 the British exerted considerable influence on the paramount leadership of Jabal ad-Durūz in order to settle crises in the Damascus province. In 1883 this policy, coupled with the intentions of Ḥamdī Pasha and Ḥusayn Fawzī Pasha led to the further incorporation of Jabal ad-Durūz in the province. Shiblī al-Aṭrash, therefore, started to address himself

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[1] FO 195/1448, Dickson to Wyndham, No. 3, Damascus, 25 January 1883; and No. 4, Damascus, 24 February 1883.

[2] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 13, "Note sur le Hauran," 25 April 1890.

[3] FO 195/1448, Block to Wyndham, No. 15, Damascus, 3 June 1883, and No. 16, Damascus, 17 June 1883.

to the French consulate in Damascus as a counterpoise to British support of his brother. Until then, the French had been supporters of the ʿAmer faction, but following the deaths of Fāris and Asad ʿAmer and the expulsion of the Ḥamdāns from as-Suwaydā in 1870 the ʿAmers had been much weakened.

The split in the Aṭrash family coincided with a significant change in French policy toward the local populations in Syria. The principal figure connected with this change was M.E. Flesch, who had been appointed consul in Damascus in December 1880 and was charged with carrying out the new policy, the aim of which was to counter British influence in Syria. Flesch commented on the need for change:

> For some years, France has restrained itself by concentrating its attention almost exclusively on the Christians. This policy could produce excellent results in Beirut and Lebanon but, today, it absolutely cannot act as an answer to the needs of the situation in Damascus.... and in territories of the Druzes, the Ansaria [ʿAlawīs], sedentary Muslims and Metwalis [Shīʿīs].[4]

The British, in his view, made an excellent policy choice when they created relations with various local elements, whereas the French consuls, Outrey, Hecquard, and Roustan, had limited themselves to conducting the traditional line of policy. Flesch now suggested a detailed program to promote the new policy based on personal relations with the principal chiefs, the establishment of French institutions like schools and medical stations, the extension of religious propaganda, and the establishment of French economic enterprises. The Druzes, like other local populations, would then perceive the advantages of French support.[5]

Flesch's calculations were not limited to French influence in Syria; they were also motivated by France's interests in Tunisia and Algeria, where the Ottomans, as he wrote, habitually engaged "in intrigues." Encouraged by the crisis of 1881 in Ḥawrān, Flesch seemed to be spoiling for a fight:

> I do not exaggerate to declare that at the slightest signal given by us [the French], 3,500 Druzes under Maḥmūd ʿAmer and Shiblī al-Aṭrash,

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[4] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 7, 23 January 1881.
[5] *Ibid.*, and vol. 11, No. 1, 12 December 1880.

> 1,500 Algerians led by the sons of the Amir [ʿAbd al-Qādir], 1,000 men of the Maydān quarter of Damascus under Holo Pasha, 1,500 Bedouins ... and 2,000 Arabs of Ḥawrān would rise up to fight the Ottoman troops.[6]

In the course of 1881, in addition to Asad ʿAmer's son, Maḥmūd, and Shiblī al-Aṭrash, the Druze chiefs Fandī Abū ʿAssaf and Yaḥyā al-Ḥamdān also developed good relations with the French consulate.[7] These relations and the new policy itself were reflected in the role played by France in the crisis of al-Karak. In May 1881, General de Torcy, the French military attaché in Istanbul, left Beirut for Jabal ad-Durūz with the objective of promoting new relations with the local chiefs. Reaching as-Suwaydā, de Torcy found himself placed under the Ottoman troops giving him no freedom of movement.[8] The visit of de Torcy was seen by the ever more suspicious Ottoman authorities as a French attempt to distort the tranquility in Jabal.[9] However, in April 1883 the French consul, Gilbert, visited the Lajā and Jabal ad-Durūz for much the same reason as de Torcy's visit had been planned, i.e., inspection of a number of schools which were being established by Jesuit priests and Greek Catholic institutions. While the Druze *sheikhs* connected with France asked for more schools to be built, the Ottomans viewed the visit with great suspicion, and even ordered the arrest of Simon Abū ʿAsalī, a Christian from Rāshayā, who was the intermediary between the French consul and Shiblī al-Aṭrash.[10]

Gradually the Jabal ad-Durūz became an arena of dispute between Ottoman and French interests in Syria, with both exploiting the split among the Druze *sheikhs*. Ḥamdī Pasha soon paid a visit to

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[6] *Ibid.*, vol. 12, No. 39, 25 July 1881.

[7] *Ibid.*, Portalis to Saint-Hilaire, No. 3, 2 September 1881. It seems that the Ḥamdān family, though deprived of their old district, were still considered one of the leading Druze families. This may be seen in the letter of the French agent, Falluḥ, dated 2 March 1881.

[8] *Ibid.*, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, No. 25, 10 May 1881; No. 26, 17 May 1881; No. 27, 27 May 1881.

[9] There was an official investigation into French activities. France was accused of inciting the revolt in Jabal al-ʿAlawīn and of attempting to do so in Jabal ad-Durūz, see Gross, pp. 350-351.

[10] On Gilbert's visit, see FO 195/1448, Dickson to Wyndham, No. 10, Damascus, 4 May 1883; and MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 13, Gilbert to Challemel-Lacour, No. 44, 4 April 1883; No. 45, 2 May 1883; and vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 13, "Note sur le Hauran," 25 April 1890.

Ḥawrān for the purpose of rebuilding the mosques in the area, in an attempt to obviate further French influence through their Jesuits schools and to settle whatever problems existed between the Druzes and their Muslim neighbors,[11] and in November he decided to open a number of schools in order to counteract the effect of the increasing number of French schools.[12] In spite of Ottoman opposition, the French succeeded, up to 1885, in establishing in the Jabal and the Lajā nine schools, six of which were indeed opened and three of which were waiting for teachers.[13] The Ottomans, however, continued to bring pressure to bear on the Druze chiefs to close the French schools, and when this happened in 1889, only two Ottoman schools were opened in their place.[14]

In spite of Ḥamdī Pasha's order to cut relations with the foreign consuls, Shiblī al-Aṭrash did not stop sending missives to the French consul Gullois. Gullois realized in 1890 that Shiblī was using the umbrella of France merely to carry out his resistance to Ottoman policy, but in 1884 relations with this chief seemed highly opportune for the French.[15] A gift was awarded "to the great chief of the Druzes, Shiblī al-Aṭrash, who has not ceased to render precious services for the missionaries and teachers who are charged with the propagation of our language in Ḥawrān."[16] Shiblī was described as brave and noble and one who could "take command of the Druze contingent one day soon, when the population of this region will lift up the flag of revolt ... in order to turn out the holders of power in Arabia and Syria."[17] In Jabal ad-Durūz, opposition to Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash by now meant opposition to Ottomanization. In June 1884, Shiblī was chosen by the Druze chiefs as *sheikh al-mashāykh*,[18] an act that flew in the face of the legitimacy of Ibrāhīm's authority. Encouraged by the friendly letters of the consul, Shiblī asked to visit

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[11] FO 145/1448; Block to Wyndham, No. 15, Damascus, 3 June 1883.
[12] *Ibid.*, No. 31, Damascus, 5 November 1883.
[13] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 14, Gilbert to Jules Ferry, No. 98, 18 January 1885.
[14] *Ibid.*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 13, "Note sur le Hauran," 25 April 1890.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.*, vol. 13, Gilbert to Jules Ferry, No. 88, 12 August 1884.
[17] *Ibid.*, enclosure: Gilbert to Noailles.
[18] *Ibid.*, No. 84, 11 June 1884.

France and continued to express his gratitude to French officials "for their aid" on behalf of the Druze community.[19]

Because France's relations with Shiblī were motivated more by expedience and moral ambitions than by a sense of pragmatism,[20] they did not really bear fruit and could stem neither Ibrāhīm's increasingly harsh autocracy nor further Ottomanization measures. With his Turkish dress, especially his *ṭarbūsh* (fez), Ibrāhīm was seen by the Druzes as a Turkish official;[21] indeed, his brother, Shiblī, sarcastically called him "Abū Ṭarbūsh" for his close ties with the Ottomans.[22] The symbolic outward appearance of Ottomanization affected by Ibrāhīm was accompanied by intensive steps to restrict the independence of the Druzes and incorporate the community within the Ottoman province of Damascus. Ottomanization, the internal split between the Druze *sheikhs*, French intervention—as unhelpful as it was—and Ottoman counteraction were all factors which, coupled with the socio-economic changes that had taken place since 1883, prompted the outbreak of the *ʿammiyya*, the "peasant revolt," of 1889-1890.

*Toward a Peasant Revolt (*ʿAmmiyya*)*

With the appointment of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash as *qāʾimmaqām*, a dualist structure had been introduced in the Jabal: the *mashyakha*, with its own rules and socio-economic structure on the one hand, and the Ottoman administration, with its new regulations, army presence, and gradual incorporation of the Jabal into the province, on the other. This dualism in the end only served to rupture any internal unity among the Druze chiefs. Opposition to Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash began to develop slowly, although at this stage it could not yet translate itself into one single movement with a common goal. The division among the Druze chiefs according to *ʿashīra* affiliation prevented the formation of effective opposition forces that could overcome their familial loyalties and the resultant disunity of the opposition made

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[19] *Ibid.*, vol. 14, Gilbert to Freycinet, No. 107, 17 May 1885; No. 7, 26 October 1886, enclosure with Shiblī's letter of 7 October 1886.

[20] The French consul in 1890 wrote that "some years ago, Shiblī gave up contacting the consulate and from time to time wrote letters without importance"; *ibid.*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 13 ("Note sur le Haurān"), April 25, 1890.

[21] *Ibid.*, vol. 14, Guillois to Goblet, No. 19, July 6, 1888.

[22] Sh. ʿAysamī, *Jabal al-ʿArab*, p. 67, Bʿaynī, p. 214.

it possible for both the Ottomans and Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash to rule the Jabal without serious trouble until 1888. But from 1883 to 1888 the seeds of the *ʿammiyya* had been growing.

The beginning of the Druze settlement in the Ḥawrān had also seen the gradual installation of a socio-economic structure to which the modern literature attributes the Arabic term for feudalism: *iqtāʿ*. Although feudal systems everywhere have many features in common, such as hereditary and hierarchical social relations, patron-client ties, mutual obligations, and tax collection, an analogy with European feudalism engenders a certain confusion which prevents an understanding of the salient features of the system in effect in Ḥawrān, as does also an analogy with the *muqāṭaʿjiyya* system of Mt. Lebanon or the *iltizām* in other parts of Syria. One reason for these differences is historical: the *mashyakha* socio-economic system in Ḥawrān, as outlined above, developed during a period of migration into an area with deserted villages ready for settlement.

The extant data on the development of the *mashyakha* socio-economic system during the eighteenth century are inadequate. When Burkhardt visited the area, peasants were not bound to the land: "Few individuals," he observed, "either amongst the Druzes or the Christians, die in the same village where they were born."[23] He described, for example, the village of Slīm, which "has been abandoned by its former inhabitants" and was occupied only by a few poor Druzes, "who take refuge in such deserted places to avoid the oppressive taxes and thus sometimes escape the Miri for one year."[24] About forty years later, Rey noted the same movement of peasants from one village to another.[25] This statement, like that of his predecessor, reflected the socio-economic framework in which the peasant class of Mt. Ḥawrān lived. Neither did a relationship exist between the peasant and the house in which he lived. Burkhardt alludes indirectly to this phenomenon when he described how "most of the doors of the houses are formed of a single slab of stone with stone hinges."[26] In other words, the new inhabitants of the once-deserted villages had no motivation to introduce any alterations and additions to the houses they occupied. When Porter visited the

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[23] Burkhardt, p. 299.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[25] Rey, p. 123.
[26] Burkhardt, p. 73.

area in the late 1850s, he made the same observations: that the inhabitants settled into their houses without making alterations, except "in one or two places [e.g.,] in Hayāt village [where] the stone doors had been removed and wooden ones substituted."[27]

The peasant possessed neither the land he cultivated nor the house in which he lived, and he rarely planted trees. This was reflected in the relationship between the *sheikhs* and the peasants: on the one hand, the peasant was free to move from one place to another to seek better conditions, on the other hand, the villages were the possession of the *sheikhs*, who had the right to expel peasants from their villages. Those who agreed to live in a certain village and to cultivate the land there constituted with the village *sheikh* a community and shared with the latter the yields of the land. While the land and the entire village itself were considered the possession of the *sheikh*, village lands were distributed among the peasants: each had his *sahm*, or plot of land, which was measured by the number of *faddāns*.[28] From time to time there would be a redistribution of the land among the peasants. The *sheikh*'s then always received a fourth of the land thus distributed, generally the most fertile plots. The main crops in Ḥawrān were grain and tobacco.[29] The *sheikhs*' plots were cultivated by the peasants of the village, and his harvest was usually gathered before that of the peasants.[30] The peasants did possess their own domestic animals, which they would take with them when they left for a new village.[31]

Until the great influx of immigrants that began in 1860, the peasants of Jabal Ḥawrān had more freedom to move from village to village, to exchange one *sheikh* for another, and even to settle in villages outside the established *mashyakha* system. For example, in 1862 thirteen villages existed independently of the main *sheikhs* of that time.[32] The abundance of cultivable land and of deserted

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[27] Porter, *Five Years*, vol. 2, p. 37.

[28] The *faddān* is generally 2 1/2 dunams, but this differs from village to village.

[29] In 1812, Jabal Ḥawrān also produced cotton; see Burkhardt, pp. 75, 80.

[30] H. ʿAudāt, *Intifadat al-ʿAmiyya al-Fallaḥiyya fi Jabal al-ʿArab* (Damascus, 1976), p. 35.

[31] According to Abū Rāshid, and thereafter repeated by many writers, the Ḥamdāns imposed an animal tax according to which every peasant had to provide the *sheikh* with a certain proportion of all animals born; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal-ad-Durūz*, p. 47; Bʿaynī, p. 59; ʿAudāt, p. 31.

[32] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 7, Hecquard to Thouvenel, No. 9, "Note sur Les Druzes du Hauran," 10 July 1862.


villages gave the peasantry of Jabal Ḥawrān the means by which it could circumvent the vexation of the *sheikhs*. *Sheikhs* usually encouraged peasants to live in their villages in order to increase both their following and the village's production. It was for this reason that the Ḥamdāns, e.g., urged Druzes from Mt. Lebanon to emigrate to Ḥawrān,[33] and that the al-Qalʿānī *sheikhs* of Shaqqa expanded settlement in some areas at the eastern fringe of the Jabal.[34] Kinship and communal solidarity of peasants and *sheikhs* mitigated social antagonism, especially during the wars and revolts of the 19th century.

Vertically, the society that set itself up in Jabal Ḥawrān was unlike that of Mt. Lebanon, which was highly stratified, with a defined, unchangeable stratum of *muqāṭaʿjīs* who had ruled the Mountain for hundreds of years. In Ḥawrān, vertical stratification was mainly characterized by an extension of the *mashyakhas*, as new families were able to establish their own *mashyakhas* during the process of emigration into the Jabal. Thus, from 1860 to 1883, the number of *mashyakhas* increased in number from eight to twenty. Some of the new *mashyakhas*, like the Ḥalabīs, ascended to the top of the existing hierarchy and numbered among the most powerful families. Through this vertical extension of the *mashyakha* system, moreover, a new relationship took hold between the peasants and the *sheikhs*, which found a clear expression in the kind of demands the peasants presented during the *ʿammiyya* uprising in 1889-1890.

Two categories of peasants developed during the period of settlement after 1862: *al-fallaḥīn* and *al-falatiyya*. The first category consisted of those who shared the land of the villages with the *sheikhs*, who received one-fourth of real estate. The second category was composed of peasants who, because they had arrived in the 1880s, remained landless since the great scale of immigration during he previous two decades had led to the settlement of virtually all the formerly ruined towns and villages of the Jabal.[35] Dussaud, who visited the region twice, once at the beginning of the 1880s and again in 1902, wrote that the settlement had extended to the border of the desert. "The Druzes by their proper ability," he remarked,

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[33] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 28.
[34] Lewis, p. 84.
[35] FO 195/1264, "Report of a Journey made by Vice-Consul Jago of Damascus during May and June 1879."



Map 9. The Druze *mashyakha* districts in 1883.

"extended the cultivated zone up to the the limits attained in the Roman epoch."[36] By the late 1880s the population of Jabal ad-Durūz had reached about twenty-five thousand inhabitants.

The search therefore for new cultivable land may explain the regular outbreak of quarrels between the Druze families. Such a dispute occurred in 1885 between the Ḥalabīs and Aṭrashs, both of whom laid claim to the property of the village of Khalkhala.[37] Similar quarrels took place between other families.[38] The need for land also explains the renewal of the Druze attempt to seize certain deserted villages in the Lajā that were under the control of the Slūṭ tribes. In 1886, *sheikhs* Abū ʿAbdī al-Aṭrash and Qāsim al-Ḥalabī took the initiative and occupied the villages of Mismia and Shaqra in the Lajā that were situated not far from the Turkish military station of Burāk. The same year, quarrels too arose between the Druzes and Circassians living near Burāk over the rights to certain pasture lands. These two events brought in the Turkish troops who compelled the Druzes to withdraw to their original villages.[39]

Although the need for land and the condition of the peasants under the *mashyakha* system induced a certain amount of social agitation, as sketched above, these factors by themselves were insufficient to cause the *ʿammiyya* uprising. The *falatiyya* peasants, since they were landless, were unable to put up any resistance at all against the *mashyakha* system. The *fallaḥīn*, also, desisted from rising up against the *sheikhs* except when a split among the leading families led to armed clashes. Until 1880, it seems that the peasantry had no special grudge against the existing system, which after all afforded them favorable conditions in comparison to the peasants of the plain. Jago observed this contrast:

> The peasantry, while apparently possessing an abundance of the simple necessaries of life as raised by themselves from the produce of their fields and flocks, presented by their independent bearing, healthy and contented appearance, and the self-respect shown by the care in their clean homespun but durable apparel, a marked contrast with the denizens of the squalid and poverty-stricken villages of the plains.[40]

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[36] R. Dussaud, *Mission dans les region desertique de la Syrie Moyenne* (Paris, 1903), p. 53.

[37] FO 195/1514, Dickson to Lyndham, No. 13, Damascus, 28 March 1885.

[38] *Ibid.*, Dickson to White, No. 21, Damascus, 29 May 1885.

[39] FO 195/1548, Dickson to Thornton, No. 14, Damascus, 14 April 1886; No. 16, Damascus, 1 May 1886; No. 17, Damascus, 31 May 1886.

[40] FO 195/1264, "Report of a Journey made by Vice Consul Jago."

In the same report, Jago refers to the relations between *sheikhs* and peasants:

> The mode of living of the chiefs presents but little difference to that of the majority of the people, their riches and power being chiefly manifested by a superior quality of raiment, by the possession of fine horses, and by the numbers of retainers by whom they are surrounded. Their habitations are, however, naturally superior, being generally chosen on the site of some half ruined temple or large building of a bygone age. The powers wielded by the sheikhs over the people as feudal lords of the soil are very great, and their emoluments proportionately so. I have, however, never heard a complaint made on this score by a Druze.[41]

The complaints began to arise, however, when the Druze *mashyakha* represented by Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, more or less imperceptibly at first, began to adopt Ottomanization. Ibrāhīm's appointment as *qāʾimmaqām*, as described earlier, soon brought about a host of complaints, both from the peasants and from the smaller landed property owners, which were mainly directed against the new system of collecting the tithes.[42] Although the new system of taxation fixed an annual tribute of three hundred and seven thousand piastres, including the *badal* and the tax on animals, the methods Ibrāhīm employed to collect the taxes increased this sum considerably. Backed by the Ottoman troops, Ibrāhīm exerted his authority to collect whatever taxes he could, sometimes as much as half the annual harvest. He then forwarded the required tribute to Damascus and kept the rest for himself and his family.[43]

Encouraged by the success of Ḥusayn Fawzī's policy toward Jabal ad-Durūz, Nāshīd Pasha, who was appointed *wālī* of Damascus in September 1885, intensified the process of incorporating the Jabal into direct Ottoman rule. In April 1886 he endeavored to take a census and make a land register; unfortunately, this attempt coincided with the intervention of the troops in the Lajā to compel the Druzes to withdraw from Mismia and Shaqra.[44] The Druzes refused to cooperate with the census and began to prepare for resistance. Ḥusayn Fawzī Pasha was thereupon now reassigned his former posts for the express purpose of dealing with the recalcitrant Druzes.

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[41] *Ibid.*
[42] FO 195/1480, Dickson to Lyndham, No. 44, Damascus, 16 December 1884.
[43] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot No. 13, "Note sur le Hauran," 25 April 1890; see also Gross, p. 411.
[44] FO 195/1548, Dickson to Thornton, No. 14, Damascus, 14 April 1886.

The census proposal was subsequently dropped,[45] but military intervention was intensified. The two Druze chiefs who had been involved in the occupation of the Lajā villages were arrested,[46] and Shiblī al-Aṭrash himself was summoned to Damascus. When al-Aṭrash, however, resisted the order, an officer and seventy horsemen were dispatched to ʿIrā to arrest the Druze chief. Shiblī, while receiving this guard very graciously, made various pretexts to delay as long as possible accompanying the soldiers. In the meanwhile, he secretly sent emissaries to the neighboring villages to gather his followers and within a very short time two thousand well-armed Druzes appeared on the scene and surrounded the house, forcing the troops to retire without carrying out the arrest order.[47] The incident, however, only widened the split among the Druze chiefs. The Shiblī al-Aṭrash faction intensified its criticism of the Ottomans and of the Ottoman party among the Druzes[48]—that is, of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash. In November 1887 the rivalry between the two brothers reached the point of open quarrel at as-Suwaydā, in which about a dozen Druzes were wounded. Only the intervention of the more influential chiefs precluded further serious disturbance.[49]

At the end of 1887 the Druzes began increasingly to realize that the Ottoman measures of incorporating Ḥawrān would lead to their final full subjugation to the Porte. This feeling was confirmed after a Slūṭ attack against Druzes who had been collecting wood in the Lajā. Although the Druzes repulsed this attack and inflicted severe casualties in doing so, the Bedouins raided the Druze village of Dāmā in great number and killed one woman before a Druze counterattack drove back the Slūṭ to the northern limits of the Lajā. The Slūṭ asked the assistance of a military garrison that was stationed there; the Ottomans obliged, opening fire on the Druzes.[50] The incident incensed the Druzes, whose fury was further fueled by their disappointment in their *qāʾimmaqām* to whom they had appealed

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[45] *Ibid.*, Eldridge to Thornton, Beirut, No. 28, 16 April 1886.

[46] *Ibid.*, Dickson to Thornton, No. 17, Damascus, 31 May 1886.

[47] *Ibid.*, No. 21, Damascus, 24 July 1886.

[48] FO 195/1583, Dickson to White, No. 13, Damascus, 14 March 1887.

[49] *Ibid.*, No. 38, Damascus, 7 November 1887.

[50] Soon after these incidents, information arrived in Damascus that estimated the casualties among the Druzes at twenty to fifty dead. FO 195/1583, Dickson to White, No.39, Damascus, 25 November 1887. Later information put the figure at eighty-five dead. *Ibid.*, No. 41, Damascus, 8 December 1887.

in vain for redress. Dickson, the British consul, now summarized the Druze situation:

> It has been the policy of the authorities, during the last few years, to endeavour to close in, as much as possible, the semi-independence ... by the establishment of garrisons at all the strategical points surrounding that district [the Jabal]. They have accordingly built of late strong military stations.... The Druzes, on the other hand, have in recent years been growing wealthy in consequence of the fertility and riches of the land they cultivate.... They own a considerable amount of property, have built themselves comfortable dwellings and are naturally loathe to abandon their homes and to retire to localities further removed from the power of the Executive.

The consul's prediction was that the Druzes would find themselves "gradually surrounded by the troops..., [and] will be compelled either to make a desperate struggle for their independence or to submit entirely to the authority of the government."[51]

At first, the intervention of the troops and Ibrāhīm's turning a deaf ear to the confused population compelled the Druzes to stifle their anger for the time being. Six months later the Slūṭ again attacked—this time the target was a camel caravan—and two Druzes were killed and sixty camels stolen. Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash's reaction was to send a delegation to Damascus to persuade the authorities to deal with the Slūṭ attacks. According to Guillois, the French consul, these raids were actually encouraged by the authorities, who supplied the Bedouins with arms. It was part of the divide-and-rule policy instituted by Ḥusayn Fawzī Pasha, who intended to exploit the incidents to strengthen Ottoman forces in the Jabal and the Lajā.[52]

The new incident and Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash reaction revived the anger of the Druzes, who now demanded the expulsion of the Bedouins from the Lajā. The French consul described Druze feeling toward Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash at this time: "The population would summon ... Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash to prove to them whether he had become an Ottoman or continued to be a Druze by declaring that they could not endure the existing situation for any length of time."[53]

In their previous wars and revolts, the Druzes always fought

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[51] *Ibid.*
[52] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 14, Guillois to Goblet, No. 19, 6 July 1888.
[53] *Ibid.*

under their chiefs; in 1888, however, the *sheikhs* were more disunited than ever before. Wanting to avoid any disturbances, the Ottoman authorities summoned the powerful Druze chiefs, Ibrāhīm, Shiblī, and Muḥammad al-Aṭrash, Hazīma Hnaydī, and Qāsim al-Ḥalabī, to Damascus to deal with the Lajā events. The meeting resulted in further curbs on the Druze chiefs, who concluded an agreement which in effect made the Druzes even more dependent on the authorities. The Druze leaders agreed (1) to close all foreign schools that had been established; (2) to open and maintain at their own expense five schools whose teachers would be subject to the directions of the authorities; (3) to forbid the chiefs of the villages to intervene in affairs, even of individuals, that should be handled by the Damascus authorities; (4) to pay all arrears in taxes; (5) to deliver up criminals who sought refuge in the Jabal; (6) to impede the Bedouin raids against the inhabitants of the Ḥawrān plain; and (7) to form a Druze gendarmerie under the command of Ibrāhīm's son. Shiblī was promised a new post in the Ottoman administration, after which he also began to dress in the Turkish fashion.[54]

After signing this agreement, Shiblī, still split between loyalty to his people and his factual subjugation to the Ottomans, meaningfully declared that "this agreement has the same features as those which had been imposed in the past on his father and grandfather and cannot modify the development of things in the Jabal ad-Durūz."[55] In fact, many things had changed since the death of Ismāʿīl in 1869. Ewing, who visited the Jabal twice, remarked that:

> when [Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash] died, none of his sons displayed a capacity at all equal to that of their father. Each had a village given him, of which he became sheikh; but no one arose to fill the old man's place in the respect and awe of the people.[56]

The ʿAmmiyya *of 1889-1890*

Fragmented, the Aṭrash *mashyakha* had become subordinated to the Ottomans, with Ibrāhīm drawing from the situation a certain amount of independent authority as *sheikh al-mashāykh* and Shiblī

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[54] *Ibid.*, No. 24, 23 August 1888.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] M.A.W. Ewing, *Arab and Druze at Home* (London and Edinburgh, 1907), p. 85.

looking for a compromise between Ottoman valor and his people's independent spirit. Thus, the events of 1886-1888 led to new kinds of organization emerging within the *mashyakha* system. With the social structure of the Druzes based on the extended *ḥamūla*, the opposition movement against the Aṭrashs in 1886-87 was composed of an alliance of small families. According to Abū Rāshid, this alliance was based on *bidʿa* (i.e., invention) of a genealogical descent that claimed the same ancestor for these families, who consequently formed one *ʿashīra*.[57] In fact, *bidʿa* may be said to respond to the social condition of Druze society in which the extended family, or *ʿashīra*, constituted the only means by which people could associate in one movement. The *bidʿa*, in this case, "became an alliance agreement signed by the members of these families who met in Najrān."[58]

In 1888 the peasant opposition movement began to spread to other regions. A meeting of peasants was held in the south of Jabal ad-Durūz, the peasants from ʿUrmān and Malaḥ calling others to join them. A conference known as *ash-shūra*, took place in Majdal ʿUrmān, which the peasants later referred to by the name Majdal ash-Shūr. It ended with a declaration document signed by eighty peasants. The texts, formulated in spoken and not literary Arabic, did not refer to specific demands but sufficed with protesting "the vexation, the aggression, the greediness, and the bad treatment on the part of the *sheikhs*" (e.g., the expulsion of peasants from the villages). The names of the signers of the document indicate that most lived in the Aṭrash *mashyakha*, which covered more than twenty-five villages (see map 9). Although the text was general and even ambiguous, the peasants stressed their unity in the face of future vexation by the *sheikhs*.[59]

Writers who refer to the *ʿammiyya* often depict it as a conspiracy and an uprising in which the several different opposition bodies joined forces against Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrashh. According to these writers, Shiblī, Najm al-Aṭrash and some of the ʿAmer chiefs col-

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[57] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 54-56.

[58] Abū Rāshid gives the date of the agreement as 1886; however, many events in his book were dated differently by one or two years. It seems that the agreement was signed in 1887 or 1888. The signees belonged to the following families: Faḍil, Qunṭār, Ghazāla, Ḥajala, Kīwān, ʿAzzām, ʿArayj, Zahr ad-Dīn, Naṣr, Ḥamza, Zāquṭ.

[59] Text in ʿAudāt, pp. 55-58.

luded with the peasants right from the beginning of the uprising.[60] It seems, however, that the peasant revolt, though reflecting the disappointment of the Druzes with Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, was at least at the outset a spontaneous reaction, motivated by cumulative agitation that had built up between 1883 and 1888. Thus, the first clashes between the peasants and Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash's partisans did not gain the term *ʿammiyya*. That was to come later. These first clashes took place in ʿUrmān, site of the first peasant meeting in 1888. Of Najm al-Aṭrash, *sheikh* of ʿUrmān, the English consul mentioned in May 1890 that he was one of the main conspirators against Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash.[61] The same consul reported in June 1889 that a clash had occurred between the villagers of ʿUrmān and the partisans of the *sheikh* as a result of the *sheikh*'s attempt to expel one of the old families of the village to make room for a new one, named Abū ʿAsalī. The ensuing quarrel left one of the villagers and eleven men and two women of the *sheikh*'s family dead.[62] In August, the French consul reported on the negotiations between Najm al-Aṭrash and the villagers concerning the "blood price of the men who were killed in the clashes which took place between his [Najm] partisans and the peasants."[63]

Although the British consul reported on the ʿUrmān clashes on 3 July 1889, its seems that the incident occurred in mid-June. It was the spark that set the straw on fire, which instantly spread to several villages of the Aṭrash district. The peasants soon organized themselves into armed bands and attacked the partisans of the *sheikh*s. Both camps sent delegations to Damascus in order to solicit the intervention of the Ottoman authorities. Each had its reasons for taking this step: the *sheikh*s wanted to maintain their traditional status, whereas the peasants declared that they were inviting the Ottomans officially to register the lands.[64] The authorities made do with despatching forces to the foot of the Jabal, without actually intervening. It is likely that the troops were waiting, as the French

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[60] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 56; see McDowell, p. 62; Bouron, p. 214; Bʿaynī, p. 215.

[61] FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 17, Damascus, 12 May 1890; see McDowell, p. 62.

[62] *Ibid.*, No. 16, Damascus, 3 July 1889. The name of the new family is written in the report as el-Asal.

[63] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Spuller, No. 32, 8 August 1889.

[64] *Ibid.*, No. 25, 29 June 1889.

consul speculated, for an invitation from one of the belligerent parties.[65]

Until July 1889 the peasant uprising apparently had its own leaders and organization, the social polarization inducing peasants to fight against *sheikhs*, and pitting the villages of Shahba, al-Hit, Bthayna against ʿAmers, ʿAraja against the Nāṣīf, and Lāhitha against ʿIzzeddīn (al-Ḥalabī).[66] As in similar cases of internal division, the *ʿuqqāl* (religious chiefs) intervened to restore the unity and solidarity of the community. "The wise men [*ʿuqqāl*] of the nation," the French consul observed, "understood that this state of anarchy seriously menaces the independence of their people, and from all parts [of their localities] they rushed up to Jabal ad-Durūz in order to calm the spirits and put an end to the hostilities."[67]

In August 1889 the *ʿuqqāl* succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between the *sheikhs* and the peasants.[68] After three large meetings of the Druze community in as-Suwaydā, al-Mazraʿa and Qanawāt, an agreement was concluded between the peasants and their *sheikhs*. The latter agreed to modify their attitude toward the peasants, who in turn would become owners of the land, paying only the taxes. For their part the peasants pledged not to call for the intervention of the Ottoman officials when disputes in the villages needed settling.[69] Although the French consul's report does not mention the new land distribution arrangement, poems of Shiblī al-Aṭrash give evidence that a new distribution scheme had been worked out according to which the *sheikhs* would surrender half of their landed properties.[70]

Until that point it seemed as though the peasants had succeeded in introducing a radical change in their relations with the *sheikhs*. The execution of the arrangement was delayed, however, and some *sheikhs*, especially among the Aṭrashs, refused to surrender their "right" to a fourth of the properties of the villages.[71] Then, between November 1889 and April 1890, the peasant uprising began

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65 *Ibid.*, No. 28, 21 July 1889.

66 Ṣghayar, p. 456. The Nāṣīf family is one branch of the Ṣiḥnāwī family. In the French report listing the names of sheikhs in 1883 and 1867, the Nāṣīf name is mentioned as one of the chief of the Ṣiḥnāwī family.

67 MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Spuller, No. 28, 21 July 1889.

68 *Ibid.*, No. 32, 8 August 1889.

69 *Ibid.*, No. 35, 26 November 1889.

70 Shiblī al-Aṭrash, *Dīwān fī ash-Shurūqī waz-Zajal* (Damascus, 1950), p. 91.

71 MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 15, 7 May 1890.

to take on a new aspect. *Sheikhs* from both the Aṭrash and other leading families, such as the ʿAmers, now exploited the general agitation in order to strengthen their own influence among the Druze peasantry, without, however, forming alliances between them. The Aṭrashs were divided among themselves into three main factions: Ibrāhīm against his brother Shiblī, each with his followers; and Najm al-Aṭrash opposed to both brothers. After the agreement of November 1889, Najm "became somewhat more popular among the Druze peasantry."[72] Shiblī al-Aṭrash preferred to wait and see and there is no evidence that he joined the peasant uprising.

The term *ʿammiyya* to describe the revolt came into use after the arrangement of November 1889. The French consul, who was in constant contact with people in the Jabal, notably the ʿAmers, wrote in May 1890:

> After the arrangement that was effected in the preceding year between the chiefs and the peasants, these latter formed a sort of national assembly, called the *ʿammiyya*. This assembly, which substituted the ancient gatherings of the *sheikhs*, sovereignly determines and settles all the interests of the nation; it particularly allocated to itself the right to elect the *sheikhs*, and the faculty to choose them either from the members of the noble families or from the people. Many influential chiefs joined the *ʿammiyya* and took an active part in its deliberations. The most notable are Maḥmūd ʿAmer, Wahba ʿAmer, Sulaymān ʿAmer, Ḥamad al-Maghūsh, Ḥusayn Jarbuʿ, Shihāb ʿAzzām. It is said that others who are supporters of the *ʿammiyya* but until now have abstained from any involvement in their activities are members of the families of Abū Fakhr, Ḥamdān and Naṣṣār. Others act with absolute neutrality; among them the important is the Ḥalabī family.[73]

A comparison of the above names listed by the consul with those mentioned by Abū Rāshid and Ṣghayar[74] shows that the *ʿammiyya*, at the beginning of 1890, formed the basis for a general uprising against the Aṭrash *sheikhs*. Comprising both peasantry and *sheikhs*, the *ʿammiyya* consequently encompassed in one movement a number of different motivations and ambitions. In addition to the peasants' demands it embodied, the ʿAmers and other leading families who

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[72] FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No.17, Damascus, 12 May 1890.
[73] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 15, 7 May 7, 1890.
[74] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 56; Ṣghayar, pp. 454-455, 459.

joined the *ʿammiyya* simply wanted to see the Aṭrashs deprived of their prerogatives as the paramount leaders.

Reading through the poems of Shiblī al-Aṭrash, one also finds that the second phase of the uprising consisted mainly of a revolt against the Aṭrash family. Shiblī ironically coined the term *ash-sharīʿa al-jadīda* (the new doctrine) and he called the insurgents of the *ʿammiyya* "*banū ʿamʿūm*" (the rabble).[75] It was in this second phase, that the term *ʿammiyya* came into prominence. The Aṭrashs, refusing to surrender, began to gather their partisans, and the Jabal soon was divided into two camps. The division was now no longer merely one of social strata. Among the Aṭrash allies were the Abū ʿAssāf and Hnaydī families. In addition to this alliance between these three established families, there was a faction from the *ʿuqqāl* under the leadership of Ḥusayn Ṭarabe. The alliance also included "some number of Druzes, named Shūfaniyya, because they are originally from Jabal ash-Shūf in Lebanon. Their establishment in Jabal ad-Durūz is recent."[76]

On 18 April seven to eight hundred supporters of the *ʿammiyya* held a meeting in Sahwat Blāṭa at which they reiterated the resolutions arrived at in the November 1889 meeting. Three hundred of this crowd then proceeded to as-Suwaydā in order to present these resolutions to Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, who chose to greet them with gunfire. This soon developed into severe fighting between the two sides during which twenty-eight to thirty-six persons were killed and about fifty wounded. The Aṭrashs, who had started the battle, were defeated, however, and even compelled to leave as-Suwaydā. They fled to Damascus to solicit the help of the authorities. Following this battle, the Druze *ʿammiyya* held a new meeting at which they drew up a petition addressed to the *wālī* and the *mushīr* demanding the divestiture of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash and his replacement by Saʿīd Ḥamdān, whose grandfather had been evicted from as-Suwaydā in 1870.[77]

The internal strife among the Druzes was soon exploited by the Ottomans, who saw the moment opportune to complete the incor-

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[75] al-Aṭrash, *Dīwān*, p. 179.

[76] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 15, 7 May 1890; FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 17, Damascus, 12 May 1890.

[77] *Ibid.*; also No. 16, Damascus, 3 May 1890 and MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, No. 15, 7 May 1890.

poration of the Jabal into the province. They contemplated appointing a Turkish military official as *qā'immaqām* in place of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash, and preparations were made to dispatch a large expeditionary force with the objective of putting an end to the "Druze autonomy" once and for all.[78] The new road to Ḥawrān had been completed in 1888, and a strong garrison was already stationed in Mazraʿa, near as-Suwaydā, where the troops were to concentrate.[79] In May, while the Ottomans were preparing the expedition, the British consul analyzed the situation as follows:

> By the dispatch of troops and establishment of strong garrisons at certain strategic points [and by] bringing this hitherto, semi-independent race into subjection, there is no doubt that before long, there will be no other alternative left for them, but either to retire into the desert as the Bedouin tribes, or to submit entirely to Government.[80]

By the beginning of June, Ottoman troops were pouring into Ḥawrān. The military authorities ordered the Druzes to deliver up all their Martini-Henri rifles (about three thousand). At a meeting in Murdūk on 21 May the Druzes determined to resist this demand.[81] Nevertheless, the Ottoman military build-up, completed in mid-June, was such that it induced the Druzes to accept the government's terms without any resort to coercive measures.[82] The Ottoman conditions clearly meant only one thing: complete Druze submission. Two military garrisons were to be established among the Druzes, one at as-Suwaydā and the other at ʿĀhira; the sheep tax and tithes had to be paid. Druze land needed to be registered according to the Regulations of the Tabu. Martini rifles had to be surrendered. Lastly, the Aṭrash *sheikh*s were to be permitted to return to their villages.[83]

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[78] *Ibid.*, No. 18, 22 May 1890; FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 18, Damascus, 19 May 1890.

[79] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Geoffory to Ribot, No. 21, 7 July 1890.

[80] FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No.18, Damascus, 19 May 1890.

[81] *Ibid.*, No. 19, Damascus, 2 June 1890.

[82] *Ibid.*, No. 24, Damascus, 23 June 1890; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Geoffory to Ribot, No.20, 26 June 1890.

[83] *Ibid.*, No. 21, 7 July 1890; FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 27, Damascus, 1 July 1890. It should be mentioned that the British consul reported in May that Ibrāhīm and Shiblī al-Aṭrash had entered into secret negotiations with the rebels to try and persuade them to turn against the authorities when the government was preparing the expedition. FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 18, Damascus, 19 May 1890.

Shocked, the Druzes refused all but the last condition. At the dawn of 25 June, the Ottoman troops surrounded as-Suwaydā and began to bombard it, a prelude to an invasion of the town itself. Ferocious street-to-street fighting took place, as the Druzes attempted to prevent the army from occupying the town. By the end of the day, Druze casualties were heavy. On 28 June, Druzes gathered from other villages laid siege to the occupying Ottoman troops, who suffered heavy casualties in the ensuing battle. The Druzes were unable, however, to disrupt the line of supply to the army in the town. After several days of fighting, the siege was lifted and negotiations began. Sheikh ʿAlī Junblāṭ hastened to Damascus in order to mediate between the two parties.[84] It seems that the Druzes had stopped fighting primarily because they were anxious to gather their crops.[85] The Ottoman troops had lost four hundred dead and a greater number wounded; still, the authorities succeeded in imposing most of their conditions upon the Druzes. The latter now accepted the presence of a permanent force in as-Suwaydā, where the construction of a garrison began. They also did not oppose the construction of a similar garrison in ʿĀhira. They agreed to pay the arrears in taxes after *al-fiṭr bayram* of that year. The Aṭrashs were restored to the Jabal, and the "rebels" declared their submission to the Sultan.[86]

The *ʿammiyya* was thereby crushed. The Ottoman intervention, however, did not restore the old interrelationship of *sheikhs* and peasants; the new distribution of lands called for the *sheikhs* to take one-eighth instead of one-fourth of all yields, and for the villagers to be considered proprietors of their own plots.[87] The peasant uprising and the events of 1889-1890 proved that social antagonism could not free itself entirely of primordial loyalties as dictated by the *ḥamūla* and communal solidarity.

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[84] *Ibid.*, No. 27, Damascus, 1 July 1890; No. 28, 7 July 1890; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Geoffory to Ribot, telegram, 3 July 1890; No. 21, 7 July 1890.

[85] *Ibid.*, FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 31, Damascus, 15 July 1890.

[86] *Ibid.*, No. 34, Damascus, 21 July 1890; No. 38, Damascus, 18 August 1890; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 15, Geoffory to Ribot, No. 21, 7 July 1890; No. 22, 15 July 1890.

[87] ʿAudāt, pp. 46-49; Bʿaynī, pp. 217-218; Ṣghayar, pp. 458-459.

The Desperate Strife

From 1890 until 1914 the Druzes of Ḥawrān had to contend with an Ottoman policy which employed several means in its efforts to complete the process of Ottomanization and put an end to the Druze's spirit of independence. The Ottomans had already established several garrisons to enable them to keep a permanent military presence in the Jabal. Thus, those who now fled to Ḥawrān from other parts of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in order to escape heavy taxes, conscription and Ottoman interference in their life, only again came up against the Ottoman government's persistence in finally imposing what the Ottoman *wālīs* of 1860-1890 had failed to execute.

The authorities retained the status quo introduced in 1890-1893, and no special events occurred. However, the crisis of 1889-1890 had left deep scars on the Druzes' psyche. Disunited during those years, the Druzes, when they confronted the Ottomans in 1890, had fought without the lead of their traditional chiefs, the Aṭrashs. As a consequence, although Shiblī al-Aṭrash attempted to rebuild the confidence of the Druze populace in the Aṭrash leadership, a certain alienation had inevitably been created. The Ottoman occupation of as-Suwaydā and the restoration of the Aṭrash leadership had been accompanied furthermore by the arrest of several influential Druze *sheikhs*, fifteen of whom stayed imprisoned until 1892 and some until 1895.[88]

In July 1893 Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash died, only a few days after his return from Istanbul where he had been granted the title of Pasha.[89] Ra'ūf Pasha, the *wālī*, appointed a Damascene Muslim, Maḥmūd al-Ghazzī, as acting *qā'immaqām*; and when the latter was dismissed, again a Muslim, Yūsuf Ḍiyā' Pasha al-Khālidī, from Jerusalem, replaced him.[90] This appointment reflected the changed Ottoman attitude toward the Jabal ad-Durūz *mashyakha*. Earlier, in 1881-1883, the Ottomans had used the Aṭrash *sheikhs* to promote

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[88] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 13, 18 March 1895, FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, No. 55, Damascus, 17 November 1896; FO 195/1765, Eyres to Ford, No. 25, Damascus, 30 September 1892.

[89] *Ibid.*, No. 31, Damascus, 28 December 1892; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 12, Guillois to Ribot, No. 1, 7 January 1893. Seven *sheikhs* accompanied Ibrāhīm on his visit, among them his two brothers Yaḥyā and Muṣṭafā, and his son.

[90] FO 195/1801, Eyres to Ford, No. 25, 4 November 1893; MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Bertrand to Develle, No. 20, 7 November 1893.

control over the *mashyakha* itself. Ten years later the Ottoman administration in the Jabal was more independent vis-à-vis the *mashyakha* system. Thus the Ottomans could appoint a foreigner to head this administration without facing the difficulties that would have erupted a decade earlier.

Shiblī al-Aṭrash, who succeeded his brother as the leader of the family, at first attempted to reach a compromise between his ambition to take over his brother's office and the Druzes' dissatisfaction with Ottoman policy in the Jabal. When he was ignored as the logical candidate for the *qā'immaqāmmiyya* of the Jabal, Shiblī took on a hostile attitude toward the authorities. The latter used a proxy to retaliate. In September 1893 the Rwalā tribe, with Ottoman backing, attacked Shiblī's village, ʿIrā, killing four men. The disaffected Druze leader now formed an alliance with Banū Sakhr, a Bedouin tribe that opposed both the Ottomans and the Rwalā.[91] Before he could exact his revenge for that raid, however, Shiblī al-Aṭrash was arrested by the gendarmerie on his return to as-Suwaydā after the burial of Sheikh Muḥammad al Qaḍamānī in Shaqqā village. He was accused of inciting the Druze *sheikhs* during his stay in that village to declare a general revolt against the Ottomans. Thereupon, a large group of Druzes, led by Shiblī's brother, Sheikh Yaḥyā al-Aṭrash, and the *sheikhs* of the Naṣr, ʿAzzām, and Abū Fakhr families, attacked the Marzaʿa garrison, laid siege to it, cut off its sources of water, and damaged the telegraph lines connecting it with Damascus. The Druze attack resulted in casualties on both sides. Because the Ottomans wished at the time to achieve Druze neutrality rather than their hostility, they formed a special commission to settle the dispute when the troops came back from an expedition in the al-Karak district. Headed by an Ottoman official, the commission consisted of the principal Druze *sheikhs*, Abū Fāris al-Ḥalabī, Ḥusayn Ṭarabe, and Hazīma Hnaydī. Shiblī was released; in return, he left his son as hostage and promised to assuage the Druze anger. It was just at this time that the Jerusalemite Yūsuf Ḍiyā' al-Khālidī was appointed *qā'immaqām* of Jabal ad-Durūz.[92]

This incident may explain the situation of the Druzes in the

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[91] FO 195/1801, Eyres to Nicolson, No. 21, Damascus, 9 October 1893; Gross, pp. 433-334; McDowell, p. 70.

[92] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Bertrand to Develle, No. 20, 7 November 1893. Muḥammad al-Qaḍamānī was the brother of Sheikh Abū ʿAlī al-Qaḍamānī, one of the principal *ʿuqqāl* of Jabal ad-Durūz.

northern parts of the Jabal, where the Ottoman troops had a permanent presence, and why the resistance against the Ottomans had moved south. On 30 October, less than three weeks after Shiblī's release, the Druze *sheikhs* held a meeting in the village of Malaḥ, in order to discuss possible action to be taken against the Turkish authorities.[93] Together with the issue of the gradual enforcement of Ottoman administration in the south, another urgent question on the agenda dealt with the presence of armed soldiers who, when not on duty, would walk around in the villages, instead of staying inside their garrisons.[94] Out of this meeting came a decision to put into effect a new kind of resistance in 1894: guerrilla attacks. Several skirmishes followed, the objective of which was to embarrass the authorities, to capture arms from the soldiers, and to prevent the latter from leaving their camps. These hit-and-run attacks left a number of casualties in their wake.[95]

In the summer, when the Ottomans had to focus their efforts on the Armenian question and temporarily displayed a certain conciliatory attitude toward the Jabal,[96] a dispute ending in blood erupted between the Druzes of Jawlān and Circassians who had settled near Majdal-Shams and Buqʿātha two decades previously. The authorities arrested about ten Druzes from Majdal-Shams. In September a Druze caravan wending its way from Jabal ad-Durūz to the Maydān *sūq* (market) of Damascus was attacked at the same place by the *sakhanē* (people from Maydān quarter), abetted by Ottoman troops. Five Druzes were seized and thrown into prison.[97] These incidents clearly marked a new turn in Druze-Ottoman relations: government troops were persuading local elements to attack the Druzes.

The Druze *sheikhs* thereupon urged their people to retaliate by, in effect, becoming highwaymen.[98] Shiblī al-Aṭrash himself led raids

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[93] *Ibid.*

[94] *Ibid.*, Guillois to Develle, No. 22, 29 November 1893. It seems that the Druzes' demand was motivated by their fear for the *ʿirḍ* (honor and dignity) of their women.

[95] FO 195/1839, Eyres to Nicolson, No. 3, 3 February 1894; *idem*, Meshaka to Currie, No. 22, 18 October 1894.

[96] See Gross, p. 436.

[97] FO 195/1839, Meshaka to Currie, No. 13, Damascus, 11 June 1894; No. 14, Damascus, 21 June 1894; No. 18, Damascus 31 July 1894; No. 22, Damascus, 18 October 1894; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 18, 11 June 1894.

[98] FO 195/1839, Meshaka to Currie, No. 22, Damascus, 18 October 1894.

against two neighboring villages in the plain.[99] In order to contain the situation in Ḥawrān and probably in Jawlān, the Ottomans invited Shiblī to Damascus and in order to make him yield alluded to his being appointed *qāʾimmaqām* of Jabal ad-Durūz.[100] The Druze *sheikh* indeed returned to the Jabal with the *qāʾimmaqām* title,[101] to which he had aspired since 1883. By accepting the appointment at this time, when the aggression of the Ottomans in 1890 was still fresh in the people's mind, Shiblī alienated himself further from the community, which instead was seeking a leader who could stand firm against the Ottomans. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Ottomans at the outset had actually intended to create this alienation. Ewing, who was well acquainted with the Druzes of the Jabal, thought that the

> appointment ... represents one side of the Turkish policy in its endeavour to gain the mastery over these free spirited and warlike people.... The other side of the policy has long been familiar to the world, the method of setting rival factions and races against each other fomenting their quarrels, fanning their animosities, until they are so weakened by mutual conflict that Turkey can step in without much trouble and lay an iron hand on all.[102]

Whether or not the Ottomans deliberately employed a divide-and-rule policy in this case, the events of 1895-1896 where characterized by numerous instances of sectarian conflict in the Druze localities in the Syrian province. The Druzes had to contend with a broad alliance of Kurds, Circassians, Bedouins, inhabitants of the Ḥawrānese plain, Damascenes, and the Ottoman troops. This alliance formed a continuation of the struggles of 1893-1894. Now, however, the Druze had to fight when their official chief, Shiblī, chained by his new title, was effectively neutralized. In the course of 1895 two separate but related events darkened the Druze skies from Wādī at-Taym to Ḥawrān. The Ottomans decided, once again, to introduce conscription among the Druzes.[103] Meanwhile, attacks and counter-attacks were raging between the Druzes and

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[99] MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Bertrand to Hanotaux, No. 24, 25 August 1894.

[100] FO, Meshaka to Currie, No. 22, Damascus, 18 October 1894.

[101] *Ibid.*, No. 23, Damascus, 1 November 1894; MAE, *CPC*, *Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Bertrand to Hanotaux, No. 26, 22 October 1894.

[102] Ewing, pp. 80-81.

[103] H.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria* (London, 1969), p. 181.

their neighbors. In early November the Druzes attacked and completely destroyed about twelve villages on the Ḥawrān plain. The villagers fled to Sheikh Maskīn, where further Ottoman troops were being mobilized and prepared for the conscript expedition to Jabal ad-Durūz.[104] These preparations made use of the Beirut-Damascus-Mazrib (in Ḥawrān) railroad, which had opened in July-August 1895.[105] The Druzes now realized what was in store and began their own preparations:

> Signals of convocation [for war] by means of great bonfires; the signals started up from Jabal ad-Durūz, were perceived in Qunaytira [region] where they have been repeated on Jabal ash-Shaykh [Ḥermon] and from there they were transmitted to the Lebanon.[106]

While the troops continued to arrive at Sheikh Maskīn, Bedouins and Circassians from Jawlān attacked the villages of Ḥaḍar and Ḥīna. In reprisal the Druze of Majdal-Shams attacked Manṣūra, a Circassian village. Supported by the intervention of government troops against Majdal-Shams, the villagers raided almost every Druze village in the Jawlān.[107] The recruitment of reserves in the Damascus province went ahead without difficulties; many volunteers also presented themselves for service in Ḥawrān.[108] The French consul summed up the situation before the attack against Jabal ad-Durūz: "All races have risen against the Druzes, either for malice or plunder. After the Bedouins and the Circassians, the Kurds have entered the game.... It has been asserted to me that the populace of the town has joined the Kurds and the Bedouins."[109]

The army set out from Sheikh Maskīn on 15 October toward Jabal ad-Durūz. The first battle was joined in Qarrāṣa, where the Druzes attempted to stop the army's advance. In spite of heavy casualties, the force continued to march, though encountering stiff resistance; between Qarrāṣa, ʿĀhira, and Najrān they lost some

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[104] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 39, 8 November 1895.

[105] See Gross, pp. 387, 442.

[106] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, telegram; Drummond-Hay to Ambassador, 8 November 1895.

[107] *Ibid.*, Guillois to Bertholot, No. 48, 3 December 1895; No. 49, 9 December 1895.

[108] Gross, p. 440.

[109] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 17, Guillois to Bertholot, No. 49, 3 December 1895.

forty-five soldiers killed and sixty-five wounded. The Druzes "fought with heroic bravery" at every point, but they had to cope not just with the Ottoman troops. Taking advantage of the situation, the Rwalā tribes began to plunder Druze flocks and the inhabitants of the plain followed behind the troops to plunder and burn the abandoned villages, while in Damascus the people cheered the progress of the expeditionary force.[110]

On 21 December the Ottoman troops entered as-Suwaydā, where Shiblī al-Aṭrash appeared with several other *sheikhs* before Adham Pasha, the Ottoman commander, and announced their unconditional surrender. The army commander then said: "I want to hear this from all the Druze chiefs."[111] The occupation of as-Suwaydā permitted Adham Pasha to inform the *wālī* that "peace was restored" and, further, that direct administration would be introduced into the Jabal. When, however, he gave the order for the Druze chiefs to come to as-Suwaydā, only a few of them obeyed. Thereupon troops were sent to several points to arrest the "rebels" and to disarm the Druzes. In spite of meeting resistance in certain villages, such as in ʿĀhira and Ṣalkhad, the army succeeded in arresting about three hundred Druzes in the Jabal. Arrests were also carried out at the same time in the Damascus area, Wādī al-ʿAjam, and in Iqlīm al-Billān. The total number of the Druze prisoners reached about one thousand, among them Shiblī al-Aṭrash himself and forty-three *sheikhs* accompanied by their families, who were to be exiled.[112]

Soon after the occupation of as-Suwaydā, Druze officials were replaced by Ottomans, who, under the protective umbrella of the Ottoman troops, began to execute a cadaster and census of the population and to effect forced conscription. A Circassian commander of the provincial gendarmerie, Khusrev Pasha, was appointed acting *qāʾimmaqām* of the Jabal.[113] Meanwhile, Kurdish, Circassian, and Bedouin irregulars were allowed to commit outrages among the

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[110] *Ibid.*, No. 51, 21 December 1895.

[111] *Ibid.*, No. 52, 28 December 1895.

[112] *Ibid.*, vol. 18, No. 1, 5 January 1896; No. 2, 12 January 1896; No. 6, 29 January 1896; No.7, 6 February 1896; No. 8, 12 February 1896; FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, No. 6, Damascus, 1 February 1896; No.8, 8 February 1896; No. 9, 24 February 1896; No. 16, 29 May 1896.

[113] *Ibid.*, No. 5, 27 January 1896; No. 9, 24 February 1896; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Bertholot, No. 7, 6 February 1896.

Druze villages of Mt. Ḥermon.[114] The war against the Druzes bore religious overtones—the Druzes in Damascus even sought refuge from the Muslims in the Christian quarter.[115] The general surrender of the Druzes at last was felt in the province of Damascus in January 1896. The British consul, Eyres, thought that this submission came after Shiblī al-Aṭrash's surrender, which he had declared without consulting other chiefs. Shiblī al-Aṭrash, the consul wrote, "was a traitor to his co-religionists and to the government. Had he declared openly for the government there would probably have been no fighting, and had he declared for resistance the troops would have found the Ḥawrān a far harder nut to crack."[116]

The actual leaders of the resistance, Muḥammad al-Aṭrash, Muḥammad Naṣr, Abū ʿAlī al-Qaḍamānī of Shaqqā, as well as many *sheikhs* from the south of the Jabal did not concur with Shiblī al-Aṭrash's submission and with some two thousand followers took refuge in the Ṣafā (east of the Jabal) and in the Lajā in order to prepare for the next stage.[117]

On 16 June an Ottoman force attempted to register the lands in the southern village of ʿUrmān and to arrest Druzes whom they accused of killing Bedouins in the area. Approaching the house of the Druze *sheikh* of the village, they were greeted by shooting which killed the Ottoman *mudīr* of Ṣalkhad. The four battalions that had entered ʿUrmān thereupon found themselves in a trap: Druzes from several villages had surrounded the village, and a merciless fight ended with about six hundred dead soldiers; only a few were able escape.[118] To the present day the Druzes in Ḥawrān and elsewhere still tell the story of this battle and still recite poems such as those by ʿAbdalla Kamāl and Shiblī al-Aṭrash that praised the "heroic" resistance of the Druze men and women in ʿUrmān and the two hundred Druzes killed in this battle.[119]

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[114] McDowell, p. 74.

[115] S. Saleh, "The British-Druze Connection and the Druze Rising of 1896 in the Ḥawrān," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13(1977), p. 256.

[116] FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, No. 11, Damascus, 19 March 1896; see also McDowell, p. 75; Saleh, p. 256.

[117] *Ibid.*; MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Berthelot, No. 8, 12 February 1896.

[118] *Ibid.*, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 21, 19 June 1896.

[119] See Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad Durūz*, pp. 64-66; Ṣghayar, pp. 463-465. According to the Druze historians, the cause of this battle was the defense of a Druze woman, Metha al-Aṭrash, whom one of the Ottoman officers had attempted to assault; see Bʿaynī, p. 220; Ṣghayar, pp. 462-63.

ʿUrmān stirred up the Druzes' resistance in other areas, and the Ottomans soon found themselves under siege in as-Suwaydā.[120] Some two thousand Druzes from Lebanon, Wādī at-Taym, Iqlīm al-Billān, and the Damascus area rushed to join their brethren in Ḥawrān.[121] Ottoman reinforcements were called from Izmir and from Tripoli in North Africa; a new *mushīr* was appointed, Ṭāhir Pasha, to deal with the insurrection in Ḥawrān. Twenty-nine battalions (about twenty-five thousand men) were dispatched to Ḥawrān to break the siege on the as-Suwaydā garrison.[122] The Druzes retreated, and sending their women and children to the Lajā and the Ṣafā into safety, "prepared for the only road they could take, the way of the partisans."[123]

After arriving at as-Suwaydā, Ṭāhir Pasha decided to make a sweep of the northern parts of the Jabal and the Lajā, taking nine infantry battalions from as-Suwaydā to Qanawāt, Shahbā, Umm Zaytūn, Qarrāṣa, and ʿĀhira. In every village, the army encountered fierce resistance, especially in Qanawāt, where the Druzes attempted to stop this advance. Both the Ottomans and the Druzes suffered heavy casualties. In Qanawāt alone, about thirty women were massacred.[124] On the fighting in Qanawāt the official bulletin in Damascus stated: "They [the Druzes] were beaten like mad dogs."[125]

The war in the Jabal compelled the Druzes to evacuate their villages, which immediately were plundered by the Bedouins.[126] This was a war for survival, as the British consul described: "They [the Druzes] have inflicted heavy losses on the troops and have themselves lost heavily also. The Turks acknowledge that the Druzes have fought with most desperate courage, both men and

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120 MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 22, 24 June 1896.

121 *Ibid.*, No. 24, 8 July 1896.

122 *Ibid.*, No. 26, 15 July 1896; FO 195/1940, Eyres to Herbert, No. 23, Damascus, 4 July 1896; No. 25, Damascus, 9 July 1896.

123 MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 26, 15 July 1896.

124 *Ibid.*, No.27, 20 July 1896; No. 32, 29 July 1896, enclosing two telegrams from the *mushīr* to the *wālī*; FO 195/1940, Eyres to Herbert, No. 27, Damascus, 28 July 1896; No. 30, 29 July 1896.

125 Cited in MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 32, 29 July 1896.

126 *Ibid.*, No. 27, July 20, 1896.

women."[127] The Druze resistance soon took its toll, inducing fatigue among the Ottoman army ranks, and sickness spread among the soldiers. The treasury in Damascus had also suffered and was unable to provide further funds for the expeditionary force. Prior to the military operation, Muṣṭafā Arslān, the Druze *qā'immaqām* of the Shūf in Mt. Lebanon, had attempted to mediate between the Druzes and the Ottomans through the British consuls of Beirut and Damascus. Following the recommendation of the acting *wālī*, Naṣūḥī Bek, the Sultan agreed to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the Druze crisis. The commission arrived in the Jabal on 29 July with the intention of reaching a compromise.[128]

The Ottoman commission came with a precondition, however: the Druze *sheikhs* should first present their submission before the *mushīr*. Only ten *sheikhs* with no special influence among the Druze masses responded to the order. Neither the *sheikhs* from the north nor those from the south accepted the condition.[129] The commissioners then decided not to press the issue as they wanted to concentrate their efforts on the terms of restoring peace to the area. And indeed, quickly—perhaps prematurely—they reported that peace had been restored. The Druzes in the Lajā had other ideas. Spurred on by the lack of sufficient food in the Lajā where many Druzes had taken refuge, they attacked a military baggage train. From the Ṣalkhad region, Druzes began to make other raids in the plain in order to recover their plundered flocks.[130]

Before leaving the Jabal, on 15 September, the commission instructed government officials persist in carrying out both the census and the land registration. In October a new *mushīr* was appointed and new measures were adopted to contain the Druzes. Again the army was sent to sweep the whole of the Jabal. This campaign, in addition to leaving many dead, rounded up for detention a great number of Druzes, including women and children. Some of the prisoners were exiled while others were conscripted; many others escaped to the Lajā and the Ṣafā. The Druze population, which had numbered some twenty-five thousand in 1896, after this action

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[127] FO 195/1940, Eyres to Herbert, No. 30, Damascus, 29 July 1896.

[128] Gross, pp. 452-453.

[129] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 35, 12 August 1896; FO 195/1940, Eyres to Herbert, No. 34, 12 August 1896.

[130] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 35, 12 August 1896; No. 36, 20 August 1896; Gross, p. 455.

counted only four thousand, most of them children, women, and old men who had remained in their villages.[131] The harsh measures taken by the Ottomans were meant to accomplish what was described by the French consul in July 1896 as follows:

> The Druzes ... are not sage enough to govern themselves: the first object of an Ottoman administration will be to lead them to quarrel among themselves. Nothing in their behavior, past and present, would justify the action of a rule in their favor. On the contrary, this small people should be under an iron hand until its combative temperament and its sanguinary morals are modified.[132]

Jabal ad-Durūz at the End of the Ottoman Period

Considering that the military blow inflicted on the Druzes in 1896 had succeeded in suppressing their communal autonomy, the Ottomans began to execute their plan for the full Ottomanization of the Jabal. In January 1897 a special Turkish commission was sent to the Jabal to study the functioning of the Ottoman administration in the area.[133] In March the Sultan issued an amnesty to those who had fled to the Lajā and the Ṣafā.[134] The newspaper *Sūriya* reported on 11 March 1897 that the Druzes "found themselves homeless and leading a wandering life" and the Imperial authorities allowed them "to return to their homes on condition of their submitting to the government, complying with all its orders."[135] This Imperial order reflected the policy of the years 1897-1900. The Ottomans demanded at least a manifestation of the Druzes' submission. In return for the release of prisoners who were allowed to go back to their homes, a number of conscripts were enrolled.[136] In 1898 the

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[131] *Ibid.*, No. 41, 14 September 1896; No. 45, 29 October 1896; No. 46, 13 November 1896; No. 48, 27 November 1896, No. 50, 28 December 1896; FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, No. 47, Damascus, 14 November 1896; No. 52, 28 December 1896.

[132] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, Damas, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 32, 29 July 1896.

[133] FO 195/1984, Richards to Currie, No. 5, Damascus, 27 January 1897; No.7, Damascus, 11 February 1897.

[134] *Ibid.*, No. 14, Damascus, 17 March 1897.

[135] *Ibid.*, No. 11, Damascus, 11 March 1897, enclosure (English translation of an article in the official paper, *Sūriya*, No. 1603, of 11 March 1897).

[136] *Ibid.*, No. 24, Damascus, 4 May 1897; No. 26, Damascus, 11 May 1897; No. 39, Damascus, 23 July 1897; No. 41, Damascus, 26 July 1897. Twenty-six prisoners from Majdal-Shams were released. Sheikh Ḥamad Qays of Hāsbayā and others came back from exile. The important *sheikhs*, however, remained in exile.

authorities attempted further to achieve the Jabal incorporation through two mediators, Murād al-Quwatlī, a Muslim from Damascus, and Salīm Nawfal, a Druze *sheikh* from Hāsbayā. The latter was appointed official mediator between the Druze community in the Damascus province and the authorities.[137]

But the brutality of 1896 had left a strong residue of mistrust among the Druzes of every step taken by the Ottomans. After 1896 the Ottomans continued their policy of controlling the Druze community not only by administrative means, but also by religious means when they attempted to instruct the Druzes in Islamic orthodox doctrine. Apart from the establishment of Ottoman schools around the year 1900, twenty-five mosques were to be constructed in the Jabal.[138] The Ottomanization of the administration of the Jabal was accompanied by the Islamization of the Druze *madhhab* according to the accepted religious ideas of the Ottomans. In October 1900 the *wālī*, Ḥusayn Nāzim Pasha, on a visit to the Jabal invested the young Sheikh Aḥmad al-Hajarī as *sheikh ʿaql aṭ-ṭāʾifa*,[139] an act which was interpreted as sanctioning the Druze *madhhab*,[140] but which, in fact, was no more than an attempt to draw the *ʿuqqāl* closer to Islamic orthodoxy and to Ottoman authority. The appointment was similar to Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash's as *qāʾimmaqām* in 1883, which may account for the "coincidence" of its occurrence with the proposal to construct twenty-five mosques.

Efforts at the Islamization of the *madhhab* had begun in 1896 by forceful means and were now continued by peaceful tactics. In 1913 the British consul reported a special unrest among the Druzes owing to the fact that Ottoman troops had occupied Druze *khalwa*s and were using them as mosques:

> In the disturbances of 1896 and 1897, when Turkish troops were dispatched on a large scale into the district, Sweida [as-Suwaydā] was occupied and troops were billeted in the Druze ʿKhalwaʾ or temple of that town, which was inhabited entirely by Druzes, though there may now today be two or three Moslem or Christian houses, established there during the last five or six years. The ʿKhalwaʾ was occupied several

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[137] FO 195/2024, Richards to Bunsen, No. 37, Damascus, 25 July 1898; No. 46, Damascus, 16 September 1898.

[138] Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʿAwād, *Al-Idāra al-ʿUthmānīyya fī Wilāyat Sūriyya 1864-1914* (Cairo, 1969), p. 293.

[139] FO 195/2075, Richards to O'Connor, No. 81, Damascus, 4 October 1900.

[140] McDowell, p. 83.

months and when they were withdrawn, orders were given that it should be used as a mosque.[141]

The attempts by the Porte to incorporate the Jabal into the administration of the Syrian province had conflicted with the *mashyakha* system, and led to military interventions in 1879, 1881 and 1884. Since 1896, however, Ottoman confrontation was increasingly with the Druze particularist religious doctrine. The Druzes as a result became more conscious of their existence as a separate religious community. This awareness was reflected in letters addressed to the consul as well as in poems. In desperation over the bitterness of the Ottoman expedition and occupation, fourteen Druze *sheikhs* signed a demand calling for the intervention of France to rescue the Druzes from the Muslims: "We come to ascertain the hate and the hostility which is hidden by the Muslim people and was inspired against us ... Thus we choose France rather than this people."[142] In exile, Shiblī al-Aṭrash wrote in a poem how "it was decided to exterminate our race."[143]

Jabal Ḥawrān, which had served as a refuge and haven for the Druze community until 1896, because of these developments began to lose its attraction to those who were leaving Mt. Lebanon or other places. In 1902, for example, about fifty to sixty Druzes from the Shūf who arrived in Damascus on their way to settle in Ḥawrān, stopped at Jaramānā, a Druze village in the Ghūta. While twenty-five of them eventually returned to Lebanon, all the others remained in the village.[144]

The turn of the century saw two important Ottoman measures taken in the Jabal: administrative reorganization, and amnesty for the Druzes exiled in 1896. In March 1900, Nāzim Pasha divided the Jabal *qaḍā*ʾ into three: as-Suwaydā, Ṣalkhad, and ʿĀhira. This

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[141] FO 195/2453, File No. 2013, Devey to Lowther, No. 27, Damascus, n.d., 1913.

[142] MAE, *CPC, Turquie-Damas*, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, No. 29, 23 July 1896, enclosure (letters to the consul signed by Ismāʿīl, Sulaymān, Shāhīn, and Ḥusayn Hnaydī; Saʿīd and Aḥmad al-Quntār; ʿAlī Naṣr; Aḥmad and Ḥamad al-Quntār; Ḥamad Darwīsh; Muḥammad al-Maghāwīsh; Ḥamad al-Khāter; Ḥusayn Muḥammad Hnaydī; Ḥusayn Yūsuf).

[143] Aṭrash, *Dīwān*, p. 89.

[144] FO 195/2122, Richard to O'Connor, No. 100, Damascus, November 27, 1902. This intention to migrate was motivated by the protest against the appointment of Nasīb Junblāṭ as *qāʾimmaqām* instead of Shakīb Arslān.

tripartite creation was motivated by the extension of Ottoman control. Led by Sheikh Abū Ṭalāl ʿAmer, the Druzes opposed this step which meant the stationing of further troops in their villages.[145] Although soldiers were dispatched to overcome the Druzes who refused to accept the proposal, the Amīr ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾrī was sent to mediate. The bargaining produced a compromise: the Druzes would accept the innovation in return for an amnesty that would be granted to those Druzes exiled in 1896; furthermore, there would be a guarantee to exempt the Druzes from military service for twenty years at least.[146] On 20 April the Sultan issued the *ʾāmān* (amnesty).[147] The Druzes' rejection of the reorganization was formally removed, but on condition. The *sheikhs* had held three general meetings in which they decided to condition the establishment of the new administration on the arrival of the last exiled Druze.[148] Shiblī al-Aṭrash, Shihāb ʿAzzām, Ḥusayn Jarbūʿ, and Muḥammad Naṣṣār were ordered to pass through Istanbul on their way back. By July, all those exiled in 1896 had returned.[149]

Using force on the one hand, and reconciliation on the other, the Ottomans succeeded between 1900 and 1905 in attaining a relative pacification of the turbulent Mountain of Ḥawrān. Four Druze figures helped them achieve this situation: Shiblī al-Aṭrash, who died in January 1905, Salīm Nawfal, Amīn Arslān, and Shakīb Arslān. The last represented the Islamization of the Druze *madhhab* which the Ottomans were hoping to introduce among the Druzes. Nawfal was an official representative of the Druze community in the province, and Amīn Arslān was *qāʾimmaqām* in several parts of the province. Shiblī al-Aṭrash's mistrust of the Ottomans, especially after his experience of 1896, led him, in order to prevent the intervention of Ottoman military expeditions, to restrain Druze retalia-

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[145] FO 195/2075, Richards to O'Connor, No. 21, Damascus, 29 March 1900.
[146] *Ibid.*, No. 24, Damascus, 12 April 1900.
[147] *Ibid.*, No. 26, Damascus, 21 April 1900.
[148] *Ibid.*, No. 27, Damascus, 26 April 1900; No. 30, Damascus, 2 May 1900.
[149] *Ibid.*, No. 34, Damascus, 17 May 1900; No. 36, Damascus, 26 May 1900; No. 44, Damascus, 5 June 1900; No. 49, Damascus, 23 June 1900; No. 65, Damascus, 31 July 1900. The exiled *sheikhs* were, among others, Shiblī al-Aṭrash, Shihāb ʿAzzām, Ḥusayn Jarbūʿ Muḥammad Naṣṣar, Salīm bn Manṣūr al- Aṭrash, Jadʿān ʿAmer, Ḥamad al-Aṭrash, Shāhīn Abū ʿAssāf, Khaṭṭar Ḥinnāwī, Ibrāhīm al-Qaḍamānī, Qāsim al-Ḥalabī. Sheikh Quftān ʿAzzām and Sheikh al-ʿAql Ḥasan al-Hajarī fled from exile in 1897 and reached Ḥawrān, where the latter died shortly afterwards.

tion for each and every Bedouin raid or for any kind of humiliation from the side of the Damascene populace.[150]

In 1904-1905 the Aṭrash *sheikhs* displayed a great deal of prudence when leading an opposition movement or even attacks against the Bedouins of ash-Shamāl (al-Mᶜajjil), who had intensified their raids against the Druze caravans.[151] Although this situation minimized the presence of Ottoman troops in the Jabal and, consequently, revived certain autonomous features of the *mashyakha* system,[152] the fact was that both the Druze *sheikhs* and the Ottoman authorities preferred to maintain a *modus vivendi* based on mutual recognition of both the Ottoman administration and the *mashyakha* system. Some Druze leaders became very concerned that a possible Ottoman invasion would destroy what had been built up over the last few decades. Some of them harbored ambitions to take advantage of the possibility that would result from integration into the economic and political life of the province. This situation was incidentally but no less astutely observed by Gertrude Bell, who visited the Jabal in 1900 and again in 1905:

> There are signs that the turbulent people of the Mountain have turned their minds to other matters than war with the Osmanli [Ottomans], and among the chief of these are the steam mills that ground the corn of Salkhad and a few villages besides. A man who owns a steam mill ... does not wish to see it wrecked by an invading Turkish army.[153]

Later on, she remarked how "Muhammad [Naṣṣār, a Druze *sheikh*] had been so completely convinced that there was a world beyond the limits of the Mountain that he had attempted to push two of his six sons out into it."[154]

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[150] Several incidents were resolved without Ottoman expeditionary intervention: the destruction of the Ottoman school in Ṣalkhad (FO 195/2122, Richards to O'Connor, No. 2, Damascus, 8 January 1902); some attacks against Ottoman troops (*ibid.*, No. 39, Damascus, 6 May 1903; No. 41, Damascus, 12 May 1903); encounters with the Bedouins of ash-Shamāl (al-Mᶜajjil) and Druze reprisal attacks in which a great number of Bedouins were killed (*ibid.*, No. 25, Damascus, 28 May 1904). Thirty-two Martini-Henry rifles were stolen by the Druzes (*ibid.*, No.37, Damascus, 9 July 1904). The Bedouins of ash-Shamāl (al-Mᶜajjil) attacked a Druze caravan killing fourteen Druzes (*ibid.*, No. 39, Damascus, 26 July 1904).

[151] *Ibid.*

[152] FO 195/2245, Devey to O'Connor, No. 11, Damascus, 15 March 1907. Even the tribunals that had been established in 1897 were abolished.

[153] Bell, p. 87.

[154] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

This "turbulent people," however, lived in an environment in which tranquility could not prevail for any length of time. When in August 1904, with Shiblī al-Aṭrash still the paramount chief urging restraint among the Druzes, beacon fires were lit all over the mountain in a call for war against the Bedouins of as-Shamāl (al-Mᶜajjil), who had persistently been attacking the Druzes, Shiblī al-Aṭrash had been able to suspend the Druze reprisal.[155] After his death, however, the Druzes began to retaliate with severe attacks of their own to every Bedouin raid, thus compelling the authorities to send in forces to resolve matters. In 1906 the Porte, preoccupied with completing the new Ḥijāz railway and protecting this project, contented itself with allowing the locals to solve their own conflicts.[156] In such circumstances the Druzes attacked the Bedouins of al-Mᶜajjil in reprisal for previous raids. The attack was similar to those that had taken place before 1890 in which the Bedouins suffered a great number of casualties.[157] The severity of the Druze reprisal was partly motivated by the "Muslim excitement against the Druzes."[158]

In 1905-1906 the *mashyakha* system with its autonomous features seemed as though it could after all withstand all Ottoman attempts to curb the "free spirit" that the travelers described. In 1905 Bell observed that the Druze *sheikhs* "have returned to exercise a semi-independence almost as they did before."[159]

In 1908, when the Young Turk revolution renewed Ottoman attempts to incorporate the Jabal by ordering a census of the population and the holding of elections to the parliament in Istanbul, the Druzes' "semi-independence" again asserted itself: they refused.[160] When the Druzes continued to take the law into their own hands after every Bedouin raid, as in the period before 1908,

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[155] FO 195/2165, Richards to O'Connor, No. 43, Damascus, 10 August 1904; No. 45, Damascus, 8 September 1904.

[156] Gross, p. 511.

[157] FO 195/2217, Devey to Barclay, No. 26, Damascus, 12 October 1906, No. 31, Damascus, 12 November 1906; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 70; Bᶜaynī, pp. 231-234; McDowell, pp. 126-127.

[158] FO 195/2245, Devey to O'Connor, No. 4, Damascus, 7 February 1907; Bᶜaynī, p. 232.

[159] Bell, p. 104.

[160] FO 195/2277, Devey to Lowther, No. 35, Damascus, 22 August 1908; No. 51, Damascus, 1 October 1908; No. 68, Damascus, 10 December 1908; see also McDowell, p. 90.

this provided sufficient reason for enforcing conscription, disarmament, and direct rule among the Druzes. The Turks were determined to put the Jabal under their direct control,[161] and preparations began for an invasion of the Jabal. First, the government employed a tactics, again, that had been used in the previous period: the local population was stirred up against the Druzes. Bedouins began following the invading troops in the hope of plundering destroyed Druze villages.[162] Certain papers in Damascus and Cairo joined the official Ottoman propaganda line against the Druzes. Perhaps the most famous article written to incite the Damascene population was one by Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī (who much later during the French Mandate period served as education director, and president of the Arab Academy) that appeared in *al-Muqtabas*. Kurd ʿAlī, who described the Druzes as an aggressive people, summarized their history. The article accused the Druzes of forcing the indigenous Jabal population to withdraw after they came and of being responsible for civil war in Lebanon and Damascus. "They maintained their habits of killing and plundering [until the expedition of 1896]. At that time," the author concluded, "if the government had not granted them amnesty, they would not have returned to their ancient habits in the summer of this year [1910]."[163]

Thirty battalions led by Sāmī Pasha al-Fārūqī were dispatched to the Jabal. Beacons were soon lit on the hilltops from the Jabal to Mt. Ḥermon mobilizing the entire Druze community.[164] The Druze leaders realized, nevertheless, that they could never successfully oppose an army of such magnitude. Apart from some resistance in al-Kafr in the south and in Qanawāt, they submitted to the government without a fight. The Jabal seemed to be at last under direct control of the Turks, who began to carry out the reorganization that the Ottomans perpetually had failed to implement since 1862. Al-Fārūqī took a census which showed that the Druze population amounted to forty-four thousand. Druzes were disarmed, and some ten thousand weapons were confiscated. Conscripts were enrolled. Druze *sheikhs* Yaḥyā and Mazyad ʿAmer, Dhuqān al-Aṭrash (father

[161] FO 195/2342, Devey to Lowther, No. 33, Damascus, 2 August 1910; McDowell, pp. 94-95; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 76-77.

[162] FO 195/2343, Devey to Lowther, No. 43, Damascus, 9 September 1910.

[163] *Al-Muqtabas*, vol. 5, No. 1 (1910), p. 247; see the article in Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 77-81.

[164] FO 195/2343, Devey to Lowther, No. 44, Damascus, 12 September 1910.

of the famous Sulṭān al-Aṭrash who was to lead the Druze revolt against the French in 1925), Ḥamad al-Maghūsh, Hazaāᶜ al-Ḥalabī, and Muḥammad al-Qalᶜānī were all taken away and publicly hanged in Damascus in March 1911. Yaḥyā al-Aṭrash, Shibli's successor, was exiled to Rhodes.[165]

When the troops finally pulled out again, however, the Jabal returned to its semi-autonomous state, and it was clear that only a permanent and sufficiently strong military presence could control the last "lawless" area in the Syrian province. Now, however, a decade into the twentieth century, Jabal ad-Durūz, which had risen to become the center of the Druze community in the nineteenth century, would see radical changes introduced by new economic factors and means of communication, more sophisticated weaponry and a better developed infrastructure built in and near the Jabal. It is these radical changes which characterize the development of the Druze community in the first half of the 20th century.

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[165] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 81-84; McDowell, pp. 98-107; Bᶜaynī, pp. 241-245; Bouron, pp. 216-218.

PART FOUR
BETWEEN COMMUNAL PARTICULARISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM

CHAPTER ONE

A PARTICULARIST MINORITY FACING THE FRENCH MANDATE

The Druzes and the Arab Revolt, 1916-1919

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and the changes that followed in its wake opened a new era in the history of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. As the Allied forces, Great Britain and France emerged during the war as the powers most likely to determine the political future of the region. Arab nationalists in Syria, the Maronites in Lebanon, and the Zionists in Palestine were among those seizing the opportunity to try and realize their political ambitions through various agreements and different forms of collaboration. Consequently, the Druze community, in particular that of Jabal ad-Durūz, found itself facing a changed political power constellation. Among the important ties forged during the war years were those between the British and Sharīf Ḥusayn al-Hāshīmī, who, under Turkish suzerainty, was the ruler of the Muslim holy cities in the Ḥijāz. Secret negotiations, contained in the Ḥusayn-McMahon correspondence in which the British promised the Hāshīmī in return for their assistance in the war effort against the Turks rulership over the Arab areas previously controlled by the Ottomans, induced Sharīf Ḥusayn and his sons, Fayṣal and ʿAbdalla, to throw in their lot with the Allies and to instigate the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, which erupted in June 1916. Although most of the events in the Arab uprising occurred beyond the borders of Syria, Syrian Arab nationalists played a large role in the way it progressed. The subversive political activities of the Arab nationalists, the threat of the British forces in Egypt to Turkish positions in Syria and the outbreak of the Arab revolt led Jamāl Pasha, the governor of Syria and the commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces there, to adopt special security measures. In 1915-1916, he ordered a number of Arab nationalists to be hanged in Damascus and Beirut. He also prohibited the transport of grain from Ḥawrān into Lebanon lest it fall into the

hands of the Allies, which led to food shortages for the population in Lebanon.[1]

The Druzes of Jabal Ḥawrān were soon drawn into the conflict between the Turks and their enemies. Motivated by the need for Jabal ad-Durūz grain during the war, the Ottomans exempted the Druzes from conscription and taxes. This seemingly liberal policy caused an influx of Lebanese refugees who had been suffering from the food shortages, of Syrians and Palestinians fleeing conscription, and of Arab nationalists escaping the vigorous measures imposed by Jamāl Pasha and by the end of 1916 had added some ten thousand residents to Jabal ad-Durūz. A great quantity of the Jabal's grain, which the Ottomans had hoped to secure for their forces now went to feed these refugees. Meanwhile, Jamāl Pasha's policy in the Jabal to stem the flow of grain failed in that after all some of it reached ʿAqaba, which was under the control of the British and their Arab allies. In addition to its grain, the Jabal was also important because of its strategic position. Situated south-east of Damascus on the border of the desert, the Jabal was coveted both by the Ottomans, who were defending Damascus, the capital of the Syrian province, and by the Allies, who were poised to capture Damascus in order to expel the Turks from the entire province. This dual importance of the Jabal in the war led both the Turks and the Allies to compete for Druze support, which often took the form of a liberal distribution of sums of money among the Druze *sheikhs*.[2]

Druze connections with the Sharīfians dated back to secret meetings Fayṣal had with nationalists in Damascus in 1915 and the beginning of 1916, prior to the outbreak of the Arab revolt. Two landowners and notables from Damascus, Nasīb and Fawzī al-Bakrī, had put the leaders of the revolt in contact with the Druze *sheikhs* Sulṭān and Ḥusayn al- Aṭrash.[3] At this stage, however, the Druze *sheikhs*' support of the Arab nationalists stemmed mainly from their personal friendship with the Damascus notables and not from their identification with the nationalists' cause.

Like many of the rural and nomadic chiefs in Syria, the Druze

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[1] More details on the region during this period may be found in Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London, 1958), pp. 46-61.

[2] See Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 83; McDowell, pp. 181-185.

[3] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 85.

leaders did not share the Arab nationalists' aspirations which the notables of Damascus, Ḥoms, and Ḥamā carried with them to Jabal ad-Durūz. As in other places in Syria, tribal and communal identities remained predominant, and efforts at mobilizing such groups for the Arab "cause" were either based on personal contacts or accompanied by gifts of money. Meanwhile, some of the chiefs, Salīm al-Aṭrash paramount among them, continued their loyalty to the Turkish authorities in Damascus right up to the end of the war. The Druze community in the Jabal as a whole until 1918, rather than undertaking a clear position vis-à-vis either of the protagonists, kept up a policy of "wait-and-see." The chiefs would give verbal support, at times to the Arab revolt and at other times to the Turks, but played no active role in the events.[4]

The Druze policy of apparent non-involvement naturally intensified the competition between the protagonists to win over the Druze community. This "rivalry," however, in turn deepened the split among the Druze *sheikhs*, with the result that of two factions the one led by Salīm al-Aṭrash supported the Turks while the second, headed by Sulṭān and Ḥusayn al-Aṭrash, favored the Arab nationalists. Although in this case clearly fostered by the protagonists, the factionalism among the Druzes in the Jabal dated back to the death of Ismāʿīl al-Aṭrash in 1869, when the Aṭrash family had split up, each side claiming legitimacy for the leadership of the community.[5] While now the Turks and Arab nationalists tried to exploit this Druze factionalism for their own respective interests, the Druze *sheikhs* saw an opportunity to use the two competitors for their own internal purposes in Jabal ad-Durūz.

Until the arrival of the insurgent Arab army in Syria in the summer of 1918, the majority of the population in Syria did not join in any actions against the Turks. Nor did Druze supporters of the Arab revolt take an active part until the Arab army approached the Jabal in mid-summer. It was then that Nasīb al-Bakrī was dispatched to the Jabal by the Sharīfians to deliver a message from Amīr Fayṣal calling upon Druze supporters of the nationalists to participate in

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[4] See Amīn Saʿīd, *ath-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya al-Kubrā*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1943), vol. 1, p. 235.

[5] Sulṭān and Ḥusayn al-Aṭrash doubted the ability of their cousin, Salīm, who succeeded Yaḥyā in 1914; see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 84; Bouron, p. 210.

the "expelling of the enemies" from Arab lands.[6] Heeding the calls, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash assembled those who formerly had given their verbal support to the Arab cause[7] and appealed to them to now join the Arab revolt actively. Meanwhile, he wrote to French and British officials in Jerusalem to inform them of the readiness of the Druze community to join the war efforts of the Allies.[8] Sulṭān next turned to face the Druze opposition faction led by Salīm al-Aṭrash, which still acknowledged Turkish authority.

The correspondence between Sulṭān and Salīm shows that the rivalry between them was indeed primarily an internal dispute which bore no nationalist overtones or dimension. Each of the two chiefs defended the position he had taken by referring to the interests of the Druze community rather than to the Turkish, Syrian, or Arab interests. Whereas Salīm stressed the importance of the Druzes' loyalty to the Ottoman authorities, Sulṭān argued that the Druzes instead should fight the Turks "who killed our fathers," and should aid the British, "our ancient friends and the protectors of the Druze community." Each also accused the other of accepting money from his ally.[9] Sulṭān al-Aṭrash's letters clearly reflect the dedication of those Druze *sheikhs* who had chosen the side of the Arab revolt to the preservation of the autonomous status of Jabal ad-Durūz. That is, in order to mobilize the Druzes actively the nationalists had first to conclude an agreement with the *sheikhs* which guaranteed the principle of Druze autonomy and the maintenance of the *mashyakha* system. This agreement stipulated the following:

> Jabal ad-Durūz will be politically and administratively independent, maintaining all its traditional customs based on the *ashīra* (law).
>
> Friendly relations among the three allies, the Ḥījāz, Syria, and Jabal ad-Durūz is founded on three principles: (a) mutual aid between the Druzes and the Arabs according to circumstances; (b) no actual or

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[6] For the text of the proclamation, see Saʿīd, vol. 1, p. 235; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 87.

[7] The *sheikhs* who supported the Arab revolt were Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, *sheikh* of al-Qrayā village; Nasīb al-Aṭrash, *sheikh* of Ṣalkhad; ʿAbd al-Karīm and Fāris al-Aṭrash, *sheikhs* of as-Suwaydā; Ḥusayn al-Aṭrash, *sheikh* of ʿAnz; Ḥamad and Hazīma ʿAmer, *sheikhs* of Shahbā; Faḍlalla Hnaydī, *sheikh* of Majdal; Salīm Farḥān al-Maghūsh, *sheikh* of Khalkhala; and Ḥamad al-Barbūr, *sheikh* of Umm Arrummān; see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 84-87; McDowell, pp. 186-188.

[8] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 90; see also *Mudhakkarat Sulṭān*, collected by N. al-Qāsim, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 44-48.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 90-92, for the texts of the letters.

> military authority will be imposed on Jabal ad-Durūz by the government of Ḥījāz and Syria; (c) the Druzes recognize Amīr Fayṣal as prince of Syria but not as prince of the Jabal, except in an honorary and ceremonial sense.[10]

The agreement attests to the fact that the Druze supporters of the Arab revolt were indeed motivated primarily by communal and clan considerations. The Druze signatories hoped to be able to restore the autonomy that they had been losing during the previous two decades through successive Ottoman attempts to incorporate the Jabal within the Damascus province. Supporting the Arab revolt was for the Druze not an expression of nationalist aspirations but, on the contrary, of traditional particularism.

After the signing of the agreement the Druzes shifted from passive to active support of the Arab cause. Three hundred Druze horsemen led by Sulṭān al-Aṭrash set out and attacked the Turkish garrison in Buṣrā Eskī ash-Shām. On the way Sulṭān's men raised not only the Sharīfian banner but also his own village standard.[11] In doing so Sulṭān al-Aṭrash was manifesting, whether consciously or not, his independence vis-à-vis Amīr Fayṣal. It meant that the Druze leader was still firmly attached to the Druze *mashyakha* system, in which every village *sheikh* had his own standard, and symbolized that Sulṭān's men had not in any way assimilated into Fayṣal's army. Lieutenant Alec Kirkbride, one of the British officers who accompanied the Arab army when Sulṭān's men joined the main force at Sheikh Maskīn observed: "It was equally evident that they [the Druzes] did not regard themselves as being under the orders of anyone but themselves."[12]

Sulṭān's group then took part in the capture of Damascus on 1 October 1918.[13] Their participation in the Arab revolt, however,

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95. The agreement was signed by Sharīf Nāsir (Fayṣal's representative), Nasīb al-Bakrī, and Zakī ad-Drūbī (Arab nationalists), Ḥusayn and Salmān al-Aṭrash (representatives of the Druze *sheikhs*). Sultan, however, denies there ever existed such an agreement; see *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 42-43.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[12] A.S. Kirkbride, *An Awakening: The Arab Campaign 1917-1918* (Tavistock, 1971), p. 87.

[13] According to Sulṭān, he himself raised the first Sharifian banner over the sarāy of Damascus; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, p. 53; see also Salāma ʿUbayd, *ath-Thawra as-Sūriyya al-Kubrā 1925-1927* (Beirut, 1971), p. 84; Bʿaynī, p. 295. Most likely Sulṭān here also raised his own village standard; see McDowell, p. 191.

ended already only a few days later as the result of a quarrel between Sulṭān and ʿAuda Abū Tayih, chief of the Ḥwayṭāt tribe of Transjordan, who accused the Druzes of looting shops in Damascus.[14] Although the Druzes thereupon decided to return to the Jabal, Sulṭān maintained close relations with the Sharīfians and succeeded in mediating between Amīr Fayṣal and Salīm al-Aṭrash, who had remained loyal to the Ottomans up to the time of the taking of Damascus.[15] Sulṭān, in fact, was willing to acknowledge Salīm's primacy as *sheikh al-mashāykh* and to content himself with leadership of the military,[16] which his participation in the Arab revolt had done much to establish. Meanwhile, his support of the revolt further determined his political position as well as attitude toward the important events that were to occur in Syria in the years 1918-1925.

Despite the Anglo-French agreement between Mark Sykes and Georges Picot of 16 May 1916, by which the two Allies divided the Fertile Crescent into a number of zones that after their victory in the war were to come under their respective control; despite the Balfour Declaration, published in November 1917, in which the British saw "with favour" the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people; and despite or perhaps because of the ambiguity of promises given by Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, to Sharīf Ḥusayn concerning the political future of the Arab provinces that had been subject to Turkish rule,[17] Amīr Fayṣal decided to take steps on his own and on 5 October 1918 established an independent Arab government in Damascus. While he hoped to rally all residents of Syria and Lebanon around his new government,[18] Fayṣal collided with three main obstacles: first, Anglo-French policy, which soon thereafter would sacrifice his government to their own interests; second, local political forces, particularly the Maronite leaders who rejected the authority of the Damascus government and demanded a separate state in Lebanon,

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[14] *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 55-56; ʿUbayd, p. 84; Kirkbride, p. 94; McDowell, pp. 191-192.

[15] ʿUbayd, p. 84.

[16] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 113.

[17] For further details, see A. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1946), pp. 41-48.

[18] On the establishment of the Damascus government, see Z.N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence* (Beirut, 1960), pp. 25-43; Kh. Qāsimiyya, *Al-Ḥukūma al-ʿArabīyya fī Dimashq bayn 1918-1920* (Cairo, 1971), pp. 46-63.

and third, the Arab nationalists, who were opposed to making any concessions to the Great Powers. In addition, at the Versaillse Peace Conference soon thereafter Amīr Fayṣal failed to secure what he had hoped to achieve, i.e., international recognition for a unified Arab state. The status of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine remained uncertain.[19]

The ambiguity and incertitude surrounding the political future of Syria had their impact on the Druze leaders of the Jabal, as ʿAbdalla Najjār, a contemporary Druze writer, explained: "The war ended and the political situation in Syria was uncertain .... No wonder one found different positions in the Jabal."[20] Some Druze chiefs continued to support the Arab government while others attached themselves to the French who began to rally support in Syria and Lebanon in preparation for their attack on Damascus and their ejecting of the Arab government. In the short time it lasted the Arab government once more reaffirmed the agreement that had been concluded with the Druzes in September 1918. In a speech given in May 1919, Fayṣal stressed his government's intention to recognize the administrative division of the country according to geographical location as well as habits: "so that the southern parts of Syria will not be governed like the northern parts, and the Ḥawrān and Jabal ad-Durūz will have special laws, which will be in conformity with the wishes of the people."[21] He had already confirmed Salīm al-Aṭrash as leader by appointing him *mutaṣarrif* of Jabal ad-Durūz with the title of *amīr*. Nasīb al-Aṭrash, *sheikh* of Ṣalkhad, was appointed a member of the new *majlis ash-shūrā* (advisory council) which Fayṣal had established in Damascus.[22] Because they still conceived of administrative organization in its Ottoman form, the Druze chiefs in 1919 did not mind to fall under the rule of an independent Syrian state or become part of Arab unity as long as their own administrative autonomy remained preserved. In 1919, the main issue for the Syrians was safeguarding their independence in the face of mounting French attempts to establish their control over Syria. On this issue Nasīb al-Aṭrash, as the Druze representative in *majlis ash-shūrā*,

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[19] Cf. Zeine, pp. 45-149.
[20] Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, p. 108.
[21] E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1st Series, vol. 4 (London, 1952), p. 271.
[22] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 101. On the establishment of the new administration, see Qāsimiyya pp. 51-56; Longrigg, pp. 83-103.

declared: "All the tribes in Syria, whether Arab or Druze, sacrifice their lives ... in the service of the Arab nation, and the one who does not do this has no honor and is a traitor to the Arabs."[23] A Druze delegation meeting in Damascus with Dr. H.C. King and Charles Crane, two Americans who had been sent in the summer of 1919 to the Levant by the Versailles Peace Conference in order to ascertain the opinion of local inhabitants concerning their political aspiration, expressed the Druzes' support for an independent state of Syria.[24] The Druze delegation, however, represented but a portion of the Druze chiefs, viz., mainly the families of Aṭrash, Naṣṣār, and ᶜAzzām.[25]

As soon as the British had given in to France's territorial claims, the French went ahead and resolutely executed their long-standing decision to put Syria and Lebanon firmly under their Mandate.[26] France's firm stand and the hesitance of the British convinced some Druze chiefs to collaborate with the former even before French troops had arrived in Damascus.[27] French agents succeeded in forming among the Druze *sheikhs* a faction that would support a French Mandate in Syria. On 19 April 1919 this Druze faction held its first, secret, meeting in the village of ᶜUrmān in the southern Jabal. A secret association was formed by twelve members, three of which were from the Bedouin tribe of Banū Ḥasan. Although the Druze members initially belonged only to small families, subsequent meetings of the association took place with the connivance of Faḍlalla Najm al-Aṭrash, brother of ᶜUrmān's *sheikh*, Muḥammad. The association's aim was to call for French aid through petitions signed by local inhabitants of the Jabal. Two petitions were sent in due course to Colonel Couses, the French liaison officer in Damascus. Disappointed that neither petition was signed by a Druze chief, Colonel Couses asked for the signatures of some influential leaders. Thus, a third petition was drafted to which was added the signature of Muṣṭafā Najm al-Aṭrash, chief of one of the branches of the Aṭrash family.[28] The French apparently succeeded in forming a "Francophile" faction by exploiting the rivalry between the two

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23 Woodward and Butler, 1st Series, vol. 4, p. 267.
24 For more on the Commission, see Longrigg, pp. 89-93.
25 Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 104.
26 Longrigg, pp. 98-99.
27 Najjār, *Banū Mᶜarūf*, p. 109.
28 Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 104.

branches of the Aṭrash family, the pro-France group corresponding to the Najm branch of the family.[29]

The large measure of French activity in Jabal ad-Durūz was motivated, first, by fear of a renewal of the Anglo-Druze connection that had existed throughout the 19th century (and, consequently, inclusion of the Jabal in the British zone) and, second, by the strategic location of the Jabal, which could be exploited by the Sharīfians in case of a French attack against Damascus.[30] The French, therefore, needed a large Francophile party in the Jabal, one that would include the ruling chiefs (the Aṭrashs) as well as France's traditional friends, the ʿAmers. Connection was easily renewed with the latter.[31] Meanwhile an attempt was made to recruit Salīm al-Aṭrash through the mediation of Amīn Ḥamada, brother of the Lebanese *sheikh al-ʿaql*, Ḥusayn Ḥamada. As a result, a significant pro-France party emerged among the Druze formed by Mitʿib al-Aṭrash, *sheikh* of Rarsās, who on a secret visit to Beirut met with George Picot, the French high commissioner. Two other Aṭrash chiefs, Nasīb and ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, and a Greek Orthodox leader, ʿUqla al-Qitāmī, subsequently joined this party.[32]

In September, the French Ministry of War proceeded to reinforce France's military presence in Syria. General Gouraud was selected as the commander of the French forces and the supreme representative of France in the Levant. On 22 November 1919 the general landed at Beirut where he was met by many local delegations, one of which was from Jabal ad-Durūz, led by Yūsuf al-Aṭrash, brother of the above mentioned Mitʿib. In order to enlarge his support among the Druze Gouraud sent out personal letters to the Druze chiefs of the leading families: Aṭrash, ʿAmer, Hnaydī, ʿIzz ad-Dīn (Ḥalabī), and Naṣṣār.[33] In these letters the French commander promised to recognize the independence of the Jabal. Although the Peace Conference, he wrote to Nasīb Naṣṣār,

> did not ... precisely determine the future of the territories that were under the ... Turks, we have the firm intention to recognize the privileges

[29] The Aṭrash family was composed of two branches: that of Ismāʿīl, from which came the paramount chiefs, and that of Najm, which competed with the former since the days of Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash.

[30] See McDowell, pp. 203-208.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

[32] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 105-106.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

and the autonomy which Jabal ad-Durūz had enjoyed in the time of the Turks, while keeping its economic integrity with the rest of Syria.[34]

By March 1920 it was clear that the ambitions of the Damascus government of Fayṣal would be difficult to reconcile with the political designs of the French. New forces multiplied French presence in the coastal cities of Syria and Lebanon while Amīr Fayṣal was urged by his followers to adopt a more vigorous and assertive policy. A meeting of the National Congress in Damascus proclaimed Fayṣal King of Syria (including Palestine and Lebanon). The resolution of the Syrian National Congress and the enthronement of Fayṣal as king alike were rejected by both the French and the British. At the last session of the Peace Conference held in San Remo in April 1920, the Supreme Allied Council offered the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon to the French Republic and that for Iraq and Palestine, including Transjordan, to Britain. News of the conferring of the two Mandates was published on 5 May.[35]

The Druze minority in the Jabal now confronted circumstances not unlike those of 1918, before the capture of Damascus by the Allies, when also it had been wooed by both sides to the conflict. On 20 May Salīm al-Aṭrash wrote to General Gouraud asking for written assurance that France would indeed maintain the autonomy of Jabal ad-Durūz.[36] Conscious of the strategic importance of the Jabal and anxious lest the Druzes would slip into the French camp, Fayṣal in one last effort dispatched his uncle, Sharīf Nāṣir, to the Jabal, but Nāṣir failed to recruit the Druze community for the defense of the Syrian kingdom.[37]

Apart from those Druze chiefs who sided with the French, most Druzes stood aloof from the dispute between the Damascus government and the French. From the capture of Damascus by the Sharīfians in 1918 until July 1920 Sulṭān al-Aṭrash had virtually disappeared from the political scene. After 14 July, the date when King Fayṣal received Gouraud's ultimatum to accept the French Mandate, the Sulṭān's headquarters, al-Qrayā, became the center of several Druze meetings whose purpose was to try—in vain, it turned out—to adopt a common position regarding the approaching

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[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109; Gauraud to Nasīb Naṣṣār, 26 January 1920.
[35] Longrigg, pp. 97-99.
[36] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 109.
[37] ʿUbayd, p. 86.

hostilities between the French and the Sharīfians.[38] According to Salāma ʿUbayd, when French troops advanced to Khan-Maysalūm where the Damascus road crosses the Anti-Lebanon, a Druze meeting was convened in as-Suwaydā in order to organize a force to defend Damascus against the French. By the time, however, the Druze contingent was formed and had arrived in Burṣā al-Ḥarīr, the French had already entered Damascus and Fayṣal had fled to Darʿā in Ḥawrān. Ḥamad al-Barbūr, one of Sulṭān's followers, suggested transferring the Damascus government to as-Suwaydā and resisting the French.[39] French threats to bomb Darʿā forced Fayṣal to flee once more, first to Haifa and thence to Italy.[40]

French Recognition of the Druze Mashyakha

After the establishment of the French Mandate in 1920 one of General Gouraud's first acts was to divide Syria and Lebanon into five distinct political entities: Greater Lebanon; the ʿAlawī state; Damascus state, which included the districts of Ḥoms and Ḥamā; and Aleppo state, including the *sanjaq* of Alexandretta (the latter two were united in 1924 to form the state of Syria), while the autonomy of the Jabal ad-Durūz was put back to 5 April 1921, the Druze state to be formally recognized exactly one year later. The French administration dealt with these states according to its policy of preserving the ethnic and regional division of the country. Most of the new French administrators of Syria had previously served in Morocco. Almost naturally they began to apply the so-called "Moroccan formula" as a suitable system for administering the Syrian population. Marshal Louis Hubert Lyautcy, the French colonial administrator in Morocco, described this system as the economic and moral way of winning a people not by subjection but by close association.[41] It meant a system of indirect rule, one that respected local traditional institutions, but also took advantage of and exploited local rivalries; it emphasized the primacy of the countryside over the cities and attempted to win local allies who would

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[38] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 109.
[39] ʿUbayd, p. 86.
[40] Longrigg, p. 103; later the British were to make him king of Iraq.
[41] Cited by S.H. Roberts, *A History of French Colonial Policy 1870-1925* (London, 1929), p. 576.

then be used against indigenous hostile elements.[42] To carry out this policy of "*association*" in Syria, one of Gouraud's colleagues in Morocco, Colonel Catroux, was appointed governor of Damascus. One of the new governor's most urgent tasks was to establish French authority over Jabal ad-Durūz. As Catroux wrote in January 1921:

> The problem of the Druzes was considered one of the most somber before which our occupation of Damascus stood. It was also one of the most urgent. The geographic position of the Druze Mountain, the war-like character of its inhabitants, their conspicuous desire for independence, the incertitude of their dispositions, their old relations with the British, and the compromising attitude of certain of their chiefs with regard to Fayṣal required our serious attention. It appears that our hold over Ḥawrān and, in general, the security of our southern zone will not become affective so long as the bastion of Jabal ad-Durūz is not, at least politically, in our hands.[43]

In 1920 the Jabal had become the escape route of many Syrian nationalists who were seeking refuge in Transjordan where the British had set up a Sharīfian *imāra* under the rule of Amīr ʿAbdalla, the elder brother of Fayṣal. In such circumstances the Druze Mountain was game to the "intrigues" of both the Sharīfians and the British. For France, consequently, the Druzes had to be under complete French control, even if it meant "forcing them to accept the presence of our [the French] troops on their soil."[44]

In order to achieve this objective, Catroux preferred to use the local chiefs as "an intermediate instrument [of French] action."[45] The best means of recruiting their support was the Moroccan formula, which suited Druze particularism and the autonomy the Druzes had possessed during the Ottoman period. In his quest for powerful chiefs who could be France's instrument Catroux turned to the Aṭrashs, specifically Salīm, ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, Nasīb, and Sulṭān. The first three agreed to collaborate, on the condition of the

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[42] On the theory and application of the "Moroccan formula" in Syria, see McDowell, p. 215-225; also Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate. The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945* (Princeton, 1987), pp. 55-57.

[43] MAE, *Series E, Levant 1918-1940, Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, Catroux to de Caix, Damascus, 24 January 1921, vol. 239, pp. 49-50.

[44] General Catroux, *Deux Missions en Moyen Orient, 1919-1922* (Paris, 1958), pp. 36-37.

[45] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, Catroux to de Caix, Damascus, 24 January 1921, vol. 239, p. 50; see also L. Bokova, *La Confrontation franco-syrienne à l'époque du Mandat, 1925-1927* (Paris, 1990), p. 96.

Jabal being granted autonomy under the rule of their clan.[46] Although he was well aware of the internal rivalries among the Druze families, Catroux chose as future chief of the planned autonomous region Salīm al-Aṭrash, who was formally *sheikh al-mashāykh* and thus likely to be accepted by an important portion of the Druze chiefs.[47]

The French choice, however, was similar to the appointment of Sheikh al-Mashāykh Ibrāhīm al-Aṭrash as *qāʾimmaqām* in 1883. In each case, the outside recognition of one *sheikh* as a representative of the central government meant a shift in the internal balance of Druze power insofar as for the Druzes a *sheikh* of the village of ʿIrā after all was no more than *primus inter pares*. Thus, Salīm's appointment only deepened the division among the Druze chiefs. Apart from the deep-rooted split between the Aṭrashs and the ʿAmers, the rivalries within the former clan re-emerged. Consequently, there were four factions which argued among themselves over the stand that the Druze community had to adopt. The first group, led by Salīm al-ʿAṭrash, sought autonomy under the French Mandate. The second, under the leadership of Ṭalāl ʿAmer, demanded direct French rule. A third faction, headed by Muṣṭafā Najm al-Aṭrash, favored Druze autonomy but rejected Salīm's leadership. The fourth faction, under Sulṭān al-ʿAṭrash, opposed the French Mandate altogether.[48]

Insufficient information exists on the real motives of Sulṭān's opposition to the French at this stage. France, for its part, did see him as a "British client"[49] and one who maintained good relations with the Sharīfians.[50] Although Sulṭān continued to be in touch with the Sharīfians and the Syrian nationalists, there is no evidence that he was influenced by the "British connection." Similarly, his relations with the nationalists did not mean that he was motivated by firm notions of nationalism as certain historians have suggested.[51] Evi-

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[46] Catroux, *Deux Missions*, pp. 44-45.
[47] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, Catroux to de Caix, Damascus, 24 January 1921, vol. 239, p. 54.
[48] See Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 130.
[49] Catroux, *Deux Missions*, p. 44.
[50] Bouron, p. 229f.
[51] See Adham Jundī, *Tāʾrīkh ath-Thawra as-Sūriyya fī ʿAhd al-Intidāb al-Faransī* (Damascus, 1960), pp. 184-185; Ḍhūqān Qarqūt, *Taṭawūr al-Ḥaraka al-Waṭaniyya fī Sūriya 1920-1939* (Beirut, 1975), pp. 61-67; and Abū Ṣāliḥ, *Tārʾīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, pp. 313-320.

dently, Sulṭān's view differed from those of many of the Druze chiefs, who easily shifted their political positions. He was one of the few Aṭrash chiefs who possessed the steadfast and noble character traits of their grandfather, Ismāʿīl, and thus, since he had supported the Arab revolt and Syrian nationalism before 1920, Sulṭān naturally rejected the French Mandate.

At the end of 1920 the Druze chiefs held several meetings in Lāhitha, al-Kafr and Ṣalkhad in order to try and formulate a common stand toward the French proposals.[52] In his report to Robert de Caix, the secretary-general of Gouraud in January 1921, Catroux admitted that a combination of rivalry and incompetence on the part of the pro-French chiefs led to their failure to rally a large number of the temporal, as opposed to the religious, Druze chiefs. In order to overcome the "communal anarchy" prevalent among the political chiefs, Catroux used the religious chiefs, both as mediators between the rival factions and as propagators of the French proposals. Catroux's plan was

> to call for an accord between the religious chiefs and a political chief whom we would choose in order to realize through the force of his personality our superior authority. Our assistance would be given to the latter in order to reduce the opposition of the principal rivals.... Upon accomplishing this preparatory work, the religious chiefs would be incited to hold a general meeting, at which a draft of the Druze country's status would be elaborated.... The plan developed, in spite of some reverses, in the sense we had wished for.[53]

On 25 November 1920 the planned general meeting Catroux mentioned was held at Qanawāt, the traditional site of *mashyakhat al-ʿaql*.[54] On 3 December a circular signed by Catroux was distributed among both the religious and political chiefs which reaffirmed the French "promise" to create a "broad administrative independence."[55]

The decisions taken at the Qanawāt meeting, however, did not satisfy French expectations, because Salīm al-Aṭrash failed to rally many of the influential chiefs to the side of France. Moreover, the draft of the Qanawāt protocol, although it recognized the French

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[52] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 130.
[53] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, Catroux to de Caix, Damascus, 24 January 1921, vol. 239, p. 50-54 (quotation on p. 54).
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 54; Catroux, *Deux Missions*, pp. 46-47; Bouron, p. 227.
[55] ʿUbayd, Appendix No. 2, pp. 260-61.

Mandate, presented "a concept of political status that ... would perpetuate the inherent anarchy in the Jabal."[56]

On 20 December another general meeting was held at as-Suwaydā at which the Druze chiefs drew up the final draft of their autonomy program. The draft actually consisted of an adapted version of the *mashyakha* as it had developed since 1860. The program furthermore reflected the experience derived from the long struggle against Ottoman interference in the internal affairs of the *mashyakha*, as expressed in Articles 1, 2, and 8 of the draft document:

> (1) The Government of Jabal ad-Durūz is based on a council of advisors, with complete internal independence; (2) The Government accepts the French Mandate so long as it does not affect its independence; ... (8) The Mandatory Government has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Jabal, neither to conscript the inhabitants of Jabal Hawrān, nor to disarm them inside the French Mandate.[57]

The Druze chiefs who had drawn up the proposals were aware that they were not creating a new political system but instead giving de jure status to their *mashyakha* within a defined territory, as Article 3 affirmed: "This Government is called *mashyakha* of Jabal Ḥawrān, which consists of the complete districts of Lajā and Ṣafā. It extends in the north to Dayr ʿAlī and in the south to al- Azraq." Article 12 stipulated: "*mashāykh al-ʿaql* will be appointed for life tenure;" while Article 4 stated that the "local governor" shall be elected for three years.[58]

After he had received and studied the draft of the Druze program, Catroux sent it to de Caix with the suggestion that its principal ideas be adopted and the text of an agreement formulated that would "safeguard at once both our Mandatory rights and the aspirations of the Druzes. It means that we could procure an instrument which legitimizes in every way our intervention in the country and in Druze affairs."[59] The French subsequently modified the Druze draft in response to their own needs, and the treaty was duly signed on 4 March 1921 by Robert de Caix and a delegation of thirteen

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[56] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, Catroux to de Caix, Damascus, 24 January 1921, vol. 239, p. 55.
[57] The text of the draft is found in Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 130-132.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, Catroux to de Caix, Damascus, 24 January 1921, vol. 239, p. 56; Bokova, p. 98.

Druze chiefs, one Greek Orthodox chief, and a representative of *mashāykh al-ʿaql.*[60] Although the treaty stood in contrast to the mere imposition of the French Mandate on the regimes in other states in that it seemed to offer more independence,[61] the modifications incorporated by the French in the original draft as it had been presented by Francophile Druze chiefs were seen as concessions and as such exploited by the nationalists as well as by other Druze opponents of the French Mandate. The oppositionists criticized the manner in which the agreement was signed because but a small proportion of Druze chiefs had accepted the treaty without actually consulting their colleagues who had participated in the Qanawāt and as-Suwaydā meetings. By its Druze opponents the treaty was ironically called the Abū Fakhr de Caix agreement.[62]

Instead of "safeguarding the aspirations of" the Druze chiefs, the treaty strengthened the opposition, which was furthermore encouraged by Amīr ʿAbdalla's advance from Maʿān to ʿAmmān in March 1921 at the head of a force of about eight thousand. Through the intermediary of Rashīd Talīʿ, ʿAdil Arslān and Fūʾād Slīm, Druze nationalists of Mt. Lebanon,[63] the opposition in the Jabal began to move into a more active phase and now consisted of several influential chiefs among whom was Turkī ʿAmer, who joined the Sharīfian camp, and Asad al-Aṭrash, cousin of Sulṭān, who on 12 August 1921 donned the Sharīfian uniform, rode into as-Suwaydā at the head of a troop of cavalry and, raising the Arab flag of the Sharīfians over the *sarāy*, proclaimed the annexation of the Jabal to the Arab *imāra* of ʿAbdalla.[64] In March 1921 Sulṭān al-ʿAṭrash had already made a short visit to ʿAmmān at the head of one hundred cavalry troops and had met with the *amīr*'s younger

[60] For the text of the "Franco-Druze agreement," see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 133-136. The signatures were Faḍlalla Hnaydī, Nasīb al-Aṭrash, Salīm al-Aṭrash, Tawfīq Abū ʿAssāf, ʿUqla al-Qiṭāmī (Greek Orthodox), Quftān ʿAzzām, Fakhr ad-Dīn ash-Shaʿrānī, Masʿūd Ghānim, Jabr Shalghīn, Nāīf Abū Fakhr, Khamrī Shalghīn, Dakhlalla Abū Fakhr, Nasīb al-Ḥusaynī, Ḥusayn Abū Fakhr, and Maḥmūd Abū Fakhr (*sheikh al-ʿaql*).

[61] On the regimes of the states under the French Mandate, see Longrigg, pp. 123-132.

[62] ʿUbayd, pp. 87-90.

[63] See McDowell, pp. 240-245; Jundī, p. 186.

[64] General Andrea, *La Révolte Druze, et l'Insurrection de Damas, 1925-1926* (Paris, 1937), p. 45; Bouron, p. 228; McDowell, pp. 240-245.

brother, ʿAlī. By the end of March about two hundred Druzes had joined ʿAbdalla.[65]

Irreconcilable Contradiction: Mashyakha *vs. Mandate*

Manifestations of the Druze opposition to the French Mandate coincided and were probably also connected with the preparatory meetings of the Arab nationalists for the Syro-Palestinian Congress, which held its first meeting in Geneva in August 1921. One of the most prominent Druze members of the Congress was Amīr Shakīb Arslān, who was then living in exile in Europe. His younger brother, ʿAdil, had already taken refuge in Transjordan in 1920. The two brothers, as well as the above mentioned Rashīd Talīʿ, were members of the pan-Arab Istiqlāl Party who had sought refuge in Europe, ʿAmmān, Cairo, and Jerusalem.[66]

Faced with a changing situation in the Jabal, the French adopted a policy of admonition and of showy displays of military force. An ultimatum was sent to the Druze chiefs demanding the eviction of Asad al-Aṭrash from as-Suwaydā. When he found he received no aid from his coreligionists, Asad surrendered in mid-August. Several days later, on 20 August, about thirty planes flew over the Druze villages[67] and dropped leaflets containing a warning by Catroux:

> A great number of planes are flying over your country and a good number of French troops are proceeding to as-Suwaydā. Whether you look up or look down, you will recognize the strength of the State [France] whose Mandate had been demanded by you and whose generosity had been acknowledged by you when it granted your administrative autonomy.... The disturbers are few and come from the outside [Transjordan] in order to sow the seeds of division among you and to deceive you .... France will not permit such a situation.... The force that the Mandatory State has sent to your Mountain has two objectives: to protect you and to punish its enemies.[68]

The following day a French column of two battalions reached as-

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[65] McDoweli, p. 240.
[66] On these meetings, see Najīb Armanāzī, *Sūriya min al-iḥtilāl ḥattā al-jalāʾ* (Beirut, 1973), pp. 38-39.
[67] Bouron, p. 228; Andrea, p. 45; McDowell, p. 245.
[68] "Declaration of Catroux to the Druzes" (n.d.), ʿUbayd, Appendix No. 5, pp. 265-266.

Suwaydā.[69] Their presence perhaps provided the incentive for a notice signed by some of the Druze religious chiefs warning those who "collaborate with Sharīf ʿAbdalla."[70]

French troops soon began to circulate in Druze villages in search of suspected nationalists and Sharīfian sympathizers; in so doing, France began to adjust its "Moroccan formula" in the direction of the policy the Ottomans had applied in the Jabal. During this campaign in August-September 1921 the French sent a body of soldiers to Sulṭān's village and ordered him to come out for questioning. Not only did Sulṭān refuse to comply, he threatened to attack the French troops in the Jabal.[71]

The presence of the French troops and the attempts they made to disarm the Druzes were seen by many chiefs as a breach of the principles contained in the autonomy agreement. General Andrea, a French officer, described the situation in 1921:

> Agitation prevailed among the people and clouded the internal situation of the Jabal. The horizon became very somber when the order to disarm the Druzes was launched by the delegation of the high commissioner in Damascus.[72]

Taking advantage of the spreading discontent of many Druzes, Sulṭān began to rally the opposition around him. At the end of 1921 the pro-France party issued a leaflet signed by Mitʿib al-Aṭrash in an attempt to stop the "intrigues" of those who continued to "deceive" the people.[73]

Realizing that the opposition was gathering force, the French "advisors" sent Salīm al-Aṭrash on a reconciliation mission to al-Qrayā to meet with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. In order to appease him, Salīm accepted the idea of holding a general meeting at as-Suwaydā at which they would discuss the entire situation involving Jabal ad-Durūz.[74] The meeting, presided over by a French officer, was accordingly held in December 1921.[75] The decisions taken indirectly

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[69] Bouron, p. 228.

[70] "Declaration of *Ruʾasāʾ ad-dīn* [the religious chiefs]," as-Suwaydā, 20 September 1921, ʿUbayd, Appendix 6, p. 267.

[71] McDowell, p. 249.

[72] Andrea, p. 46.

[73] For the "*Manshūr* [declaration] of Mitʿib al-Aṭrash" (n.d.), see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 141-142.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 141., 144.

[75] McDowell, p. 250.

delegitimized the first Franco-Druze agreement. The first point demanded an inquiry as to the modifications which had found their way into the original draft of the Druze autonomy agreement. Other decisions reached at this meeting called for a general amnesty for all Druzes, the re-election of *al-majlis an-niyābī* [the assembly of deputies], and the withdrawal of French troops from the Jabal.[76]

The only decision of the Druze meeting of which the French took notice was that of the re-election of *al-majlis an-niyābī*. The French made great efforts, however, to preclude from this body the chiefs of the Aṭrash who belonged to the branch of Ismāʿīl but whom they considered as nationalists.[77] On 5 April 1922, a few months after the Druze meeting to most of the decisions of which they paid no heed whatsoever, the French formally declared the establishment of a Druze state in the Jabal. From then until July, when Sulṭān raised an armed force of his followers against the French, dissension among the Druzes steadily increased. Ill and weak, Salīm al-Aṭrash failed to exercise authority over the Druze chiefs. Thus he resigned at the beginning of 1923 leaving Trenga, the French adviser in the Jabal, to deal with the Druze nationalists. Instead of calming the internal situation, the de jure status of the new state further augmented dissatisfaction. The most impressive testimony of this process was borne perhaps by the director of the Education Department of the Druze state, ʿAbdalla Najjār. A sub-chapter entitled "*al-Hukm an-niẓāmī*" [Constitutional Rule] of his book *Banū Maʿrūf* deals with the impact of constitutional rule on traditional Druze society which is based on the social unity of *al-ʿashīra*. Referring to both the religious and the political *sheikhs*, Najjār charged that most of them occupied themselves with politics and mainly looked out for their own personal interests. Corruption, cheating, and intrigue, he criticized, had supplanted traditional values and customs. Thus, the Druzes could have no respect for a state and a constitution, and sarcastically were asking: "What? A state? A government?"[78]

Although many of the Druze chiefs no longer possessed the "knighthood" characteristic of their leaders in the nineteenth century, Sulṭān Aṭrash still symbolized the kind of chief about whom

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[76] See the text of the "Decisions of the Druze Meeting," Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 144-145.

[77] *Ibid.*, 145-146.

[78] See Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, pp. 137-147. This testimony was repeated by Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 141 and ʿUbayd, p. 91.

the oral history of the Jabal told. For many Druzes he was not only a brave warrior, he was also among only a few leaders who had not accepted any official rank in the newly created state. After its establishment, in fact, Sulṭān managed to rally several villages under the banner of his leadership: al-Qrayā, Umm Arrummān, Bakkā, Ḥūṭ, al-Munaydhrī, Ṣammā, Samīʿ, Ṭisiya, and al-Ghariyya.[79] Certainly Sulṭān did not use nationalist arguments to recruit these villages. His opposition was attuned to the internal balance of forces and to the social structure of the Druze *mashyakha* system, which was still based on the *ʿashīra*.[80] Prior to 1914 confrontation between *ʿashīra* rule and the Ottoman reforms had led to several uprisings by the Druzes.

In July 1922 Sulṭān mobilized an armed force to defend the "honor" of *ʿashīra* which the French had breached. On 17 July one of Sulṭān's guests, Adham Khanjar, a Shīʿī from south Lebanon, was arrested at al-Qrayā on his way to Sulṭān's house. The prisoner was delivered to as-Suwaydā when Sulṭān was out of his village. Khanjar was one of those the French suspected of having attempted, in the summer of 1921, to assassinate General Gouraud.[81] While to the French Khanjar was a criminal, to Sulṭān he was a *mushhid* (a guest who is seeking asylum).[82] Failing to convince French officials at as-Suwaydā to release his guest, Sulṭān wrote two letters to the authorities in Damascus and Beirut reminding them that the Franco-Druze agreement stipulated respect for Jabal customs, one of which was protection of a guest.[83]

The French rejected the accusation that Khanjar's arrest was in violation of hospitality customs. In their view, Sulṭān's contention

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[79] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 141.

[80] The two writers who lived in the Jabal each devoted a significant part of their books to describe *ʿashāʾir al-Jabal*: Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, pp. 128-132; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 29-32 and 132-133. See also Elizabeth P. MacCallum, *The Nationalist Crusade in Syria* (New York, 1928), pp. 107-108.

[81] See Andrea, pp. 47-48; Bouron, p. 229; Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, p. 123; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 146; ʿUbayd, p. 92-93; Bokova, pp. 109-110.

[82] *Mushhid* is a guest who announces [*ashhada*] that he intends to take asylum in the house of his host, which obliges the latter to protect him; see Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, pp. 132-133. When Sulṭān's brother, ʿAlī, rode to as-Suwaydā to request Trenga to release his brother's guest, the latter replied: "The man ... is under arrest ... For you, it is important to protect the guest, but for the soldiers to arrest the criminal"; cited in Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, p. 134.

[83] See the two letters in Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 147-148; see also ʿUbayd, pp. 93-94.

was no more than an excuse to obtain the release of a representative of Amīr ʿAbdalla, with whom Sulṭān had close relations.[84] In fact, Sulṭān's attitude since 1920 testifies that he was looking for just such an opportunity to rally the Druzes against France. The Khanjar incident seemed to offer sufficient justification to get them to bear arms in order to save the "honor breached" by the French. On 21 July Sulṭān led about fifteen of his followers in an attack on the three armoured cars that were escorting Khanjar to Damascus in which the French commander and three French soldiers were killed.[85] In many Druze villages the story of this attack soon did the rounds in terms glorifying the courage of Sulṭān, who "attacked one of the cars single-handedly. Finding its top open, he dispatched with his sword the two Frenchmen who occupied it, while his followers disabled the two other cars."[86]

In order to isolate Sulṭān, the French put pressure on the religious *sheikhs*, who issued a notice condemning the attack.[87] The day after the attack the French bombed al-Qrayā. In the following days the villages of Umm Arrummān, al-ʿAnāt, al-Ghariyya, and al-Aṣluḥā were also bombed in order to deter Sulṭān's partisans.[88] Sulṭān left the Jabal for Transjordan from where he kept up a guerrilla warfare. In August he ambushed a French patrol, killing its commander; in December, he succeeded in shooting down a French aircraft.[89] Sulṭān's attacks may have been discomfiting to the French, but they also embarrassed the British Mandatory authorities, and a certain tension crept into the relations between the two Mandatory authorities. In order to assuage this tension the British consul in Damascus took pains to mediate between Sulṭān and the French, and on 5 April 1923 Schoeffler, the new delegate of the high commissioner

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[84] There were several conjectures about the purpose of Khanjar's visit. According to the British consul in Damascus, Khanjar came from Transjordan carrying a secret message to Sulṭān; see McDowell, p. 254. According to ʿUbayd, Khanjar came from Transjordan with a rebel band in order to blow up the power station of Damascus. The French managed to follow the band, two members of which took refuge in the Jabal, see ʿUbayd, p. 93.

[85] Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, p. 135; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 149; ʿUbayd, pp. 94-95. See also the French version: Andrea, p. 48; Bouron, p. 229; see also *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 74-78.

[86] MacCallum, p. 108.

[87] For the "Declaration of *mashāykh al-ʿaql*" of 23 July 1922, see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 150-151.

[88] ʿUbayd, p. 95; MacCallum, p. 109; McDowell, p. 255.

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 256; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 152-153.

in Damascus, took advantage of the occasion of the first anniversary of the Druze state in order to grant Sulṭān a pardon.[90]

Sulṭān's return to the Jabal was seen by the Druzes as the return of a victorious warrior.[91] Andrea, the French officer, subsequently admitted that many Frenchmen felt that the "pardon has augmented the prestige of Sulṭān and permitted him to continue his anti-French propaganda."[92] Captain Carbillet, Trenga's successor as governor, shared the view of many French officials that the pardon of Sulṭān "had transformed his submission into true apotheosis. Again we [the French] have been defeated by our victory because Sulṭān's influence gained more than our indulgence."[93]

Sulṭān's arrival back in the Jabal in April, with Salīm al-Aṭrash by then having resigned, and the factionalism that was debilitating the Druze state government led the French high commissioner to introduce direct administration in the Jabal. He explained the reason for his decision on 17 April: "The situation created by the return of Sulṭān Pasha necessitated an immediate repression. Thus ... the government of Salīm Pasha, who had resigned, had to be replaced by a direct administration of ours."[94]

The death of Salīm al-Aṭrash on 15 September further deepened rivalries among the Druze chiefs and strengthened France's conviction of the necessity for direct rule in the Jabal. Toward this end, Captain Carbillet was temporarily appointed governor of the Jabal.[95] Soon the chiefs came to realize that the French actions would lead to the dissolution of their *mashyakha*. It was a strong enough inducement to begin putting aside their rivalries.[96] After

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[90] MAE, *Series E, Carton 413, Syrie-Etats Syriens-Djebel Druze*, vol. 270, telegram from de Caix, Beirut, 12 April 1923; Abū Rāshid, Jabal ad-Durūz, p. 154; Bouron, p. 230. According to Andrea, Sulṭān came and demanded the *ʾāmān* (pardon); see Andrea, p. 49. On the arguments of Schoeffler to grant Sulṭān pardon, see Bokova, pp. 111-112.

[91] See the description of Sulṭān's reception in ʿUbayd, p. 97.

[92] Andrea wrote: "Toutefois, dans l'esprit de beaucoup, cette mesure de clémence ne servira de rien; elle va, au contraire, augmenter le prestige de Soltan et permettre à ce féodal criminel, vendu aux étrangers, de donner libre cours à sa propaganda anti-française au milieu des Druzes"; see Andrea, p. 49.

[93] Capitaine Carbillet, *Au Djebel Druze, Choses vues et vécues* (Paris, 1929), p. 64.

[94] MAE, *Series E, Carton 413, Syrie-Etats Syriens-Djebel Druze*, vol. 270, Le Haut-Commissaire to le Président du Conseil, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Beirut, 17 April 1923.

[95] Andrea, p. 50; MacCallum, p. 110; Bouron, p. 232; Bokova, p. 115-119.

[96] See MacCallum p. 110; ʿUbayd, pp. 106-107.

1923 it would become easier for Sulṭān to recruit the broad opposition he had sought in vain the two previous years. Sulṭān al-Aṭrash was one of those figures who knew exactly where and when to use arms in order to incite the Druzes to take action and realized that mobilizing popular support for an armed opposition against the French could never be achieved by using nationalist slogans, which were not conceived for the Druze peasantry. Instead, such events as the Adham Khanjar affair presented the kind of opportunity Sulṭān eminently knew how to seize upon and take advantage of for his purpose. The accumulation of a series of similar incidents after 1923, all triggered by a French policy that only introduced more and more unrest among the leading chiefs of the Jabal, would finally induce a general uprising of the Druze community.

France's new policy of direct rule replaced the Moroccan formula, which had failed already during the first year of the Druze "autonomous state." The appointment of Carbillet as temporal governor had marked the final abandonment of this formula. Soon after the death of Salīm al-Aṭrash Carbillet began alienating the influential chiefs who previously had formed the basis of France's strategy of isolating the Jabal from Syria. His first act in this respect consisted of his attempt following Salīm's demise to play off the rivals against one another in the succession for paramount chief. There were four candidates: Ḥamad, who was Salīm's uncle and the son of Shiblī and who, as *sheikh* of ʿIrā, expected to ascend to the top rank; ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, son of Ibrāhīm and *sheikh* of as-Suwaydā, the capital of the Jabal; Nasīb of Ṣalkhad and Mitʿib of Rasās, the sons of Muḥammad and Hilāl respectively. During the first week (*usbuʿ*) after Salīm's death and in accordance with Druze tradition people came to pay condolence visits and to express their sympathy with the one who for them would succeed the dead chief. During the *usbuʿ*, Ḥamad was chosen *amīr* of the Aṭrash clan. Unfortunately, the people's choice was not recognized by his colleagues.[97]

The tradition of the Druze *mashyakha* called for the *amīr* of ʿIrā to be appointed governor of the Jabal. Carbillet, however, refused to follow the Druze political tradition. The main instrument for setting aside the appointment of the local governor was *al-majlis an-niyābī* which Carbillet controlled. In the absence of a generally agreed

[97] See ʿUbayd, pp. 104-105; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 158-159.

upon chief, Carbillet continued to serve as "temporal governor."[98]

The question of the governorship occupied the rival chiefs inconclusively from mid-September to the beginning of October. Following Carbillet's insistence to reduce the power of the influential chiefs, the *majlis* then decided to appoint him governor for another three months. In the meantime, he continued to throw out promises to each of the competing chiefs, Ḥamad, Nasīb, and ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, and Mitʿib. In December the *majlis* was asked to approve Carbillet's decision to postpone the choice of governor until May 1924.[99] By that time, the influential chiefs of the Aṭrash family had buried their mutual jealousies. Ḥamad, ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, and Nasīb cooperated with one another in drawing up and presenting a petition to the high commissioner in which they demanded an investigation of "how Captain Carbillet has obtained the majority of the *majlis*."[100] Aware of the uneasiness that had been introduced among the Aṭrash chiefs, Carbillet once again attempted to manipulate the factionalism that traditionally informed the leading families, and in December 1923 paid a visit to Shahbā, the capital of the ʿAmer clan, where he declared:

> I came to liberate your country from the oppression of the tyrannical chiefs [Aṭrashs] .... I came to support the people and not the chiefs .... When I say the chiefs, I do not mean those who served the people, such as Abū Ṭalāl ʿAmer, during the *ʿammiyya* [the peasant revolt of 1889-90].[101]

In mentioning the peasant revolt, Carbillet was referring to his intention of freeing the peasantry from the yoke of the *mashyakha* system. Carbillet was motivated by a desire to destroy "the Druze feudal system" and to transform the Jabal into a "modern colony." Instead, however, his policy accelerated the confrontation between the Mandate and the Druze *mashyakha* and led directly to the Druze revolt of 1925.

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98 *Ibid.*, McDowell, p. 274.

99 MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache [Ḥamad al-Aṭrash] au sujet des causes de la Révolution Druzes" in *Enquête de M. Daclin*, pp. 31-32; ʿUbayd, pp. 106-107; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 160-161; McDowell, pp. 272-276.

100 MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad bey Attrache," p. 33.

101 Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 161.

The Druze Revolt—From Communal to National Uprising

Historians who have dealt with the causes of the Druze revolt that broke out in July 1925 as well as some French officials of that period have each put Carbillet's policy under close scrutiny. Arab historians, including Druzes, have generally viewed the Druze revolt as an integral part of the general Syrian resistance against French colonialism. Carbillet is seen by them as a representative of those French officials who resorted to various means of oppression in order to subdue the uprising.[102] To General Andrea and Captain N. Bouron, two French officials who served in Syria during the Mandatory period and who writing on the Druze revolt expressed the conception which prevailed among the French at the time, the uprising of the Druzes in 1925 came in consequence of errors committed by certain French officials which were exploited by the Druze leaders who were adversely affected by Carbillet's reforms. In other words, in their eyes the revolt had no connection with the Syrian nationalist movement.[103] With slight variations, this view was perhaps first expressed in September 1925 by the French colonial *Bulletin de l'Asie Française*. A long article in that month's issue referred to the conspiratorial role of Amīr ʿAbdalla and the British, who were said to have exploited the discontent among Druze chiefs who opposed the reforms since they were based on Western conceptions. This, the article concluded, was the real cause of the Druze revolt.[104]

In her discussion of Carbillet's reforms and the Druze revolt of 1925 Elizabeth MacCallum wrote:

> It was one of the ironies of history that Captain Carbillet, an enthusiastic administrator, who acknowledged to his compatriots that his love for Jabal al-Durūz was second only to his love for France and who refused to accept the salary due to him as Governor, was one of the two persons immediately responsible for the outbreak of the Syrian rebellion.[105]

According to MacCallum, what Carbillet had wanted was to transform the feudal society of the Druzes and to secure full land tenure

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[102] See an example of these arguments in Jundī, pp. 184-215; Armanāzī, pp. 42-63; Qarqūt, pp. 65-72; Abū Ṣaliḥ, *Tārʾīkh al-Muwaḥḥidīn*, 320-325.

[103] Bouron, pp. 231-238. Andrea, pp. 51-52.

[104] *Bulletin de L'Asie Française*, No. 234, August-September 1925, "L'Affaire du Djebel Druse," pp. 249-253.

[105] MacCallum, p. 110; on Carbillet's policy, see Bokova, pp. 120-128.

for the poor peasants. In order to grant them the right of individual ownership and to abolish the common lands, Carbillet encouraged viniculture and in 1924 alone about one million vines were planted. These reforms, however well intended, obviously threatened the authority of the Druze chieftains, which was clearly seen by the French high commissioner when he wrote in his annual report of 1925:

> It was the dissatisfaction of the feudal chieftains directed at a policy that seemed to be transforming the Druze social system at their expense which was without doubt the main cause of the revolt of July 1925.[106]

Philip Khoury, accepting MacCallum's analysis, added that Carbillet failed to free the conservative, suspicious Druze peasantry from its dependence on the great Druze clans and, therefore, in his tactics of pitting class against class.[107]

Carbillet's ambitious project of reform, combined with the autocratic and sometimes cruel methods by which he attempted to carry it out, clearly engendered a great deal of dissatisfaction and unrest among the Druzes of the Jabal. But this alone can not explain the outbreak of a revolt which brought about the destruction of many Druze villages, the death of more than three thousand men as well as of a great number of women, the elderly, and children, and the maiming of at least one thousand persons.[108] As with similar historical events, one should look at the entire process that transformed this dissatisfaction into the armed revolt of the whole Druze community and turn to the decisions and actions of the two antagonists and the reactions these elicited, in particular to the ability of the Druze leadership to mobilize their people in the face of such a formidable force as the French.

The re-election of members of *al-majlis an-niyābī* who were predominantly in his favor and the *majlis'* approval of his appointment as governor followed the first steps Carbillet had taken in creating dissatisfaction, especially among those who felt that these measures were being directed first and foremost against themselves, i.e., the Aṭrashs. The two events dominated political discussions

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[106] French Annual Report of 1925 cited by MacCallum, pp. 111-112.
[107] Khoury, p. 157.
[108] See Ṣghayar, pp. 710-748.

among the Druze chiefs throughout 1924.[109] During this year, too, opposition to Carbillet's rule was already beginning to spread beyond the ranks of the Aṭrash chiefs,[110] fueled by hostility over the administrative reorganization by which Carbillet had abolished the thirteen administrative units (*mudīriyyas*) that had been established in 1921 in accordance with the geographical distribution of the clans;[111] these units were replaced with a central office, viz., *al-mudīriyya ad-dākhiliyya*, two *qāʾimmaqāmiyyas*, and six district administrations. Although indigenous chiefs were appointed to serve in the new administration, the French advisers and Carbillet himself were the real decision makers.[112] Carbillet also removed the chief of police (*ad-darak*), Tawfīq al-Aṭrash, and put in his place the Damascene Ḥusnī Ṣakhr, but without effective powers, which were in the hands of Lieutenant Maurel.[113]

Recognizing that opposition against him was gaining ground among all *sheikhs* of the Aṭrashs, Carbillet during the spring of 1924 began directing his reaction mainly against them and their supporters. The Aṭrash chiefs, in turn, used two means against Carbillet, i.e., they first sent petitions to the high commissioner to protest the "breaching by Carbillet of the Franco-Druze agreement," and, second, they launched a campaign against Carbillet in their *maḍāfāt*,[114] where the despotic image of Carbillet as the "new Emperor of Jabal ad-Durūz"[115] became the main subject. Attempting to suppress the voice of the opposition, Carbillet ordered the closing of a number of such Aṭrash *maḍāfāt*, notably that of ʿAbd al-Ghaffār.[116]

Carbillet's social and economic reforms, instead of creating a positive, counter-balanced image for him, only alienated the

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[109] MAE, *Serie E, Syrie-Etats Syriens-Djebel Druze*, vol. 270, *Correspondences*, 8 August, 9 August and 24 December 1924.

[110] McDowell, pp. 276-277.

[111] In the administrative organization of 1921, twenty chiefs were appointed representatives, either as *mudīrs* or as *ḍābits* (officers); see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 140; Najjār, *Banū Maʿrūf*, p. 142.

[112] See Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 160, 164-165.

[113] *Ibid.*, p. 165; ʿUbayd, p. 106; McDowell, pp. 264-265.

[114] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache," pp. 32-33; McDowell, p. 276. *Maḍāfāt* (sing. *maḍāfa*) were big guest rooms for each *sheikh* in the Jabal where people met together and discussed public affairs.

[115] According to Abū Rāshid, Carbillet himself had exclaimed: "I am the Emperor of Jabal ad-Durūz." Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 168.

[116] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1919-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache," p. 33; ʿUbayd, p. 112.

Druzes, both chiefs and peasants. For example, while he reorganized the system of justice with exclusively indigenous staff, the Druzes continued to seek arbitration through French officials. It is probable, as Abū Rāshid claimed, that Carbillet himself was involved in such arbitration, with ultimately dissatisfactory results.[117]

The construction of an irrigation system, the provision of a permanent water supply for as-Suwaydā, and the construction of a road network of six hundred kilometers (for vehicles the Druzes did not possess) were done through the system of *corvée* (i.e., forced labor) which Carbillet applied as a form of tax in lieu of tithe payments. In 1924, the Druze peasants each contributed an average of ten to twenty days of *corvée*. In addition to the *corvée*, many Druze peasants and chiefs as punishment were forced to work the roads under severe conditions.[118]

Carbillet also had his own way of carrying out an ambitious project of establishing schools in the Jabal. When Carbillet took over, he found public instruction being directed by a Lebanese Druze, ʿAbdalla Najjār, who had served in the Ministry of Information in Fayṣal's government before the French occupation. Twenty schools had been established in the first year of Najjār's service in the Jabal, while teachers had been brought in from Lebanon. Carbillet's educational development program was more ambitious; and to enable its execution, he transformed the Public Instruction Department into an instrument of his governmental apparatus. First, Carbillet dismissed all Lebanese Druze teachers and replaced them with Greek Catholic teachers, some of whom also acted as informers against the Druze villagers.[119] He then laid his hand on the curriculum. Such intervention could not but create severe tensions between him and ʿAbdalla Najjār.[120]

In the spring and summer of 1924 Druze disaffection, now widespread in the Jabal, contained two dimensions: one, that of the Druze chiefs who opposed the French from the start and were waiting for an opportunity to arouse the community against them; the

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[117] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 169. See also McDowell, pp. 265-266.

[118] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 177; ʿUbayd, p. 109; MacCallum, pp. 112-113; McDowell, pp. 268-269.

[119] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 167-168; ʿUbayd, p. 109; MacCallum, p. 113; McDowell, pp. 266-267.

[120] MAE, *Syrie-Liban, 1918-1929*, vol. 240, Compte Rendu "des événements ayant déclenché le mouvement révolutionnaire au Djebel-Druze," Beirut, 8 July 1926.

second, that of the Druze chiefs who previously had cooperated with the French Mandatory authorities. Carbillet's divide-and-rule tactics which had tried to set up chief against chief and peasant against chief had clearly failed, and his actions now began to reflect his fear and anticipation of an uprising. Apparently he did not pay attention to the grumbling of the peasants and the disappointment voiced by the pro-French chiefs. His deterrent measures were primarily directed against the seemingly more inimical chiefs led by Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. Sulṭān and his lieutenant, Ḥamad al-Barbūr, came under permanent surveillance by Carbillet informers.[121] In March, al-Barbūr was summoned to Damascus. The plan had been to take him hostage, but he fled and joined his friends, the Sardiyya Bedouins.[122] Suspecting a renewal of the connection between Sulṭān's followers, the nationalists in Damascus, and the Sharīfians in Transjordan, Carbillet forbade the entry into the Jabal of the Arab national press; further, he put all traffic from and into the Jabal under close observation, even to the extent that he dispatched aircraft for the surveillance of suspicious villages.[123]

In an attempt to assuage adverse feelings, Carbillet persuaded General Weygand, the high commissioner, to participate in the Druzes' celebration of their Independence Day, on 5 April 1924, and to spend three days among the Druzes. On 30 March Carbillet distributed a notice informing the inhabitants of the Jabal of the high commissioner's forthcoming visit, which clearly reflected his fears: "His Excellency General [Weygand] wants to dispel the rumors ... that the Jabal is on the path to rebellion."[124]

At this time more evidence of the relationship between the Druze nationalists and the Sharīfians began to emerge. Twenty days after Weygand's visit, which was uneventful, Carbillet launched a campaign against the chiefs whom he suspected of having a connection with the Sharīfians. The operation resulted in the flight by Ḥusayn al-Aṭrash of ʿAnz and Asad al-Aṭrash of as-Suwaydā to Transjordan, followed a few days later by ʿAlī Ṭrudī al-Aṭrash of Qayṣamā and Mitʿib al-Aṭrash of Rasās.[125] The summer saw a similar cam-

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[121] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 181-182.
[122] McDowell, p. 278.
[123] ʿUbayd, pp. 112, 114.
[124] *Ibid.*, pp. 295-296, annex No. 29, Circular of Carbillet, March 30, 1924.
[125] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 183; McDowell,. p. 290.

paign against the Ḥalabī villages after Saʿīd ʿIzz ad-Dīn had requested the annexation of these settlements to the Syrian state.[126]

While the French authorities tried to curb external influence on the Druzes of the Jabal which they considered a dominant factor in stirring up unrest and possible revolt, they continued to ignore the petitions that the Francophile chiefs had been addressing to them. The reason for this disregard, which was tantamount to a victory for the anti-French faction, apparently lay in the fact that since all petitions praised the French Mandate but protested Carbillet's behavior, high officials in France assumed that personal motives lay behind them, a feeling that was reinforced when Carbillet succeeded in organizing counter-petitions in his favor.

This was the situation surrounding the elections for *al-majlis an-niyābī* in September 1924, which were controlled by Carbillet and resulted in the decline of the powerful chiefs, notably the Aṭrashs. When on 1 October Carbillet was elected governor of the state of Jabal ad-Durūz,[127] the Aṭrash chiefs held a secret meeting at ʿIrā, at which they decided to circulate *maẓbatas* (petitions) in the Jabal criticizing the breach of the Franco-Druze agreement.[128] Ḥamad Nasīb and ʿAbd al-Ghaffār al-Aṭrash collectively addressed a petition to the French delegation in Damascus as well as to General Weygand in protest against Carbillet's appointment and asked for an audience with the general. According to Ḥamad al-Aṭrash General Weygand's reaction at the meeting was as follows: "*Nous verrons si nous ne pouvons pas faire de nouvelles élections.*" (We'll see if we can't hold new elections.) Carbillet, however, had informed the high commissioner that apart from the three chiefs, whose views should be discounted, "the entire population is satisfied with the results of the elections and the decision that has been adopted." Although Ḥamad and Nasīb al-Aṭrash later met General Weygand in Damascus, "the General did not grant us a sufficient time of audience; he announced that he would meet us in ʿĀlay [in Lebanon]—the audience of ʿĀlay has never been granted." On another occasion when

[126] ʿUbayd, p. 113.

[127] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache," p. 33. See Abū Rāshid's description of the way in which the *majlis* was elected; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 161, 178-179; McDowell, pp. 191-193.

[128] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 180.

Ḥamad and Nasīb were in Damascus, they tried in vain to meet with the French delegation in Damascus.[129]

In January 1925 Weygand was replaced as high commissioner by General Sarrail. The Druze chiefs Ḥamad, Abd ʿAl-Ghaffār and Nasīb al-Aṭrash seized this opportunity to raise their grievances before the new high commissioner. Again Carbillet attempted to prevent any audience between these chiefs and Sarrail. The Druze delegations that welcomed Sarrail had been carefully selected by Carbillet who duly overlooked the influential chiefs. The celebration of Druze Independence Day on 5 April 1925 provided a further opportunity for these chiefs to present their grievances to Sarrail, who visited the Jabal for the occasion. Carbillet frustrated this attempt, too, announcing that General Sarrail had no intention of hearing speeches. Some days later, however, the high commissioner finally granted them an audience.[130]

According to Ḥamad al-Aṭrash, General Sarrail prior to this audience first met with Carbillet, who was accompanied by Schoeffler. "Knowing *les désidératas* we were going to present," Aṭrash was recorded as saying, "they informed him of the opposite of what we would say."[131] The Druze delegation demanded the full application of the Franco-Druze agreement: "Basing ourselves on the statute of the independence of the Jabal," the Druzes argued, "we claim the right of a native governor." When the general replied: "But you are not qualified to present such a demand. On what do you base yourselves in doing this?" they answered: "On the agreement written and signed by M. Robert de Caix...." and presented Sarrail with the agreement. The general reacted: "I don't know anything about this agreement, and what you present to me has no value whatsoever in my eyes. This is no more than a scrap of paper."[132]

It was this refusal of Sarrail to recognize the Franco-Druze agreement which formed the turning point in the relationship between the Mandate authorities and the Druzes. The changed attitude was observed in France by critical voices after the revolt had broken out

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[129] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache," p. 33.

[130] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 187; ʿUbayd, p. 116.

[131] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache," p. 35.

[132] *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36. See also Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 187, 199-201.

in July 1925. As already mentioned, *L'Asie Française* of August-September 1925 pointed to a British-Sharīfian conspiracy as being behind the "events of Jabal ad-Durūz," but it nevertheless considered the high commissioner's action as the major French failing in the events leading to the revolt, particularly since the Druze chiefs seemed ready for compromise.[133] In the parliamentary debates in Paris, on 17 December in the Senate and on 18-20 December in the Chamber, some deputies charged that Sarrail's refusal to recognize the validity of the agreement formed a grave error.[134] Ḥamad al-Aṭrash described the feeling of the Druzes after the failure of the meeting with Sarrail in Damascus: "When we came back, the people learned of the failure of our audience; and told that the agreement had been confiscated by the General, they were convinced that the independence of our country had been taken from us."[135]

The once pro-French Druze chiefs were now left confused and without much hope. They had expected to be able to renew their cooperation with the Mandatory authorities on the basis of the Franco-Druze agreement. Now, in April 1925, however, when the credibility of the French Mandate had become doubtful, these chiefs were willing to adopt anti-French positions more in line with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. The hostile attitude toward the French Mandatory authorities was no longer obvious only among the influential chiefs of the Aṭrash clan, but also among large portions of the Druzes of other clans. Petitions against the "brutality" of Carbillet continued to be ignored by the French. On 1 March 1925, for instance, a petition had been submitted which enumerated twenty-four grievances against the French authorities in the Jabal. The complaints consisted of detailed cases of the humiliation of Druzes who were sent to break stones for new roads, the unjustified levying of fines on a number of villages, the arrest of innocent people, the strict measures against the free movement of the people, and many acts of beating Druzes for any unimportant reason.[136] These twenty-four griev-

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[133] *L'Asie Française*, No. 234, August-September 1925 "L'Affaire du Djebel Druse", pp. 253-4.

[134] *Ibid.*, January 1926, "Les débats parlementaires sur la Syrie," pp. 9-31.

[135] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache,", p. 36.

[136] ʿUbayd, Appendix No. 20, pp. 281-284, a petition signed by Hilāl ʿIzz ad-Dīn, 1 March 1925; on the development of the dissatisfaction among the Druzes, see Bokova, pp. 129-136.

ances later formed the basis for a new petition with a list of thirty-five complaints which was to be presented only a few days before the revolt erupted; the Druze delegation involved this time represented most Druze clans. However, it was not until a year later, in July-September 1926 when the French government decided to investigate the causes of the Druze revolt in 1925, that this Druze petition was finally considered at all.[137]

With the spirit of rebellion fast spreading among the Druzes Captain Carbillet was instructed to take a much-needed vacation in France. When he left the Jabal on 17 May the Druze chiefs expressed their hope that the new governor, Captain Raynaud, would correct Carbillet's mistakes. Addressing the official on behalf of these chiefs, ᶜAbd al-Ghaffār al-Aṭrash stressed that they opposed Carbillet, not the French Mandate.[138] Although ostensibly he was replacing Carbillet for but the short period of the latter's vacation, Raynaud removed many of Carbillet's restrictions and harsh policies.[139] Raynaud's approach in the Jabal soon led to a popular demand for the removal of Carbillet from office. The main instigators of this demand were four officials in Carbillet's own administration: ᶜAbdalla Najjār, the Lebanese Druze who directed the Public Instruction Department; Yūsuf Shidyāq, a Lebanese Christian who served as secretary and translator for the French delegation in as-Suwaydā; Tawfīq al-Aṭrash, the head of the Interior Affairs Department; Muḥammad ᶜIzz ad-Dīn al Ḥalabī, the head of the Judiciary; and the Maronite journalist, Ḥannā Abū Rāshid. By early June, many Druze chiefs had accepted the idea that Carbillet had definitely to be replaced by Raynaud.[140]

On 2 June Captain Raynaud sent his first report to Schoeffler in Damascus describing the unrest among the Druze chiefs. On 17 June he forwarded another alarming report, this time to Sarrail. Suspicious of Raynaud's motives in criticizing Carbillet's policy in the Jabal, Sarrail continued to ignore the Druzes' dissatisfaction.

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[137] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, text of the "Requête présentée par la délégation Druse du Hauran à M. Tommy Martin, Gouverneur par intérim du Djebel Druse," pp. 232-238.

[138] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 208-209.

[139] *Ibid.*, pp. 209-215; McDowell, pp. 297-300.

[140] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 240, Compte Rendu "des événements ayant déclanché le movement révolutionnaire du Djebel-Druze," Beirut, 8 July 1926; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 215; McDowell, p. 299.

He was of the opinion that what was taking place in Carbillet's absence was a conspiracy against him.[141] At this time and under Raynaud's more liberal rule, the different political trends in the Jabal formed an alliance with the purpose of preventing Carbillet's return to his post. It was composed of anti-French chiefs, such as Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, and chiefs who opposed Carbillet's rule but accepted the French Mandate, such as ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, Ḥamad and Nasīb al-Aṭrash. The group was further supported by officials who served in Carbillet's administration, such as Muḥammad ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Ḥalabī, ʿAbdalla Najjār, and ʿAlī ʿUbayed, and by some of the Druze religious *sheikhs* such as Yūsuf al-Hajarī. The opposition to Carbillet succeeded in overriding their factionalism, if only for the moment. Subsequently they set up committees comprising the important families and chiefs of the Jabal.[142] The alliance of these various groups permitted the Druzes to send a large delegation of some thirty members to Damascus in order to meet with August Brunet, a republican senator who had meanwhile been sent to Syria on a fact-finding mission.[143]

Although the delegation on the one hand consisted of those who till then supported the separation of Jabal ad-Durūz from Syria and on the other of some who still essentially supported Carbillet, the demands it presented to Brunet indicated that the Syrian nationalist idea had already entered into the political consciousness of some Druze chiefs. While the delegation stressed that it wanted to see Carbillet replaced with Raynaud, it also emphasized the attachment of the Jabal to Syrian "native land": "The Druze mountain is an integral part of Syria through common language, common nationality, and common economic interests."[144] It seems that the nationalists among the Druzes had succeeded in arriving at the formulation concerning the integrity with Syria at a time when the possibility for independence of Jabal ad-Durūz had become doubtful even to the separatist chiefs themselves, though the latter preferred

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[141] *L'Asie Française*, No. 237, January, 1926, "Les débats parlementaires sur la Syrie", pp. 16-29; MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1919-1929*, vol. 240, "Les causes de la révolution Druze," report by M. Daclin, p. 174; McDowell, pp. 300-304.

[142] See Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 219-227, 236-238.

[143] *Ibid.*, pp. 237-239; McDowell, pp. 301-302. According to Ḥasan Hakīm, the delegation was composed of twenty-eight members and headed by Yūsuf al-Hajarī; see Ḥasan Hakīm, *Mudhakkarātī*, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1965), vol. 1, p. 240.

[144] Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 239.

to maintain an independence based on the original draft of their agreement with the French authorities.[145]

The sympathetic Brunet failed to convince Sarrail to withdraw from his former position. The Druze delegation itself thereupon decided it wanted to meet Sarrail in Beirut. On 16 June the Druze chiefs sent a telegram informing Sarrail of their intended arrival in Beirut the following day. When they reached the city, however, they were told to return to the Jabal or else they would be forcibly detained. In a last attempt to arrive at some form of negotiation with Sarrail, Nasīb al-Aṭrash stayed on in Beirut. He sought the mediation of the Lebanese Druze leaders, Amīn Arslān and ʿAlī Junblāṭ, in order to present a final request before Sarrail. The high-minded French official, however, refused to meet him.[146] In his comments on Sarrail's refusal, the British consul in Damascus observed:

> It would seem that the French colonial mentality is unable to adapt itself to the peculiar circumstances of the Jebel Druze ... there would seem no reason why France should not respect the Charter of Independence and tolerate a native Governor, suitably guided by French advisers, who, as elsewhere in French mandated territory, would exercise the real power. The result of this attitude appears to be that the Mountain is being driven into the arms of Syrian nationalism and unity, from which the Druzes, if their local independence were respected, would gladly hold aloof.[147]

The refusal of French Mandatory officials to talk with the Druze leaders in June alienated most Druze chiefs and effectively undermined the pro-France party. Under these circumstances but a small incident was needed for Sulṭān al-Aṭrash to rouse the Druzes into open revolt. The situation in the summer of 1925 differed from that of 1922 when Sulṭān had first attempted to set the Jabal aflame. However, as in 1922, Sulṭān now, too, for his purpose attached great importance to the traditional means of mobilizing his community for armed struggle. Since his return to the Jabal in April 1923, he kept a low profile in his political activities. Not that he was inactive, but the fact was that he excelled in selecting the opportunity that would again involve him in internal politics at the right time. Unlike his colleagues, whom he belittled, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash under-

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[145] *Ibid.*, p. 240, for Faḍlalla Hnaydī's answer to Brunet concerning the unification with Syria.

[146] *Ibid.*, p. 241; Hakīm, vol. 1 pp. 243-244; McDowell, pp. 302-303.

[147] FO 371, 10850 E 4005/357/89, Consul Smart to Chamberlain, No. 107, 23 June 1925, p. 167.

stood how and when to garner popular support around him for a *levée en masse*.[148]

It is uncertain whether the revolt of July 1925 was deliberately planned by Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. He did not create the events that led up to the revolt but he followed them closely, deftly exploiting each and every event which could form yet another step on the way to mobilizing all Druzes against the French. Ironically, the first incident to provoke a large amount of agitation among the Druzes had no connection with their political dispute with the French authorities. On 22 June Ḥammūd Naṣr, a Druze chief, was killed in his bed by the Bedouins of Lajā. On 1 July Sulṭān rallied some four hundred horsemen in order to retaliate. Although Sulṭān was in the end persuaded by Raynaud to desist from carrying out any retaliatory act, the very ardor and immediate readiness of the Druze leader to attack and take revenge on the Bedouins provided Sulṭān with further legitimacy in the eyes of the Druzes as the leader who would and indeed could defend their community.[149]

In early July the opposition forces formed an organization, named *al-Jamʿiyya al-waṭaniyya*, in order to prevent Carbillet's return. Then, on 3 July, the day of ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā (the festival of the Greater Bairam), a group of young Druzes linked with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash's faction seized the opportunity to demonstrate in front of the municipal building in the Druze capital—where the *majlis* was holding an ordinary session—against the anticipated return of Carbillet as well as against Fāris al-Aṭrash, the most prominent pro-France chief who had continued throughout to support Carbillet. Soon the demonstration led to the incident that may be considered the torch that set the Jabal aflame.[150] That same day Raynaud reported to the French delegation in Damascus on the demonstration, the measures he had taken to contain events, and the atmosphere prevailing among the Druzes:

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[148] Although there has been no serious historical research on the personal life of Sulṭān, almost all of those who met him or had close relations with him expressed their admiration for his personal characteristics. See, for example, Ẓāfir Qāsimī, *Wathāʾq Jadida ʿan ath-Thawra as-Sūriyya al-Kubrā* (Beirut, 1976), pp. 103-109; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 227-235.

[149] Ibid., p. 253; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 2, pp. 103-104.

[150] FO 371, 10850, E4310/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 116, 10 July 1925, p. 172; MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 240, "Les causes de la Révolution Druze," p. 174; ʿUbayd, pp. 120-21; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 255-264; Bokova, pp. 136-138.

> Just as the *majlis* began its meeting at nine o'clock in the Serail ... numerous groups of young people of as-Suwaydā who had already gathered for celebrating the Feast [of al-Aḍḥa] provoked, by their attitude, a manifestation the character of which was not forecasted by the participant demonstrators themselves.[151]

As the demonstration against Fāris al-Aṭrash grew increasingly louder, Carbillet's lieutenant, Maurel, decided to intervene and ordered the local gendarmerie to disperse the demonstrators. One of the heated demonstrators, Ḥusayn Murshid, fired his pistol at Maurel but missed his target. The latter fired back two shots but also missed, and a melee erupted. Attempting to calm the situation, the Druze chiefs immediately offered an apology to Maurel for the incident which they termed a regrettable mistake. Raynaud thereafter summoned the chiefs and informed them of the terms of the punishment which had been decided upon for the inhabitants of as-Suwaydā: (1) a fine of two hundred gold Napoleons; (2) the arrest of twenty young people from different as-Suwaydā families; (3) the expulsion of ten members of Murshid's family to Ṣalkhad; and (4) the destruction of Ḥusayn Murshid's house. In addition to these measures, Raynaud prohibited any gathering of the inhabitants in groups.[152] Although the Druze chiefs expressed an intention to comply with Raynaud's order, they indicated that the destruction of Murshid's house would provoke an immediate uprising.[153] The incident of as-Suwaydā and the punitive measures to be exacted by the French authorities, Raynaud warned, "would be exploited by the fomentors of troubles ... and would serve as a pretext for more serious movement."[154]

At 2:45 p.m. of that same day, i.e., fifteen minutes before the time fixed for the demolition of Murshid's house, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, accompanied by an armed band of his followers, suddenly appeared in front of the house.[155] Only three days earlier Sulṭān had been

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[151] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, Raynaud to le Délégué du Haut-Commissaire auprès des Etats de Syrie et du Djebel Druze, 3 July 1925, p. 101.

[152] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-104, and vol. 240, "Les causes de la Révolution Druze," report of M. Daclin, p. 174. On the incident and Raynaud's measures, see Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 255-264.

[153] *Ibid.*, p. 265; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, p. 107. See also the version given of ʿUbayd, pp. 120-121.

[154] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, Raynaud to le Délégué du Haut Commissaire, 3 July 1925, p. 100.

[155] *Ibid.*, vol. 240, "Les causes de la Révolution Druze," p. 174; McDowell, p. 307; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, p. 108.

talked out of attacking the Bedouins of Lajā. Again now, when the Druzes of as-Suwaydā found themselves in a state of tension and confusion, Sulṭān showed up at the right place and the right time to prove how full well he understood what his community demanded of its leader—his arrival on the scene compelled the French authorities to back down and abandon any thought of demolishing Murshid's house. In his report on the causes of the Druze revolt, Charles Daclin, whom the French government later assigned to investigate the revolt, considered this the most important event which won the Druze leader his great popularity: "Sulṭān came to the Capital maneuvering with his men in front of Ḥusayn Murshid's house. The women received him with ululations [*zaghārīd*] ... Sulṭān became more popular than ever."[156]

Three days later the Druze chiefs presented the above-mentioned famous *maẓbata* consisting of thirty-five grievances against Carbillet. This petition also reflected the decision of the Druze chiefs to support the opposition force led by Sulṭān al-Aṭrash.[157] On 7 July Raynaud was replaced by Major Tommy Martin, chief of the *Service des Renseignements* in Damascus which had been instructed to investigate the accusations against Carbillet.[158]

Although the petition of 6 July clearly reflected the dissatisfaction of the Druzes in general, Sarrail still believed that the Aṭrashs were the only genuine malcontents and, on the same day Martin sent off his report, issued two directives, the first a decision informing the delegation in Damascus that Carbillet would be returning to his position in Jabal, the second an order for the French delegation in Damascus to summon the five main chiefs of the Aṭrash family, Ḥamad, Nasīb, Mitʿib, ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, and Sulṭān. Sarrail had by now completely abandoned the "*association*" formula that Gauraud and Catroux had tried to apply in the Jabal and reverted to tactics similar to those used by the Ottoman governors when they would summon Druze chiefs with the purpose of arresting and holding

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[156] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 240, "Les causes de la Révolution Druze," p. 174.

[157] *Ibid.*, vol. 239, "Observations du Cdt. Tommy Martin sur les 35 plaintes mentionnées dans la Mazbata du July 6, 1925," pp. 24-28.

[158] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, report of Tommy Martin, 11 July 1925, vol. 234, p. 102. See also the report of the *Service des Renseignement* in Darʿā of 8 July 1925 and that of Tommy Martin of 8 July 1925, in Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 275-276.

them as hostages.[159] On 10 July the British consul in Damascus, wrote:

> If, however, France was resolved to impose not only a French governor, generally, but Captain Carbillet, particularly ... it is inconceivable why this agitation was allowed to flow ... Perhaps the Mandatory authority will, before the danger now apparent, pull itself together and resort again to the usual French colonial methods of maintaining order.[160]

Two days later, three of the five "invited" chiefs came to Damascus, while Mitʿib pleaded sickness and Sulṭān baldly refused the invitation. The three were duly arrested the following morning and exiled to Palmyra. The news of their arrest reached Sulṭān at the time a French officer was urging him to follow his colleagues to Damascus.[161]

The arrest of the Druze chiefs by which the French had meant to prevent a revolt had the exact opposite result: The deception by which the French had succeeded in capturing the Druze chiefs provided Sulṭān with the justification he needed for calling the Druzes to arms against the French. Unlike 1922, the Jabal was now ready for this revolt and Sulṭān faced but slight opposition. As in the Druze revolts of the 19th century, Sulṭān and his followers went from one village to another to recruit warriors singing the traditional war songs.[162] His first attack against the French troops came on 18 July. The same day the Druzes also succeeded in shooting down a French aircraft that had been sent to survey the movements of the dissidents. Two days later Sulṭān took possession of Ṣalkhad, the second largest town in the Jabal.[163]

Sulṭān's actions and the way the French reacted after 20 July suggest that neither he nor they realized that what in fact had started

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[159] *Ibid.*, p. 278, for the texts of these orders. It should be noted that Abū Rāshid apparently had access to French confidential correspondence because his texts completely overlap the French version; see *Journal officiel, Débats Sénat*, 17 December 1925, p. 1735; McDowell, pp. 308-309.

[160] FO 371, 10850 E4310/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 116, 10 July 1925, p. 172.

[161] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 239, "Déclaration de Hamad Bey Attrache," p. 41-42; also Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 281-282; MacCallum, pp. 117-118; McDowell, pp. 309-310; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 110-111; Bokova, p. 141.

[162] For a description of Sulṭān's means of mobilizing the Druzes for the revolt, see ʿUbayd, p. 125; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, p. 112.

[163] Andrea, p. 52; ʿUbayd, p. 125; MacCallum, p. 118; McDowell, p. 311; Bouron, p. 238-239.

was a general revolt. In spite of the alarming reports issued by Raynaud and Martin, the French authorities in as-Suwaydā continued to refer to Sulṭān's movements as apparent disturbances, not as a major uprising. Thus they sent out a column of no more than one hundred and sixty-six men, under Captain Normand, to restore order in the southern parts of the Jabal. Sulṭān, when he called for armed struggle, had actually intended to use this force to secure the release of the Druze chiefs arrested by the French. That this was his sole initial purpose may be seen in Sulṭān's attempt to negotiate with Normand when the latter reached the village of Kafr on 21 July. Sulṭān sent one of his Druze chiefs to advise Norman to return to as-Suwaydā and to open negotiations over the return of the exiled chiefs. The French officer, however, preferred to achieve the task he had been assigned and dared Sulṭān to attack him. The Druze leader thereupon did exactly that, in the half-light of dawn cutting to pieces the small French troop of which but a few succeeded in fleeing to as-Suwaydā. Giving the French no time, Sulṭān proceeded that same day, 22 July, to as-Suwaydā, where he forced the French to retire to the citadel and besieged them there. It was with these developments that both Sulṭān and the French began to realize that they were involved in a general revolt.[164]

Sulṭān's initial successes encouraged many Druzes to join him. The French authorities, for their part, became increasingly apprehensive that the revolt in the Jabal would lead to uprisings in other districts of Syria. The victory gained by Sulṭān in his first battle against the French troops had the effect of persuading even the chiefs who had close relations with Carbillet to join the dissidents. One of the Francophiles who joined Sulṭān at this stage was Ḥamza Darwīsh, who perhaps reflected the general mood of the Druzes at the time when later (on 16 July 1926) he explained why all the Druze chiefs joined the revolt after Sulṭān's capture of as-Suwaydā. Darwīsh said he had decided to join the insurgents after he learned that thirty-four of the men in his village had already gone over to Sulṭān.[165]

On 2 August the French, now taking matters more seriously, sent a force of thirty-five hundred men under the command of General

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[164] See ʿUbayd, pp. 126-129; Andrea, p. 53; MacCallum, p. 118; Bouron, pp. 240-242; McDowell, p. 312; *L'Asie Française*, No. 234, August-September 1925, p. 254.

[165] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 240, *Enquête de M. Daclin*, "Interrogation de Ḥamza Darwīsh," Beirut, 16 July 1926, pp. 41-44.

Michaud. Facing them were two thousand Druze warriors, representing the entire community of the Jabal. At the battle of Mazraʿa, ten kilometers northwest of as-Suwaydā, the French army was badly defeated, losing four hundred and fifty dead or missing and more than three hundred wounded; in addition a great number of rifles, artillery pieces, machine guns, and general supplies fell in the hands of the Druzes. The importance of the battle at Mazraʿa, as France had feared, lay in its after-effects. The lesser aspect was that the Druzes had proved they still were worthy of the military prestige earned in the nineteenth century. Of far more serious consequence was that the French defeat increased restiveness in other parts of Syria.[166] The Druze revolt of 1925 became the instrument through which the Druze minority slowly abandoned its separatism and, instead, began seeking its integration in the movement for Syrian nationalism. What had started as a sectarian revolt was soon transformed into a more general uprising, which historians have called the Great Syrian Revolt.

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[166] On the Mazraʿa battle, see, *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 125-159; *L'Asie Française*, No. 234, August-September 1925, p. 255; MacCallum, p. 119; Andrea, p. 55; Bouron, p. 243; ʿUbayd, pp. 130-137; Jundī, pp. 192-194; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 223.

CHAPTER TWO

BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

From Druze Insurgency to the Great Syrian Revolt

Until the battle of Mazraʿa the revolt by the Druzes may be considered as an uprising motivated by communal and familial reasons rather than by Syrian nationalism. Mazraʿa, however, raised the hopes of many nationalists that the insurgency would spread from the Jabal into other districts of Syria. The British consul observed this tendency four days after the battle: "The Druze rebellion is of course causing considerable satisfaction in Nationalist circles, and hopes of a general rising in the country are entertained in some native quarters."[1]

Although Sulṭān al-Aṭrash had communicated with some of the nationalist leaders, in the months leading up to Mazraʿa he had acted first and foremost as a Druze chief whose task it was to defend the community against the successive humiliations the French had been perpetrating on the Druzes in the Jabal. It was not until news of the French defeat at Mazraʿa reached Damascus and Beirut that the Druze revolt began to take on a nationalist dimension. Fear of the insurgency expanding into Damascus and other areas forced Sarrail to change his policy. On 6 August he authorized a peace mission, which consisted of Lebanese Druze leaders, to negotiate with the rebels. The delegation returned to Beirut empty-handed because Sulṭān refused to meet with them. Three days later, ʿAbdalla Najjār and Captain Raynaud arrived in the Jabal, authorized by Sarrail to mediate toward a peaceful solution in the Jabal. The terms presented by the Druze chiefs after several rounds of talks included the freedom for the Jabal to unite with Syria, and further dealt only with the internal affairs of the Jabal and its relations with the Mandatory authorities. The terms put up by the French tended to accept all the Druze demands, but countered with their conditions concerning the

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[1] FO 371, 10850/E4310/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 133, 11 August 1925, p. 213.

return of arms and equipment captured by the Druzes and a further payment in gold as indemnity.[2]

Immediately after the battle of Mazraᶜa, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash's connections with the Syrian nationalists reemerged as a factor in his military and political decisions. Several days after the victory Sulṭān asked his old friend and one of the nationalist leaders, Nasīb al-Bakrī, to help draw up a common plan of action against the French.[3] On 19 August, when ᶜAbdalla Najjār and Yūsuf Shidyāq were still in the Jabal transmitting the French authorities' final offer in their negotiations with the Druzes, a nationalist delegation arrived to set out plans for the coordination of military action against the French in the Jabal and Damascus. The nationalists convinced Sulṭān to break off the negotiations and, claiming that the people of Damascus were prepared to join the revolt, urged him to make a sudden descent upon Damascus. Arrangements were made for a Druze force to connect with a group of two hundred cavalrymen who would be recruited by the nationalists on the night of 23 August at al-Kiswa, eighteen kilometers south of Damascus. From there the joint force was to approach the city at dawn on the 24th.[4]

Between 2 and 23 August Sulṭān issued two proclamations that reflected the transition of the rebellion from a Druze communal uprising to a Syrian nationalist revolt. He addressed his first proclamation to the Muslims and Christians in Syria and in Lebanon in an effort to counteract the French press which had reported on Druze oppression against the Christians and Muslims in the Jabal. While the text of this proclamation, which was worded before the agreement with the nationalists, suggests that Sulṭān had yet to adopt the nationalist notion of the revolt: "From the Arab Druze Emirate to our brethren ... Muslims and Christians ... we hope that you will

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[2] On the negotiations, see Bokova, pp. 162-168; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 290-291; ᶜUbayd, pp. 138-139; Jundī, p. 195; McDowell, pp. 216-220; Abū Rāshid, *Ḥawrān ad-Dāmiya*, pp. 415-416; Ḥakīm, vol. I, pp. 266-267.

[3] Muḥī ad-Din Safarjalānī, *Tā'rīkh ath-Thawra as-Sūriyya al-Waṭaniyya* (Damascus, 1967), p. 144; Hakīm, vol. I, p. 267; ᶜA. Shahbandar, *ath-Thawra as-Sūriyya al-Waṭaniyya* (Damascus, 1933), p. 32. According to Sulṭān contact with the nationalists was kept up uninterruptedly since 1918, i.e., before but also immediately after Mazraᶜa; see *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 114-116.

[4] *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. I, pp. 156-166; Ḥakīm, vol. 1, pp. 267-268; ᶜA.Shahbandar, pp. 32-33; McDowell, pp. 324-326; Khoury, pp. 162-163; ᶜUbayd, p. 139; Bokova, pp. 170-172.

not trust the ambitious enemy [France],'[5] it is important in that it shows that for him Jabal ad-Durūz was the Arab Druze *imāra*. Sulṭān's second proclamation three weeks later openly called for struggle against foreign domination and for an unfettered and independent Syria.[6] The plan to enter Damascus went awry, however, as the Syrian nationalists failed to recruit their quota of cavalrymen and to meet the Druzes in al-Kiswa. The Druze rebels were driven back by a French regiment supported by the air force.[7]

Although Sulṭān al-Aṭrash and a few other chiefs in the Jabal sympathized with the goal of Arab nationalism, the dominant factor until Mazraʿa that had incited the Druze community to support Sulṭān was communal and particularist in outlook. The experience of the Druzes during the short period of their "independent state," however, had convinced many of them that the Jabal could not be separated from its Syrian and Arab environment. While it was true that the internal situation in the Jabal had led the Druzes to take up arms in order to defend their "autonomous" state from the abuses of the French, the dynamics of subsequent events led many of them to reconsider their attitude toward separatism. In this sense, though caused by local factors, the revolt of 1925 soon enlisted a small number of Druze chiefs in the Arab nationalist cause, which transformed it into a wider Syrian revolt, as Sulṭān had called for in his proclamation of 23 August 1925.

The French saw what was coming and during the last two weeks of August at high speed sent out reinforcements in order to contain the revolt. In early September, French troops began to assemble in Azruʿ for an attack on as-Suwaydā. Sulṭān's nationalist fervor was not shared by all Druze chiefs, and indeed, in the light of these developments several were beginning to lose their zeal for further sacrifices.[8] On 5 September some of the doubters held a meeting in the village of Nimra at which they expressed their willingness to withdraw from further engagements against the French.[9] The

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[5] FO 371, 10851/E5138/357/89, Symes to secretary of state for the colonies, Palestine, 14 August 1925, including proclamation of Sulṭān, p. 65.

[6] Safarjalānī, pp. 153-155; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 286-287, "Manshūr Sulṭān al-Aṭrash," 23 August 1925; see also Bokova, pp. 172-176.

[7] *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 167-168; Ḥakīm, p. 270; ʿUbayd, p. 140; McDowell, p. 326-7; Khoury, p. 163.

[8] See Andrea, p. 57.

[9] Qāsimī, p. 83.

Syrian nationalist leaders, for their part, could not free the majority of Damascenes of their prejudices against the Druzes, and when the news reached Damascus that the Druzes would enter the city on 24 August the feeling was more akin to panic than to joy. Several notables, in fact, openly stated their reservations about such a move.[10]

By taking on nationalist colors the revolt had to make room for heterogeneity and even the mistrust which the Syrian population had inherited from its Ottoman past. As a result, the same nationalist dimension that was to give the revolt its intensity and duration also represented its weakness in that it prevented any military coordination among the region's several districts. The revolt constituted the first popular struggle for national independence in the history of Syria in which both urban and rural populations, nomads, Christians, Muslims, Druzes, and others took part—but for that very same reason it never rose above a series of scattered uprisings in several districts. The leaders of the rebellion failed to forge their different groups into a single coherent movement with clear military and political objectives—unable to assimilate into one armed force under the command of a single leadership, each group of rebels continued to act independently in its own district.[11]

Thus, though they had fought since 24 August under the nationalist banner, the Druzes were entirely on their own when in mid-September they faced a French army of more than ten thousand troops supported by an air force and heavy artillery. On the night of 16 September two thousand Druzes attacked the French as they were proceeding to as-Suwaydā via the village of al-Msayfra. This time the Druze failed to pull off another Mazraʿa, leaving three hundred dead on the battlefield. On the 22nd the French captured as-Suwaydā, though only after overcoming great resistance.[12]

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[10] MacCallum, p. 123.

[11] See the criticism voiced by ʿUbayd, pp. 207-230, in his analysis of the cause of the failure of the revolt. See also Jundī's description of the revolt, which explicitly reflects the fact that the Great Revolt actually consisted of scattered uprisings in several districts; Jundī, pp. 186-457. For a different view on the passage from local Druze to nationalist Syrian revolt, see J.L. Miller, "The Syrian Revolt of 1925," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 8 (1977), pp. 503-545.

[12] On the battle of al-Msayfra and the capture of as-Suwaydā, see *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 179-184; Andrea, pp. 58-65; MacCallum, pp. 127-8; Jundī, pp. 196-200; McDowell, pp. 333-334; Safarjalānī, pp. 165-173; ʿUbayd, pp. 140-159; Bokova, pp. 177-184.

When some of the Druze chiefs surrendered in consequence of the French success, the commander of the army, Gamelin, decided to withdraw from as-Suwaydā. Most probably he feared that the rebels would besiege the city. This withdrawal gave Sulṭān the chance to reorganize the Druze resistance while he was also banking on the support of the nationalists to incite a popular uprising in Damascus as well as of his co-religionists in Lebanon, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Wādī at-Taym to spread the revolt into their areas.[13] In October the nationalists of the Ḥamā district rose up in rebellion and captured the city; the orchards of the Ghūṭa, which surrounded Damascus, afforded shelter for bands of rebels there, and in the Aleppo region Bedouin warriors demonstrated outside the city.[14]

The spread of the revolt to the Ghūṭa and into Ḥamā revived the will of the Druzes in the Jabal. Rebellious activity elsewhere in Syria, meanwhile, relieved some of the pressure on the Jabal and enabled the Druzes to open a new front of resistance in Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān—like Druze revolts in the nineteenth century the revolt of 1925 quickly inflamed the Druzes of these districts. In mid-October, Zayd al-Aṭrash, Sulṭān's brother, accompanied by Ḥamza Darwīsh, Shakīb Wahhāb, and other chiefs, left the Jabal for the Ghūṭa in order to join the nationalist forces who were trying to enter Damascus. Zayd's group, however, did not stay but proceeded to the Druze district of Ḥermon.[15] The French authorities, meantime, took brutal measures to suppress the resistance in Damascus and in the Ghūṭa.[16]

Attempting to incite the Druzes of the Ḥermon area, Zayd al-Aṭrash found that he had to contend with a sectarian issue that had been causing tension between Christians and Druzes since the out-

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[13] FO 371, 10851/E5039/357/89, Smart to FO, No. 144, Damascus, 12 August 1925, pp. 8-10; E5450/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 156, Damascus, 10 September 1925, pp. 73-4; E5951/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 177, Damascus, 18 September 1925, p. 97. See also McDowell, pp. 334-337.

[14] MacCallum, pp. 129-139; Safarjalānī, pp. 182-238; Khoury, pp. 168-182; FO 371, 10851/E6547/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 209, Damascus, 26 October 1925; Bokova, pp. 201-216.

[15] According to MacCallum, p. 139, it was a group of Damascenes who requested Zayd al-Aṭrash not to enter the city. According to ʿUbayd, p. 162, however, the Druze group realized that Damascus was not yet ready for an uprising and so proceeded to the area of Ḥermon; see also McDowell, p. 340.

[16] For a description of these measures, see MacCallum, pp. 130-146; Ḥakīm, pp. 283-290; Jundī pp. 244-245. For French justification of the brutality of the measures, see Andrea, pp. 74-90.

break of the revolt in the Jabal.[17] Shortly after Zayd's arrival in the area, a clash occurred in the village of Kawkaba, near Ḥāsbayā, between Christians and Ḥamza Darwīsh in which some of the villagers were killed while others fled spreading tales of massacre and Druze cruelty. Aware of the probable consequences of this incident, Zayd was furious and in his reaction very nearly killed Ḥamza Darwīsh. This, however, could not prevent the incident from reviving the nineteenth-century antagonism between the Christians and Druzes in Lebanon. Not surprisingly, a large number of Maronites began to respond to entreaties by the French to accept arms and aid the authorities against the rebels. Some Druze leaders of Mt. Lebanon were equally alarmed and requested the Druze rebels not to enter the mixed area of Shūf and Matn. Zayd al-Aṭrash wrote to the Druze member of the Lebanese Parliament, Amīn Arslān, promising to respect his request.[18] Unlike Shakīb and ʿAdil Arslān, who opposed the French Mandate and called for the independence and unity of Syria, including Mt. Lebanon, Amīn preferred the Syrian entity not to include Mt. Lebanon, which he wanted to remain autonomous.[19]

Thus Zayd al-Aṭrash restricted his activities to the Druze areas of South Lebanon, which had been annexed to Lebanon in 1920. Although he emphasized the non-sectarian character of the revolt by reaffirming the principle that it was a national, not a religious, war against the French,[20] neither Christians nor Muslims in this area could be drawn into the fighting against the French, and the Druzes continued to carry the nationalist burden. In an effort to open up a new front Zayd al-Aṭrash seized the whole area of Wādī at-Taym before the French could launch a counter-attack. On 5 November he took Marjʿiyūn and then, on the 21st, Rāshayā, which was the most important strategic town in the area. As of the 24th, however, the

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[17] FO 371, 10850/E4677/357/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 130, Damascus, 27 July 1925, p. 190; FO 371, 10851/E5039/357/89, No. 144, 12 August 1925, p. 9; E5951/357/89, No. 177, 18 September 1925, p. 97; E6391/357/89, No. 194, Damascus, 5 October 1925, p. 103; see also *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 211-212.

[18] FO 371, 10852/E7291/357/89, General Mayers to Chamberlain, No. 150, Beirut, 5 November 1925, p. 220; MacCallum, pp. 141-2; ʿUbayd, p. 163; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, pp. 305-307; Qāsimī, pp. 145-147.

[19] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 240, *Enquête de M. Daclin*, Amīn Arslān to the French consul in Haifa, pp. 130-132.

[20] See Zayd's appeals in Qāsimī, pp. 140-145; see also Bokova, pp. 221-222.

French army began to sweep the Druzes out of Wādī at-Taym. As in the Jabal, the Druzes in the area paid with great losses of life and property. In December the French occupied Ḥāsbayā, the last stronghold of resistance in Wādī at-Taym. Zayd's men retired to Majdal-Shams, where they continued to resist until 8 April 1926 when the French finally besieged the village. After a hopeless, bloody, and day-long battle, the village was destroyed and its inhabitants turned into refugees.[21]

In December 1925 Henry de Jouvenel replaced General Sarrail as high commissioner and put into effect a new policy for dealing with the revolt. The French approach from here on would be two-pronged: political means and negotiations on the one hand; sufficient forces prepared for a military option, on the other. This policy was expressed by the formula stressed by de Jouvenel in his initial speech: "War upon those who wish war, and peace to those who wish peace."[22] On 17 December, he authorized the Druze member of the Lebanese Parliament, Amīn Arslān, to head a delegation of notables that was to go to the Jabal to mediate with Sulṭān. The mission failed as Sulṭān could not be drawn into negotiations with the French authorities.[23] In an attempt to sow confusion among the rebels, de Jouvenel issued on 24 December a decree promising amnesty to any rebels who would surrender before 8 January 1926.[24] The offer, however, proved not as persuasive as Sulṭān's insistence that "the Druze people do not agree to lay down arms until France recognizes the complete independence of Syria."[25] De Jouvenel addressed a final message of surrender to the Druze rebels on 27 February the principal aim of which was to split the Druzes and the nationalists. Thus, he promised to grant the Druzes full autonomy on their mountain, but also made certain threats:

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[21] On the fighting in Wādī at-Taym and Iqlīm al-Billān, see the following: *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 1, pp. 217-227; vol. 2, pp. 22-26; Safarjalānī, pp. 255-282, 364-267; Qāsimī, pp. 149-175; ʿUbayd, pp. 164-186; MacCallum, pp. 144-146; *L'Asie Française*, April 1926, pp. 160-161; McDowell, p. 343-344. Many Majdal-Shams inhabitants fled to Palestine, others to Lajā.

[22] MacCallum, p. 176; Abū Rāshid, *Jabal ad-Durūz*, p. 326.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 327; FO 371, 11505/E148/12/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 285, Damascus, 28 December 1925, p. 45; McDowell, p. 363; Khoury, p. 184; Andrea dates the delegation to February 1926; see Andrea, p. 92.

[24] MAE, Haut-Commissariat en Syrie et au Liban, *Recueil des actes administratives du Haut-Commissariat 1925*, Decree No. 27, 24 December 1925, p. 354; see also McDowell, p. 362-363.

[25] Andrea, p. 92.

> Only France can provide you the wheat, spring-water, schools and the national freedom you are lacking .... Before the decisive hour, which will be your last battle, I want to do my duty by warning you that if your blood will flow, if your women and children will go hungry, if your ruin and defeat will be without remedy, this will not be my fault, but that of Sultan Attrache [Sulṭān al-Aṭrash] .... Druzes! The easiest way to conquer is to put down your arms: the peace, freedom, bread with which I provide you are worth more than your guns.[26]

With strong nationalist fervor, the rebels rejected de Jouvenel's appeal:

> In response to your Excellency, a great meeting was held on 25 February in the village of Dāmā [in the Lajā]; at this meeting it was decided ... to bring forth the following demands: (1) the recognition of the independence of the Syrian territories with representation abroad and acceptance of Syria in the League of Nations; (2) the proclamation of Syrian unity and the return of Greater Lebanon to its old, pre-war status; (3) the conclusion of a durable, fixed treaty with France that will guarantee the interests of France without damaging the national sovereignty of Syria; (4) the withdrawal of the French troops; (5) a general amnesty.[27]

It is obvious that these demands and their nationalist tone were formulated under the inspiration of such Druze nationalists from Mt. Lebanon as ʿAdil Arslān, Rashīd Talīʿ, Fūʾād Slīm, Ḥamad Saʿb and others who had joined the revolt in the course of 1925.[28]

While de Jouvenel tried to obtain a surrender through these negotiations, he was at the same time also preparing for the military option. In December, the high commissioner had appointed General Charles Andrea as commander-in-chief of French forces in the Damascus area with orders to evolve a scheme for crushing the revolt. Three principles were adopted to carry out the plan: (1) separating the Druzes from the nationalists and detaching the rebels of the Jabal from those of the Damascus area; (2) using local elements, such as Bedouins, Circassians, Armenians, and Kurdish

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[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94; also *L'Asie Française*, No. 237, January 1926, pp. 45-46; The Arabic version may be found in ʿUbayd, Appendix No. 51, pp. 324-335.

[27] Andrea, p. 94; *L'Asie Française*, No. 239, March 1926, p. 125; see also Bokova, p. 232.

[28] On the role of the Druze Lebanese nationalists, see Jundī, pp. 216-218, 246, 240-242.

irregulars, against the rebels; and (3) training a strong army for an attack on the Jabal.[29]

In February 1926 General Andrea began his offensive against the villages of the Ghūṭa to clear the rebels out of Damascus with the support of the irregulars and local auxiliary troops.[30] Two months later, on 22 April, a regular force of some ten thousand men, backed by tanks, artillery, and airplanes, set out for as-Suwaydā. Not waiting for the troops to reach the city, the Druzes began attacking the advancing army. Outnumbered and outgunned, they fought fiercely and with great courage, sacrificing in the process more than six hundred men, but to no avail. It proved impossible to hold the French back and the city was recaptured on 25 April 1926.[31]

General Andrea hoped that his "*plan des operations*" would quickly lead to the "*pacification*" of the Jabal. Andrea's plan was based on four phases:

> Order to be restored in as-Suwaydā, and a garrison to be installed there in order to show the Druzes our will to remain henceforth in the Jabal; a revitalizing base to be established for the troops, and columns to be sent out to the interior of the country to introduce pacification.
>
> In the beginning a force to be sent to the north of the Jabal, where the people are less militant than others elsewhere and where the important family of ʿAmer certainly will re-establish its ancient contact with us.
>
> Then to move south, to the country of the Aṭrashs and the inciters of the revolt.
>
> After strangling the revolt and restoring the peace, [we will] re-establish a government and a new administration for the Druze state.[32]

The pacification of the Jabal was not achieved entirely as Andrea envisioned. Although in the north he did succeed in linking up with the ʿAmers and although most of the villages submitted by May,[33]

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[29] For the application of this scheme, Andrea, pp. 69-129; MacCallum, pp. 149-172; FO 371, 11506/E1589/12/89, Smart to Chamberlain, No. 77, Damascus, 23 February 1926, p. 4, E1593/12/89, No. 81, Damascus, 24 February 1926, p. 6, ʿUbayd, pp. 218-221; Khoury, pp. 191-192.

[30] See Andrea, pp. 77-90; MacCallum, pp. 151-159; Jundī, pp. 367-390; Khoury, pp. 192-195.

[31] According to Andrea, p. 117, the Druzes lost fifteen hundred killed and injured. For other estimations see McDowell, p. 350; Khoury, n. p. 195; *L'Asie Française*, May 1926, p. 200. For a description of the battle, see FO 371, 11506/E2933/12/89 Russell to Chamberlain, No. 149, Damascus, 28 April 1926, pp. 119-120; E3333/12/89 from liaison officer to Air Ministry, 29 May 1926, pp. 174-197; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 2, pp. 112-118.

[32] Andrea, p. 99.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 132-142; ʿUbayd, p. 191.

the capture of Shahbā, whose defense under Muḥammad Kīwān was formidable, proved costly.[34] The most important engagement after as-Suwaydā took place in the south early in June. Again, as in the Ghūṭa, a campaign of destruction was waged against the villages in the south of the Jabal where the main victims were the unarmed peasants. After bombarding the southern villages the French attacked Ṣalkhad, the capital of Aṭrash's district.[35] Using armoured cars and artillery the French took four hours and heavy losses to drive the rebels from their positions.[36]

Andrea's expectation that the fall of Ṣalkhad would lead to the complete "pacification" of the Jabal was based on the assumption that the town was "the fief of Aṭrashs where the revolt was born" and, therefore, its capture would prove a "great victory of which the reverberations will be profound in Syria and elsewhere."[37] In spite of their difficult situation, the rebels continued to launch hit-and-run attacks the effect of which was to grant the Great Revolt another one year of life.

Just as they had done in the Ghūṭa and in the Aleppo district, the French recruited in the south of the Jabal an irregular auxiliary force from amongst the Druzes themselves to aid in the effort to "keep order."[38] The economic pressure and the despair of the Druzes under the occupation attracted scores of young men who were not adverse to earning the monthly wage of £ 7 gold as auxiliaries.[39] The same circumstances caused a number of Druze chiefs to submit to the French and even to come out with pro-French statements.[40] For use as "contra-propaganda" against the nationalists, the French persuaded their Druze collaborators to express the futility of following the nationalists, who "sacrificed" and "sold" the Druze blood for personal interest.[41]

Sulṭān and his followers, neither to be cowed nor bought, continued to sabotage France's "pacification" plans. Fighting continued apace between August and October 1926 when Sulṭān and

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[34] Jundī, pp. 220-221.
[35] MacCallum, pp. 169-170.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 169; *Mudhakkarāt Sulṭān*, vol. 2, pp. 129-131; Jundī, pp. 221-223; Andrea, pp. 170-172.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 172.
[38] See *ibid.*, pp. 140-141; MacCallum, p. 170; ʿUbayd, pp. 219-220.
[39] Andrea, p. 139.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 132-136, 138, 175, 179-183.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 142-144.

Shahbander, the Damascene nationalist, were finally forced to seek refuge in al-Azraq in Transjordan. Those who refused to surrender entrenched themselves in the vastness of the Lajā. While Sulṭān was still making forays against the French in the south of the Jabal until April 1927, Muḥammad ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Ḥalabī led groups in the Lajā in hit-and-run attacks until March 1927. With the revolt having been suppressed in the Ghūṭa and other Syrian districts, these attacks were manifestations of a by now desperate struggle. In March the French launched a strong attack in the Lajā, the last engagement in the area, in which the rebels were overwhelmed. The latter abandoned their positions and followed Sulṭān into al-Azraq. In April the British authorities, under pressure from France, put the Druze encampment in al-Azraq under martial law and threatened to eject Sulṭān from Transjordan. The Druze defense finally broke down in June 1927. Sulṭān and about five hundred of his fighters along with their families withdrew to Najd in Saudi Arabia.[42] Here some of them spent the next ten years in exile relying on money sent them from several sources. Only a small percentage of these funds actually reached Sulṭān and his Druze followers, however, the bulk of it being taken by the Istiqlāl party which represented the nationalist notables of Damascus and Lebanon.[43] In the course of 1932 most of the Druze exiles in Najd left for Transjordan where they again concentrated in the village of al-Azraq. Meanwhile, a number of important chiefs who had accompanied Sulṭān in his exile submitted to the French authorities and received permission to return to the Jabal. The encampment in al-Azraq in time became a permanent Druze settlement in Transjordan.[44]

A New Form of Separatism

The revolt of 1925 had its impact on the French Mandatory authorities as well as on the Druzes of Syria and Lebanon. In the course of the revolt itself the French tried to learn from their "faults" in the Jabal in order to adopt a policy that would better protect their interests in Syria and Lebanon. In its August-September issue of 1925

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[42] Further details in ʿUbayd, pp. 205-206; MacCallum, pp. 171-172.

[43] See McDowell, pp. 373-374; Qarqūt, pp. 92-95.

[44] MAE, "Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, Année 1932" (Paris, 1933), p. 8.

the colonial *L'Asie Française* pointed out certain failings which it said had incited the Druze chiefs. The revolt was seen by *L'Asie Française* as a rebellion by the chiefs in reaction to French provocations.[45] In December the deputies in the Senate and the Chamber in Paris conducted a parliamentary debate on the failures of French officials in Syria. Some blamed Carbillet and Sarrail while others held Raynaud to be at fault.[46] In September 1926 Charles Daclin—who had been assigned to investigate the Druze revolt—completed his report on the causes of the Druze revolt. After having talked to a great number of Druze chiefs as well as French officials Daclin came to three principal conclusions: 1. The officials and some Aṭrashs had sought to anger Carbillet so that he would act against them, first for their indifference and then for their patrician influence [vis-à-vis their own people]; 2. Through his naivety [*bonne fois*], his weakness, and his shortcomings, Raynaud had put the entire Jabal in the service of these discontents; 3. Sulṭān, whose political tendencies were known, then had put the Jabal in the service of the Syrian cause.[47]

In April 1925, when the French were preparing all available means to crush the revolt, the future of the Druze state had stood between either of two French options: the restoration of the Druze government in accordance with the Franco-Druze agreement of 1921, or the preparation of a new "*statu organique*" (organic law). After the French troops had recaptured as-Suwaydā later that month, the Jabal was put under the charge of the military authorities. By 1927 Paris decided to abandon the Franco-Druze agreement altogether in order to adopt a course of reorganizing the organic law of the Jabal. Explaining the reasons for this course, the high commissioner was later, in 1930, to argue:

> In consideration of its geographical and military situation, the Jabal should be controlled vigorously by the Mandatory state. It must, at least temporarily, be subject to an administration directed by the French and by the military by reason both of external defense and of internal security.[48]

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[45] *L'Asie Française*, No. 234, August-September 1925, pp. 249-255.

[46] *Journal Officiel, Débats Senat*, 17 December 1925; Débats à la Chambre, December 18, 20, 1925. See also *L'Asie Française*, No. 237, January 1926, pp. 9-31.

[47] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1918-1929*, vol. 240, *Enquête de M. Daclin*, "Les Cause de la Révolution Druze," p. 164.

[48] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 477, Le Haut-Commissaire to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, "Statut Organique du Territoire du Djebel Druze," January-February 1930, pp. 45-46.

The two options considered by France were not motivated only by its concerns in the Jabal. The Great Revolt in Syria also impacted on France's entire policy in Syria and Lebanon. Early in June 1926 de Jouvenel left for Paris for discussions with government officials of certain plans he had formulated after studying the situation during his service as high commissioner. De Jouvenel was replaced in October by General Henri Ponsot, who seemed in no rush to adopt either option and preferred to follow a cautious course. During his first five months as high commissioner Ponsot visited various areas and communities. Accompanied by Colonel Catroux, who was well acquainted with the Syrian people, he listened to the programs and petitions of representatives of the different communities and political organizations. On 27 July 1927, when the Great Revolt was over, Ponsot announced the general lines of his policy: (1) France "will not renounce its Mandate," which had been undertaken to facilitate "the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent states and [to favor] local self-government in full measure where circumstances permit." Meanwhile, he declared that France "has decided to comply with the wishes expressed during periods of order and peace, and to respect the rights of minorities." Although he mentioned "complete decentralization" in regard to the reorganization of the French Mandate, he also emphasized that "states of the Levant cannot alone seek their development in the practice of a narrow policy of separatism—so the Mandatory Power, anxious to strengthen union and concord between the communities confined to its protection, wishes to see them brought closer together." He also promised to allow the "continuity of French policy" in order to establish "the organic law."[49]

The use of such expressions as "complete decentralization" and "union between the communities" rendered the declaration ambiguous. It was not known whether the Druze and ʿAlawī state would be maintained or whether they would be integrated into the Syrian state. In the absence of the leading Syrian nationalists, who had been exiled, a new form of nationalist movement emerged, this time along non-revolutionary lines. Three months after Ponsot's declaration, fifteen nationalists from Syria and Lebanon met in Beirut to frame a response. Seven of these nationalists formed the core of the

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[49] The full text of Ponsot's declaration in MacCallum, Appendix III, pp. 273-277.

"National Bloc": Iḥsān ash-Sharīf, Ibrāhīm Hanānū, ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Kayyālī, Najīb al-Barāzī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Kaylānī, Maẓhar Raslān, and Hāshim al-Atāsī. All were representatives of the big cities of Syria, and the National Bloc continued to attract nationalists primarily from the urban areas of Syria while neglecting the Druzes, ʿAlawīs, and rural inhabitants. Indeed, the Bloc's activities focused on the unity of the Syrian districts in one state.[50]

In May 1930 Ponsot decided to translate his ambiguous declaration of 1927 into a less equivocal constitutional reorganization by first dissolving the Constituent Assembly in Damascus and then promulgating a new constitution which he wanted to impose. At the same time, he issued organic laws for the *sanjaq* of Alexandretta, the ʿAlawī state, and the Druze state. Explaining to the French foreign minister the reasons behind his decision in regard to the Druzes, he gave a survey of the history of the Druzes' independent and separatist attitude during the Ottoman period and the immediate post-war years of 1918-1920. He then summarized the events that led to the revolt of 1925. In concluding, he rejected the return of the form of government that had existed before 1925: "Our control of a turbulent population," he wrote, "would not be effectual without the constant presence of the army, the only guarantee that similar events to 1925 would take place no more."[51]

The organic law of the Jabal, like that in other districts in Syria, stressed the equality of the citizens; the liberty of the individual; freedom of conscience, communication, expression, reunion, association, and the press "within limits of the laws and regulations that are meant to insure the maintenance of public order."[52] Unlike the regulations of the 1920s, the organic law did not recognize "local customs." The judicial system, administration, education, internal security, and other public affairs were to be organized in accordance with Western models (Articles 8-12). The organic law did not refer to the nationality of the governor of the Jabal; however,

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[50] For more details on the National Bloc and its political aims, see Khoury, pp. 248-284; Armanāzī, pp. 71-92; Qarqūt, pp. 101-144; Longrigg, pp. 187-199.

[51] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 477, Le Haut-Commissaire to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, "Statut Organique du Territoire du Djebel Druze," January-February 1930, p. 47.

[52] *Ibid.*, vol. 478, "Statut Organique du Territoire du Djebel Druze," Articles 1 to 7, p. 162.

the decree by which the organic law was declared stated that the governor was to be appointed by the high commissioner.[53]

Thus, the organic law effectively maintained the separation of the Jabal from Syria; meanwhile, it also deprived the Druze chiefs of their full autonomy as stipulated in the Franco-Druze agreement. In this sense the organic law was meant to provide the death certificate of the traditional Druze *mashyakha*. By implementing the organic law the high commissioner sought to strike a blow at the two main forces of opposition that the French faced during the revolt: nationalism and full autonomy. With the nationalists, led by Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, in exile (until 1937), the autonomists formed the main opposition in the Jabal. French authorities continued up to 1934 to make great efforts to remove Druze leaders ᶜAbd al-Ghaffār, Mitᶜib and Ḥasan al-Aṭrash, in order to carry out France's policy in the Jabal.[54]

In 1935, after plans had been made for a mission of Syrian delegates to negotiate in Paris a Franco-Syrian treaty that would pave the way for an independent, united Syria, the Druze autonomists began to assuage their attitude vis-à-vis the French authorities in order to gain French support for their autonomy and ᶜAbd al-Ghaffār, the leader of this faction, expressed the desire of the Druze leaders for "maintaining the autonomous statute from which their Jabal benefited."[55]

Once again the Druzes split into two factions: separatists-autonomists and unionists-nationalists. The "new" factionalism, however, although it was also a manifestation of political tendencies among the young Druzes, again reflected the traditional dispute between the clans. On the traditional level, the division between unionists and separatists was motivated by political considerations of an internal nature, and some of the leading chiefs, notably amongst the Aṭrashs and the ᶜAmers, shifted their political affiliations in accordance with the prevailing balance of forces and their clan's interests. Such changes were explained by Meyrier, the general delegate of the high commissioner, in these terms: "Autonomists by mere interest and not by conviction, they do not hesitate to reconcile with Damascus on the day when the Syrian leaders

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

[54] MAE, "Rapport à la Société des Nations, Année 1933" (Paris, 1934), p. 11; "Année 1934" (Paris, 1935), p. 8.

[55] *Ibid.*, "Année 1935" (Paris, 1936), p. 4.

guarantee the sinecures they seek for themselves and the members of their clans."[56]

Naturally, these shifts in political affiliations and subsequent actions stemmed from the Druzes' concern about their political future. One month before the first meeting, on 2 April 1936, of the Syrian delegation and the French foreign minister, a dispute erupted between Druze separatists and unionists in the Jabal. The former were represented by an alliance between the Francophiles and the old full-autonomists, led by Aṭrash chiefs who had spearheaded the campaign against Carbillet in 1925; the unionists by an alliance of young people, the chiefs of the Najm branch of the Aṭrash family, the Ḥalabī family, and chiefs of many second-rank clans. In the absence of Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, Muḥammad ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Ḥalabī and ʿAlī ʿUbayd—who were still in exile and thus were prevented from leading the unionists—a group of young leaders came to the fore, the most prominent of which were ʿAlī al-Aṭrash, Sallūm Naṣṣār, Fraḥān al-Aṭrash, Ḥammūd Hnaydī, Jabr ʿAzzām, and the Druze Lebanese journalist, Najīb Ḥarb.[57]

Whereas the separatist alliance inspired by the French authorities was unstable, the unionist group represented a new generation of Druzes who idealized the events of the revolt of 1925-1927 and saw it only in its nationalist dimension. On 13 May this group distributed a handbill in Damascus in which they stressed the Druzes' attachment to Syria and charged that the French authorities in as-Suwaydā were "exercising repressive measures against the unionists while they are organizing separatist demonstrations in the Jabal." A month earlier ʿAlī al-Aṭrash had paid a visit to Beirut and Damascus to draw the attention of the nationalists to the measures being conducted by the French against his group.[58] Elaborating on the grievances and demands of his faction, he stated that the French had prohibited three meetings of the unionists.

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[56] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 492, M. Meyrier délégué general du Haut-Commissaire to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, No. 577 Beirut, 29 May 1936, p. 144.

[57] MAE, "Rapport à la Société des Nations, Année 1936," (Paris, 1937), pp. 3-4. On the Druze unionists and separatists, see Longrigg, pp. 219-220; Khoury, pp. 515-517.

[58] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 492, Le Secrétaire-General de la Residence du Conseil a M. le Sous-Directeur des Affaires d'Afrique et du Levant, 15 June 1936.

> While the authorities forbade the meetings of the liberal leaders [nationalists], arresting some of them ... they signaled to their functionaries and their "*creatures*" to propagate the separatist idea ... in order to be published in the French press.[59]

'Alī al-Aṭrash then presented the demands of the Druze unionists: full confirmation of the memorandum that had been sent to the French foreign minister on 13 April 1936 which had called for the unity and independence of Syria, and the authorization of the Syrian delegation to represent also the Druzes.[60]

In June, when the negotiations in Paris began dealing with the status of the Druze and ʿAlawī districts in the Syrian state, the dispute between unionists and separatists in both the Jabal and ʿAlawī districts intensified. Demonstrations and petitions for and against union with Syria involved most of the Druze leaders in the Jabal. It seems that some of the separatist petitions were heavily prompted by the French, who attempted to exercise influence over the negotiations. A comparison of some of the texts of various separatist petitions reveals their literal similarity. Thus, two of the petitions, e.g., completely overlapped while four petitions emphasized in almost equal terms the historical particularism of the Druzes and their struggle for existence in a hostile environment. Fawzī al-Aṭrash, one of the petitioners, argued that the Druzes, like the Jews, had the right to establish a "national home." All petitions pretended to be congratulations to the newly elected prime minister of France, Leon Blum.[61] "On this occasion," the petitioners wrote,

> we have the honor to beg of you support for our demand. The Druzes have frequently declared and sent multiple telegrams and *maẓbatas* [petitions] insistently demanding confirmation of their separation and independence from Syria.[62]

It seems, though, that the French did not succeed in persuading the more influential political chiefs to send such petitions. Apart from

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[59] *Ibid.*, "*Manshūr* (proclamation) of ʿAli al-Aṭrash" (n.d.), p. 145.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

[61] The general elections in France on 26 April 1936, resulted in the victory of Popular Front headed by the Socialist Party leader, Léon Blum.

[62] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 493, letter from Fawzī al-Aṭrash to Léon Blum, 11 June 1936; letter of Aḥmad al-Hajarī, Aḥmad Jarbūʿ, and ʿAlī al-Ḥinnawi, the *mashāykh al-ʿaql* to Blum, 16 June 1936; Ḥamza and Ismāʿīl Darwīsh to Blum, 17 June 1936, Druze emigrants in Beirut to Blum, 17 June 1936, pp. 22-26, 30-32.

the religious *sheikhs* and the temporal leaders Ḥamza Darwīsh and Fawzī al-Aṭrash, the petitioners belonged mainly to the common people. Even the petition signed by thirty-five Druzes and called by the French "*un message colletif*," did not contain the signatures of any powerful Druze chief, either of the ʿAmers or of the Aṭrashs.[63]

The unionists in their petition attempted to draw the attention of the Popular Front, the "champions of liberty," as they called it, to the pressure exercised by the French authorities to "suppress the individual freedom" of unionists.[64] In spite of such pressure, the unionists demonstrated in the streets of as-Suwaydā in favor of Syrian unity and against the religious chiefs who supported the separatist faction.[65]

After the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936

On 9 September 1936 a treaty was signed in Paris between the Syrian delegation and the French government. Although the document showed an understanding of the need to protect the religious minorities, it specifically recognized the unity with and within the Syrian state of the (separate) Druze and ʿAlawī districts. The official re-attachment of the two districts to the Syrian state was prescribed by subsequent decrees on 2 and 5 December 1936. Neither the separatists nor the unionists gained a victory as a result of the accord which, in effect, represented a compromise between the nationalists' demand for unification and the safeguarding of the minorities' rights in the face of the centralizing policy that Damascus would adopt—according to the December enactments the Druze and the ʿAlawī districts became two *muḥāfaẓas* (provinces) of the Syrian state. Although the governors of these two provinces would be appointed by the Syrian president, the locally elected councils were given powers of local legislation. Each province was to be autonomous insofar as its financial organization was concerned. French troops were to be stationed in the two provinces for the first five years after the pact had come into force. The ʿAlawīs would have

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[63] *Ibid.*, vol. 493, p. 152.

[64] *Ibid.*, vol. 492. Telegram signed by ʿAli al-Aṭrash, Salīm Naṣṣār, Farḥān al-Aṭrash, Ḥammūd Hnaydī, Najīb Ḥarb and Jabr ʿAzzām, 15 June 1936.

[65] *Ibid.*, telegram, No. 551, 19 June 1936, p. 17; dispersing the crowd, the French authorities used force, injuring some of the Druze demonstrators.

twelve and the Druzes five deputies representing the two respective communities in the Syrian Parliament.[66]

Even before the issuance of the December statutes, Druze chiefs had already contacted Syrian leaders in order to prepare the incorporation of the Jabal into the new Syrian state. In these discussions the Druzes were represented by the influential *sheikhs* ʿAbd al-Ghaffār and Ḥasān al-Aṭrash. In an effort to maintain their supremacy in the Jabal the Aṭrashs tried to convince Syrian leaders of the necessity of appointing a Druze governor in the Jabal.[67] In doing so they confronted the Syrian government with the Druze particularism of the Jabal embodied in the traditional social structure of the *mashyakha* system. No more successful than the Ottomans, the Sharīfians, or the French, the Syrian government could not persuade the Druze chiefs, through an appeal to nationalist interests, to abandon their "inherited privileges." The separatism of the Aṭrashs and ʿAmers naturally did not correspond with the separatism of the officials and others who benefited from the French presence in the Jabal. The chiefs wanted to retain their rule through the new administration of the Jabal—and this could only be achieved by imparting maximum autonomy to their province. Some of the Aṭrash chiefs, therefore, formed a separatist faction in December 1936.

Two main questions now occupied the internal parties of the Jabal: the appointment of the governor and the representation in the Parliament of Syria. The first brought back the competition between the Aṭrash and ʿAmer clans on the one hand, and among the Aṭrashs themselves on the other, whereby the main rivals for this post were Amīr Ḥasan al-Aṭrash and ʿAbd al-Ghaffār. The former was the chief of ʿIrā, a position considered in Druze tradition as that of paramount chief. ʿAbd al-Ghaffār was the chief of as-Suwaydā, the capital of the Jabal. At the beginning of 1937 the ʿAmers seemed to be supporting the nationalist faction because they knew that appointing a local governor meant the choice of an Aṭrash chief. As a compromise the government named Nasīb al-Bakrī, the Damascene nationalist who had personal bonds with the Druze chiefs, notably with

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[66] On the treaty of 1936, see Longrigg, pp. 218-225; Khoury, pp. 264-468.
[67] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 495, telegrams, 16 October 30, 1936, pp. 60-62.

the Aṭrash family.[68] His selection, however, was not quite the success it was meant to be: "Although the Mahafiz [*muḥāfiẓ*] chosen...," the British consul observed,

> had played a prominent part in the Druze rebellion of 1925, the powerful Druze clan of Atrash did not take kindly to the appointment of a non-Druze .... Faced with the problem, the Government temporized by appointing a Syrian who had been a rebel in the Druze ranks .... Arising out of these troubles was an accusation ... made by the Mahafiz himself, that Colonel Tarrit and Mr. Pruneaud, the French military commander and civil adviser, respectively, have been covertly encouraging the Atrash clan.[69]

When Sulṭān al-Aṭrash returned to the Jabal following his amnesty in May 1937, he found the community in a state of agitation: The dispute between separatists and unionists had brought the Jabal to the brink of violent troubles once again.[70] On Sulṭān's position in this dispute no data are available. It seems that he kept his silence, which could be interpreted that he either maintained neutrality or refrained from open rivalry.[71] His previous position toward internal factionalism, his relations with the National Bloc and his mistrust of the French could certainly explain such silence. Since the First World War Sulṭān had not taken sides in any dispute among the chiefs on an official position; during his period of exile he had been ignored by most of the leaders of the National Bloc while the full independence for which the nationalists of 1925 had fought was not attained. Sulṭān's notion of nationalism had been forged through his struggle against the French and further stemmed from his ties with the Sharīfians and Shahbander. Although the treaty of 1936 did lead to a withdrawal of the French from Syria, treaties could be violated—as had been the case with the Franco-Druze treaty in 1921.

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[68] *Ibid.*, vol. 495. Haut Commissaire en Syrie to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 19 September 1937, pp. 209-212; MAE, "Rapport à la Société des Nations, Année 1937," (Paris, 1938), p. 4; Khoury, p. 517.

[69] FO 371, 20846/E2159/836/581, Mackereth to FO, Damascus, 8 April 1937, pp. 187-188.

[70] Ṣghayar, p. 647.

[71] The Zionist movement in Palestine at this period had an agent, Yūsuf al-ʿAaysamī, who was assigned to collect information on Druzes joining the Arab rebels in Palestine and on the political situation of the Jabal. In one of his reports on the political activities of the Jabal, he considered Sulṭān to be neutral in the dispute; Hagana Archives (HA) (Israel), 8B/5B, letters from Yūsuf al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 13, 16, 25 January 1939.

While Sulṭān was keeping his silence, other powerful Aṭrashs continued to voice their protest against the appointment of al-Bakrī. The hesitant new government gave in, but on the condition that al-Bakrī finish his term of office of six months after which Ḥasan al-Aṭrash would be appointed governor.[72] In October 1937 al-Bakrī was replaced, however, by an interim governor from Damascus, Bahīj al-Khatīb, who was mandated to organize the elections of the deputies representing the Jabal in the Syrian Parliament. The delay in appointing a local governor coupled with the election of deputies further agitated the Druze chiefs, and the division among those who competed for the seats allocated to the Jabal deepened even further. An electoral brawl in Shahbā, where at least one person was killed, was one manifestation of this bitter competition; not until February 1938 could the interim governor carry out a reelection there.[73]

The discord during the election campaign reflected the transitional period through which the Jabal was passing, a period characterized by conflict between the continuity of the *mashyakha* and the emerging of new political forces. Thus, the dispute once again manifested a mixture of clan competition and strife between separatists and unionists. Those who were elected to the Parliament—Zayd al-Aṭrash, Muḥammad ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Ḥalabī, Sulaymān Nassār, and ʿUqlā al-Qiṭāmī—represented this mix of traditional and new politics: Although all of them belonged to the stratum of chiefs of clans and traditional factions, two of them, al-Ḥalabī and Naṣṣār, had linked their political activities with the ambitions of secondary families and young educated people who wanted full integration with the Syrian state.[74]

In February 1938 the Syrian government finally decided to appoint Ḥasan al-Aṭrash as *muḥāfiẓ* of the Jabal. His appointment indirectly legitimized the paramountcy of his leadership. In this sense the government preserved his role of intermediary between the Jabal and the central government, a role the Aṭrash family had played in one way or another since 1870. However, the recognition accorded

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[72] FO 371, 20846/E2295/252/89, Mackereth to FO, Damascus, 21 April 1937, p. 201.

[73] MAE, *Syrie-Liban 1930-1940*, vol. 495, Haut-Commissaire en Syrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 29 September 1937, pp. 212-213; MAE, "Rapport à la Societé des Nations, Année 1937" (Paris 1938), p. 4; "Année 1938" (Paris, 1939), p. 8.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

Ḥasan al-Aṭrash had also as effect the weakening of the influence of the secondary families and the educated younger generation, i.e., those who were pressing for further integration with Syria in order to debilitate the Aṭrashs' supremacy in the Jabal. This particular interethnic dispute coincided with two major developments in Syria, viz., the intensification of the rivalry and factionalism that existed among the Syrian nationalists, and the revision of France's policy on Syrian unity. In regard to the first, the government became less and less capable of dealing effectively with problems in peripheral districts such as Jabal ad-Durūz, and in May 1938 France subsequently accepted, in principle, the recommendation of the high commissioner for returning autonomy to the ʿAlawīs and the Druzes.[75]

Encouraged by this action of the French, the Druze Francophiles mounted a separatist campaign against the institutions of the Syrian government in the Jabal, whereby officials and judges were placed under house arrest and then compelled to leave the Jabal. With this breakdown of order some of the Druzes began to call for the renewal of the Franco-Druze treaty of 1921, which had granted the Jabal complete detachment from Damascus.[76]

Although these factors external to the region spurred the separatist into action, the internal politics of the Jabal remained their main motivating force. No matter which slogans the separatists used, it was the traditional dispute between clans that lay behind their activities. The Aṭrash chiefs, ʿAbd al-Ghaffār and Ḥasan, used the "autonomy of the Jabal" in 1937 as an instrument for maintaining their own dominance. When, however, Ḥasan al-Aṭrash was appointed *muḥāfiẓ*, he shifted his position. The British consul made this assessment in March 1938: "At present [Ḥasan is] supporting the Syrian nationalists, but he is notoriously a political opportunist."[77] Disaffected by Ḥasan's appointment, ʿAbd al-Ghaffār went beyond the rubric of separation from Syria when he sought Britain's support for the eventual annexation of the Jabal to Transjordan. At the end of 1938 he sent an emissary to the British consul in Damascus to ask him to come and visit the region "under the

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[75] See Longrigg, pp. 232-237.
[76] MAE, "Rapport à la Société des Nations, Année 1938" (Paris, 1939), p. 9.
[77] FO 371, 21914/E1405/441/89, "Records of Leading Personalities," 14 March 1938, p. 240.

cover of the pretext of a shooting trip'' in order to discuss an arrangement for this annexation.[78]

Prompted by their old rivalry with the Aṭrashs in general and by their opposition to Ḥasan al-Aṭrash's appointment in particular, the ʿAmer chiefs were now in the forefront of the separatist campaign. At the end of 1938 they held a large separatist meeting in Shahbā, at which they voiced their main demand: "the independence of the Jabal under the protection of the Mandatory state."[79] Thus, no coherent separatist movement existed in the Jabal—while the ʿAmer chiefs were looking for support of the French, ʿAbd al-Ghaffār sought out the British, both leaders using the traditional particularism of the Druze community in order to achieve their aim.

In order to arouse support among the Druze populace for separation from Damascus, separatist leaders spread the news that had been filtering in of attacks by Palestinian rebels against Druze villagers in Palestine.[80] During 1938-1939 the Druze community, in particular in the Jabal ad-Durūz, was confronted by political action from several forces in Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. The French in Syria were in the process of revising the policy they had adopted in 1936. In Jordan, Amīr ʿAbdalla

> was taking a lively interest in affairs in Syria in the hope that a popular demand would soon arise for him to be proclaimed King of a united Transjordan and Syria... He retains the belief that there is a strong desire in the Hawrān and the Jebel Druse for amalgamation with Transjordan.[81]

In Palestine, both the Zionists and the British were concerned at the increasing numbers of Druzes from the Jabal who were recruited by the Palestinians. The Zionists made great efforts to neutralize the Druzes of the Jabal, Iqlīm al-Billān, and Lebanon in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict, and emissaries of the Zionist movement during this period intensified their activities among the Druze chiefs, notably the separatists (see below). Although the British had

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[78] FO 371, 23276/E18/5/89, Mackereth to FO, 30 December 1938, pp. 138-139.

[79] MAE, "Rapport à la Société des Nations, Année 1938" (Paris, 1939), p. 9.

[80] FO 371, 23276/E92/5/89, Mackereth to FO, "Syrian political report," 4 January 1939, p. 151.

[81] FO 371, 23276, Cox, British resident in Transjordan, to the British high commissioner, Amman, 7 January 1939, p. 231.

no interest in encouraging Druze separatism, the British consul in Damascus refrained from informing the French authorities about ʿAbd al-Ghaffār's attempt to annex the Jabal to Transjordan. British concern for the Jabal was related to events in Palestine, and ʿAbd al Ghaffār could be useful in preventing Druzes from joining the Palestinian rebels: "Were Abdul Ghaffar Pasha to learn that I had betrayed his confidence, I could no longer rely on his support in preventing Arab High Committee recruiting armed gangs for Palestine amongst Syrian Druzes."[82]

While the French, the Zionists, and the British, each for their own political aims, all came to rely on the separatists, the Arab nationalists depended on the Druze nationalists. The latter were connected with Nabīh al-ʿAzma, a radical nationalist who was very active not only in Syrian politics but also in Palestinian issues. ʿAzma was leader of the Palestine Defense Committee in Damascus and played a leading role in recruiting Druzes for the Palestinian cause in the Holy Land.[83]

Unlike the separatists, whose principal adherents made for an unstable faction, the nationalist party represented the educated younger class as well as the chiefs of the secondary families who had linked their destiny to Syria. While the French continued to assume that the nationalists comprised no more than twenty percent of the population of the Jabal,[84] a leading separatist of the period claimed that the nationalist party's percentage was three times the French figure.[85]

Two months before the outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September 1939, the high commissioner dissolved the Syrian Parliament and placed the government in the hands of a Directorate composed of non-nationalist personalities. At the same time, he granted Jabal ad-Durūz and the ʿAlawī districts a greater measure of autonomy. With the outbreak of war martial law was imposed on Syria, and Jabal ad-Durūz, like other regions, came under military control. The Franco-German armistice in June 1940 opened the

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[82] FO 317, 23276, Mackereth to FO, 9 January 1939, p. 161.

[83] Nabīh al-ʿAzma's activity among the Druzes were known to the Zionists through the reports filed by Yūsuf al-ʿAaysamī; see HA 5/A/8B, correspondence of November-December 1937 and January 1939; See also below, Chapter III.

[84] FO 371, 23277/E5341/5/89. Enclosure to report of Mackereth, 22 July 1939, pp. 90-94.

[85] HA 58/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 1 January 1939.

door to German propaganda in Syria and the Germans succeeded in recruiting Druze "fighters" under the leadership of the old Francophile chief, Ḥamza Darwīsh.[86] Vichy Syria was captured by the Allies in June 1941, and thereafter the French were no longer sole masters of that country. As far as the French Mandate was concerned, massive British military pressure meant that London would share in shaping the destiny of Syria with General de Gaulle's Free France. General Catroux, the delegate-general appointed by de Gaulle, had to cooperate with Major-General Edward Louis Spears, Churchill's chief emissary to Syria and Lebanon.

A hint of competition between the two Allies occurred. In an attempt to maintain French influence on the Aṭrash chiefs, who were expected to look to the British for their lead, General Catroux announced in August 1941 his intention of granting greater liberty to the Druzes by withdrawing the French administrative officers who had hitherto resided in the Jabal.[87] Less than five months later Catroux signed an order revising the statutes of the Jabal ad-Durūz and ʿAlawī territories and integrating them in the state of Syria.[88]

While the French were dealing with the administrative reorganization of Syria in preparation for its independence, the British were occupied with forming military units among the Syrians to assist the Allied war effort. At the end of 1941 Spears proposed the recruitment of Druzes into a British-Druze legion. The proposal was opposed by Catroux and de Gaulle who thought the plan would offer "*des inconvenients*."[89] In actual fact the French were worried about losing their influence among the Druzes to the rising tide of England in Syria and Lebanon. In order to circumvent restrictions imposed by the Franco-British agreement of July 1941, which regulated the relations between the two Allies in Syria, the British decided to carry out their plan by enlisting Druzes in a special unit, called the Druze Regiment.[90] Set up in early December, this regiment soon left to

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[86] *Ibid.*

[87] Spears, *Private Papers*, Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Box IB, file K4-150, Spears to Embassy, Cairo, 12 August 1941.

[88] FO 371,31466, file No. 181, E 1209/181/89, Minister of State, Cairo to FO, pp. 24-26.

[89] Spears, *Private Papers*, Box IB, file K7-746; FO to Cairo, 18 November 1941.

[90] *Ibid.*, K7-748 C.-in-C. Middle East to War Office, 10 November 1941; K7-751, C.-in-C. Middle East to War Office, 18 November 1941; K7-752, 19 November 1941; K7-758, 20 November 1941; and K7-768, telegram from Cairo to FO, 21 November 1941; K7-780, 22 November 1941.

join the British army stationed in Transjordan.[91] Although the Druze regiment did not play any significant part in the war, it trained a new generation of officers who later would play a political role in both Syria and Lebanon. The regiment was also the last organized military unit of the Druze community in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine to be dissolved at the end of the war.

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[91] *Ibid.*, K11-823, telegram War Cabinet to Cairo, 1 December 1941; *ibid.*, L-834, to War Office, 6 December 1941.

CHAPTER THREE

DRUZE PARTICULARISM IN THE SHADOW OF THE PALESTINIAN-ZIONIST CONFLICT

Facing the Palestinian-Zionist Conflict

The Druzes in Palestine had never enjoyed the relative independence of their coreligionists in Lebanon and Jabal ad-Durūz. From the end of the 17th century until 1914 the Druze settlement in Palestine had steadily declined and many Druzes emigrated to Ḥawrān, with several villages in the Galilee and on the Carmel abandoned in the process. Since their villages lay scattered within a Sunnī Muslim environment, the Druzes of Palestine in their religion manifested Islamism to a greater extent than did their brethren in Jabal ad-Durūz or Mt. Lebanon. A small community, the Druzes in the Galilee and on the Carmel kept to themselves, minimizing contact with their neighbors and with Ottoman administrators in the cities.

At the beginning of the Mandate period the Druze population of Palestine totaled 7,028, residing in eighteen villages, viz., sixteen in the Galilee and two on the Carmel.[1] While by 1931 this number had risen to 9,148,[2] it still represented less than one percent of the total population of Palestine, where the number of Jews was now increasing through massive immigration following the First World War.[3] Until the 1930s, more than 95 percent of Druze manpower was occupied in agriculture and pasturage.[4] Unlike the Druze society on Mt. Lebanon and Jabal ad-Durūz, where the leading

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[1] Government of Palestine, *Census of Palestine 1922* (Jerusalem, 1923).

[2] Government of Palestine, *Census of Palestine 1931* (Jerusalem, July 1932), pp. 1, 83-107.

[3] The total population of Palestine increased from 757,182 in 1922 to 1,035,400 in 1931; *Census of Palestine 1922* and *1931*.

[4] Abba Ḥushi Archives, Series 1-5, Report of E. Epstein, "Notes for a Plan concerning the Transfer of the Druzes of the Land of Israel [Palestine] to Jabal-Druze," E. Epstein to Abba Ḥushi, marked "Strictly confidential," 3 May 1939 (hereafter "Epstein Report"), p. 4. These notes contain extensive information on Druze history, demographics, society and politics, which can also be found in E. Epstein, "Ha-Druzim be-Eretz Israel" (The Druzes in Palestine), *Yalkut Haizraḥ Hatikhon* 32/33 (1938) (Hebrew), and in English translation in Spears, *Private Papers*.

families were usually the large property owners, the Druze society in Palestine was characterized by a relatively equal distribution of land among all families of a particular village. The power of the leading families, in fact, usually did not extend beyond their own villages, and Palestine counted no leading families on the model of Aṭrash, ʿAmer, Junblāṭ, or Arslān. In each village, usually two or three families contended for local power, mainly the office of *mukhtār*.[5]

The lack of leading families paved the way for a greater role to be played in community affairs by the religious leaders. In each village a *jwayid* or *ʿāqil* (religious and respected) emerged as accepted *sheikh*, some of whom succeeded in extending their spiritual authority over the whole community or several of the villages. This was true, for example, of Sheikh ʿAlī al-Fāris, who lived in Yarkā in the Galilee (d. 1753), and later of Sheikh Ṭarīf Muḥammad Ṭarīf of Jūlis (d. 1928). The latter's brother Mhanā had initiated in the 1880s the reconstruction of *maqām an-nabī Shuʿayb* (shrine of the prophet Shuʿayb) on the Ḥittīn in the Galilee, an act that lent wider respect to the family's spiritual authority. At the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman authorities appointed Ṭarīf Muḥammad Ṭarīf *qāḍī* of the Druze community in Beirut province.[6]

During the same period, competition between Ṭarīf of Julis and two other families, Muʿadī of Yarkā and Khayr of Abū Snān, resulted in feuds among these three neighboring villages. Even though Sheikh Ṭarīf Muḥammad Ṭarīf had been appointed as *qāḍī*, the spiritual affairs of the whole community were administered by three persons representing those three families.[7] At the beginning of 1926 the Ṭarīf family attempted to have the Druze community included within the Mandatory decree, which accorded the Palestinian Christian communities independence in the conduct of their religious affairs. An appeal to this end was addressed to the commissioner of northern Palestine; the British chief secretary in Jerusalem, how-

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[5] The British authorities retained the Ottoman administrative organization in the villages, where the head of local community was called *mukhtār*.

[6] ʿAbdalla Ṭarīf, *Sirat faḍīlat ash-Sheikh Amīn Ṭarīf* (Jerusalem, 1987), photocopy of a letter of Ṭarīf Muḥammad Ṭarīf. Apart from the Druze of the city of Beirut, the Druzes of the Beirut province were those who lived in the Galilee and the Carmel.

[7] State Archives (Israel), Jerusalem (hereafter SA), 548/N-Y/82/33, Haifa district commissioner to chief secretary in Jerusalem, Haifa 20 August 1935.

ever, rejected the demand by stating that the Mandatory Government did "not [have] the intention ... to grant any statutory power to the Druze community,"[8] an attitude which essentially reflected the Ottoman legacy in regard to the religious communities of the country.

When Sheikh Ṭarīf Muḥammad Ṭarīf died in 1928, leaving the Druze community without a *qāḍī* and thus without its recognition as an independent community, the British authorities left the Druzes meanwhile under the religious authority of the Sunnīs. At the end of the year, Salmān Ṭarīf, Sheikh Ṭarīf Muḥammad's son, went and held several meetings with the district commissioner in Haifa, who subsequently in January 1929 approved the appointment of the former as successor to his father, thereby formally recognizing the Ṭarīf family's paramountcy:

> Approval is hereby given for your appointment as head of the Druze community in succession to the late Sheikh Mohammed Tarif. You are hereby granted the powers, and are authorized to perform the duties in regard to the Druze community hitherto held and performed by your predecessor.[9]

Although granting Sheikh Salmān the title of "head of the Druze community," the district commissioner limited this appointment to religious matter, as he wrote to the chief secretary in March 1929.[10]

The rival families, Khayr and Muʿadī, continued to consider the appointment as even further restricted, i.e., to *qāḍī* only and not head of the community. They insisted Druze religious affairs be administered by representatives of the three leading families.[11] In fact, the Druze *ʿuqqāl* at that time considered Sheikh Salmān as a temporal leader, not a religious one, which can explicitly be seen from in a letter sent to the high commissioner and signed by ninety-two Druzes, from among the two categories of *ar-rūʾasāʾ ar-rūḥiyūn* (the spiritual leaders) and *ar-rūʾasāʾ az-zamaniyūn* (the temporal

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[8] SA 550/N-Y/132-136, No. 8, Haifa district commissioner to chief secretary, Haifa, 9 November 1931.

[9] SA 548/N-Y/82/83, Haifa district commissioner to Sheikh Salmān Ṭarīf (through district officer, Acre), 16 January 1929.

[10] *Ibid.*, district commissioner to the chief secretary, Haifa, 1 March 1929.

[11] *Ibid.*, "Report of Sheikh Hussein Hamadeh [Ḥusayn Ḥamada], 7 December 1934," enclosure of Haifa district commissioner to chief secretary, 20 August 1935.

leaders). There were four signatories from the Ṭarīf family, viz., Amīn, Saʿīd, Salīm, and Salmān: The last name appeared under the category of the temporal leaders, while Sheikh Amīn's signature headed the list of spiritual leaders.[12]

The disturbances that took place in Palestine in 1929 are generally considered a turning point in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. Since these hostile events had been sparked off by incidents at the Western Wall and the *Ḥaram ash-Sharīf* in Jerusalem between Muslims and Jews, the Druzes began to look upon the conflict as one bearing a religious character.[13] Apart from a group of Druzes from Ḥawrān led by Aḥmad Ṭāfish who participated in attacks on Jewish settlements in the Galilee,[14] the Druzes of Palestine adopted a neutral position in the conflict. They did not respond to the appeals of Arab organizations that were recruiting Palestinians to fight against both the Zionists and the British. The majority of the Druze leaders expressed their intention to preserve neutrality and to maintain good relations with the Mandatory authorities. In 1930, they demanded to be independently represented in the Legislative Council (which represented Palestine's various ethnic groups), a demand they based on to their political position: "The neutral position which the Druze community has taken justifies its demand ... to be represented."[15] In order to convince the British authorities to separate Druze representation in the Council from that of the Muslims, the Druze leaders contended that "the Druze community is completely independent in its *sharīʿa* (laws), doctrine, cult and customs. Including it in another [the Muslim] community would affects its internal unity."[16]

The Druze position toward the events of 1929 and the attempt to be represented in the Legislative Council as an independent community were closely related. At a time when confusion reigned in people's mind as to nationalism and Islam, the Druze community,

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[12] SA 550/N-Y/31/36, Appendix A, letter of Druze spiritual and temporal leaders to the high commissioner, 15 November 1930.

[13] For further details, see Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London, 1974), pp. 258-73.

[14] On the Arab attacks on Jewish settlements, see ʿIsā Ṣafarī, *Falasṭīn al-ʿArabiyya Bayna al-Intidāb waṣ-Ṣuhiūniyya*, 2 vols. (Jaffa, 1937), vol. 2, p. 126.

[15] SA 550/N-Y/31/36, letter of the Druze leaders to the High Commissioner, 15 November 1930.

[16] *Ibid.*

in its particularism, saw the Palestinian-Zionist conflict, as mentioned, predominantly as a religious phenomenon. Since the events of 1929 did not affect their villages, they remained largely indifferent to what was happening. The main Palestinian national organization of the time was Muslim, *al-Majlis al-islāmī al-aᶜlā* (the Supreme Muslim Council), which was led by a religious leader, Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, who played a dominant role during the events of 1929. Thus, the Druzes' demand for independent representation was the expression of an independent position vis-à-vis *al-Majlis al-islāmī al-aᶜlā* as a politico-religious organization.

The British authorities did not respond to the Druze demand for representation in the legislative council and refused to recognize the Druzes as a separate ethnic community.[17] Thus, the Druze *qāḍī* and religious head of the community remained subordinate to the religious Muslim institution. The function of the Druze *qāḍī*, e.g., was restricted to marriage matters, while divorce remained the province of the Muslim *qāḍīs*.[18] This situation continued until the end of the Mandatory period, whereby Sheikh Salmān Ṭarīf maintained good relations with the Supreme Muslim Council through its representatives in northern Palestine Rashīd Ḥāj Ibrāhīm and Subḥī al-Khaḍra. The *sheikh*, however, showed great prudence in his relations with the Arab Palestinians as well as with the Zionists.[19]

After 1930, the rivalry between the Khayrs and Ṭarīfs began to bear features of factionalism not unlike that reigning among the leading families in Lebanon and Jabal ad-Durūz. In 1930, a young leader of the Khayr family, ᶜAbdalla, came back from Beirut as the first Druze graduate of the American University there. He continued his studies in law in Jerusalem. As a student in Beirut, he had come to know much about the Lebanese Druze community and its organization; in Jerusalem he in addition learned about the Zionist organization and the Supreme Muslim Council. Naturally, when he began his political career as leader of the Khayr family, ᶜAbdalla tried to organize the Druze community by combining elements of the organizations he had learned about, and in 1932 he established

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[17] In 1936 a Druze advocate again presented the demand for such representation and recognition; SA 550/N-Y/31/36, "Ali Hussein El-Asad, [ᶜAlī Ḥusayn al-Asᶜad], a Palestinian Druze advocate of Haifa, to the High Commissioner, 23 January 1936."

[18] SA 550/N-Y/132-136, Haifa district commissioner to chief secretary, Haifa, 9 November 1931.

[19] Abba Ḥushi Archives, "Epstein Report," 3 May 1939, p. 11.

"The Druze Union Society."[20] ʿAbdalla Khayr also wanted to put the Druze *waqf* under the supervision of this society in order to use its income for the "benefit of the Druze community," following the Lebanese Druze model initiated by ʿĀrif an-Nakadī in Lebanon. Administering the Druze *waqf* in this way, moreover, would deprive the Ṭarīf family of its exclusive control of Nabī Suʿayb's *waqf*. The Society also intended to conduct Druze affairs through a Druze Council, with members drawn from all the villages, an idea which was based on the model of the Zionist organization's Knesset Israel and the Supreme Muslim Council, the main Jewish and Muslim organizations of the time. ʿAbdalla Khayr asked the Zionists for the text of Knesset Israel legislations so that he could draw up similar legislation for Druze society.[21] ʿAbdalla Khayr's Society responded to demands of some Druze elements to form a council that would represent the community and thereby free it from the control of the Ṭarīf family. One year before ʿAbdalla Khayr's efforts to establish the Society, the district commissioner in Haifa had already observed:

> A great many of the Druzes are much concerned at the behaviour of Sheikh Soliman [Salmān] Tarif who has recently shown a tendency to mix himself in politics. He was chosen as Kadi [qādī] ... on the understanding that he would confine himself solely to his official business.... Instead of this he has tried to represent himself as head of the Druzes in general administrative matters.... The elders now want to conduct Druze business through a Druze council of sheikhs from all the villages, which should be presided over by a president elected by the council who would alone be entitled to represent the community.[22]

The Druze Union Society also responded to the demands for the independent status of the Druze community vis-à-vis the Muslims, as expressed two years before by a majority of Druze leaders. Even Sheikh Salmān Ṭarīf asked the British in 1933 for recognition of its independent status.[23] The objectives of the two rival families, Ṭarīf and Khayr, however, were completely different: The Khayrs hoped that such a move would weaken the Ṭarīfs, while the latter expected that it would legitimize their paramountcy as the religious leaders

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[20] SA 548/N-Y/82/83, "By-Laws of the Druze Union Society in Palestine."
[21] Abba Ḥushi Archives, "Epstein Report," p. 12.
[22] SA 550/N-Y/132-136, No. 1, district commissioner to chief secretary, Haifa, 11 March 1931.
[23] SA 550/N-Y/82/33; Salmān Ṭarīf to District officer in Acre, 1 April 1933.

of the community. ʿAbdalla Khayr's efforts at establishing the Druze Union Society divided the Druze community into two camps, those who supported his initiative and those who joined the Ṭarīf clan's opposition to it. With violent quarrels between the two camps breaking out in many villages, the peak of this dissension possibly came in April 1933 during the annual Druze pilgrimage to *maqām an-nabī Shuʿayb*, which led to the intervention of Druze temporal and religious leaders in Lebanon to try and put an end to the division of the Druze community in Palestine. Headed by Ḥusayn Ḥamāda, *sheikh al ʿaql* in the Lebanon, a delegation of religious leaders arrived in November 1933. Although they failed to settle the dispute, Ḥamāda presented to the British a long report suggesting that the Druze community be granted an independent status and that, in the meantime, temporal and religious power be equally distributed among the three main families, Ṭarīf, Khayr, and Muʿadī.[24] In June 1934, Shakīb Arslān joined other Druze leaders of Mt. Lebanon and Jabal ad-Durūz in yet another effort at reconciling the division among the Druzes of Palestine.[25] Disappointed by the Druze reaction to his initiative, ʿAbdalla Khayr halted his political activities, a move which further strengthened the Ṭarīf family, notably Sheikh Amīn, who had led the opposition to Khayr's Society.[26]

The early 1930s saw a worsening of the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. The Zionist movement at the time intensified its land acquisition program, and the Palestinian Arab peasantry began to play a dominant role in the events. These developments, along with the growing popular anger and violence displayed by the Muslim majority against the encroaching Zionist activities, were to lead the particularist Druze community to abandon its indifference toward the conflict. Two tendencies emerged, viz., in the view of the Palestinians the Druzes naturally ought to give their support to the Palestinian cause, while the Zionists, for their part, encouraged Druze par-

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[24] SA 548/N-Y/82/33, district commissioner to chief secretary, Haifa, 20 August 1935, enclosure, Report of Sheikh Ḥusayn Ḥamada, 7 December 1934.

[25] Muʿadi Family Papers, "Shakīb Arslān to Marzūq Muʿadī," 19 June 1934.

[26] According to Epstein, the Druze opposition to ʿAbdalla Khayr was motivated by the fear that the Druze Society would lead to a worsening of the community's relations with the Muslims; Abba Ḥushi Archives, "Epstein Report," p. 12.

ticularism in order to establish "friendly relations" with this religious group.[27]

In 1930, while the majority of Druze leaders had decided to maintain a neutral position in regard to the conflict, Druze intellectuals and some political figures from Lebanon already strongly supported the Palestinians' struggle against the Zionists. Some of these personalities had immigrated to Palestine, while others were active among Arab nationalists who were living in exile in Europe or in Jordan. The most prominent among these were Shakīb and ʿAdil Arslān, who rejected the Mandatory regimes. Through the Istiqlāl party, and the Syrian-Palestine Congress, they called for independence and for the unification of Arab countries under the Mandatory regime, including Palestine.[28] During the events of 1929, they also called for armed struggle against the Zionists. Shakīb also began to maintain contact with Palestinian leaders, particularly with Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī.[29] His younger brother, ʿAdil, visited Palestine several times in the 1930s and met with Palestinian leaders there.[30] The activities of the Arslān brothers, however, had no significant impact on the Druze community in Palestine.

Even the group of Lebanese Druzes who had come to live in Palestine and maintained direct contact with the Druze community failed to recruit the Druzes in the Galilee and the Carmel to the "Palestinian cause." This group can be divided into two categories, the first of which consisted of activists such as ʿAjāj Nuwayhid, Hānī Abū Muṣliḥ, Farīd Zayn ad-Dīn, and ʿAlī Nāṣir ad-Dīn. ʿAjāj Nuwayhid had joined the Istiqlāl party upon its founding in Damascus in 1919. In 1920 he immigrated to Palestine where he served as secretary of the Supreme Muslim Council from 1922 until 1932. He continued to take an active part in the political life of Palestine until 1948 as being a member of the "Muslim Committee for the Defense of the Holy Places" and of the Arab Committee, both established

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[27] Early in 1929 the Zionists had expressed the desire to create "friendly relations with the Druzes;" see Sh. Ṭevet, *Ben-Gurion ve-ʿArvey Eretz Israel* (Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, 1985), p. 357, n. 152.

[28] See Khoury, pp. 220-242, Bayān (Nuwayhid) al-Ḥūt, *Al-Qiyādāt wal Muʾassasāt as-Siyāsiyya fī Falāstīn, 1918-1948* (Acre, 1982), pp. 160, 246, 260, 366-367.

[29] Y. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-39, From Riots to Rebellion* (London, 1977), pp. 65-66; Ḥūt, pp. 220-221.

[30] On ʿAdil visits and activities in Palestine see R. Faraj, *ha-Ksharīm ben ha-Druzīm ve-Hayehūdīm be-Tkufat ha-Mandaṭ ha-Briṭī 1918-1948* (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Haifa, 1990), pp. 24-26.

in 1931.[31] Hānī Abū Muṣliḥ[32] had installed himself in Haifa, where he was active in the Arab clubs. He delivered anti-Zionist propaganda through his speeches in Haifa mosques.[33] Farīd Zayn ad-Dīn, a headmaster of Nāblus College, in 1929 joined the "Arab Nationalist Group," which had close contact with Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī.[34] ʿAlī Nāṣir ad-Dīn, who came to Palestine as an exile in 1924, was a publicist and member of the Muslim and Arab Committees.[35]

The second category of Lebanese Druzes in Palestine consisted of merchants and professionals who had immigrated mainly to Haifa, whose economic development during this period had turned it into an economic magnet. Although active in the social life of the city as well as in the public affairs of the Druze community in Palestine, the political activities of this group were limited. Most of them were integrated into Arab intellectual circles in Haifa and were members of such Arab clubs as, e.g., the "Association for the Development of the Arab Village." Through the initiative of Dr. Yūsuf Yaḥyā, Dr. Nāīf Ḥamza, and Judge Ḥusayn ʿAbd aṣ-Ṣamad, a Druze association was established in 1944. Called *Jamʿiat iʿānat al-faqīr ad-Durzī* (The Association for Aiding Poor Druzes), it soon proved popular to many Palestinian Druzes, and by 1947 its membership had increased to more than two hundred and fifty. Through its support and guidance similar Druze associations were established in ʿIsfiya, Bqayʿa, and Rāma.[36] Although the two Lebanese groups preserved good relations with the leaders of the Druze community in Palestine, they failed to introduce within the prevailing Druze particularism any significant receptiveness toward nationalist ideas. A predominantly peasant community, the Druzes in Palestine remained attached to their traditional social life.

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[31] On the activities of ʿAjāj Nuwayhid, see Ḥūt, pp. 861-863, 867-871, Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, pp. 123, 125.

[32] On Hānī Abū Musliḥ, see Najīb al-Bʿaynī, *Rijāl Min Bilādī* (Beirut, 1984), pp. 273-289.

[33] Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter CZA), S/25/6638 Report of E. Cohen on "A meeting with Sheikh ʿAbdalla Khayr, 12 March 1932," 17 April 1932.

[34] Ḥūt, pp. 312, 491.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 877-879.

[36] The information on this group was collected from the private papers of the Manṣūr family.

Zionist Encouragement of Druze Particularism

Whereas it was not accepted by the Arab Palestinian leaders, the Zionists not only well understood Druze particularism but even encouraged it. One of the Zionist activists at the time, Israel Shoḥam, in 1929 expressed the Zionist idea as to the existence of nationalist notions among the non-Jewish population in Palestine and the possibility of the Jews' creating good relations with them:

> In Eretz Israel [Palestine] there is no national movement ... the Christians certainly are not Eretz Israel [Palestinian] nationalists and the Arab intelligentsia is very small.... It is necessary to exercise influence on teachers who are nationalists.... It is recommended that relations be created with the Bedouins because they are more dangerous than the peasants. Friendly relations could be also created with the Druzes.[37]

The Druzes, for their part, began to take the measure of the power of the Zionist movement and the influence it had upon British officials in Palestine. Thus, Eliahu Ḥaim Cohen, one of the Zionist leaders, reported in July 1932: "The Druzes are interested in friendship with the Jews because they have an exaggerated estimation of our power here and in the world."[38] The combination of the desire of the Zionists to create friendly relations with this community and the wish of some Druze leaders to use "Zionist power" as an intermediary promoted the connection between these two parties.

On 7 July 1930, a Muslim policeman, ʿAbd ar-Raʾūf al-Qubjī, suspected of having relations with a Druze woman, was killed near the Druze village of Mghār. A group of policemen entered Mghār and the nearby villages of Rāma to look for the murder suspects, one of whom was the son of Sheikh Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn, the *mukhtār* of Mghār. The "brutality" of the policemen in arresting the *mukhtār*'s son angered the Druze villagers in the Galilee. Through the good offices of Yosef Naḥmani, a Zionist activist from Tiberias, Sheikh Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn, accompanied by Sheikh Salmān Ṭarīf, met on 2 August 1930 in Jerusalem with the Zionist leader Yizḥak Ben-Zvi (later Israel's second president) to solicit his influence with the British authorities in order to have the Druze prisoner released. The two Druze *sheikhs* were put up in a hotel at the expense of the Zionist movement, and on the following morning

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[37] Cited in Ṭevet, p. 357, n. 152.

[38] CZA S/25/6638, Report of E. Cohen, 13 July 1932.

Ben-Zvi arranged a meeting between the *sheikhs* and the superior British police officer. Ben-Zvi, when he met this officer on 4 August, explained to him the Druze position: "... these people [the Druzes] are peaceful... since they have nothing against the Muslims and the Jews.... Among the prisoners who were arrested during the events [1929] there was not one single Druze."[39] Several days later the Druze murder suspect was released. The Arab Executive Committee had also protested against the "brutality" of the (Muslim) policemen in the Druze village,[40] while in the Palestinian press the mistreatment of the Druzes by the police had likewise been criticized.[41]

At the end of August Ben-Zvi and his wife paid a visit to the Druze villages of Rāma and Mghār, where their hosts, Sheikh Ṣāliḥ Farrāj and Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn, as Ben-Zvi afterward reported, "expressed their readiness to establish with us [the Zionists] constant friendly ties." Through his visit to the villages, Ben-Zvi was carrying out a policy which he himself had drawn up and which, albeit after some hesitation, had been adopted by the Zionist movement. In the same report Ben-Zvi put into shape the general lines of the Zionist policy toward the Druze community:

> It is important to acquire the friendship of this community.... In every constructive activity which we would initiate among the Arabs, such as bank loans... friendly organizations, etc., it is indispensable to take into consideration the villages of the Druzes.... It is necessary to pay visits to the Druze leaders of Eretz Israel [Palestine] and to express our willingness to offer them legal help in matters concerning pressure which may be exerted on them by the government or by the Muslims and Christians.... After these preparatory moves, we should establish relations with their leaders in Ḥawrān, Syria, and the Republic of Lebanon.[42]

Ben-Zvi's report was apparently distributed among the Zionist

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[39] *Ibid.*, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi's report on "The establishing of good relations with our neighbors, the Druzes in Eretz Israel," August 1930; the same report also bears another date: 28 December 1930.

[40] *Ibid.*, S. Saleh, "Relations between Jews and Druze between the two World Wars," *Bar Ilan Studies in History II: Confrontation and Coexistence*, ed. by Pinhas Artzi (Ramat Gan, 1982), pp. 168-169.

[41] *Falasṭīn* (Jaffa), 3 August 1930; *al-Jāmiʿa al-ʿArabiyya* (Jaffa), 6 August 1930; CZA S/25/6638, Report of E. Cohen, on "Visits among the Druzes in the north of the country, 30 September to 6 October 1932," 20 October 1932.

[42] *Ibid.*, Ben-Zvi's report on "The establishing of good relations with the Druzes," August 1930.

activists, one of whom, Colonel F. Kirsch, responded that the importance of this small community should not be exaggerated: "Although I agree," he wrote,

> with the establishment of friendly relations with those neighbors, I do not ascribe great importance to this small community of peasants, and therefore I do not see justification for [our] distinctive action on their behalf. I agree that they could be taken into consideration in future actions.... You [Ben-Zvi] properly indicate that their main importance lies in the ties they have with their leaders in the north [Lebanon] and in the Ḥawrān. But just in this we must be prudent.... Establishing relations with them would implicate us with the French.[43]

In November 1930, a quarrel took place between the two "neighbors," the Druzes and the Jews of Bqayʿa. Through the mediation of Sheikh Salmān Ṭarīf, Ben-Zvi succeeded in reconciling the two communities in the village.[44] Although there is not sufficient information on the cause of this quarrel, the incident occurred when there were rumors of a Zionist plan for more acquisition of land in the Galilee. Despite the settlement of the dispute between the Druzes and Jews of Bqayʿa, the attitude of the Druze community in the Galilee toward the Jewish settlement underwent a change in the first two years of the decade. In March 1932 Ben-Zvi and Eliahu Cohen met Sheikh ʿAbdalla Khayr in Jerusalem, where the latter was then studying law. At this time, the *sheikh* was already much occupied with the planning of his Druze Society Union, which meant to challenge the paramountcy of Sheikh Salmān Ṭarīf who was suspected of having ties to the Supreme Muṣlim Council.[45] In this first meeting, held in Ben-Zvi's home, two main issues formed the agenda: "rumors" of Druze participation in the "disturbances" against the Jews in the Galilee and the political activity of Hānī Abū Muṣliḥ in Haifa. As to the first issue, ʿAbdalla Khayr gave his assurances that "the Druzes are maintaining their neutrality" in the conflict. Referring to Abū Muṣliḥ's political activity, the *sheikh* argued that it did not reflect the general Druze view and attitude. Ben-Zvi was full of admiration for ʿAbdalla Khayr's initiative to organize the

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[43] *Ibid.*, F. Kirsch to Ben-Zvi, 9 September 1930.

[44] *Ibid.*, letter of Ben-Zvi to Salmān Ṭarīf, 18 November 1930; Salmān Ṭarīf to Ben-Zvi, 22 November 1930; ʿAbdalla Ṣāliḥ Khayr (*mukhtār* of Bqayʿa) to Ben-Zvi, 28 April 1931.

[45] *Ibid.*, Report of E. Cohen on "A meeting with Sheikh ʿAbdalla Khayr," 17 April 1932.

Druzes, because such organization "would foster among the Druzes a particularist identity."[46] At another meeting, between ʿAbdalla Khayr and Cohen, when the Zionists' uneasiness again stemmed from the attitude of the Druzes in northern Palestine, ʿAbdalla Khayr reassured him that his community was neutral.[47]

Cohen kept up his contact with Sheikh ʿAbdalla Khayr, whose revolutionary society was clearly gaining momentum in the summer of 1932. Meanwhile, the friendly relations and the neutrality that the Zionists were seeking of the Druzes began facing obstacles when increasing Zionist acquisition of lands in the Galilee threatened the Druze villages. The question of Druze lands had been the subject of a meeting between Khayr and Cohen on 11 July 1932. "Yesterday," Cohen was to report,

> Sheikh ʿAbdalla Khayr invited me for a discussion. Information has reached the Druze leaders in the north of the country that one of the land acquisition institutions of the Jews is bargaining with Fūʾād Saʿd [a well-known Christian landlord] for buying the village of Sājūr and to resettle its inhabitants in an-Naqūra in Syria.... Another report says that an American female donor has already contributed a sum of money to the Jewish leader of Pkʿin [Bqayʿa] ... in order to acquire further lands .... In Kfar Smayʿ a rumor has been spread that the Keren Kayemet le-Israel [Jewish National Fund] is preparing to acquire the lands of this village through Ḥabīb's sons, the Christians. Thus Sheikh ʿAbdalla Khayr, on behalf of the elders and the leaders of the Druze community, addressed a clear message to the Jewish institutions that there is no place for any bargaining for these lands .... Any intention of depriving the Druzes of their lands would incite the whole community and would lead to a bloody dispute, with bad results for the two sides.[48]

ʿAbdalla Khayr suggested the purchase of other villages, whose inhabitants, according to him, could be resettled in their own country (i.e, Palestine), whereas such acquisition of Druze villages would result in the transfer of their inhabitants outside Palestine.[49]

At the end of September, Cohen conducted a seven-day long visit to the Druze villages of the Galilee. In Abū Snān, where ʿAbdalla Khayr lived, he spent two days. In his report Cohen summarized the development of Druze-Jewish relations as of 1930 when they had

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46 *Ibid.*
47 *Ibid.*, E. Cohen's report of 17 March 1932
48 *Ibid.*, E. Cohen to Arlosorof, 7 July 1932.
49 *Ibid.*

begun, and referred to many issues that were important to the Zionist movement, such as the relations of the Druzes with the Palestinian national movement and with their coreligionists in Syria and Lebanon. Cohen did not mention exactly why he had stayed so long in the Druze villages, where rumors of their acquisition by the Jews were fast spreading.[50]

By September-October 1932, when Cohen was on his visit to the Druze villages, the dispute between the Khayrs and the Ṭarīfs had already caused a split in the Druze community. It is clear that the Zionists favored ʿAbdalla Khayr and his movement, whose "tendency is to organize [the Druzes] in national form separate from the Muslims."[51] Cohen had been meeting with the most important representatives of the families which supported ʿAbdalla Khayr's movement. Among those who received Cohen in Rāma was Sheikh Ḥasan Abū Rukun of ʿIsfiya, who "indicated that the Druzes had yet to do anything for the Jews, while these latter had done much for them."[52]

The Druzes and the 1936-1939 Uprising

In the internal dispute ʿAbdalla Khayr was defeated in 1934 and he abandoned the political scene. Firmly attached to Druze particularism, the Ṭarīf family conducted a policy of minimum contact with external political forces. The Zionists, who were seeking "friendly relations" with the Druzes, had to suffice with developing such relations with representatives from the second rank of families with whom they had gained acquaintance in 1930-1932. These contacts were carried out in the main by two Zionist activists, Yosef Naḥmani, of the Jewish Agency in Tiberias, and Abba Ḥushi, the secretary of the trade union (Histadrut) in Haifa. The former kept up good relations with the al-Ḥusayn family of Mghār, Farrāj of Rāma, and Fāris of Ḥurfeish. Abba Ḥushi developed relations with the Abū Rukun family of ʿIsfiya.[53]

In 1934-1935 the Palestinian-Zionist conflict developed into an

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[50] *Ibid.*, Report of E. Cohen on "Visits among the Druzes."

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Ibid.* The discussion took place in Rāma at the home of Sheikh Farrāj Ṣāliḥ al-Yūsuf, who invited some Druze leaders to receive Cohen.

[53] See Saleh, "Relations between Jews and Druze," pp. 171-172.

increasingly hostile confrontation between Palestinian peasants and Jewish settlers. Especially in the northern parts of the Galilee and around Haifa, areas where the Zionist land-acquisition program had been intensified, the situation deteriorated sharply and in April 1936 the peasants in these areas instigated a revolt directed against both the Jewish settlements and the British authorities, which was to last till 1939. Characterized by popular violence but lacking a single leadership, the Palestinian revolt consisted of groups of peasants, referred to by the British and the Zionists as "the bands," which executed raids and assassinations against the Jews, the British, and Arab "collaborators."

The Druze community, still primarily preoccupied with its internal politics, at first remained indifferent toward the conflict. From the outset, however, they were courted by both the Palestinians and the Zionists. The Palestinians sought the Druzes' active participation in the revolt, while the Zionists tried to persuade the community to maintain its neutrality. Between April and September 1936 both hostile parties addressed their appeals to the Druze community in the form of circulars distributed in the Druze villages, which reflect the situation of the Druzes at the start of the Palestinian revolt.

On 20 April 1936, the "Supreme Leadership of the Revolt in the North" issued an important notice to the Palestinian population:

> Recently a whispering campaign has been widely spread among the Muslim and Druze communities and the number of whisperers has increased. Since these whispers are completely based on lies, we are addressing this declaration of ours to demonstrate the eminence of our brothers, Banū Maʿrūf [the Druzes] and their deep concern for the safety of the sacred fatherland.... After this date we do not want to hear any whispers regarding this honorable community. Those who are uttering such words for the purpose of causing a dispute will be severely punished.[54]

While it shows part of the mood which prevailed among some groups of Palestinian Muslims, the declaration also expresses the desire of the leaders of the revolt to recruit the Druzes in their struggle against the British and the Zionists. On 20 October the head of the "National Committee" in Acre invited some of the Druze

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[54] HA 4/8b, "*Iʿlān Ilā ash-Shaʿb al-ʿArabī al-Karīm*," [declaration to the Arab people] issued by the Department of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, the supreme leadership of the revolt in the northern district, signed by Abū ʿAlī, 20 April 1936.

leaders to a meeting on 29 October in order to discuss the mobilization of the Druze community against the "national enemies."[55]

While the majority of the Druze community in Palestine continued to deal with the Palestinian-Zionist conflict through its traditional form of particularism and remained neutral, Druzes from Lebanon and Syria did join the Palestinian rebels at the beginning of the revolt. In June 1936 a group of these Druze began operating near Tiberias. Two months later about thirty Druzes from Syria, under the leadership of Ḥamad Ṣaʿb, infiltrated the border with Transjordan and joined up with the volunteer force of the Iraqi Fawzī al-Qāwaqjī. His group encountered British forces on 10 August and again on 3 September in the area of Ṭūl-Karm, near the village of Balʿa. In the latter engagement two Druzes were killed.[56] That summer, about thirty Druzes, under Shakīb Wahhāb, were apprehended and sent back by the Jordanian military when they intended to cross the border into Palestine.[57] A small number of Druzes, however, from Palestine did commit themselves to the Palestinian cause. In July 1936, several Druzes from ʿIsfiya joined a group of rebels from Muslim villages in the Haifa area. Others associated themselves with the "bands" led by Fakhrī ʿAbd-Hādī. Near Bqayʿa in the Galilee, a Druze group under Qāsim Ghaḍbān ambushed a column of British army cars on its way from Tarshīḥa to Naharia on 9 July 1936.[58]

In order to persuade the Druzes to maintain their neutrality in the conflict, the Zionist movement continued to act through Druze leaders with whom they had created friendly relations in the early 1930s. The Zionists operated on two levels, i.e., among the Druzes of Palestine and also among the leadership of the Druzes in Syria and Lebanon. Knowing that some Druzes had already joined the rebels, Yosef Naḥmani distributed on 26 September 1936 a leaflet urging the Druzes not to join the "Arab bands." He understood, however, that economic rather than ideological factors would push the Druzes into the Palestinian camp. His long circular, therefore, attempted to

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[55] The Druze Archives, Haifa University, "Letter from *muftī* of Acre to Sheikh Farrāj Ṣāliḥ Farrāj, 20 October 1936."

[56] Saleh, "Relations between Jews and Druze", p. 179; Y. Arnon-Uḥanna, *Fallaḥim ba-Mered ha-ʿAravim be-Eretz Israel, 1936-1939* (Tel-Aviv, 1978), pp. 45, 51-53; Safarī, vol. 2, pp. 128, 145.

[57] CZA Y1/6184, Abba Ḥushi to Ben-Zvi, 29 August 1936.

[58] Faraj, pp. 67-68, 71-73.

convince the Druze peasants of the contribution the Zionists could make to the prosperity of Palestine. The revolt was described by Naḥmani as manipulation of the peasants by Palestinian landlords, who felt threatened in their interests as a result of the prosperity introduced by the Jewish immigrants:

> You, the Druze community ... know that there is no truth in the arguments of the Arab leaders that the Jews have caused damage to Palestine and that they have competed with the Arabs for economic positions. The Jews did not attack anyone, but all their acquired lands have been purchased by cash money .... None can deny that thanks to the Jews the economy of Palestine has progressed and all of its communities have benefited from this progress. Look at the difference between the prosperity of Palestine and the poverty of Transjordan, where there are no Jews, and even Syria, where there live a small number of Jews.... The strong landlords, who are accustomed to exploiting the peasants for their own interests, feel that their authority has begun to decline as a result of the improvement in the peasants' condition; those landlords, who became rich thanks to the Jewish immigration and to their acting as brokers for the land acquisitions, want today to subjugate the country, but they find the Jews to be an obstacle in their way.[59]

After this long introduction, Naḥmani wrote that

> Some persons from the Druze community have participated with the bands in their attacks against the Jews.... I was greatly amazed by this information and I did not believe it because an understanding and friendship had existed already a long time ago between the Jews and the Druze community. Previously we responded to your demand for assistance, and no doubt you will remember the assistance that Ben-Zvi and I gave you .... Do not forget that you are a minority in this country, and many disasters and accusations against you have come from the side of our neighbors, the Arabs.... Certainly you agree with me that the bands cannot resist a powerful state such as England which is committed to carry out Balfour's promise and to help the return of the Jews to their country.... We appeal to you to convince the Druzes in Palestine and al-Jabal [Jabal ad-Durūz] to maintain the friendly relations between us.[60]

A similar circular was distributed by Abba Ḥushi in the Druze villages on the Carmel.[61]

Because most of the Druzes who joined the Palestinian rebels came from Syria and Lebanon, the Zionists took great pains to stop

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[59] CZA Y1/6184, "Circular of Naḥmani to the Druzes," 9 September 1936.
[60] *Ibid.*
[61] HA 6/8B, Ben-Zvi to Abba Ḥushi, 15 and 20 October 1936.

them there. Between 1930 and 1936 Abba Ḥushi had managed to create close ties with the Abū Rukun family.[62] Working with Sheikh Ḥasan Abū Rukun, Abba Ḥushi helped many Druze villagers obtain jobs in the port of Haifa and in the Jewish economic enterprises that were taking off in this city.[63] Now, in August 1936, Abba Ḥushi mobilized his friends in the Abū Rukun family to help in persuading the Druzes of Lebanon and Syria not to join the Palestinian rebels. The temporal and religious chiefs of the family, Ḥasan and Zāyd Abū Rukun, were sent to Syria and Lebanon especially for this purpose. Sheikh Zāyd was assigned to talk with the religious *sheikhs* in Lebanon while Ḥasan Abū Rukun's task was to meet Sulṭān al-Aṭrash in Transjordan, where he was then still in exile. In Lebanon, Zāyd met with *sheikh al-ʿaql*, Ḥusayn Ḥamada, Sait [Miss] Nazira Junblāṭ, Sheikh Ḥusayn Talīʿ, ʿAlī and Ḥusayn al-Gharīb and Najīb Qays. Messages to these personalities emphasized that Druze support of the Palestinians would severely harm the Druze minority in Palestine. On 20 August, four days after Zāyd's departure, Sheikh Ḥasan Abū Rukun arrived in Transjordan. In order to persuade the Druze leaders in Syria and Lebanon to exercise their influence upon their coreligionists, the two Abū Rukun *sheikhs* employed more or less the same arguments and stressed that the new-found prosperity of Palestine was achieved because of the Jews; the Jews had aided the Druzes, and a friendly relationship prevailed between the two communities; and that the support of the Lebanese and Syrian Druzes would seriously affect the Druzes of Palestine,[64] arguments which also appeared in Naḥmani's circular. The two emissaries reported back that the Druze leaders had promised to adopt a neutral position.[65]

In 1930, when Ben-Zvi laid the groundwork for "friendly relations" with the Druzes, he had stressed, as mentioned above, that part of the purpose of such a relationship was to establish ties with

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[62] According to Najīb Abū Rukun, Ḥasan's son, the first contact between his father and Abba Ḥushi was in 1927; see *al-Hudā* [a Druze journal in Israel], November 1972.

[63] Abba Ḥushi Archives, 6/13A, correspondence of Ḥasan Abū Rukun with Abba Ḥushi and Salīm Alfiyya, 1937.

[64] The Zāyd mission was reported in CZA Y1/6184, "Report of Salīm Alfiyya to Ben-Zvi," 4 October 1936; the Ḥasan mission was reported in *ibid.*, Abba Ḥushi to Ben-Zvi, 29 August 1936, and Ben-Zvi to Abba Ḥushi, 30 September 1936.

[65] *Ibid.*

Druze leaders in Syria and Lebanon. The events of 1936 reinforced Ben-Zvi's vision. In addition to Abū Rukun, whose efforts were already directed at fulfilling part of that task, the Zionists in October 1936 recruited for the same purpose one of Sulṭān al-Aṭrash's partners in the Druze revolt, Yūsuf al-ᶜAaysamī, who was also in exile in Transjordan. Al-ᶜAaysamī had visited Palestine in 1935 as the guest of a relative in Dāliat al-Karmel, the Druze village near Haifa, where he met Salīm Alfiyya, Abba Ḥushi's secretary. In October 1936 the two men met again, this time in Haifa, were Alfiyya succeeded in persuading al-ᶜAasaymī to contact Sulṭān al-Aṭrash on behalf of the Zionists.[66]

At the end of 1936 Ḥamad Saᶜb and his group left Palestine, Qāsim Ghaḍbān was arrested by the British authorities, and most of the Lebanese and Syrian Druzes who had joined the Palestinians went back to their own countries. It is uncertain, however, that their leaving was due primarily to the Zionists' influence on the Druze leaders in Syria and Lebanon. Saᶜb had probably also received appeals to leave Palestine from Amīr ᶜAbdalla of Transjordan, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, and ᶜUqla al-Qitāmī, as a Zionist report of 26 October 1936 indicates.[67] However, it would seem that this report was based only on information provided by Druzes. The Palestinian paper *ad-Difāᶜ* reported on 18 November that Saᶜb was still in Palestine and participated in a farewell meeting held the same day in Jerusalem on the eve of Qawaqjī's departure from Palestine.[68]

At the end of 1936 the "whispered rumors" that the Palestinian flier of April 1936 had tried to stop again began to be spread among the rebels. The popular violence which characterized the revolt grew worse, whereby increasingly the peasants rather than the notables were completely in charge. Neutrality or passivity were no longer tolerated: Those who continued to adopt these attitudes were considered collaborators of the "enemies." The great majority of the Druzes, who nevertheless remained indifferent to the revolt, would only be agitated by small events in which a Druze was injured or humiliated, even if the occurrence had no political background. Such events happened in September 1936 when two Druzes were injured in the villages of Abū Snān and Kisrā during a campaign by

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[66] *Ibid.*, Salīm Alfiyya to Ben Zvi, 23 October 1939.
[67] *Ibid.*, Alfiyya to Ben-Zvi, 26 October 1936.
[68] *ad-Difāᶜ* (Jerusalem), 18 November 1936.

the rebels to sign up fighters and collect money for the Palestinian cause. One month later the Palestinians captured two Druzes from Dāliat al-Karmel who were suspected of having stolen two rifles in order to sell them to the Jews. In December 1936 the two Druze villages on the Carmel, ʿIsfiya and Dāliat al-Karmel, were attacked by a band from the Muslim village of Umm az-Zināt which had come to steal sheep. In the course of 1937 mutual mistrust between the Druze community and the Palestinian rebels increased, leading to further incidents in which Druzes were beaten or humiliated.[69]

Whereas the peasant leadership of the rebels in northern Palestine failed to convince the Druzes to side with it, exiled Palestinian notables in Damascus made great efforts to recruit Druzes from Syria and Lebanon. Palestinian leaders ʿIzat Darwaza, Akram Zʿayter, Muʿīn al-Māḍī, and Aḥmad al-ʿAqīqī were exiled to Syria in the autumn of 1937. According to a Zionist report they met with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash with the hope of recruiting Druzes for the Palestinian fight.[70] At the end of the year, Ḥasan Abū Rukun, who in August 1936 had been the Zionists' emissary to Syria and Lebanon, was again sent there and reported that a group of Druzes under Kanj Abū Ṣāliḥ was preparing to leave for Palestine. Yūsuf al-ʿAaysamī, who already had returned to Syria, confirmed the report.[71] Apparently al-ʿAaysamī succeeded in postponing the group's departure to Palestine.[72] In March 1938 information again surfaced on the intention of this group to enter Palestine.[73] Accompanied by one hundred men, Abū Ṣāliḥ reached Ṭūl-Karm, but apart from nine men the group there abandoned him. Three days later, Abū Ṣāliḥ withdrew again to Syria.[74]

The Zionist leadership meanwhile stepped up its activity among the Druze leaders in Lebanon and Syria to forestall any Palestinian recruitment drive. The Zionists' contacts were the Abū Rukun family chiefs and Yūsuf al-ʿAaysamī, who had presented himself early in 1937 as Sulṭān al-Aṭrash's representative in Palestine.[75] As

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69 CZA Y1/6184, Alfiyya to Ben-Zvi, 11 and 23 October; Faraj, pp. 81-83.

70 CZA S25/6638, Abba Ḥushi to Reuven, 1 November 1937.

71 HA 5A/8B, Ḥassan Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 31 December 1937; al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 8 January 1938.

72 *Ibid.*, 3A/9B, Abba Ḥushi to Reuven, 28 January 1938.

73 *Ibid.*, Sh.e/2/8, Eliahu Sasson to Shertok, 6 March 1938.

74 *Ibid.*, 5A/8B al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 4 and 17 July 1938.

75 al-ʿAaysamī informed Alfiyya in February 1937 that Sulṭān and his brother

already described, Ḥasan Abū Rukun was sent to Syria and Lebanon toward the end of 1937. Sheikh Zāyd Abū Rukun sent letters to the religious Druze leaders in Ḥāsbayā urging them to exercise their influence upon the Druzes of Iqlīm al-Billān, who seemed to entertain ideas of joining the rebels in Palestine. Zāyd again stressed the argument that Druze participation in the revolt would complicate the community's relations with the British authorities. He implied that most of the British officials were Jews.[76] Despite these efforts, continuing reports of the participation of Druze volunteers from Syria and Lebanon kept the Zionists preoccupied.[77] Early in 1937 al-ᶜAaysamī raised the idea of drawing up an agreement between the Jews and the Druzes that would put an end to the efforts of the Arab notables to recruit the Druzes of Syria and Lebanon.[78] Ben-Zvi defined such an agreement as a "promised hope" from the Druze community.[79] Al-ᶜAaysamī was duly delegated to discuss the agreement with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. However, according to subsequent reports by the Zionists and al-ᶜAaysamī's letters to Abba Ḥushi, either Sulṭān could not be convinced to accept such an agreement or the subject was never discussed with him at all.[80]

In fact, al-ᶜAaysamī's attitude in 1937 and his contradictory letters at that time suggest that he had, in fact, no influence with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash and, moreover, that he was equivocal concerning the Druze-Jewish relationship.[81] The Zionist leaders apparently did not completely trust al-ᶜAaysamī's reports as on many occasions they insisted on some written document from Sulṭān to prove that contact was made. The Israel Archives, however, contain not one

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Zayd had assigned him the responsibility of dealing with the Druze problems in Palestine; HA 5A/8B, Alfiyya to Ben-Zvi, 5 February 1937.

76 *Ibid.*, Report of Ḥasan Abū Rukun, 2 April 1938.

77 *Ibid.*, al-ᶜAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 24 October 1938; Reports of Alfiyya, 8 and 26 July 1938.

78 *Ibid.*, Alfiyya to Ben-Zvi, 25 February 1937.

79 *Ibid.*, 3A/8B, Ben-Zvi to Abba Ḥushi, 19 March 1937.

80 *Ibid.*, 5A/8B, al-ᶜAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 2 September 1937; Alfiyya to al-ᶜAaysamī, 29 September 1937; Ḥasan Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 5 October 1937.

81 For an example of al-ᶜAaysamī's ambiguous attitude, see the letters to Abba Ḥushi of July 1938 in which he gave contradictory information on Kanj Abū Ṣaliḥ; *ibid.*, al-ᶜAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 3 and 17 July 1938. While discussing an agreement with the Jews, he also encouraged the Druzes to oppose the Royal Peel Commission's suggestion concerning the partition of Palestine; al-ᶜAaysamī to Abu Mazyad (Ḥusayn) Abū Rukun, as-Suwaydā, 21 July 1937, Abba Ḥushi Archives, 6/13A.

single document written or signed by Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. It would seem that al-ʿAaysamī pretended he had good relations with Sulṭān only in order to justify his cooperation with the Zionists and to give it some legitimacy also in the eyes of the Druzes.

Although there is no evidence that Sulṭān actually encouraged Druzes to join the Palestinian rebels, Akram Zʿayter, the Palestinian activist, met Sulṭān in April 1937 in Transjordan, possibly in an attempt to convince the Druze chief to support the Palestinian cause.[82] In September-October Ḥasan Abū Rukun, who had been dispatched to Jabal ad-Durūz where he visited several Druze leaders, including Sulṭān, described a different situation from that which al-ʿAaysamī had been reporting. According to Abū Rukun, many groups of Druzes in fact were preparing to join the Palestinians, and he himself had to flee from Ḥawrān via Ḥāsbayā in fear of his life.[83]

That the Druze question continued to occupy most of the Zionist leaders who were in favor of establishing good relations also with the Druzes in the Jabal is obvious from the fact that when Sulṭān returned to his country in May 1937 a Zionist delegation had at first intended to participate in the welcome that was accorded him after his long exile. At the suggestion of Eliahu Epstein and David Luziyya, a Jewish merchant in Damascus, the Zionists thought better of such a visit since it would have raised the suspicion that the Jews were encouraging Druze separation from Syria.[84] At the end of 1937 Abba Ḥushi, accompanied by Ḥasan Abū Rukun, made his first trip to the Jabal. Although Ḥushi met with some Druze leaders, he did not meet with Sulṭān.[85]

Ḥushi's visit had been made after the Palestinians and Syrians had succeeded in recruiting a number of Druze groups. Several days after Abba Ḥushi's and Ḥasan Abū Rukun's return from Jabal ad-Durūz, al-ʿAaysamī wrote to Ḥasan to describe that this visit had provoked suspicion in as-Suwaydā and to inform him that there was "an important issue which must be discussed."[86] A few days later

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82 A. Zʿayter, *Yaumiyāt, al-Ḥaraka al-Waṭaniyya al-Falasṭiniyya 1926-1939* (Beirut, 1980), p. 228.

83 HA 5B/8B, Ḥasan Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 15 November 1937.

84 CZA S25/5570, E. Epstein to Moshe Sharet, 4 August 1937; David Luziyya to Salīm Alfiyya, 24 August 1937.

85 *Ibid.*, Report of Abba Ḥushi, 1 November 1937.

86 HA 5A/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Ḥasan Abū Rukun, 6 November 1937.

he told Ḥushi that three Druze fighting groups had been formed under the leadership of Ḥamad Saʿb, ʿAlī Sallām, and Salīm ad-Dibsī, who were in contact with Nabīh al-ʿAzma, one of the Syrian nationalists in Damascus. At the end of the month al-ʿAaysamī reported that he had managed to persuade them not to leave for Palestine.[87]

Al-ʿAaysamī's activity greatly intensified at the end of 1937, when he began consulting with the Zionists before taking any steps. Luziyya defined al-ʿAaysamī's function as follows:

> (1) Preventing the men of al-Jabal from joining the bands in Palestine; (2) Collecting information on the activity of the Palestinian leaders in Damascus; (3) Influencing the Druze chiefs to establish an alliance with the Jews in the country [Palestine].[88]

In a report on relations with the Druzes of Syria, Eliahu Cohen explained the importance of such an agreement, saying that it

> would prevent Druzes from joining the Palestinians. It would also result in the possibility of marketing Jewish products in the Jabal. This agreement will [cause] another division in the unity of the Arabs. At any time in the future if this affair [the agreement] does not respond to our interests, we can dissolve it.... We are faced with the partition of the country and the establishment of a Jewish state, which, according to the proposed plan, would contain eighteen villages inhabited by ten thousand Druzes. It is possible that relations with the leader of the Druze people in the Mountain [Jabal ad-Durūz] will help us to transfer in the future those who are living among us to the Mountain or to another place in Syria.... Only such acts can give us greater standing in the eyes of the important Arab governments.[89]

The transfer plan Cohen mentioned in November 1937 became possible in 1938 as a result of two factors, one having to do with the deterioration in Druze-Muslim relations in Palestine and the second with the activity of the Zionists in Jabal ad-Durūz, who used this worsening situation as an opportunity to implement their policy vis-à-vis the Druze leaders in the Jabal. The transfer plan was portrayed by the Zionists as "the salvation" of the Druze community in Palestine.

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[87] *Ibid.*, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 22 November 1937; al-ʿAaysamī to Ḥasan Abū Rukun, 29 November 1937.
[88] *Ibid.*, Report of Luziyya, 12 December 1937.
[89] *Ibid.*, 3A/8B, Report of E. Cohen, 2 November 1937.

The Zionist Transfer Plan

By the end of 1937, the continuing neutrality of the Druze community in Palestine increasingly aggravated the Palestinian rebels. The Druze attitude, coupled moreover with the actions of some Druzes notably in the village of ʿIsfiya, made them suspicious in the eyes of the Palestinians of pro-Zionist sentiments.[90] The rebels began to react more and more in the course of 1938 against entire "suspected" villages by meting out collective punishments. With the resumption of the Palestinian revolt in the spring of 1938, one of the bands began operating in the Haifa area under the leadership of Yūsuf Saʿīd Abū Durra. Abū Durra was a peasant from Sīlat al-Ḥārithiyya near the town of Jenīn, and his group was typical of the popular violence perpetrated by the peasant rebels. Until 1935, Abū Durra had worked with the Iraq Petroleum Company in Haifa where he met many Druzes from the villages on the Carmel.[91] Abū Durra's efforts to recruit these Druzes, however, met with little success.[92] Similar appeals also came from Palestinian rebels in the upper Galilee, where a Druze from Lebanon, Salmān Ṭurfa, was active with the rebels.[93] In the Galilee, too, however, the Druzes paid little heed and continued to display a neutral attitude. On 3 September Abū Durra distributed a flyer in which he demanded from the inhabitants of ʿIsfiya to collect a sum of money sufficient for the purchase of thirty rifles as their contribution to "*al-umma* [the nation's] struggle."[94] By remaining indifferent to this call the village elicited Abū Durra's anger and in the beginning of October he lay siege to it. His group entered ʿIsfiya twice, on the 4th and on the 11th, in

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[90] In December 1937 a list was put up on the door of the mosque at Tarshiḥā with the names of eleven Druzes ("traitors"). In the same month there was an attempt on the part of the inhabitants of ʿArrāba, Balad ash-Sheikh and Umm Azzināt to harm the Carmel Druze villages; *ibid.*, 4/8B, letter from Milḥim ad-Dibs to Hagana, 17 December 1937.

[91] Further details on the life of Abū Durra may be found in M. Asaf, *Toldot Hitʿorerut ha-ʿAravim be-Eretz Israel ve-Briḥatam* (Tel-Aviv, 1967), p. 150; E. Danin and Y. Shimʿoni, *Teʿudot ve-Dmuyyot me-Ganze ha-Knufiyyot ha-ʿArviyyot be-Me'oraʿot 1936-1939* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 129-130, n. ʿ3.

[92] HA 5A/8B, Labīb Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 24 October 1938. In his letter, Labīb mentioned Ṣāliḥ al-Khatīb from Dāliat al-Karmel, Sulaymān Sharrūf, Muḥammad Kayūf, and Ḥasan ʿAzzām from ʿIsfiya. Oral testimony of the elders indicates that there were about fifteen Druzes who left with Abū Durra in August.

[93] *Ibid.*, reports of 8 and 26 July 1938.

[94] CZA S25/4405, flyer of 3 September 1938.

order to collect the sum he wanted.[95] ʿIsfiya had been singled out by Abū Durra because the pro-Zionist attitude of some *sheikhs* in the village had become widely known. The once-clandestine contacts, e.g., between the Abū Rukun family and the Zionists were no longer a secret,[96] and Ḥasan Abū Rukun, who was wanted by the rebels, kept out of sight during the siege. In December the Zionists reported that he had been murdered by the rebels on 27 November 1938.[97] According to Abba Ḥushi's report of 7 December Abū Durra had paid a visit to ʿIsfiya on the night of Abū Rukun's murder.[98] Ḥushi wrote to al-ʿAaysamī to inform him of the brutal behavior of the Palestinian rebels in ʿIsfiya: Ḥushi's description, however, deviated somewhat in its tone from what earlier had been reported by Sheikh Labīb Abū Rukun on 24 October:

> Our friends of ʿIsfiya informed us about the grave crimes which have been committed by Yūsuf Abū Durra in ʿIsfiya village. These criminals [the rebels] desecrated the holy articles of the Druze community when they tore its holy books and heaped scorn on its religion. When the women attempted to protect their holy books, they [the rebels] beat them.... It is necessary to agitate public opinion among the Druzes in the Jabal and the Lebanon.... Our friend, Labīb [Abū Rukun] of ʿIsfiya, will come to you. He will tell you what has happened in ʿIsfiya.... Meanwhile, one of my men from Jerusalem will go to Damascus. He will meet you in Shlomo Alfiyya's home.... Do everything he says.... Now is the time to act.[99]

The same day, Labīb Abū Rukun was sent by Ḥushi to Ḥāsbayā to meet the religious leaders of that community. On 1 December Labīb wrote to Abba Ḥushi that these religious leaders

> were extremely irritated, especially at the acts of desecration and they decided to call a general meeting in the *khalwāt al-bayāḍa*.... They asked [one of them] to accompany me in my journey to Jabal ad-Durūz and Lebanon.... The journey will cost money. Please send me 5 Palestinian pounds with your emissary who will arrive into Damascus on Sunday.[100]

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[95] HA 5A/8B, Labīb Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 24 October 1938.
[96] Saleh, "Relations between Jews and Druzes," p. 176.
[97] CZA S25/4405, information on the months of November-December, 1938.
[98] HA 7/8B, report of Abba Ḥushi, 7 December 1938; see also Saleh, "Relation between Jews and Druzes," p. 176.
[99] HA 5B/8B, draft of a letter in Hebrew for translation into Arabic from Abba Ḥushi to al-ʿAaysamī, 27 November 1938.
[100] *Ibid.*, Labīb Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 1 December 1938.

At their meeting, the religious leaders of Ḥāsbayā assigned Sheikh ʿAlī Sjāʿ to write to the Druzes in Jabal ad-Durūz to ask for their assistance against those who had desecrated the holy books and beaten Druze women. The letter was sent to thirteen temporal and religious *sheikhs*, among them Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. Meanwhile, Labīb arrived on 1 December in the village of Imtān, where al-ʿAaysamī lived. Through the latter Labīb met with the most important chiefs of the Jabal and told them of the "danger which the Druze in Palestine [were] facing." Sulṭān al-Aṭrash and the other Druze chiefs promised to respond firmly, expressing their disappointment with the behavior of the Palestinians.[101] Meanwhile, an anonymous letter from "the Druzes of the Carmel" addressed to Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, Amīr Majīd Arslān, and Asʿad Kanj Abū Ṣāliḥ appealed to them to

> rescue, rescue us from the danger which threatens us. Rescue three thousand souls, the Druze inhabitants of Dālia and ʿIsfiya on the Carmel .... We, the Druzes are the pure Arabs.... Rescue us from this disaster which the Palestinian leadership has in store for us.[102]

On 5 December al-ʿAaysamī wrote to Ḥushi that he had already met the emissary (called Iliās) and told him what he had done in order

> to incite the feeling of the populace.... Now we can continue with our activity. A wide range of possibilities has been opened to us by which we could arouse the people and convince those who previously had opposed our actions.[103]

Abū Durra's attacks on ʿIsfiya and the collective punishment he had applied there led its inhabitants to alert the British army, which subsequently ambushed the rebels on the morning of 27 November, killing and injuring a large number of rebels while Abū Durra himself was wounded.[104] The rebels, as well as the Muslims of the area, thereupon took vengeance on the Druzes of the Haifa area. Druze peasants were attacked in their fields at the end of November and the beginning of December. Five Druze were killed and many injured.[105] These attacks coincided with the efforts of Labīb Abū

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[101] *Ibid.*, Report on the activities of the emissary from ʿIsfiya [village], Sheikh Labīb Abū Rukun, 16 December 1938.
[102] CZA S25/6638, copy of a letter sent to Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, Majīd Arslān, and Asʿad Kanj by the Druzes of the Carmel, 4 December 1938.
[103] HA 5B/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 5 December 1938.
[104] Saleh, "Relations between Jews and Druzes," p. 177.
[105] Faraj, pp. 85-86.

Rukun and al-ʿAaysamī to mobilize Druze support in the Jabal and in Lebanon for the Druze in Palestine.

On 4 January 1939 one of the Druze religious leaders, Sheikh Ḥasan Khnayfis of Shafāʿamr, was killed upon leaving the Jewish village of Yavnael.[106] Israeli Archives do not point to any contact that the *sheikh* might have had with the Zionist institutions. His death inflamed the Druze communities in Lebanon and Syria as well as Palestine. Sheikh Ḥasan Khnayfis's son, Ṣāliḥ, was studying at the time in the *khalwāt al-bayāḍa*, the Druze theological school, as an initiate in order to widen his knowledge of the Druze faith. Upon his father's murder Ṣaliḥ abandoned his rank as *ʿāqil* and returned to his village to avenge his blood.

The death of Ḥasan Khnayfis and the attacks against the Druzes in Haifa area as well as in ʿIsfiya and Dāliat al-Karmel assisted al-ʿAaysamī and the emissaries to Jabal ad-Durūz in their task of stirring up the Druze leaders and in particular, Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. One month before Ḥasan Khnayfis' death, Abba Ḥushi in one of his reports had alluded to the consequences of the Palestinians' acts:

> The desecration of the religious articles [of the Druzes] and the massacre committed in the village [ʿIsfiya] have lit the flame of vengeance in the hearts of the Druzes and if someone could exploit this, it would lead to important results.[107]

The attacks by the Palestinian rebels against the Druze villages bore the clear characteristics of sectarian antagonism. In Jabal ad-Durūz, the Druze leaders, among them Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, who had received his information from al-ʿAaysamī and the Druze emissaries, expressed great anger at what was happening in Palestine. Labīb Abū Rukun quoted Sulṭān as saying, "This people is ungrateful, we have fought for them several times but it [our help] did not bear fruit."[108]

The events in ʿIsfiya, Dāliat al-Karmel, and Shafāʾamr led soon enough to the "important results" to which Abba Ḥushi had referred. A group of Druzes from ʿIsfiya was organized by Labīb Abū Rukun and with the help of Abba Ḥushi as their intermediary

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[106] HA 5B/8B, copy of a letter sent by Labīb Abū Rukun to Zayd al-Aṭrash, 9 January 1939.

[107] *Ibid.*, 7/8B, report of Abba Ḥushi, 7 December 1938.

[108] *Ibid.*, 5B/8B, "Report on the activities of the emissary from ʿIsfiya, Sheikh Labīb," 16 December 1838.

they obtained arms from the British army. The group coordinated their security arrangements with the Jewish guards of Yagūr, a kibbutz neighbor of ʿIsfiya. Ḥushi succeeded in deepening cooperative ties with Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis.[109]

Perhaps the most important result of these events related to Jabal ad-Durūz. Abba Ḥushi had already visited the region in August 1938 several months after the resumption of the Palestine revolt. During this visit, al-ʿAaysamī arranged a meeting between Ḥushi and Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, the background to which was the information that, despite the fact that al-ʿAaysamī, Zāyd, Labīb, and Ḥasan Abū Rukun all had made great efforts to neutralize the Druze of Syria and Lebanon, apparently many Druzes were still joining the revolt. In his report on this visit, Ḥushi observed that Sulṭān al-Aṭrash knew that "the Jews want a true peace with the Arabs in Palestine and good relations with the neighboring Arab countries."[110] Ḥushi, however, does not refer to the true context of the visit or to the reasons for Sulṭān's "statements." These remarks, it should be noted, were written down by Ḥushi himself; as already mentioned, the Israeli Archives contain not one single document from the hand of Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. Ḥushi's visit also sought to deal with rumors that Sulṭān was encouraging the Druzes of Palestine to join the rebels,[111] in addition to the information about the intention of Asʿad Kanj and Shakīb Wahhāb, two close friends of Sulṭān, to lead a group of Druzes and join the rebels in Palestine.[112] The Zionists were still hoping, however, that an agreement could be reached with Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. This was also the period when the British were attempting to resolve the Palestinian-Zionist conflict through partition proposals, and Sulṭān politely rejected the suggested agreement with the Zionists by referring to these British proposals. According to Ḥushi, Sulṭān expressed his hope that in

> the future months the British government will finally adopt the decision on the partition of the country and the establishment of a Jewish State. Then he and his people would be ready to conclude a friendly agreement with the Jewish State.[113]

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[109] *Ibid.*, 3A/8B, Report of Abba Ḥushi on the activities from January to September 1939, 9 September 1939.
[110] *Ibid.*, Abba Ḥushi's report on the visit to Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, 4 August 1938.
[111] *Ibid.*, Report of 8 July 1938.
[112] *Ibid.*, al-ʿAasamī to Abba Ḥushi, 17 July 1938.
[113] *Ibid.*, 5A/8B, Abba Ḥushi to Rosenberg, 4 August 1938.

In April 1939 the time seemed ripe for another visit to Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. The events of ʿIsfiya, Dāliat al-Karmel and Shafāʿamr had by now aroused the entire Druze community, and Sulṭān al-Aṭrash had become convinced that the Druzes in Palestine were indeed in great danger. From the beginning of 1939, the correspondence between al-ʿAaysamī and Ḥushi no longer mentioned the idea of a Druze-Jewish agreement. Palestinian attacks on the Druzes in Palestine put paid to any thought of the Druzes joining the rebels. Under such circumstances, the plan calling for the Druzes to move en masse to Jabal ad-Durūz by now had become acceptable both to the Druzes of Palestine, who were suffering from the attacks, and to the Druzes of the Jabal, who were willing to save their brethren from the "imminent danger." The correspondence between al-ʿAaysamī and the Zionists reveals that the transfer plan was again raised between December 1938 and March 1939. Al-ʿAaysamī's letters simply referred to it as the "plan." His first mention of it came in a letter dated 3 March when he asked "if there is any change regarding this plan."[114] Alfiyya replied

> the information on your proposals to transfer your brethren from ours [our country] to yours [your country] has been received here with favor.... In regard to the visit [by Abba Ḥushi] to the great brother [Sulṭān] and the discussion with him on the common plan, you have to pave the way for such a visit, which should be as soon as possible and in no more than one month as we have both said.[115]

On 17 April al-ʿAaysamī wrote that he had informed Sulṭān about the visit. Sulṭān "asked me if I know the purpose of the visit. I answered him that I do not know."[116] Al-ʿAaysamī confessed, however, that Sulṭān had not given his immediate acceptance for this visit to take place. "He told me I should inform you later."[117] On 22 April al-ʿAaysamī wrote that Sulṭān was going to fix the time of the visit for the 27th or 28th.[118]

Abba Ḥushi reported on the visit to Sulṭān al-Aṭrash, which took place on 27 April, on 30 April. After describing the hospitality of the Druzes, Ḥushi described how al-ʿAaysamī opened the discussion by

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[114] *Ibid.*, 5B/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Alfiyya, 3 March 1939.
[115] *Ibid.*, Alfiyya to al-ʿAaysamī, March 9, 1939.
[116] *Ibid.*, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 17 April 1939.
[117] *Ibid.*
[118] *Ibid.*, al-ʿAaysamī to Abū Khālid (Abba Ḥushi), 22 April 1939; al-ʿAaysamī was accustomed to calling Abba Ḥushi by different names.

stressing the desires of the Jews to establish good relations with all the peoples of the Middle East, especially with the Druzes. Then al-ʿAaysamī brought up the question of the Druze in Palestine, who

> [had] greatly suffered ... and many of them came here to protest against the great pain. Many of them are, today, thinking of leaving Palestine and coming to Syria. But the question is how we see this matter and how we can help them.[119]

Addressing himself to Sulṭān, al-ʿAaysamī continued:

> All sides will benefit, the Druze people, who will be gathered in this place; the Jewish people, who will buy their lands; and our country [the Jabal], where they will introduce the capital by which we will be able to save them and ourselves from ruin and poverty. Here there are many ruins of abandoned villages and a vast amount of land that they could occupy.... In such a case, we will no longer have to be preoccupied with their problems.[120]

Alfiyya, who had accompanied Ḥushi, then surveyed Jewish assistance to the Druzes in Palestine. According to Ḥushi's report, Sulṭān responded that

> there are no differences of opinion in regard to the friendship and relations between us. From when we were in exile until now, we have ordered our people in Palestine, Lebanon, and al-Jabal not to intervene in what is happening in your country. In this conflict we do not take sides and we pray ... that a solution will be found for both sides. Our view has not changed. As for the second issue, if our brothers [the Druze of Palestine] have the desire to come here voluntarily and see that it would be to their benefit, we have no objection. But I think there are many obstacles; money, housing, acclimatization, etc. All this should be studied and a plan should be prepared so that our brothers, the Muslims, will not see us as traitors.[121]

In order to carry out this plan, Abba Ḥushi asked al-ʿAaysamī to prepare a list of the deserted villages that could be occupied by the Druzes of Palestine.[122]

Only three days after Abba Ḥushi's report on his visit to the Jabal, Eliahu Epstein prepared a long series of "Notes for a Plan

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119 *Ibid.*, 2/8B, Report on the visit to Sulṭān Pasha al-Aṭrash, 30 April 1939.
120 *Ibid.*
121 *Ibid.*
122 *Ibid.*

concerning the Transfer of the Druzes of the Land of Israel [Palestine] to Jabal-Druze." The information on the Druzes in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, the details on their demography, history, the lands they owned, etc., that he provided in this report suggest that Epstein had already spent some time on its preparation prior to Ḥushi's trip. Epstein referred to the obstacles that had to be overcome for the plan to work and listed four factors exercising their influence: the Druzes in Palestine, the Druze in the Jabal, the British, and the French. Analyzing both the negative and positive elements in regard to all four of these, Epstein advised that the plan be approached with the highest secrecy. Concerning the Druzes of Palestine, he counselled acting among the chiefs; as for the Druzes of the Jabal, he suggested encouragement of the "separatist aspiration of the Druzes in the Jabal." Because the Druzes there were poor peasants and depended on the merchants of Damascus, the transfer plan should "free them from this dependency."[123] Six days after the Epstein report was distributed, Ḥushi informed Ḥaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, that "Sulṭān and his people look with favor on the matter of the acquisition of the lands and properties of the Druzes in Palestine by the Jews.... The acts should be made in secret until the achievement of the plan."[124]

As he had done before Ḥushi's visit to the Jabal, al-ʿAaysamī again played the key role in preparing the Druzes for the transfer plan. Until the end of 1939, al-ʿAaysamī's correspondence with Abba Ḥushi and his secretary Salīm Alfiyya concentrated on two issues: the internal situation of Syria and of the Jabal, particularly the interrelationship of Damascus and Jabal ad-Durūz; and his contacts with Druzes from Palestine who were to emigrate to the Jabal. Although al-ʿAaysamī had reported in January that the national party in the Jabal, which wanted full integration with Damascus, represented the majority of the Druzes,[125] he welcomed the French proposals in July to grant the Jabal more independence vis-à-vis the central government in Damascus. This "would aid us to achieve the

[123] CZA S25/5323, E. Epstein, "Notes for a Plan of the Transfer of the Druzes of the Land of Israel [Palestine] to Jabal-Druze, 3 May 1939" (= "Epstein Report," see n. 4 above).

[124] HA 2/8B, Abba Ḥushi to Ḥaim Weizmann, 9 May 1939.

[125] *Ibid.*, 5B/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 1 January 1939. According to al-ʿAaysamī, the national party represented sixty percent of the people.

whole plan [of the transfer]."[126] To preserve Sulṭān al-Aṭrash's acceptance, al-ʿAaysamī continued to use the original argument that the intention was to save the Druzes of Palestine. This line also allowed him to gather support for the plan.[127]

The transfer plan met with favorable response among both the Druzes of Palestine and the Druzes of the Jabal because of the sectarian antagonism that prevailed during 1939 between the Palestinian rebels and the Druzes. This antagonism had provoked severe clashes between the Druzes of Shafāʿamr and groups of Palestinian rebels, the most serious incidents of which occurred during the summer of 1939 and ended in eleven Druze deaths.[128] During the summer the Druzes turned to their coreligionists both in the Jabal and in Lebanon for aid. A delegation of Druzes from Shafāʿamr was sent to this end to meet with Majīd Arslān and Sulṭān al-Aṭrash.[129] Until Sheikh Ḥasan Khnayfis' death, the Druzes of Shafāʿamr had maintained no relations with the Zionist representatives; however, Abba Ḥushi's assistance to Sheikh Ṣāliḥ that summer widened the Druze-Jewish cooperation.[130]

It were the events of the summer of 1939 which led some Druzes from Shafāʿamr, ʿIsfiya, Dāliat al-Karmel, and Mghār to respond positively to al-ʿAaysamī's letters concerning the transfer plan. At one point, seventy-seven family heads from Shafāʿamr announced that they had already arranged the sale of their properties and were preparing to emigrate to the Jabal.[131] After a Druze delegation from the same village came to the Jabal in September, al-ʿAaysamī reported that its members had declared their intention to emigrate. Druzes from Dāliat al-Karmel also visited the Jabal to arrange for their emigration.[132] Between January and September 1939 Alfiyya

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[126] *Ibid.*, 2/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 3 July 1939.

[127] CZA S25/6638, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi. 1 July, 5 July and 13 August 1939; HA 2/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Alfiyya, 13 July, 22 August 1939.

[128] The Druze Archives, University of Haifa, copy of a letter from Majīd Arslān to the British consul in Beirut, 31 August 1939.

[129] On the Druze appeals for assistance, see HA 5B/8B, Labīb Abū Rukun to Zayd al-Aṭrash and Ṣāliḥ Ṭarabe to Abba Ḥushi, 9 September 1939.

[130] *Ibid.*, Druze *sheikhs* from Shafāʿamr [Ḥusayn Nakad, Aḥmad Abū ʿUbayd, ʿAbdalla Ḥassūn, Muḥammad as-Salmān, and Ṣaliḥ Khnayfis] to Abba Ḥushi, 4 September 1939.

[131] *Ibid.*, 2/8B, al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, 3, 5, 13 July 1939; Qāsim as-Salmān to al-ʿAaysamī, 22 August 1939; seventy-seven signatures from Shafaʿamr to al-ʿAaysamī, 27 August 1939.

[132] *Ibid.*, al-ʿAaysamī to Alfiyya, 9 September 1939.

paid seven visits to Syria, with the transfer plan as one of the main issues on his agenda.[133]

At this point, the Druze *sheikhs* in Palestine and Muslim leaders in the Galilee began seeking a reconciliation between the Druzes of Shafāʿamr and the Muslims of the area. Abba Ḥushi had by then succeeded in establishing good relations with Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis. On 24 September Ḥushi went to Shafāʿamr, where he was received by the pro-Jewish faction among the Druzes, notably Khnayfis and Labīb Abū Rukun. In a long speech, Abū Rukun referred to the dangerous situation faced by the Druzes, and to aid given by the Zionists to the Druze community against the attacks of "those who use the murder of innocent people as an instrument for their interests."[134]

The British authorities meanwhile had captured several of those who attacked the Druzes in Shafāʿamr and in early October had sentenced six of them to death. The date of the execution was set for 31 October 1939. In order to avoid further clashes and retaliation that were likely to follow upon the execution, a committee of reconciliation was formed from among Christian, Muslim, and Druze notables. The objective was to reach a *ṣulḥa* (peaceful solution) according to custom in the case of feuds. Such a *ṣulḥa* also meant that the condemned prisoners would be released after paying a *diyya* (blood money).

On 30 October the committee members—Gregorios Ḥajjār, the bishop of Haifa, Sheikh Asʿad Qaddūra, the *muftī* of Ṣafad, and Sheikh Amīn Ṭarīf, the spiritual chief of the Druzes—had settled their differences and reached a solution. In order to convince the British authorities to release the prisoners, the committee decided to send telegrams, three from the Druzes of Shafāʿamr and two from the whole Druze community.[135] A short time before accepting a final decision, Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis and Saʿīd Muʿadī, a Druze leader from Yarkā, met with Ḥushi to ask his counsel. Ḥushi's reply was:

> If they [the committee members] are asking you to retract all your demands and to grant the murderers full pardon—this should not be done. Thus my advice to you is to telegraph this text to the head of the police:

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[133] *Ibid.*, Report on the activities of the secretary of the Eretz Israel Workers' Union, September 1939.

[134] *Ibid.*, 5B/8B, Speech of Labīb Abū Rukun at the meeting of 9 September 1939.

[135] *Ibid.*, for three of the texts of these telegrams, 30 October 1939.

"We request you to substitute the death sentence with life in jail for the six men...."[136]

Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis, however, could not at this late hour completely change the resolution of the committee, and instead of sending five telegrams with five different texts the committee agreed to send one telegram, which demanded the "pardon for the six condemned men ... in order to prepare the way for reconciliation between the Druzes and the Muslims in Shafāʿamr."[137]

The British delayed the execution in order to give the committee more time to complete its task and bring the parties to the formal *ṣulḥa* ceremony. But a few days later information reached the Druzes that two Muslim bands had already been formed for the purpose of attacking the Druzes of Shafāʿamr. It seems that this piece of intelligence was provided by Salīm Alfiyya and Abba Ḥushi.[138] It effectively prevented the committee from continuing with the *ṣulḥa*, and there loomed an immediate resumption of hostilities.

The situation in Shafāʿamr also much concerned the British. At the end of October, a high British official expressed his dissatisfaction at Abba Ḥushi's relations with Labīb Abū Rukun and Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis. The British official learned that Abū Rukun was in fact working for a salary for Abba Ḥushi.[139] He also pointed out to his superiors that there existed a connection between Ḥushi's activity among the Druzes during this period of the *ṣulḥa* negotiations and the acquisition of Druze lands through the transfer of Druzes from Palestine.[140]

Coordinating their actions with the British and French Mandatory authorities, the Druzes of the Jabal had by that time established a special delegation that was to mediate between the Druzes and the Muslims of Shafāʿamr. On 2 November the French high commissioner, knowing that Abba Ḥushi had hastened to send Salīm Alfiyya to Jabal ad-Durūz before the departure of the Druze delegation, demanded that the Druze chiefs list the names of the delegates who would go to Palestine. Alfiyya, in his report of 17 December 1939,

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[136] *Ibid.*, Report of Alfiyya on the meeting between Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis and Abba Ḥushi, 31 October 1939.
[137] Cited in Faraj, p. 97.
[138] HA 1/8B, Alfiyya to Abba Ḥushi, 20 November 1939.
[139] *Ibid.*, 5B/8B, Labīb Abū Rukun to Abba Ḥushi, 11 November 1939.
[140] *Ibid.*, Alfiyya to Ṣaliḥ Khnayfis, 6 November 1939.

revealed the purpose of his visit between 11 to 15 December and the connection between Shafāʿamr and the transfer plan:

> After the outbreak of the war ... and the lack of visible relations with Syria, suspicion has entered the hearts of our friends in Jabal ad-Durūz that our determination has weakened and we no more wished or that we feared to continue our plan of transferring the Druzes from Palestine to the Jabal. In fact, what happened to the Druzes in Palestine—the affair of the Druzes and the Muslims in Shafāʿamr—was a suitable opportunity for the beginning of action. But unable to deal with the Druzes by force of arms, the Muslims attempted to defeat them by a peace through the influence of their leaders in the Jabal. For this purpose, a delegation of leaders from the Jabal was elected to come into Palestine.... In Damascus I met our friend Yūsuf al-ʿAaysamī, who reported that (1) Sulṭān Pasha and other leaders are pressing him to know our position in this whole affair, including the question of the delegation; (2) letters had been sent to Sulṭān from ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Ḥalabī and Akram ʿUbayd asking him to send to the high commissioner in Palestine, through the French high commissioner, a telegram demanding him not to allow the Druzes of Shafāʿamr to sell their lands.... Our reply [to al-ʿAaysamī] was to delay and, if possible, to cancel the delegation.[141]

Alfiyya, however, failed in this mission. The Druze delegation arrived on 31 December 1939 and succeeded in working out a reconciliation between the two communities by 14 January 1940. Al-ʿAaysamī continued to write to Abba Ḥushi and Alfiyya until the end of 1940. But neither the transfer plan nor other political issues now formed the subject of those letters. What remained of al-ʿAaysamī's relations with Abba Ḥushi was a small shop in Damascus on the financial difficulties of which he now reported, asking for monies that previously had arrived without delay.[142]

From 1940 until 1948 the Druze community in Palestine returned to its position of neutrality and to its traditional particularism. The experience of the 1930s, however, further rooted the Druze indifference to the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. Apart from those who cooperated with the Jews during the upheavals of the 1930s, the majority of the Druze leadership in Palestine continued to act cautiously in its relations with both the Jews and the Palestinians. Out of concern for their own interests most of the Druze leaders con-

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[141] *Ibid.*, Report of Alfiyya on his visit to Syria during the period of 11 to 15 December, 17 December 1939.

[142] *Ibid.*, letters of al-ʿAaysamī to Abba Ḥushi, from January to December 1940.

tinued to manifest their loyalty to the British authorities. This policy of the Druze leadership found its explicit expression in a letter that was sent to the British high commissioner in March 1940, in response to British authorities who had criticized some Druze leaders for the relations they maintained with Abba Ḥushi.[143]

In 1947, when the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended the partition of Palestine, the Druze community again kept silent, and neutral. In May 1948, when war erupted in Palestine between the Jews and Arabs, the Druzes again preferred to take a waiting attitude. Even those who sympathized with the Zionist movement took a similar position.[144] Except for some: Druze friends of Abba Ḥushi began operating among their brethren and as a result of their activities many Druze soldiers from Syria decided to abandon the Palestinian camp. The victory of the Jews in the 1948-1949 war was also a victory for those activists, who thereafter quickly ascended to the new leadership of the Druze community. Indeed, during the 1950s, Sheikh Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis and Sheikh Labīb Abū Rukun served as members of the Knesset of the newly established State of Israel.

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[143] SA A/540-Y/82/33, letter from the three religious *sheikhs* who represented the Druze community, Saʿīd Muʿadī, Salmān Khayr and Amīn Ṭarīf, to the high commissioner, 9 March 1940.

[144] CZA, 525-6638, Report of Lavi on his meeting with Ṣāliḥ Khnayfis, 23 January 1948.

PART FIVE
CONCLUSION—THE PRESENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CONCLUSION—THE PRESENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

During the Ottoman era the history of the Druze community evolved within a framework that allowed it to preserve its traditional characteristics as a close-knit religious community. Individuals and groups of families were bound together by strong ties of religious identity. The ethno-religious community formed the main unit from which the community's members derived their solidarity. The Ottoman economic, political, and administrative structures, based mainly on a subsistence economy, and the prevailing decentralization policy particularly in the semi-autonomous peripheral regions prevented an aggregation of several communities forming one linguistic ethnic group. The nationalistic notion of a nation based on linguistic identity, introduced into the Middle East only at the end of the 19th century, was not carried beyond small groups of urban elites and intellectuals, and never succeeded in undermining the traditional framework in which ethno-religious identity and communality were rooted.

Though during the Mandate years the Druzes continued to constitute an ethno-religious group and, indeed, to draw on their Ottoman legacy, the new territorial divisions, the emergence of various nationalist movements, and the over-all socio-economic developments were sowing the seeds of change that reshaped the traditional Druze particularism. In the course of this period, the separate socio-economic and political developments that overtook Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine placed the Druzes in each of these countries in a different situation, which found its expression in the attitudes that each community developed toward the Mandatory state in which it lived and toward the events that occurred in the region. Thus, while in Palestine the Jewish-Arab/Zionist-Palestinian conflict led to a strengthening of particularism among the Druzes, in Syria and Lebanon, on the contrary, a process of association between Druze particularism and Arab nationalism set in. Although at times—at the instigation and with the encouragement of the French—one finds particularism translated into separatist tendencies, the process of association was the more general one and expressed itself on two levels: first, a convergence of interests in the common struggle

against the French; and second, the adoption of a shared nationalist ideology, which would aggregate the various religious communities into a single national unity.

In Syria, what began as the Druze revolt of 1925 was soon transformed into a Syrian revolt, with Druze particularism allied to the national movement. Although Ḥawrān, the Druze Mountain in Syria, remained separate from the Syrian state until 1936, the revolt clearly induced and deepened a process of association. Following the revolt, Druze leaders and intellectuals began to adopt a nationalist ideology and launched a campaign against the Druze separatists who wanted to preserve the traditional face of their communal particularism. The adoption of a nationalist ideology, however, did not lead, as one might have expected, to assimilation, but instead to a new form of particularism: The community was maintained, though now conceived as a sub-unit of the Syrian people and the Arab nation. This neo-particularism made it possible for communal leaders who were in favor of nationalism to uphold their traditional role as representatives of the community and as such exercise influence in external affairs. In their acceptance to deal with the Druze community through these representatives, the nationalist leaders of Syria gave de facto recognition to such neo-particularism. Thus nationhood functioned as an aggregating but not as an assimilating force.

Druze leaders and intellectuals in Syria at the time were actually following the example of their Lebanese brethren, who had adopted this form of nationalism already before the Druze revolt of 1925. Although the community's political and military force had shifted from Mt. Lebanon to Ḥawrān as far back as 1861, the leaders and intellectuals of Lebanon remained in the forefront where spiritual and religious guidance were concerned, not in the least since they had been successful in devising ways and means of wrestling with the question of their community's external relations. Two operative factors were at play here: First, Mt. Lebanon and Wādī at-Taym were the main centers where the Druze spiritual and religious leadership had been established already in the days of the *daʿwa*, i.e., as early as the 11th century. Second, though since 1861 the Druzes of Lebanon had undergone a downward shift in their political and economic power and the Christians had gained ascendancy, the Druzes nevertheless benefited from the process of modernization that was informing Mt. Lebanon and Beirut. Exposed to modern, i.e. Western, education, the traditional Druze chiefs and a new cadre of

intellectuals in Lebanon fostered adequate models for the old communal particularism to deal with the outside world.

The first generation of these educated leaders started their social and political careers at the turn of the 20th century, when the emerging Arab nationalism and Islamic reformism became for them the "virtues" by which they, as also the Christian and Muslim intellectuals, hoped to meet the Western challenge and to offer a means of social and political progress. Several variants of nationalism and Islamism were formulated by Egyptian and Syrian-Lebanese intellectuals; while Christian Arabs predominantly adopted secular nationalism, Muslim Arabs either linked nationalism with Islam or looked upon "true Islam" as the only way for Muslims to enjoy progress.

Taking their cue from the time-honored Ottoman recognition of the Druze community as a Muslim sect, this first educated generation of Druzes combined nationalism with an Islam that would accept and unite all the various Muslim sects. The most prominent Druze leader representing and actively promulgating such an attitude was Amīr Shakīb Arslān (1860-1946), who belonged to one of the noblest Druze families of Lebanon. Arslān established a connection between the revival of the Muslim *umma* and the Arab *nation*. While he continued to play an important role in the local politics of Ottoman Syria and Lebanon until 1918, Arslān also took part in the political and intellectual activities of the most important Muslim reformists and Arab nationalists. This group, which also included Rashīd Riḍa, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maghribī and Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, was concerned with reviving the Muslims and Arabs under the Islamic state of the Ottomans. Up until 1918, Arslān succeeded in reconciling his reformist Islamic and Arab nationalist ideas with his political loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. From 1913 to 1918, in fact, he served as a deputy in the Ottoman parliament. Between 1892 and 1918, when successive Druze revolts against the Ottomans took place in Ḥawrān, this made Shakīb Arslān the right figure to mediate between the state and his community.

Although from 1918 until 1946 Shakīb Arslān mainly lived in Europe, first as an exile and later voluntarily, his manifold activities—as a representative of the Arab cause at the League of Nations, as a member of the Syro-Palestinian Congress held at Geneva in 1921, as a negotiator on behalf of the Syrians in their dealing with the Great Powers, and also as a journalist and publisher of the periodical *La Nation Arabe*—were imbued by a blend of

Islamism and Arabism which exerted a strong impact on Druze intellectuals and leaders. His writings on the Arabic racial origins of the Druzes and the Islamic characteristics of the Druze sect (*madhhab*) became the fundamental source for almost every Syro-Lebanese Druze who wrote on the subject.

Inevitably, the dual nature of Shakīb Arslān's guidance introduced two main streams among Druze intellectuals. The first of these, represented by a minority only of educated Druzes in the Mandate period, exactly followed Arslān's coupling of Arabism and Islamism, in a process that led straight to assimilation. The most notable advocate of this position was ʿAjāj Nuwayhid (1896-1982), whose political career was spent in Mandatory Palestine. Followers of the second stream, while using Arslān's arguments concerning the Arabism of the Druzes, in their claim that they were part of Islam stressed the special tenets of the Druze faith. This attitude was shared by the majority of Druze intellectuals—historians, politicians, poets, journalists, lawyers, and judges such as Sulaymān Abū ʿIzzeddīn (1871-1933), Rashīd Ṭliʿ (1876-1926), Amīn Nāṣir ad-Dīn (1884-1937), ʿĀrif an-Nakadī (1887-1975), Aḥmad Taqiy ad-Dīn (1888-1935), and ʿAbdalla Najjār (1896-1976). Najjār was the first to make use in his writings of the Druze Canon in order to prove the Islamism of the Druze faith.

This first generation of educated Druze leaders and intellectuals formulated the historical and religious arguments which made it possible for the Druzes in Lebanon and Syria to adopt Arab nationalism together with Islamization, while holding onto their traditional particularism. In an article on the inevitability of modernization, ʿAfīfa Saʿb, a Druze writer, not only showed the extent of the influence the new nationalists and relating ideologies were having upon the Druzes, she also wrote of the equally strong, parallel tendency among them "to return to Islam, from which the Druze *madhhab* (sect) descended." On the whole, during the Mandate period at least, these influences and tendencies among the Druzes remained restricted to the intellectual leadership.

On the nationalist level, the majority of the Druzes, like that of other minorities, were largely indifferent to nationalism, and continued to attach main importance to their particularist identities. During the years of the Mandate period, nationalism first had to arrive at a clearly acceptable and convincing framework—confusion reigned among several possible forms of nationalism. Whereas some

leaders adopted a purely secular Arab nationalism, others went further and coupled it with Islam. Some failed to make any distinction between patriotism (*waṭaniyya*) and nationalism (*qawmiyya*). Moreover, nationalism, as an ideology relatively new to the Middle East, had to confront multiple loyalties and traditional sentiments. Quastantīn Zuraiq, one of the better-known nationalist ideologists, in his book *Alwaʿy al-Qawmī* (Beirut, 1940; p. 126) indicated the dilemma as follows:

> This national spirit increases its influence daily and gathers new strength and extension. No wonder, then, that there should be attraction and revulsion, union and disjunction between it and religion.... Some of us link their nationality with religion, and others make nationalism and religion radically contradictory.... Between these two extremes there are shades of thinking and varieties of feeling which can be neither limited nor enumerated.

In such a situation, Arab nationalism and its adoption by the Druze intellectuals and leadership did not immediately succeed in shaking the deep particularist roots of the community. National identity did not abolish and could not replace communal identity.

On the religious level, the adoption of Islamism, for some Druze intellectuals, may have been a continuation of the *taqiyya* principle. Through the years of the Mandate period, however, Druze intellectuals formulated new arguments concerning the relationship of the Druze faith and the religion of Islam which did away with the ancient principle. Originally *taqiyya* was the practice of pretending to follow the dominant religion of Islam, the Sunnī doctrine. Not only did the new Druze intellectuals not pretend to follow Sunnī Islam, they now emphasized the Islamic character of the Druze faith as proof that it was an autonomous Islamic *madhhab*. Apart from Shakīb Arslān and a few others, these intellectuals preached not assimilation but co-existence with the other Islamic sects. Tendencies such as these among Druze writers and politicians were instrumental in introducing a process of Islamization among the Druzes. Already in the Mandate period, some Druze intellectuals had become more fully aware of the linkage between Islam in its Sunnī form and Arab nationalism. They preferred secular nationalism clearly separated from religion, or a nationalism that looked upon its Islamic culture as a nationalist culture, without accepting Islam as the religion of a national state. Such tendencies explain the attraction of the Syrian Nationalist Party, which was founded by a Greek

Orthodox Christian, Anṭūn Saʿāda, who advocated Syrian, or other, nationalist movements that adopted non-sectarian and non-religious ideas. The nationalist movements of Syria and Lebanon, however, dealt with politics on two levels: one was everyday politics under the Mandatory regime; the other, the struggle toward the ultimate objective or aspiration: national unity between Syria, Lebanon, and the other Arab countries.

Although the hope for national unity remained the basic idea of all national parties and movements, the independence won by Syria and Lebanon in 1946 faced them with the territorial status quo created during the Mandatory period. Instead of becoming smaller, the gap between political realities and nationalist hopes was maintained and even widened, which presented the Syrian-Lebanese elites, and the Druzes among them, with a *fait acompli*, as a result of which the neo-particularism the first generation of Druze intellectuals had developed began to be reshaped differently in Syria and Lebanon in accordance with the political system and socio-economic condition in each country.

As already mentioned, neo-particularism, as a historical process, never succeeded in undermining the traditional legacy of the Druze society. For example, the factionalism that in Lebanon had traditionally pitted Junblāṭs against Arslāns persisted in spite of the social and political changes that took place during the Mandatory period. A number of educated leaders may have adopted nationalism and used modern means in order to try and achieve political goals, the traditional leaders—the Junblāṭs, the Arslāns, and other leading families—retained their role as intermediaries between the community and Mandatory governmental institutions. This traditional form of leadership survived parallel to the new intellectual leadership and its nationalist ideologies.

The establishment of Greater Lebanon, *le Grand Liban*, in 1920 was based on confessional pluralism, in which each community was allowed to maintain its own identity. The supporters of Greater Lebanon, especially the Maronite leaders, assumed that this new political unity would bring the country's heterogeneous population together into one "nation" and build a "Lebanese identity." However, in reorganizing the various ethno-religious communities as independent units and relying on confessionalism to establish a political system, the system itself could never create more than only a low level of stateness. The territorial state never translated itself into a

national state, and the legitimacy of the state never transcended that of the communities—each community remained an independent entity within the state. The leaders of the communities accepted the political power of the state and its institutions as legitimate as long as the latter continued to recognize the communities' "rights," which the leaders in turn exploited to further their own political careers. This particular Lebanese politico-socio-economic system led to the creation of a dual pattern of politics, mixing modern, i.e. Western, and traditional elements not only among the Druzes but among all Lebanese groups.

The rise of Kamāl Junblāṭ brought a change in the traditional Arslān-Junblāṭ factionalism among the Druzes. While the Arslān faction continued to deal with Lebanese politics through traditional means, Kamal Junblāṭ adopted Western tools. In 1948 he established the Socialist Progressive Party which launched him onto a political career, whereby he became not just a Druze leader representing his own faction but a Lebanese and Arab leader whose support ranged beyond the limits of his community. Although Junblāṭ's political party reflected the aspiration of the Druze minority which called for the abolition of political confessionalism, it was not intended as a "replacement of one sectarian domination by another," as Junblāṭ himself wrote. Employing modern ideology based on a mix of socialism, Western democracy, and Arab nationalism, Junblāṭ formed a synthesis of the ideas of the first generation of Druze intellectuals led by Shakīb Arslān. Through his Progressive Socialist Party, moreover, Junblāṭ became one of the leading figures of the Arab nationalist movement between 1950 and 1975. His philosophy of nationalism and state he expounded in many pamphlets, books, and articles that found a captive audience among most educated Druzes. In Junblāṭ's view the ideological problem over nationality and state in Lebanon was a consequence of the confusion between two Lebanese identities: Christianity and Islam. The divergent attitudes of the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon introduced "a duality in thinking," which prevented Lebanese unity. For Junblāṭ, Lebanon was to be counted as one of the Arab countries—no contradiction existed between loyalty to Lebanon and loyalty to the Arab nation.

Through the Socialist Progressive Party the Druze community restored a great part of the historical role in Lebanese politics that it had lost in 1860. Under Junblāṭ's leadership, this role was rebuilt

from the same elements that had given form to Druze neo-particularism. The correlation between the political and military power of the party and that of the community gained for the Druzes an important position in the nationalist coalition established during the Civil War that erupted in 1975, which actually was out of proportion to the small number of their population. Kamāl Junblāṭ's death in 1977 did not lead to changes in the correlation between the party and the community, as might have been expected. On the contrary, under the leadership of his son, Walīd Junblāṭ, this relationship was even reinforced, especially when the state of continuing civil crisis in Lebanon began to erode the official institutions of the central government. When as a consequence communities and political parties put up alternative administrations within the territorial possessions held by their respective militias, the Druzes were well prepared and succeeded in translating their neo-particularism into de facto autonomy.

The direct political and military intervention of Israel in Lebanon in 1982 disturbed the status quo that had reigned in the country since 1976. The Christian "Lebanese forces," following in the Israeli army's footsteps, penetrated Druze territory and threatened to cause a radical shift in power into what was an autonomous area. Faced with the danger of this new situation, the traditional Druze factionalism disappeared, and through the Party's institutions and militia the whole community was mobilized for the "war of existence," as it was called. Hostilities between the Druzes and the Lebanese forces culminated immediately upon the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Druze areas of Mt. Lebanon. In September 1983 the Druzes were able to restore their de facto autonomy. Radical demographic changes were brought about when almost the entire Christian population of the area was forced to leave as refugees either to Beirut or to other regions in Lebanon. By 1990, it seemed that after nearly a century-and-a-half the Shūf had again become the "Druze Mountain," giving pride of place to the ancient name lost during the period of decline described in Part Two. It is difficult to predict the future of this area and of the Druze community in Lebanon, since a permanent solution to the Lebanese conflict is as yet not within sight as we enter the last decade of this century. The dissolution of the militias in 1991 and the attempt to rebuild the state institutions in the various districts of Lebanon on the basis of the Ṭā'if agreement may, temporarily, suspend the sectarian conflict

but will not be able to completely abolish it as long as the political system remains based on confessionalism.

In independent Syria the situation of the Druzes was different. Here, their neo-particularism came up against the primary concern of the central state for its sovereignty and statehood. With its independence in 1946, Syria took over the inheritance of the Ottoman and French periods of which it preserved communal pluralism. This legacy, however, placed obstacles in the way of the country's national unity. Motivated by both practical reasons and nationalist ideology, the Syrian government sought to attain nationhood by trying to unify the country's various communities. Thus, among the first constitutional-administrative steps it took were the abolition of the communal representation system in the parliament and the administrative incorporation of the Druze and ʿAlawī areas into the central administration of Damascus. By assimilating these areas into the new state the government expected to weaken the communal leadership and the particularist and autonomous tendencies it had inherited and was holding onto from the Mandatory period. Although the Druze elites as of 1925 had undergone a process of integration into the Arab nationalist movement, the neo-particularism that developed during the Mandate period gave a renewed chance to the traditional leadership's ancient role as intermediary between the community and the central government.

Like the Arslāns and Junblāṭs in Lebanon, the Aṭrashs in Syria adopted Arabism without abandoning communal solidarity as a means of ethno-politics. During the Mandatory period, the internal division among the leading Druze families led to political factionalism, which pitted separatists against nationalists. In the very first year of Syria's independence, this factionalism re-emerged in new form. Whereas most of the Aṭrash leaders tried to retain their supremacy by accepting integration with Syria and the "Arab nation" along with their "historical leadership," a coalition of several small and secondary families was established under the name of Shaʿbiyya (popular faction), which strove to deprive the Aṭrashs of their traditional leading role as intermediaries between the community and the state. Apprehensive of autonomous tendencies that might re-emerge under Aṭrash leadership, the Syrian government of 1946-47 employed an old tactic and exploited the internal division between Aṭrashs and the Shaʿbiyya. Abetted by governmental manipulation, this factionalism resulted in bloody feuds in 1947,

which marked the beginning of the decline of the Aṭrash family's role as the paramount family of the Ḥawrān. Only Sulṭan al-Aṭrash succeeded in preserving his primacy as leader of the community by avoiding any involvement in the Druzes' internal dispute. However, between then and his death in 1982, though Sulṭān was still considered the leader of his community, his role in Syrian politics was to be a limited one—Sulṭān contented himself with the popularity and adoration his community so readily bestowed upon him; he did not seek official positions.

While the leading families in Ḥawrān were losing their traditional intermediaries with the official government, Druze involvement in national Syrian politics now took the form of participation in the various *coups d'état* that shook the society from 1949 until 1970. It was only through these revolutions that high-placed Druze army officers played an important role in the political life of the country. Since they afforded the two frameworks in which young educated people among the country's minorities could achieve their aspiration for political careers, Druze and ʿAlawī officers used the army and the Baʿth party as instruments of integration into Syrian politics. Whereas the ʿAlawī officers continued to amass power through the military coups that characterized the 1960s, the Druzes' ascendancy was held up after an aborted coup undertaken in 1966 by a Druze officer, Salīm Ḥāṭūm. From that year on, though the rulers of Syria continued to make obeisance to pan-Arabism as part of their appeal for legitimacy, the increasing emphasis put on ethno-politics reached its high point when ʿAlawī officers succeeded, initially already in 1966 but dominantly in 1970, in taking over the core of the state's power machinery.

Since 1966, after the abortive coup of Ḥāṭūm and the subsequent weakening of their position in the army and the party, Druze officers and politicians have continued to cooperate with the state, though as individuals and not as representatives of their community. Unlike their brethren in Lebanon, the Druzes of Syria had to let go of their neo-particularism through which they at first had attempted to integrate into Syrian politics. Integration into the socio-economic and political life of Syria from now on was to be achieved solely through the institutions of the party and the state agencies, not through communal means. The future of such integration depends on the development of Syrian nationhood and its ability to overcome internal ethnic and religious divisions in order to accomplish the national

integration of the entire population. At present, the main instruments for such integration are the pan-Arab nationalist ideology and the depoliticization of ethnic and sectarian issues.

In contrast to Syria, after 1948 the Druzes in Israel found themselves in a situation that allowed them to maintain their particularism and were even encouraged to adopt a separatist identity vis-à-vis Arab or Palestinian nationalism. Before the establishment of Israel, the Druze minority in Palestine had maintained a policy of neutrality in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. Lacking leading families on the model of Aṭrash and Junblāṭ, and without intellectuals who had adopted and could spread the nationalist notion, the Druze community in Israel continued to deal with outsiders through its traditional particularism, with communal identity transcending any other identity. Thus, e.g., the Palestinian uprising in 1936-1939 failed to recruit the Druze community to the "Palestinian cause"; on the contrary, it even created friction and clashes between Muslims and Druzes.

Although the Druzes within Israel maintained an attitude of indifference toward the conflict, their particularism and the impact of the events of the years 1936-1939 were later made use of by the Israeli authorities to gain the loyalty of the Druzes to the new state. Through the intermediary of several family leaders in the villages of ᶜIsfiyā and Shafāᶜamr, the Israeli government established a Druze minority unit in the Israeli army. The way in which this unit was set up was characteristic of the way non-Jewish minorities were "integrated" into the social and economic life of the Jewish state. The Israelis created an "Arab department" as an intermediate institution between the state and the Arab minorities, whereby the chiefs of the *ḥamūlas* served as the main agents of contact with the Israeli authorities. Although, or perhaps because, the Arab Department was common to all minorities, it was used as an instrument for dividing these groups into separate communities, each of these with its own communal leadership, usually representing the *ḥamūlas*. In the wider context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict the Israeli authorities used these leaders during the 1950s and 1960s in order to depoliticize the Arab communities. Since, however, the minorities unit in the Israeli army consisted almost exclusively of Druzes, the Arabs in Israel were divided into two major, separate, categories, officially called "the Arabs" (Christians and Muslims) and "the Druzes."

Having grown up in a particularist community which insisted on maintaining its communal identity and being aloof to Arab or Palestinian nationalism, some Druze youths were indeed found willing to join the Israeli army, a step which they thought could ameliorate their overall condition in the period of economic hardship that characterized Israel in the 1950s. In 1956 the Israeli Security Service Law—compulsory conscription—was duly extended to include the Druzes. This actually had come about as a result of a secret agreement between the government and some *ḥamūla* leaders to whom army service seemed a suitable way for the achievement of equal civil rights. One year after the law had gone into effect, the Druze community in Israel was officially recognized as an autonomous entity, with its own religious judiciary organs. In 1961 "Druze" was entered as a classification of "nationality" on Israeli identity cards, replacing "Arab." In 1967 the government decided to deal with the Druzes no longer through the Arab Department but directly through the Interior Ministry. Again, in 1976, the Druzes were set apart from the Arab section in the Ministry of Education, and a separate Druze section was established in order, it was officially announced, to preserve and strengthen the community's consciousness of its "tradition and history," as one more step in a process which since 1948 has served to legalize the separation of the Druzes from the Arabs in Israel.

Although this process of legalization did not pass without opposition, especially on the part of Druze intellectuals, the particularist features of the community did much to facilitate these legal steps. The traditional leadership and Israeli government policy combined to prevent the emergence of a new, alternative leadership that might adopt a different attitude toward the internal and external politics of the community and even introduce changes in the "Druze loyalty" toward the state—the encouragement of the particularist and separatist characteristics of the community by means of the depoliticization of intellectuals and organizations Israeli officials deemed to be the most suitable way to prevent such an eventuality. This depoliticization is motivated by a clear apprehension on the part of the Israelis that any political activity of the Druzes going beyond the traditional framework might steer Druze politics closer to the political line of the Arabs. It is this fear on the part of the Israeli authorities which explains their continuing failure to respond to the demands of the Druze community and, since it already carries the burden of equal civil obligations, to extend to it also full equal civil rights.

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